









of Media in the Lives of 









Pamela Martin-Lynch BA Hons 


































I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and 
contains as its main content work which has not previously been 
































It is well documented that young children understand media differently to older 
children and adults, yet despite years of debate surrounding the psycho-social 
impact that media may have on children and youth, very little remains known 
about how they intercede into infants’ and toddlers’ lived experiences.   
We cannot assume that media have no significance in the lives of infants and 
toddlers simply because they may not understand the content. The particularities 
of very young children’s experiences of, engagement with and understanding of 
media cannot be expected to necessarily relate solely, or even primarily, to the 
media content. As an alternative this thesis focuses on the relations between very 
young children and media in terms of their material and corporeal effects and in 
this respect how media interfaces, as part of infants’ and toddlers’ environments 
literally mediate very young children’s possibilities for perception and action 
within 21
st
 century media saturated environments.  
By focusing on children from birth to three years of age and their contingent 
material, physical environments, this thesis presents a chronology of child-
technology relations as mediated relations which is necessary to understand the 
effect of media (conventionally understood) on their lived experience. In adopting 
an interdisciplinary ecological approach which relies on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology (1962), Donald W. Winnicott’s psychoanalysis (1957, 1960) and 
Don Ihde’s post-phenomenology (1995), this thesis revolves around four central 
concepts: embodiment, transitional objects, holding spaces and both James 
Gibson’s (1982) and Donald Norman’s (1990) affordances to offer a complex 
understanding of the significance of media as material objects in the lives of 
infants and toddlers.  
In doing so, it argues that media effect infants and toddlers in ways that are 
specific to the media themselves, the particular time and place in which they 
emerge and are used, and to babies’ and toddlers’ situatedness and capacity to act 
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The rise of baby media over the past decade has been the result of multiple 
factors…Academic research on the impact of such media is just starting to 
accumulate, and the popularization of such research is relatively meagre 
(sic). However,…the question ‘How does media exposure influence 
cognitive development?’ may be the wrong starting point for a debate of the 
role that media exposure plays in cognitive development. A better question 
might be ‘What are the mechanisms through which media interact with 
physical maturation, cognitive constraints, and environment (both physical 
and social) to influence cognitive development?’(Wartella, Richert, and 
Robb 2010, 125) 
Recent years have seen an explosion of media marketed directly at the very 
young (Rideout, Vandewater, and Wartella 2003, 2; Rideout and Hamel 2006, 
Wartella and Robb 2010). Yet, despite a veritable industry in media analysis and 
criticism about the potential impact that this may have on children’s psycho-
social development, there has been surprisingly little research into the impact of 
media on children up to and including the age of three (Anderson and Evans 
2001, 10, Rideout and Hamel 2006, 4, Wartella and Robb 2010, 116).  Rideout et 
al. (2003) claim to know the ‘effects’ media have on older children, yet they 
concede, ‘what we don’t know is what effect media have on the very youngest 
children, who are at such a critical developmental stage’(12). In 2003 Rideout et 
al. were among the first to explicitly consider media use in relation to infants and 
toddlers when they examined what media are available to, and engaged with, by 
children up to the age of six. 
Subsequently, there has been an increased interest in the particularities of the 
effects that media have on very young children. Much of this new research stems 
from paediatrics and psychology, and debates around the video deficit model 
which holds that children do not learn from two dimensional screen images as 
well as they might if they were interacting directly with a person in three 
dimensional space (Richert, Robb, and Smith 2011, Lauricella, Gola, and Calvert 
2011, Hisrich and Blanchard 2009, DeLoache and Chiong 2009, Anderson and 
Hanson 2010, Tomopoulos MD et al. 2010, Mendelsohn et al. 2010). Many 
investigations focus on the impact of television viewing on language and 
cognitive development (DeLoache et al. 2010; Mendelsohn et al. 2010,  
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Zimmerman, Chrstakis, and Meltzoff 2007). As has been the trend in relation to 
research into children and the media, these debates remain embroiled in 
contradictory conclusions with some suggesting that due to video deficit it is 
unlikely that very young children can learn from television (Krcmar 2010) while 
others claim that infants and toddlers under the age of two ‘can learn cognitive, 
logical reasoning skills from a video presentation when the onscreen character is 
socially meaningful to them’ (Lauricella, Gola, and Calvert 2011). Others argue 
that the increased prevalence of technologies in infants and toddlers lives may act 
to scaffold very young children’s learning (Richert, Robb, and Smith 2011). 
Another line of argument suggests that the video deficit effect can be minimised 
with repetition of content (Barr 2010) or parent-child interaction during viewing 
(Mendelsohn et al. 2010). Although in the latter assertion the caveat is added that 
this only applies to educational content (Mendelsohn et al. 2010). 
Nonetheless, next to nothing is known about how the proliferation of mediating 
technologies plays out in the lives of infants and toddlers (Barr 2008, 144). 
Moreover, as Courage and Howe (2010) remind us: 
Readers who are familiar with the long history of research on the impact of 
television on preschool and older children’s behavior and development will 
recognize the recurrence of a number of familiar themes and questions about 
the impact of these media on very young viewers…Although many of these 
questions have not only been asked but also answered with regard to 
preschoolers and older children, they have received renewed attention in 
relation to the issue of infant and toddler television viewing. (Courage and 
Howe 2010, 104) 
This thesis contributes to the emerging field of research surrounding very young 
children and the media. Not, however, by focusing on whether the content or the 
act of engaging with media impacts infants and toddlers cognitive development, 
but rather by concentrating on the ontological and perceptual significance of 
media in the lives of those under three. In doing so, this thesis argues that infants 
and toddlers fundamentally engage with media interfaces simultaneously as 
material and culturally embedded objects, at the level of their embodied being, 
and that such engagement mediates how they may experience themselves and the 
world. Through my analysis of the human-technology relationships which babies 
and toddlers have with the material elements of their environments I argue that 
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the connection which we all have with media begins as one which is primary and 
carnal.   
Before proceeding further, the terms ‘infant’ and ‘toddler’ deserve a few words of 
clarification. ‘Toddler’, as the name suggests, is ‘a person who toddles, especially 
a young child learning to walk’ (Dictionary.com). Donald Woods Winnicott, 
whose work figures prominently in this thesis, suggests that the term ‘infant’ 
comes from the French ‘infans [which means] “not talking” and [hence] it is 
useful to understand infancy in terms of “the phase prior to word presentation and 
the use of symbols”’ (Winnicott 1972, 40). Taking these definitions as a starting 
point, this thesis explores the relations between media and children at an age prior 
to language acquisition and those who are literally finding their feet or finding 
where and how they stand within the world.  
Not only has much of the research done in relation to children and the media 
focused on either pre-school children (those older than three) or older children, 
and unproblematically applied its findings to infants and toddlers or disregarded 
this age group altogether, it has primarily concentrated on ‘high’ technologies 
such as television, computers, the internet, and video, console and computer 
games
1
. Yet, these ‘high’ technologies represent only a small and relatively 
specialized type of technology. Focusing on ‘high’ technologies does not account 
for the socio-equipmental environment of which media is only a part. The term 
‘socio-equipmental environment’ is adapted from Martin Heidegger’s term 
‘equipment whole’, ‘equipment totality’, or ‘equipment structure’ (Heidegger 
1927/1962, 97-98). For Heidegger, objects can only be understood as the type of 
tools or equipment they are in relation to a background of other devices of which 
they are a part. For instance, a modern feeding bottle does not appear devoid of its 
concomitant technologies of teats, sterilising solutions, infant formulas, heating 
                                                          
1
 See for example Hodge and Tripp 1986; (Wilson 2009);(Palmer 1986);(Strassburger, Wilson, 
and Jordan 2009);(Plowman, Stephen, and McPake 2010, Courage and Howe 2010, Valkenburg 
and Vroone 2004, Dawson 2007, Roberts and Howard 2005, Rose 1998, Calvert, Jordan, and 
Cocking 2002, Seiter 1998, Valkenburg 2004, Heim et al. 2007, Turkle 2000, Buckingham and 
Willett 2006, Attewell, Suazo-Garcia, and Battle 2003, Richards and Turner 2001, Palmer and 
Young 2003, de Block and Buckingham 2007, Jenkins 1999, Subrahmanyam et al. 2000, Pange 
and Kontozisis 2001, Becker 2000, Vessey and Lee 2000, Grossman 2000, Spigel 1998, Marsh 
2005a, Pahl 2005, Kapur 1999); (Anderson and Hanson 2010). 
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devices, bottle brushes and so on which help to define them as an assemblage of 
feeding technologies. These technological ensembles are also embedded in a 
wider array of equipment including houses. Stephen Mulhall explains that the 
term ‘equipmental whole’ emphasises that: 
encountering any object as a piece of equipment presuppose[s] an equipment 
totality, i.e. that no individual tool could be encountered as such except 
against the background of an array of other items. (Mulhall 2005, 171) 
However the term also implicates the activities of humans, in the manufacture, 
design, use, marketing and perception of the equipment totality. Hence, I have 
adopted the term socio-equipmental environment to encapsulate the intertwining 
of humans and technologies in action. Adopting this term allows for the 
interconnectedness of an assemblage of technologies and their situatedness for 
very young children’s involvements with them in particular socio-cultural and 
historical contexts.   
Counter to a focus on ‘high’ technology, like post-phenomenologist Don Ihde, I 
take technology to mean more broadly, a material element, or object, which also 
enters into human praxes and so includes the relations that exist ‘between the 
technologies and the humans who use, design, make, or modify the technologies 
in question’(Ihde 1993). While acknowledging the breadth of his definition of 
technology, Ihde notes that it is not as broad as definitions ‘which make 
technology equivalent to any calculative or rational technique’ (47). Ihde’s 
definition which emerges from a phenomenological perspective examines 
experiences, specifically of human-technology relations. Thus, in adopting his 
definition we may access a broader appreciation of technological mediation, and a 
more comprehensive consideration of the socio-equipmental environments that 
very young children come to inhabit. As David Kaplan points out: 
Our lives are filled with technologies. They are everywhere. We live in 
them. We prepare food with them. We wear them as clothes. We read and 
write with them. We work and play with them. We manufacture and 
purchase them [and with them]. Our world is largely a constructed 
environment; our technologies and technological systems form the 
background, context, and medium for our lives. (Kaplan 2009, xiii) 
 
The above quote signals how technologies envelop us as well as reiterating 
Ihde’s definition which permits consideration of the mediating capacity of 
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even basic technologies such as clothing and feeding technologies, or even 
sticks or pieces of fabric as technologies with specific mediating effects 
(Ihde 1990).  Not only does Ihde’s definition enable examination of a 
broader range of technologies but it also recognises, as Peter-Paul Verbeek 
(2009) tells us that ‘by mediating human experiences and actions, 
technologies help shape the quality of our lives’ (Verbeek 2009, 227). 
Technologies, thus, may be understood as media, in the sense that they 
mediate.  In recognition of the mediating capacity of all technologies, 
throughout this thesis, the term ‘mediating technologies’ will be used to 
describe those things which are not generally considered media (things such 
as cots, feeding bottles, playpens and walkers) while the term ‘media’ will 
be used to indicate our traditional understanding (television, computers, or 
mass media) of the term.  Although I speak to the field of children and the 
media (conventionally understood), by considering how a range of 
technologies enter into our childrearing practices, I will argue that the 
mediating characteristics of objects determine how any material object, or 
mediating technology, enters into  infants’ and toddlers’ experiences of the 
world, configuring very young children’s being-in-the-world and being-
with-others.  
As well as focusing on ‘high’ technology or mass media much of the literature in 
the broad field of children and the media primarily attends to issues of media 
content, considering the potential impact or otherwise that media messages have 
on developing children via language or cognition, as can be seen in the quote at 
the beginning of this introduction
2
.  Based on the assumption that very young 
children are pre-linguistic and pre-cognitive, such an approach tends to leave the 
significance of the materiality of mediating technologies in relation to infants’ and 
toddlers’ lived experiences within their socio-equipmental environment 
unexamined. For instance, a highchair may hold an infant or toddler, thus 
mediating their capacity to move from place to place, constraining and enabling 
                                                          
2
 See for example (Hodge and Tripp 1986); (Strassburger, Wilson, and Jordan 2009); (Caruso 
1999, Buckingham 1993a, Smith 2005, Collins 1979, University of Western Sydney and 
Australian Broadcasting Authority 2000, Soukup 2006, Jordan 2001, Palmer and Young 2003, 
Anderson and Hanson 2010, Jenkins 1999, Roberts et al. 2004, Kinder 1999, Dawson 2007). 
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certain orientations, postures and gestures, yet a highchair rarely enters into 
discussions of children and the media. Moreover, if we introduce a television, a 
bottle or a toy, the experience of being in a highchair takes on a new complexion 
and complexity. Nevertheless this complexity is not generally considered in 
debates surrounding children and the media.  
As I will argue, from a phenomenological perspective, the ways in which material 
objects enter into our experiences of the world, are fundamental to all of our 
dealings with mediating technologies and media, allowing us, therefore, to take 
account of technologies which are traditionally left out of the gamut of ‘media’, 
and hence media studies. To isolate the content of the aforementioned ‘high’ 
technologies, or mass media, overlooks the ways in which media and mediating 
technologies are embedded in socio-equipmental environments and the 
relationship that infants have with the world and its components: a relationship 
which predates any comprehensive cognitive and linguistic understanding very 
young children may subsequently gain of media content.  
In order to facilitate this type of analysis I will rely on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of embodiment, with particular emphasis on the concepts of 
being-in-the-world, the corporeal schema and incorporation (1962). This will be 
supplemented by Ihde’s post-phenomenology of human-technology relations 
(1979) and how they mediate our lived experiences of and within-the-world.  
D.W. Winnicott’s psychoanalysis, especially his account of transitional objects 
(1980), the facilitating environment and infant development (1972) will also be 
used to enhance this theoretical approach.  In addition, both James Gibson’s 
(1982) and Don Norman’s (1990) notions of affordance will be explored to take 
account of the specificity of very young children’s embodiment in relation to 
mediating technologies. Finally, the study of material culture will enhance our 
understanding of the ways in which child-rearing artefacts are culturally inflected 
(Tilley 2006). This thesis, therefore, suggests an alternative approach to content-
based analytical frameworks and asserts that media do affect even very young 
children, at the level of their lived, corporeal experiences in and of the world. 
While not completely disregarding media content it will only be considered as it  
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relates to a particular medium and its mediating possibilities, since as Marshall 
McLuhan so aptly put it, ‘the medium is the message’(McLuhan 1964).  
Before elaborating on the methodology this introduction will briefly examine 
some of the key themes in the debates which have emanated from the broad field 
of children and the media, and suggest that while volumes have been written with 
insights of varying significance, the approaches adopted are inadequate to an in-
depth analysis of the potential impacts that media and mediating technologies 
may have on very young children. An alternate methodological perspective which 
enables us to consider the unique human-technology relations specific to very 
young children will be prefaced and then elaborated throughout this thesis. Prior 
to concluding I will offer an overview of the upcoming chapters.  
Discourses Surrounding Children and the Media 
It is worthwhile examining the debates surrounding children and the media as a 
means of identifying the potential and pitfalls in the various discourses that 
surround this contentious field. As David Buckingham, one of the most prolific 
writers on children and the media, points out, debates surrounding media forms 
and content date back to the time of Plato (Buckingham 1993b, 4). Throughout 
these ongoing arguments, both in academia and popular cultural discourses, the 
underlying recurrent theme has been a concern about the effect they have on 
‘other’ people ‘who are seen to be too immature or simply too feeble-minded to 
resist the negative influence of the media’, namely children (Buckingham 1993a, 
4). Toby Miller also tells us that in the early twentieth century academia initiated 
‘decades of obsessive attempts to correlate youthful consumption of popular 
culture with anti-social conduct’ (Miller 2009, 242). Yet, as Wartella and Robb 
(2010) suggest, the advent of every new media technology over the last 100 years 
or so, comes complete with both promises and fears about the potential impact on 
children’s development (Wartella, Richert, and Robb 2010, 7).  They suggest that: 
How the movies, or radio, or television, or computers would fundamentally 
alter the way children learn – making children smarter at younger ages or 
making learning easier and more accessible to more children – have been 
recurring claims. Juxtaposed to these are the naysayers who decry children’s 
time spent with media content that is morally questionable – too much sex, 
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too much violence, too commercial. In many places this history of recurring 
controversies that surround the introduction of each of the mass media of the 
twentieth century has been recounted. (Wartella and Robb 2010, 7) 
It should not surprise us that research surrounding children and the media is 
steeped in incongruity, for as Graeme Turner argues, our own common sense 
attitudes towards media are embroiled in similar contradiction (Turner 1993). We 
hold that media are at the same time ‘trivial and powerful’, believing that they can 
teach us, but more explicitly children, both pro- and anti-social behaviour while at 
the same time we tend to consider audiences as both intellectually and 
imaginatively passive, and that television in particular is a form of ‘dumbed 
down’ culture  (205).  Hence, much of the recent discourse surrounding children 
and the media has focused on media literacy as can be witnessed in the following 
quote from Victor Stasburger: 
Finally, media education is crucial. A century ago, to be ‘literate’ meant one 
could read and write. In 2009, to be literate means possessing the ability to 
text-message, IM, surf the Web, as well as decipher a bewildering array of 
media including books, radio, TO, movies, music and videos. (Strasburger 
2009, 5 emphasis added) 
Debates, both in academia and the popular press, around the effects that media 
have on children continue to flourish. On one side of the debate are the 
pessimistic accounts of imitative violence (Singer 2009), the increasing 
commercialization of childhood (Kline 1998, Strassburger, Wilson, and Jordan 
2009), the sexualisation of childhood (Rush 2011, Ianotta 2008), exposure to 
substance use and abuse (Strassburger 2010), childhood obesity (Jordan 2010),  
attention deficit disorders, (Ray and Jat 2010), eating disorders (Harrison and 
Hefner 2008), repetitive strain injuries and the popular myth of square eyes. For 
some, media are like hypodermic needles, filled with toxic meanings which 
corrupt the minds of the young, causing children to become dysfunctional (Winn 
1977). As Kinder (1999) suggests, such alarmism contends that: 
children’s media is somehow transforming our kids into a mass of dumbed-
down zombies and killers, in contrast to ‘the good old days’ when children 
were vibrantly active, creative and innocent. (Kinder 1999, 2) 
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On the other side of the debate is the position often taken by advertisers, media 
producers and some educators in their claims that various media products are 
educational, providing a window to the world, and teaching children numeracy, 
literacy and social skills (Plowman, Stephen, and McPake 2009). These 
arguments are supported by a number of studies which suggest that technology-
based activities for youth and their families yield improvements in ‘reading, 
mathematics, computer knowledge, following directions, and grammar’, that 
children who participate in these activities score higher in tests at school 
(Subrahmanyam et al. 2000, 127), and that those teenagers who have home 
computers are between six and eight per cent more likely to graduate high school 
than those who do not (Fairlie, Beltran, and Kuntal 2010).   
Traditional criticism of media effects often relies on statistical 
methodologies which concentrate on a particular element or elements of 
media content such as substance use, violence, pornography or other 
arguably anti-social behaviours, which are singled out for study and 
possible censorship (Kinder 1999, 3). Adherents to this tradition often rely 
on methods such as content analysis which ‘breaks down the components’ 
of media content into countable units from which correlations are deduced 
(Turner and Cunningham 1993, 209). This type of approach leads us to 
encounter such inconsistent claims that  media cause children to become 
‘dumbed down zombies’ (Kinder 1999, 2) while simultaneously teaching 
them the alphabet, numbers and colours (Hendershot 1999). This 
inconsistency has led many to suggest that it is the nature of the content 
which carries the burden of causality: good content delivers good outcomes 
and bad content yields bad effects  (Strassburger, Wilson, and Jordan 2009, 
Plowman, Stephen, and McPake 2009). Due to ‘a propensity to derive 
simplistic explanations based primarily on quantitative correlations’ 
(Buckingham 2008, 221), such methodologies are inadequate for analysing 
the complexities of the ontological and perceptual significance of mediating 
technologies in the lives of infants and toddlers. 
When content carries the burden of causality, despite age and capacity to 
understand, there is an attendant assumption that everyone sees and 
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interprets the same content in the same way. In this way it universalises the 
audience, a supposition which cultural studies has countered (Hodge 1986). 
One of the fundamental problems, therefore, with either the positive or 
negative effects model is the presumption that the process of making 
meaning is the same for all people, and this is precisely why it cannot apply 
to very young children, whose meaning-making happens in ways that it 
does not in adults. This is even more prevalent in the small amount of 
research that has been done in relation to infants, toddlers and the media 
who are considered to lack the capacity to differentiate between positive 
and negative media messages (see for example Jordan 2001, Anderson and 
Hanson 2010, Senju and Csibra 2008, Rideout and Hamel 2006).  
The effects tradition of media criticism also underplays the significance of 
the contextual specificities of children’s media consumption—whether they 
are in a playpen on their own watching, sitting with others, glancing at the 
screen while playing, or even licking the screen, which are all crucial to 
understanding the relation between mediating technologies and very young 
children.  
Whether we adopt the optimistic view of some educators, parents and 
advertisers or the negative view of lobbyists, psychologists, other media 
theorists and parents, we remain ensconced in a stalemate which derives 
from the notion that media cause various behavioural, developmental or 
psychological effects in children; effects which are not as prevalent in 
adults or older people. To attribute causality to media messages in this way 
is tantamount to content determinism, whereby the content of any media 
determines outcomes, a view that is dominant in psychology and paediatric 
discourses. Nevertheless, we should be careful not to dismiss the notion of 
media effects out of hand as it remains a well-documented and researched 
field of inquiry which has been ‘perhaps rather too hastily…condemned in 
some quarters’ (Buckingham 1996, 5).  
This thesis does not suggest that media content has no effects, but rather it 
exceeds the effects model by examining the materiality of media as part of a 
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spectrum of mediating technologies, and the ways they configure spatial 
and interpersonal relations, and places of engagement, just by ‘being there.’ 
In Ihde’s terms, technologies are co-opted into our experiences: we see and 
engage the world with them as a human-technology couplet (1975). 
However, the effects tradition as it has been framed and practised, 
particularly in behavioural psychology of stimulus and response, suggests 
that children’s interpretations of media or mediating technologies has 
nothing to do with the materiality of the devices. As such it is not helpful to 
our understandings of the ways that infants and toddlers interact with their 
environment, which is at a material and sensory-affective level.  
In an attempt to counter arguments of media effects, much of the research 
emanating from cultural studies has examined the vested interests served by 
various constructions of childhood. Constructions of childhood are 
important, not only because they shape our understanding of what is at stake 
in the debates surrounding this or that effect of media, but also because 
childhood, constructed as a natural and universal category of being, which 
is distinct from adulthood, informs the way children are treated, what is 
expected of them and the fears that are held for them (Prout 2008). As 
Karen Calvert points out: 
Members of any society carry within themselves a working definition of 
childhood, its nature, limitations, and duration. They may not explicitly 
discuss this definition, write about it, or even consciously conceive of it as 
an issue, but they act upon their assumptions in all of their dealings with, 
fears for, and expectations of their children. Every culture defines what it 
means to be a child, how children should look and act, what is expected of 
them, and what is considered beyond their capabilities. (Calvert 1998, 69) 
While definitions of childhood may not necessarily be overtly discussed, or 
even thought about in everyday practice, they nonetheless underscore 
behaviour in relation to children.  The association of childhood with 
primitivism, irrationalism, prelogism and innocence are inherent in our 
concepts of childhood, and these have passed from ‘the theories of 
psychologists, pedagogues, psychiatrists and psychoanalysts into public 
opinion’ (Ariès 1988, 56). Notions of childhood innocence, for instance, 
have led to two kinds of attitude and behaviour towards childhood: one 
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which seeks to protect childhood from life’s corrupting influences and the 
other ‘strengthening it by developing character and reason’ through 
education (Ariès 1988, 56). Both positions have led to the type of content 
determinism referred to earlier. Yet this, like the effects tradition tends to 
elide children’s perspectives and agency. 
An important contribution to come out of cultural studies is an affirmation 
of the child as agent. For the study of children and the media 1986 
represented somewhat of a watershed, with two influential works coming 
out of Australian cultural studies; The Lively Audience: A Study of children 
around the TV set by Patricia Palmer (1986) and Children and Television by 
Bob Hodge and David Tripp (1986). In what follows, I will examine the 
major contributions of these two works and outline why, despite their value 
to the field, their methodological approaches are not suited to an exploration 
of the ways in which media and mediating technologies figure in the lives 
and experiences of infants and toddlers.  
Adopting a developmental approach, cultural studies theorists Patricia Palmer 
(1986), and Bob Hodge and David Tripp (1986) broke new ground in distancing 
themselves from the effects tradition. Hodge and Tripp’s developmentally 
informed semiotic approach made a valuable contribution to the debate, 
facilitating a more complex and subtle understanding of the meanings children 
make of media content (Hodge and Tripp 1986, 7). This yielded useful insights 
arguing, for instance, that ‘children’s ways of thinking may be qualitatively 
different at different stages of their development’ (7) and that children’s cognitive 
and semiotic capacities continue to develop at least up until the age of twelve 
(214).  
Semiotics, which informed Hodge and Tripp’s (1986) methodology, became a 
favoured method of analysis in the second half of the twentieth century and drew 
respectively from the works of Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce 1991)and 
Ferdinand de Saussure (de Saussure 2006) and constitutes what has been termed 
the ‘linguistic turn’ which was concerned with the structural characteristics of 
language in constructing and transmitting meaning (Bouissac 2004). Semiosis 
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relies on practices of coding and interpretation (Barbieri 2012). In response to 
what he recognised as a ‘certain blindness to the importance of non-verbal signs 
both within and without the linguistic,’ Horst Ruthrof coined the term, ‘corporeal 
turn’ which is indebted to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and particularly to 
‘the primacy of perception’ (Ruthrof 1997, xii) and is a turn towards modes of 
analysis which emphasize the primacy of embodiment. With its reliance on 
cognitive and linguistic theory Hodge and Tripp’s (1986) analysis cannot explain 
the way that very young children perceive and experience— i.e. embody—media 
as part of socio-equipmental environments that include a range of mediating 
technologies. 
In her analysis Palmer (1986) also adopted a developmental methodology which 
enabled her to conclude that due to experiential and developmental differences, 
children ‘see’ and understand media messages differently depending upon where 
they are located along the developmental continuum. Palmer rightly contends 
that, ‘what children gain from television depends very much on the child’s age 
and social experience’ (Palmer 1986, 2). Like Hodge and Tripp (1986), Palmer 
(1986) recognises that if viewers are considered as active meaning makers, and 
that activity is different for different people, at various developmental stages, the 
crude correlations, which conflate all users, such as those primarily relied upon in 
media effects models ‘will not tell us much of what we want to know’ (Hodge and 
Tripp 1986, 8). Despite their recognition that age and social experience are crucial 
to unpacking how children understand media neither Palmer (1986), nor Hodge 
and Tripp (1986), investigate the significance of media in the lives of infants and 
toddlers, focusing their attention instead on pre-school and school aged children, 
and relying on understanding these children’s cognitive understanding of the 
content.  
Cognitive models of developmental psychology such as those used by Palmer, 
and Hodge and Tripp, rely on an understanding of learning and knowledge that 
assumes that high order intellectual knowledge is the only way that we can know 
the world, a position which separates feeling from knowing. Such an assumption 
is symptomatic of a particularly Western modern model of knowledge which 
insists that, ‘every relationship we have with[in] the world, even the most 
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primitive or abstract, must cross the threshold of the thinking “I” ’ (Mansfield, 
2000: 18). Developmental approaches informed by psychology (see for example 
Jean Piaget 1967 and Lev Vygotsky 1986), offer insights into the ways that 
infants’ and toddlers’ conceptualise the world in particular developmental stages, 
but not the ontological and perceptual import of media as it relates to very young 
children’s experiencing.  
The notion that our bodies are the inconsequential containers of ‘potentially 
autonomous mind[s]’ (Richardson and Harper 2002) permitted by Descartes’ ego 
cogito [ergo] sum—I think therefore I am is an implicit assumption which 
underpins much of the literature surrounding the intersection between media and 
children’s development. This assumption infers that media content should be the 
primary target of analysis, but I argue that such analysis overlooks the centrality 
of bodies in knowledge production, as well as the ontological and perceptual 
significance of media and mediating technologies in the lives of infants and 
toddlers. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology allows us to redress this oversight 
and restore infants’ and toddlers’ bodies to their essentiality in the epistemic 
process.  
As Hargrave and Livingstone (2009) suggest, one of the most problematic aspects 
of the ongoing debates surrounding children and the media ‘is the markedly 
simple, even simplistic nature of the questions often asked about the effect of the 
media…(e.g. Is television bad for children?)’ (Hargrave and Livingstone 2009, 
42). Such questions can only ever yield hesitant assertions of ‘yes…and no’. 
Hence, as Wartella suggests in the quote at the beginning of this introduction, we 
have been asking the wrong questions and a more complex approach is needed, 
which takes account of the multiple and multifaceted relationships that very 
young children have with mediating technologies, to facilitate a more 
comprehensive understanding of the ways in which they are part of very young 
children’s maturation and lived experiences (Wartella, Richert, and Robb 2010). 
As a consequence of starting out from the relatively simplistic ‘are media bad for 
children?’ the debates remain at an impasse surrounding passivity versus activity, 
as well as the types of causal effects that media may have on children.  
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One way to go beyond such approaches is to consider the artefactual 
constructedness of childhood, and how very young children’s socio-
equipmental environments comprise a complex intertwining of language, 
objects and embodiment, and are contingent upon ideas of what a child is 
and is not, and what they can and cannot do, be or access (Prout 2005). 
Studying very young children’s socio-equipmental environments enables us 
to move away from simplistic notions of effects in media analysis. 
Importantly, this thesis also explores the ways in which the child and 
mediating technologies come together to act upon the world. Attending to 
infants’ and toddlers’ socio-equipmental environments thus intentionally 
apprehends children’s perspectives and agencies. Hence, socio-equipmental 
environments of childhood will be used to inform our understandings of the 
ways in which infants’ and toddlers’ bodies are acted upon and enacted in 
particular socio-cultural contexts (Dolezal and Hyland 2008).  
Very Young Children and the Media 
As mentioned previously, while there have been vast quantities of literature 
written about the potential impact that media may have on children’s 
development, there remains very little devoted to children up to and including 
three years of age. An examination of the literature surrounding children’s online 
access conducted in 2013, for instance, reviewed 1200 studies, of which twenty 
per cent included children under nine years of age, and ‘only 4% included 
children aged birth to four years old’ (Holloway, Green, and Livingstone 2013).   
Despite recognizing developmental specificities in ways of interpreting media 
content, the trend of overlooking infants’ and toddlers’ understandings of media 
persists in much of the research in the field (see for example Strassburger, 
Wilson, and Jordan 2009). Even in the literature which does make some 
distinction between pre-school children, school aged children, youth and 
adolescence such as Strassburger, Wilson and Jordan’s (2009) Children, 
Adolescents, and the Media, there remains scarcely a mention of infants and 
toddlers. This may, in part, be due to a reliance on a semiotic model of media 
representation with its reliance on textual and linguistic meaning, or it may be that 
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many of the standard ethnographic methods cannot work in relation to infants and 
toddlers. Regardless, there remains a gap in the literature surrounding the ways in 
which a range of media and mediating technologies are co-opted into infants’ and 
toddlers’ experiences of the world and the human and non-human others within it. 
Indeed, much of the work done in the field holds that findings related to older 
children can be unproblematically applied to very young children (see for instance 
Anderson and Evans 2001).  This is reflected in the American Academy of 
Paediatrics’ (APA) prediction that ‘negative effects would also occur when 
exposure occurred at a younger age’, and their consequent recommendation, 
based almost entirely on what is said to be ‘known’ effects that media have on 
older children, that children under the age of two should not be exposed to screen 
media at all (Barr 2008, 143). Such a proposal is clearly impractical, particularly 
if the child in question cohabits with older children. Rather than advising a ban on 
screen media for very young children, we would be better advised to attempt to 
gain deeper insights into the ways that very young children come to understand 
the world in conjunction with mediating technologies. The APA’s position relies 
on a construction of children as pre-adults with limited agency, imprinted by 
screen content, and hence does not acknowledge the lived reality of media 
engagement. 
One example which does address the specificities of early childhood, is Jackie 
Marsh’s edited collection, Popular Culture, New Media and Digital Literacy in 
Early Childhood (Marsh 2005b). Marsh’s collection focuses on children from 
birth to eight years with a purported ‘predominant emphasis on children in the 
first five years of life’ (Marsh 2005a).  While many of the works in the collection 
are also based on textual, linguistic models of media analysis, Marsh’s chapter 
goes some way to recognising the important role that media, in this particular 
instance, digital toys, may play in the material mediation of very young children’s 
experiences of the world: 
 
Children’s fascination with material objects has been the centre of concerns 
about the future of childhood itself, with nightmarish vision being presented 
of contemporary children surrounded by an array of potentially harmful and 
limiting electronic toys and gadgets. While it was clear throughout the two 
studies discussed in this chapter that material cultural objects held a strong 
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fascination for children, there was no evidence that they had developed 
harmful responses to such items, nor was there evidence of the existence of 
children for who commodity fetishism was out of control. These items 
played similar functions to more traditional soothers (e.g. teddy bears); the 
key difference was that these contemporary ‘transitional objects’ were more 
directly linked to a whole array of cultural and material goods in children’s 
lives. (Marsh 2005c, 38) 
 
Marsh acknowledges that electronic toys along with other tangible, yet culturally 
embedded ‘goods’ function in much the same way as transitional objects, which is 
one aspect of the argument forwarded in this thesis. The concept of transitional 
objects emerged from DW Winnicott’s psychoanalysis (1980) and will be used 
throughout this thesis, to argue that mediating technologies and media function in 
much the same way. Suffice to say at this point that Winnicott places emphasis on 
how transitional objects facilitate maturity, entering into the gradually widening 
space between carer and child, enabling infants to ultimately arrive at the 
understanding that they are both discrete and interconnected entities within the 
world (Winnicott 1980). Transitional objects are infants’ first ‘not-me’ 
possessions, which must be able to withstand affection and aggression, and must 
have some of the characteristics of liveness, whether that be warmth or 
movement. Importantly, such objects occupy the space between carer and baby as 
a consolatory presence in the process of maturation from total dependence to 
relative independence (Winnicott 1980). As Marsh implies, in the foregoing 
quote, transitional objects exist along a continuum of mediating technologies that 
spans from soothers to digital media, a theme which will be developed throughout 
this thesis.  
Marsh also relies on the notion of intertextuality, in which media forms are 
treated as interconnected legible texts which can be ‘read’, an approach difficult 
to apply to preverbal and precognitive children. ‘Intertextuality’ is a Bakhtinian 
(1981) term which Marsha Kinder appropriates to further her argument about the 
transmedia effect, especially as it relates to children’s media experiences. 
Explaining the concept, Kinder points out that any individual text: ‘is part of a 
larger cultural discourse, and therefore, must be read in relationship to other texts, 
and their diverse textual strategies and ideological assumptions’ (Kinder 1991, 2) 
which resonates with our understanding of an ‘equipment totality’.  
18 |  P a g e
 
Yet as an ‘equipment whole’ is woven through the texture of everyday I would 
suggest that infants, toddlers, and indeed all of us, also understand media in 
relation to intertexturality. The term ‘texture’ derives from the Latin textura 
which is interestingly, equivalent to our term ‘text’ (Dictionary.com) and refers to 
the qualitative characteristics of an object. Particularly in relation to infants and 
toddlers it is more appropriate to consider intertexturality and experience than it is 
to rely on intertextuality. Taking account of children’s experiences at this age at 
the sensori-motor-affective level, intertexturality places greater emphasis on 
sensori-material elements of experience, eliding the distinction between 
embodiment and cognition. In suggesting that children understand the media only 
in reference to past linguistic utterances overlooks the potential to understand in 
reference to past sensorial experiences, rhythms and patterns of everyday life 
facilitated by mediating technologies.  
Another significant contribution in Marsh’s edition is that of Susan Roberts and 
Susan Howard (2005) whose chapter relates the findings of their observations of 
children watching Teletubbies  (Roberts and Howard 2005).  Roberts and Howard 
(2005) focus specifically on children under the age of two years. Their approach 
is also significant in that it acknowledges the sensory-affective element of very 
young children’s engagement with Teletubbies, elaborating on children’s 
embodied responses to the content which as we have seen is only one aspect of 
children’s socio-equipmental environments.  
If we consider media and mediating technologies along an experiential continuum 
this permits us to include things such as playpens, cots and highchairs for 
example, as aspects of a broader socio-equipmental environment, which is devoid 
of content as we would generally understand it. Hence developmental, textual 
approaches, while taking some acknowledging the specificities of children’s 
developmental stages, cannot be used to further our understanding of the ways in 
which media and mediating technologies are intricately intervolved with very 
young children’s growing understandings of themselves in relation to their 
environment.  Understanding the socio-equipmental environment which infants 
and toddlers come to inhabit requires a particular set of conceptual tools which 
will be elaborated upon in what follows. 
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Methodology: Embodiment, Transitional Objects, Materiality, 
Holding Environments and Affordances 
 
While the paucity of research which deals with infants, toddlers and the media is 
one motivation for focusing on children from birth to three years of age, another 
is a the importance of early childhood experiences to inform the adult life that 
follows it. The Australian Early Development Index
3
 for instance tells us that ‘it 
is well known that what happens to children in the early years has consequences 
right through the course of their lives’ (2011) and that the first two to three years 
of a child’s life lays the foundation for all subsequent action and relationships. To 
understand children’s understandings of media, we need to move beyond textual 
and cognitive based theses to approaches that include sensory perception and 
lived experience. 
There are a number of theoretical perspectives which inform this thesis: 
phenomenology, post-phenomenology, psychoanalytic theory and the study of 
material culture with their attendant concepts. Phenomenology allows us to 
approach the topic without assumptions about very young children’s ‘lack’ in 
relation to understanding, but rather acknowledges that in the first instance we are 
all embodied beings involved within the world and that the only access we have 
to the world is by virtue of our embodiment and the types of bodies we are 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962). Ihde’s post-phenomenology extends and contextualises 
phenomenology, informing our understanding of the mediating potential of all 
technologies, the cultural specificity human-technology relations, and how these 
are played out in our lived existence (Ihde 1990). Psychoanalytic theory provides 
a comprehensive approach to early childhood development and the ways in which 
infants transition into older children and ultimately adults in relation to objects 
(Winnicott 1957). The study of material culture facilitates an understanding of the 
socio-political implications of production and consumption of material objects 
(Tilley 2006). Within material cultural approaches, two quite different notions of 
affordance simultaneously enable us to understand the specificities of very young 
children’s embodiment in relation to mediating technologies as part of the broader  
                                                          
3
 The Australian Early Development Index is an adaptation of a Canadian data collection and 
research instrument designed to assess developmental health of very young children. 
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ecology of human-environment relations (Gibson 1986) and how objects are 
designed, for adults and children, to induce preferred modes of engagement 
(Norman 2007). 
 
While we may come to understand media in terms of the messages they carry, this 
can only be arrived at through our fundamental embodied relationship with 
objects and spaces within the world—what phenomenology defines as a relational 
ontology. Throughout this thesis, I will draw on phenomenology of embodiment, 
psychoanalysis, post-phenomenology, and the study of material culture with 
particular emphasis on the concepts of embodiment, materiality, transitional 
objects, holding spaces and affordances. The adaptation and combination of these 
concepts aims to provide a corporeal schematic of the way the world is for infants 
and toddlers in developed economies, in the early twenty first century, with its 
attendant mediating technologies. In doing so I argue that the particularity of 
infants’ and toddlers’ material conditions of existence, the environment(s) they 
inhabit, and the things that coexist in those spaces along with them, mediate what, 
and how children may experience the world, significantly from their own 
locatedness and capacity to act within it.  
While this thesis is primarily theoretical, it will be supplemented by anecdotal 
examples and illustrations taken from my own experiences and the observations I 
have made of my own children and their friends, and of the children and families 
who participated in this research. The use of interviews with and observations of 
four Perth (Western Australia) families of various configurations, with children 
under the age of three offers ‘real world’ anecdotal examples of the theoretical 
concepts.  
Our first family consists of fourteen month old Seb
4
 and his single mother, Kate, 
who live with Kate’s mother in a detached three bedroom, single level home in 
the inner Northern suburbs. The communal space of the home consists of a 
combined kitchen and dining room which leads into the lounge room. The lounge  
 
                                                          
4
 The names of the participants have been changed to protect their anonymity. 
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room contains a lounge suite, some of Seb’s toys, his small lounge and a 
television place high up on a wall unit. The rooms in this home are modest in size. 
Another of the families includes eighteen month old Cassie, her five year old 
sister, Sara, and their parents, Linda and Philip. They also live in a three bedroom 
single level detached home. This home has a dedicated television room which is 
separate from other communal spaces. The kitchen is a country-style ‘eat-in’ 
room which opens onto two other living spaces, one of which is used as a study 
and contains several computers and game consoles (Philip is studying new media) 
and is joined to a family room which contains a stereo and occasional furniture. 
Twins, Emily and Kane, are seven months old and live with their parents Emma 
and James, four year old bother, Jeremy, and three year old sister, Kaitlin. Their 
home is also a three bedroom single level detached home which has a lounge 
room that opens into a dining room and kitchen. James’ office is located beyond 
the dining room in an area that was an addition to the home and is able to be 
closed off by a door. The lounge room contains some of the children’s toys, two 
lounges which face each other and a television in the corner. Emma and James 
have a home theatre in the converted garage.   
Eight month old Molly is also one of four children, and has a six year old brother, 
Michael, a four year old sister, Amy and a two year old brother Jacob, who live 
with their parents Christine and Steven. Their newer and larger single level 
detached home has four bedrooms, two bathrooms, a study, a family room and a 
play room. The communal space incorporates the kitchen, dining room, family 
room which is separated from the play room by double doors. Despite having a 
dedicated playroom much of the family’s activity is conducted in the open plan 
kitchen, dining and family room area which has a lounge suite, a television and 
DVD player as well as a playpen. 
The observations of the children, and interviews with their parents, will be used to 
highlight the disjuncture between adult cultural assumptions and children’s 
actions which are not typical affordances, and also to illustrate the ways in which 
mediating technologies enter into the everyday life experiences of the families. 
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The approach that I will use is similar, although not identical, to what Pink (2011) 
terms ‘phenomenological anthropology’, or ‘sensory ethnography’ (Pink 2011, 
271). The method, ‘involves the researchers’ empathetic engagement with the 
practices and places that are important to the people participating in the research’ 
(Pink 2011b, 271). Pink is critical of multimodal scholarship which she suggests, 
‘tends to understand communication on two levels, and as happening through 
the relationship between what they call ‘modes’ and ‘media’’ (Pink 2011, 
261). It often seeks to gain understandings in semiotic terms, which Pink urges us 
to go beyond: 
observation and data collection to attend to the ways in which we might 
reflexively draw on our own existing biographical experiences…in order to 
imagine and recognize our sensory embodied responses to other people, 
objects, textures and more. (Pink 2011, 266) 
Hence while scholars who consider multiple modes of communication adhere to a 
cultural construction of a differentiated sensorium from which cultural meaning 
can be read, Pink’s phenomenological anthropology not only appreciates that the 
senses are interconnected but also that they are not necessarily distinguishable 
(Pink 2011, 268). This is particularly the case with very young children who 
cannot verbally articulate experience. While this thesis cannot strictly be 
considered a phenomenological anthropology, the value of Pink’s sensory 
ethnography as a method of analysis remains useful to a post-phenomenology of 
very young children and the media in that these ‘innovative methods that are 
currently emerging have an emphasis on mobility, affect, empathy and knowing’ 
and moreover engage with a number of ‘media and methods adapted to specific 
circumstances, persons and projects’ (Pink 2011, 274) . Moreover, it is consistent 
with the phenomenological method of ‘thick description’ which is a detailed 
account of phenomena as well as the context in which they appear (Merleau-
Ponty 1962). Hence, while my approach is primarily theoretical, photographs of 
the children and excerpts from interviews with family members who participated 
in this research will be supplemented with photographs from my own collection 
as well as accounts of my own experiences and observations to provide 
illustrative examples to situate the theory within actual contexts.  
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Chapter Overview 
As media and mediating technologies are a part of infants’ and toddlers’ lives that 
we need to understand, in Chapter One, I will expand on the theoretical 
underpinnings of this thesis, as outlined above, in greater detail, reaffirming the 
fundamental tenet of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology as the primacy of 
embodied being-in-the-world. From there I will outline how the only way we can 
come to grips with the world is through our embodied engagement with it, and 
that this is not a disinterested or unilateral action. The world and its elements 
concern us and touch us, just as we concern and touch them. Consequently, 
Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility thesis will be discussed as a way of counteracting 
any charges of technological determinism which may be raised. As previously 
suggested, elements of Ihde’s post-phenomenology will be used to show that 
embodiment is culturally embedded. Winnicott’s psychoanalysis will be 
discussed in terms of how it supplements phenomenology as a way to effectively 
explore how objects mediate very young children’s experiences in the world. The 
study of material culture and the notion of affordances will be allow us to 
understand the body-environment relation in context taking greater account of the 
specificity of very young children’s embodied perception. 
In the subsequent chapters I will examine in detail various aspects of the socio-
equipmental environments that very young children inhabit from 
microenvironments (chapter two), primary objects (chapter three), toys (chapter 
four), television (chapter five) and interactive media (chapter six). This ordering 
presents a chronological continuum from early objects to more sophisticated 
mediating technologies. In each chapter, I will consider the ways in which these 
particular aspects of infants’ and children’s socio-equipmental environments may 
act in concert with children’s developing corporeality to shape their experiences 
of the world.  
 
In Chapter Two, Being in Facilitating Microenvironments I will argue that the 
cluster of specific, yet interconnected environments that we inhabit, ‘from the 
womb to the tomb’, shape the way the world may be for us, imposing points of 
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view, delimiting our gestures, orientation and ability to traverse space in ways 
which are specific to the technology itself in concert with our own corporeality. 
Winnicott’s concept of the holding phase in infant development will be used to 
reinforce notions of ontological security and the importance of this phase of infant 
development to the adult life that follows it (Winnicott 1988). I will, in this 
chapter, relate these theories to environments of baby carriers, cots, playpens, 
highchairs and mobile ‘container technologies’ (Sofia 2000) like baby capsules 
and strollers to suggest that even these very basic technologies constrain and 
enable particular actions, understandings and experiences of space in relation to 
children’s developing corporeality. 
Chapter Three will initially consider infants’ earliest experiences of the world and 
others within it through the lens of phenomenologically informed psychoanalysis. 
I will argue, in line with both Merleau-Ponty and Winnicott, that very young 
children do not understand themselves as discrete beings apart from the world 
and the others within it, but rather as a part of them, and that maturation from 
infant to toddler and then young child, older child and adult is an ongoing process 
of simultaneous dis-integration and integration. This process allows us to 
ultimately come to see ourselves as separate from, but connected to, our particular 
socio-cultural environments, including the other people within it. I will suggest 
that infants’ primary relations with the world and its elements are inclinations 
facilitated by the gradually widening space between infant and carer, as babies 
move from total dependence to relative independence. In this chapter I will 
primarily consider the changing relationship that infants have with the maternal 
body and then move on to feeding technologies, dummies and clothing. Each of 
these objects figures largely in children’s material worlds, and their growing 
understanding of themselves as distinct beings within them.   
Chapter Four Toys Are Us: Playing is Being, will draw on Merleau-Ponty’s 
premise that as we repeatedly use instruments, in this case toys, they become 
incorporated into the dynamic organization of our bodies. This premise sets the 
scene for debunking the notion that media or indeed mediating technologies exist 
‘out there’ delivering causal effects upon children. Recognizing that those things 
we use on a regular basis become part of our embodied agency, adds a new 
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dimension to our previously held notions of the relationship between children and 
technologies. This chapter too, will depart somewhat from the previous chapters 
in that it will explore more of the socio-historical context in which toys are made 
and marketed to adults and children. It will also problematize the concept of 
texture as it relates to transitional objects in Winnicott’s account, but will suggest 
that increased plasticization, mass production and transmediation of toys 
complexifies an already complex phenomenon, mediating infants and toddlers 
experiences of the world in culturally and historically specific ways.  
In Chapter Five, The Ontological Significance of Television in the Lives of Infants 
and Toddlers I will discuss screen based media within very young children’s 
lifeworlds. I will suggest that screens potentially call and hold our attention, 
ultimately creating an expectation of relevance. This is not innate, but rather a 
learned cultural way of being-with-screens, which stems from our earliest 
orientating responses which through repetition become body habits of attention 
and distraction. Furthermore in relation to attracting and holding, I will analogise 
Winnicott’s holding phase in infant development with that of screen technologies, 
to argue that television screens serve to both hold infants and toddlers and to aid 
their transition from dependence to relative independence. That is, they are both 
facilitating microenvironments and transitional objects.  
In Infants, Toddlers and Peripatetic Screens I will consider new ways of being in 
the world facilitated by interactive media, mobile screen technologies such as 
DVD players in cars, mobile phones and the internet. Again, the concepts of 
facilitating microenvironments, the holding phase and in-habitation will be used, 
bringing us full circle to revisit microenvironments and transitional objects. 
**** 
This introduction has critiqued current modes of enquiry into children and the 
media and argued that by focusing on the central concepts from phenomenology, 
post-phenomenology and psychoanalysis we may come to a more comprehensive 
grasp of how any media may intervene into our experiences and understandings in 
and of the world. In the upcoming chapters, these concepts will be developed and  
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applied to a range of technologies to argue that very young children’s relationship 
with media is primary and embodied and part of a spectrum of mediating 
technologies in infants’ and toddlers’ cultural and corporeal situatedness.  
Regardless of years of research, and numerous perspectives, very little remains 
known about what, if any, impact media have on children up to the age of three. 
There are a number of difficulties involved in studying this very young age group, 
not the least of which is a persistent tendency to focus on media content, which 
may or may not be understood by such young children. This introduction has 
outlined the thesis’ alternative approach which recognizes that our primary 
relationship with media stems from our embodied being in the world in relation to 
other material objects. In order to further develop this approach, I will argue that 
we need to consider both media and mediating technologies together since they 
are both embroiled in the process of mediating and relations of mediation. 
Considering mediating technologies from clothing, holding spaces, and toys, to 
‘high’ technologies, allows us to come to an understanding of how we move 
along a continuum in the process of maturation in relation to things that are like 
us and those that are not. 
Very young children’s relationships to the world are unique and specific to their 
corporeality. The specificities of their embodiment are such that they do not 
experience the world as adults, or even older children do, but rather as a field of 
sensory-affective possibilities (Merleau-Ponty 1964b). While adults also 
experience the world on this sensory-motor-affective plane, this level of 
experience is overlain with layers of culturally and historically specific 
parameters of engagement, which reconfigure our relations with the world in the 
process of maturation and socialisation. I argue that very young children’s 
developing bodily motility, control over their bodily movements and limited 
experience in the world render them a special case for study in that they 
experience the world on the sensori-motor-affective level as a primary way of 
being. Moreover, while we all experience the world in this way, the cognitive and 
cultural layering we experience as adults often obscures our foundational 
corporeality. As such, studying the ways in which infants’ and toddlers’  
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experiences of the world are mediated through objects may provide greater 
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Being in a Material World: Towards a Post-
Phenomenology of Young Children and the Media 
In this chapter I will outline a theoretical framework for studying very young 
children and the media which does not rely on content as a primary mode of 
analysis. As suggested in the introduction, it is useful to frame this investigation 
in terms of the ways in which meaning-making is bound up in body-technology 
relations. This is not one that defends either the passive receptor or the active 
reader of media messages but one that insists instead that agency, or activity in 
the world, is mediated through our engagement with technologies. That is, certain 
types of actions within the world are enabled while others are constrained 
precisely due to our corporeal and affective inclinations towards the world and its 
contingent technological forms. The theoretical framework developed here does 
not prioritise the content of media, rather it considers the distinctive ways that 
infants and toddlers interact with mediating technologies at the level of their 
primary embodiment, and in relation to their socio-equipmental environments.  
The premise upon which this approach rests is a phenomenological one—that is,  
infants, toddlers, children, youth and adults alike—incorporate media, 
technologies, and objects into our corporeal schemas, such that they are integrated 
into our habitual ways of being and acting in the world. Even the simplest 
technologies mediate our existence and may consequently be considered 
mediating technologies insofar as they enter into the rhythms and practices of 
everyday life, changing our experiences of the world and its inhabitants. For 
instance, when very young children are placed in a walker and learn how to 
propel themselves about, the baby and walker may be considered a 
technologically enabled pedestrian complex. That is, the walker acts as an aspect 
of the child’s body which simultaneously enhances babies’ capacity to move by 
the inclusion of wheels and constrains their his or her limits of approach by a 
wide base and a wide tray which places a material barrier between the child and 
the rest of the world. The properties of this type of mediating technology act in 
relation to infants’ inclinations and corporeal maturity to constitute a human-
technology relation that defines what is doable within the environment. 
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Moreover as walkers are the products of Western manufacturing, their 
incorporation into the rhythms of everyday life in Western societies has only 
happened within the last fifty years. Their use is not only contingent upon having 
even surfaces which will support them, but also the space to allow them to move 
about adequately. Subsequent to 9000 American and 3000 British children being 
injured by falls, the American Academy of Pediatrics issued a report calling for 
brakes or a ban on walkers (Rogers 2001, 43) identifying them as objects of 
corporeal risk. As will be discussed in the next chapter, parents also make 
decisions about whether or not to use walkers on the bases of personal beliefs and 
attitudes about this risk, and whether such a technology is appropriate for their 
child’s socio-equipmental environment. 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment will be elaborated upon to 
reinforce the notion that we are all embodied beings involved within the world 
which is also involved with us. The phenomenological concepts of being-in-the-
world, embodied agency, fresh instruments, intercorporeality, reversibility, 
perception, corporeal schema, flesh of the world and écart will be explored at 
length. Subsequently I will move on to a brief examination of body knowledge or 
‘knowledge in the hands’. This will be done to suggest that those things with 
which we habitually engage become incorporated into our bodies enabling us to 
interact with the world with and through devices. Ihde’s post-phenomenology of 
technology will complement Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment to 
account for the historical and cultural specificity of that incorporation. The study 
of material culture as well as Gibson’s concept of affordances will be introduced 
to outline the specificities of infants’ and toddlers’ embodiment, and how this 
alters the particular possibilities that technologies offer to children who are 
literally just coming to grips with, or finding their feet in the world. To further 
complement this interdisciplinary approach, the inclusion of Winnicott’s 
psychoanalysis will permit us to consider the notion that being is a continuous and 
cumulative state. Winnicott’s account of babies’ transition from total dependence 
to relative independence also informs our understanding of the importance of 
environmental provisions, holding spaces and the gradual widening of space 
between carer and child in children’s transition to object relations and their 
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consequent emerging understanding of themselves as discrete beings. This leads 
us to a consideration of the concepts of reversibility, chiasmic intertwinings, 
flesh-of-the-world and écart to emphasise how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
and Winnicott’s psychoanalysis may be combined to offer a complex and 
comprehensive interpretation of the ways in which infants and toddlers experience 
the world in relation to the materiality of their environments.  In the following 
pages I will initially provide an overview of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
concepts of perception, being-in-the-world, body habit and incorporation to 
gradually introduce us to the conceptual framework which will be developed 
throughout this thesis. 
Phenomenology is a philosophy which ‘does not expect to arrive at an 
understanding of man (sic) and the world from any starting point other than that 
of their “facticity”’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962, vii). Phenomenology, thus, is a 
philosophy that recognises the world as, self-evidently, ‘always “already there,” 
before recollection begins’ as an ‘indisputable precondition of our knowledge of 
it’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962, vii my emphasis). Hence phenomenology does not resort 
to cognition as the origin of knowing. Rather it recognises the centrality of 
embodiment which is subsequently overlain with concepts and language. 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Embodiment and Being-In-
The-World 
A central premise on which this thesis rests is the centrality of very young 
children’s embodiment ‘as a condition of knowledge, experience and perception’ 
against the notion of a potentially disembodied knowledge (Richardson and 
Harper 2002). Therefore, I argue for a phenomenologically influenced model of 
knowledge which understands very young children as essentially embodied 
beings-in-the-world, who experience the world through their bodies in relation to 
mediating technologies, which enhance and constrain agency in medium specific 
ways. This argument will be elaborated as I progress through this thesis.  
The work of French phenomenologist, Merleau-Ponty, offers us an opportunity to 
restore issues of embodiment in relation to media effects (1962). His 
phenomenology reminds us of three essential aspects of existence which can aid 
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our understanding of the ways in which technologies mediate very young 
children’s existence. In the first instance, we are inescapably in a world that is 
non-indifferent to and for us (Taylor, 1990). Secondly, we are in this world which 
constitutes a field of meanings as an agent who acts in meaningful ways, and 
thirdly, our perception is necessarily the foundation of our experience of meaning 
and the world (Taylor 1990).  
Merleau-Ponty speaks to the significance of studying child psychology as a means 
to accessing a greater understanding, not only of individual, but also 
‘intersubjective existence’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 96n). He argues that as we 
mature into adulthood we do not move ‘from one ontological order to another’ but 
rather develop continuously throughout life, and as such, that early childhood 
experiences are ‘in some respects decisive, for the character of adult life that 
follows it’ (96n).  Moreover, he reminds us that relying on cognition is an 
inadequate model of knowledge, suggesting that: 
ordinary experience shows that, in imitating others, in learning to walk, in 
becoming familiar with an environment, what occurs cannot be explained by 
the notion that there is first an intellectual act of ‘knowing’ rules, maps, or 
words and then a move to use them. Intellectualism of this kind is, therefore, 
an unsatisfactory alternative to naturalism in explaining the nature of 
childhood existence as well as its influence on adult life (Merleau-Ponty 
1964b, 96n) 
In what follows I will examine Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in more depth to 
reinforce the notion that only by centralising embodiment as a precondition of 
knowledge can we arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of how infants 
and toddlers develop in relation to media and mediating technologies. This will 
initially be done through the lens of the inescapability of our being-in-the-world 
and the primacy of sense perception as our foundational way of knowing the 
world. At the outset, however, it is important to further explore the implications of 
the foregoing quote and discuss in more detail what distinguishes Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology from the type of ‘intellectualism’ from which he 
differentiates his own position.  
As Merleau-Ponty asserts, to be is necessarily to be as a body—we cannot be 
except as bodies (Merleau-Ponty 1962). As bodies we are also undeniably bodies 
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in-the-world. We experience the world that enfolds us, as and through, our 
embodied being-in-the-world. Our embodied being-in-the-world is our opening 
onto the world: a point of view of reality; it is our way of having a world that is, 
not a conclusion we arrive at but the ‘basic pre-understanding without which we 
would not perceive’ (Taylor 1990, 12). Perception situates each of us within the 
world, not only establishing from where we may view the world, our particular 
point of view, but also the constitutive and structural role of that point of view in 
epistemic and all other activity. Therefore, being-in-the-world is how things are 
for each of us, from where we stand as embodied sensorial beings, who may act in 
and on the world, and upon whom the world may act.  The perceptual field, which 
has an orientational structure that establishes fundamental spatiality and topology 
such as foreground, background, up, down, and near and far, is our opening onto 
the world. Thus embodied perception establishes not only where we are within the 
world but also our possibilities for movement and action within it. Unlike the 
intellectualism or cognitivism which distances itself from the world in order to 
observe, categorise, order, measure and explain it, phenomenology seeks to return 
to the things of which conceptual knowledge speaks—those things which inform 
the basis of cognition and language.  
Merleau-Ponty recognises the primary relation that exists between the observing, 
experiencing subject, and the observed, experienced object. His phenomenology 
thus insists that we are all ‘body-subjects’ who are inextricably and undeniably 
involved with the world and that this involvement,  informs our understandings of 
and action within the world (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 90).  As Richardson and 
Harper (2002) point out: 
The body is not simply a material location from which we perceive, a 
distantiated object; we experience things through our bodies not in a 
separate relationship to it.  By positioning perception as a fundamental 
corporeal reality, rather than the result of the action of a disembodied 
thinking mind, Merleau-Ponty consolidates corporeality as an essential (and 
not simply necessary) condition for the production of knowledge 
(Richardson and Harper 2002). 
Infants’ and toddlers’ bodies, like all bodies are the membranes, or ‘transparent 
medium[s]’ that enable the flow of perception, meaning and action, from the 
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world to the individual and back again in a continuous kinaesthetic feedback loop 
that ceases only with our death (Merleau-Ponty 1962 cited in Ihde and Silverman 
1985, 26). Perception, moreover, is not something we consciously do but is 
something that we cannot help but do as embodied beings-in-the-world.  
As perception is an action with which we are inescapably involved, Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology is that of embodied agency. As Taylor tells us: 
If one had to sum up Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical legacy in a phrase one 
might say that he more than any other taught us what it means to understand 
ourselves as embodied agents (Taylor 1990, 1). 
To be, is thus to be primarily an embodied perceiving subject, or body-subject, 
who can only perceive in the ways it does because of the type of body it has 
(Merleau-Ponty 1964, 101). Very young children, like all of us, inhabit the world 
within our own particular bodily space, with a ‘point of view’ arrived at from ‘the 
double horizon of external and bodily space’—the intermingling of what is 
perceived as external, in relation to the particularities of our embodiment—and a 
perceptual field constituting and constituted by our ability to act within the world 
(101). Moreover, as Sarah Ahmed (2010) points out: 
To be more or less open to new things is to be more or less open to the 
incorporation of things into our near sphere…Those things we do not like 
we move away from. Awayness might help establish the edges of our 
horizon; in rejecting the proximity of certain objects, we define the places 
that we know we do not wish to go, the things we do not wish to have, 
touch, taste, hear, feel, see, those things we do not want to keep within reach 
(Ahmed 2010, 32) 
Ahmed’s assertion is particularly salient in relation to infants and toddlers whose 
immature embodiment, their emplacement, and what is provided to and for them 
in the process of socialisation, delimits what they can and cannot experience, 
what they can and cannot be near or away from, partially determining their 
‘place’ in the world and in relation to others within the world.  
The delineation between the object of perception and action, and the perceiving 
subject is complexly problematized in Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility thesis. Our 
acts of perception cannot be considered as a unilateral ‘appropriation’ of the 
34 |  P a g e
Being in a Material World 
world. In ‘taking in’ the world, I do so from where I am located, what I can and 
cannot perceive, my ability to move closer to or further from what I perceive, and 
this synthesises with past experiences to inform current and future action. As such 
there is a reversibility or circularity to perception, rather than one side taking from 
the other.  Perception is a sensory-motor-affective interaction: the world and the 
things and people in it, touch us as we touch them. As bodily agents, not only do 
we act on things, but they also act on us. As such infants and toddlers no less than 
adults are mutually involved or intervolved, with the world and its inhabitants.  
As Ihde comments, ‘our whole-body perceptions are sensorily synthesized in our 
interactions with a “world”’ (Ihde 2002, 38).  
This reversibility thesis may be better understood by considering Merleau-Ponty’s 
concept of flesh, which is not necessarily bodily flesh, but ‘flesh of the world’, 
enabling us to grasp that:  
Everything depends, that is, upon the fact that our glances are not “acts 
of consciousness,” each of which claims an invariable priority, but 
openings of our flesh which are immediately filled by the universal flesh 
of the world. All depends, in short, upon the fact that it is the lot of 
living bodies to close upon the world and become seeing, touching 
bodies which (since we could not possibly touch or see without being 
capable of touching or seeing ourselves) are a fortiori perceptible to 
themselves. (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 16)  
Just as we are inextricably engaged in perception, we are simultaneously and 
undeniably able to be perceived. The mutuality of our engagement with the world 
allows us to understand that we are fundamentally the same, and different from, 
those things that we perceive and that perceive us. This primal intersubjectivity 
enables us to grasp our ‘fundamentally ambiguous identity-encompassing-
difference’ (Dillon 1990a, 81). Babies learn very early on, for instance, that they 
are different from, but like the other people and things that they perceive and that 
perceive them. This manifests through repetitive action and reaction, for example 
when crying elicits feeding or changing. The concept of reversibility appreciates 
that the observing eye or touching hand is an integral part of the world it 
perceives and not something that stands apart from it: ‘it must obey the same laws 
of motility, and adjust its own “I can” to the demands of the vision it interrogates’ 
(Dillon, 1990: 83). The notion that we are all body-subjects who inhabit the world 
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within perceptual space which is constituted by and constitutes our ability to act 
may now be extended to suggest that the perceiving acting subject is also 
perceived by and acted upon by the world. This may be illustrated in the case of 
baby feeding bottles. We may initially consider that babies act upon bottles, 
drinking from them, looking around or through them and feeling them, but we 
must also appreciate that the bottle has a material and textural agency, acting 
upon the baby, touching him or her, filling the child with its textures, tastes and 
smells, sating his or her hunger and informing the child’s perspective on the 
feeding experience. Reversibility then is the simultaneity of perceiving and being 
perceived; a process that allows intersubjective relationships between humans—
intercorporeality. Intercorporeality and primal intersubjectivity are terms which 
Merleau-Ponty uses interchangeably to indicate the fundamental relatedness 
between beings-in-the-world.  
By introducing the concepts of flesh and reversibility, Merleau-Ponty suggests 
that the world itself has a kind of embodiment and agency. Our ‘openness to’ the 
spatially non-coincident flesh of the world is precisely that which allows us to 
incorporate technologies and equipment into our own bodily organisation through 
repeated perception. It follows then that reversibility may describe the 
relationships between humans and nonhumans; and between non humans and 
non-humans, all of which are enabled in écart, which translates as a gap or 
distance. As the space between carer and baby widens, as it must, in the move 
from total dependence to independence, the baby’s perceptual horizons are 
broadened to allow other ‘flesh’ to enter.  Gail Weiss (1999) offers a useful 
explanation of the term as a space of non-coincidence that is articulated through 
action towards and away from other people and things within the world which 
resonates with Ahmed’s position referred to earlier (Ahmed 2010). In using a 
baby walker for example, infants are able to enjoy mobility which is enabled by 
the baby-walker combination. The walker alone cannot accomplish mobility 
without the baby or some other action, and very young babies are unable to move 
with such speed without the walker. It all relies on a mutuality enabled by the 
space which designates each as a separate entity, as they come together to achieve 
a particular action—that of semi-autonomous propulsion. The space of non-
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coincidence or the spread of écart is a necessary prerequisite to the formation of 
self-other distinctions and is a concept that I will return to shortly. Through this 
spread, the flesh of the world enters and ultimately allows us as infants to become 
aware of ourselves as discrete entities who exist more or less independently from 
other entities which are ‘like me but over there’ (Dillon 1990b, 89).  
As Taylor suggests, ‘there is a basic and inescapable articulation of perception, 
which is our awareness of things through our capacities to move among them and 
affect/manipulate them’ (Taylor 1990, 9). Given the non-coincidence of bodies in 
space, individuals construct specific understandings of the world from where they 
stand through their potential for agency within that world.  Furthermore, this 
specific point of view is not a fixed once-and-for-all position, but a dynamic 
process of becoming. This is so particularly in the context of childhood, where it 
is commonly understood that infants and toddlers are in the process of becoming 
older children, youth or adults, yet is often overlooked where adults, who are also 
always becoming, are concerned. With the passage of time and increased control 
over their own mobility and motility within it, the world is an agentic 
environment that changes in relation to the child’s own flexible corporeality. As 
Martin-Dillon notes: 
The fact is that the infant cannot live its mother’s flesh.  At least since 
parturition, the infant is a discrete body and lives its separateness.  Its 
mouth recognizes the transcendence of Mother right from the start 
(Dillon 1990b, 89).  
The fundamentals of this self-other difference is arguably settled in a child’s 
world by six months of age, and the significance of the non-coincident Other 
comes to operate at the pre-reflective level as a continuum of ‘like-me-but-not-
like-me’ (Dillon 1990b, 89). This continuum will, with the passage of time, 
develop to encompass the full range of experience, accounting for the 
identification of similitude and divergence in others, including non-human others, 
who are similarly in the world but ‘over there’ (89). Only from a position which 
argues for cognition devoid of experience, is it possible to suggest that the lack of 
conscious differentiation, such as that attributed to infants, equates to lack of 
differentiation altogether (89). 
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Our ability to act in and on the world, as well as our openness to be acted on 
within the world, is limited in some ways and amplified in others by the 
incorporation of tools and objects into our corporeal schemas. The corporeal 
schema is another of Merleau-Ponty’s concepts which, as Weiss (1999) explains, 
is ‘the dynamic organization of [our] bodies which renders [us] capable of 
performing physical tasks, an organization which unfolds in the absence of 
conscious intervention’ (Weiss 1999, 2). Through repetitive use, tools and 
technologies effectively become aspects of our corporeal schema in culturally and 
medium specific ways (Weiss 1999, 2). This is noticeable in the example of 
‘jumpers’ which are designed to hang from door frames which are clearly of no 
use unless a door frame exists from which to hang them. Consequently, through 
the notion of reversibility and its concomitant concept of flesh of the world, 
Merleau-Ponty situates equipment and technology in a primary relation to the 
body and as an aspect of embodiment. 
This is crucial to the investigation of children and their use of mediating 
technologies. The corporeal schema specific to very young children is one in 
which their capability to perform physical tasks is limited by their developing 
mastery of their own bodily movements. The flexibility, control and dynamic 
embodiment demanded by technologies is a key element in any account of 
children’s experiences of technologies. Weiss suggests:  
In order for human beings to “interface” with machines, in order for us 
to become one with our familiar, mass produced or even “one-of-a-kind” 
prostheses (e.g. glasses, clothes, artificial limbs, moussed-up hair, cars, 
watches, etc.), there must be, as Deleuze affirms, a strange space of 
disincorporation that makes incorporation possible (Weiss 1999, 120).  
The space of disincorporation, in the foregoing quote refers to the previously 
mentioned écart, or space of non-coincidence which is necessary for objects to be 
incorporated into our corporeal schemas.  Those actions in which we habitually 
engage entail incorporation of instruments into oneself, such that they ‘play a part 
in the originary structure of [one’s] own body’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 91). The 
body ‘understands’, that is, experiences harmony between intention and 
performance in the cultivation of such habits; the manipulation of instruments, 
equipment, tools and technologies is learned ‘when the body has understood it, 
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that is, when it has incorporated it into its ‘world’, and to move one’s body is to 
aim at things through it’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 139). For example baby walkers 
become a part of pre-ambulatory children’s capacity for mobility in the world. 
Through habitual use, even very young children’s bodies learn that by adjusting 
their orientations, postures and gestures, they can move from one place to another, 
allowing them with increasing confidence to aim at the world through the walker. 
In doing so, the walker becomes gradually incorporated into the child’s corporeal 
schema which extends and limits his or her possibilities for action in the larger 
environment of say, the lounge room. As such, the walker functions as an 
exosomatic corporeal device.  
It is important to also note that bodies learn these actions; they are not the reflex 
actions of an objective body, like recoiling our hand from heat or danger, nor are 
they actions which require conscious thought and/or planning; rather they are the 
realisation of action towards the flesh of the world which is enabled by the non-
coincidence of the technologies and our own body. This constitutes a ‘knowledge 
in the hands’ (a euphemism for body knowledge), which is forthcoming only 
when bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that 
effort (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 144). That is, our body and its instruments combine 
to act as the medium through which intention becomes action. In manipulating the 
walker, an infant experiences, ‘at every stage of the movement the fulfilment of 
an intention, that is, as a stage in one’s perpetual movement towards a world’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, 144-5). It is this perpetual movement towards the world, or 
opening onto the world, that has led phenomenologists to suggest that embodied 
agents are essentially être-au-monde, which literally translates to being-in-the-
world. 
The techno-body is the body we are in contemporary Western society. It is the 
body from and through which we perceive, act in, and which is acted upon within 
the world. So, to attribute either utopian or dystopian causality to technologies in 
relation to children’s agency rests on the naïve premise that children are not active 
participants in the world but ‘tabulae rasae to be inscribed by culture’ (Hodge 
and Kress 1988: 240). Yet, the perceiving, acting body is knowledge, and 
perception is the fundamental corporeal reality from which all subsequent 
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knowledge emerges. Furthermore, this fundamental corporeal reality structures 
and is structured within the world as a field of meaning and potential agency. For 
infants and toddlers therefore, we may conclude that the an emergent 
consciousness of themselves as distinct beings is a complex combination of fields 
of meaning and potential action, which not only structures and is structured by 
perception, but that this happens in relation to young children’s developing 
corporeality, and is enabled and constrained by the environment and mediating 
technologies within it. 
Ihde’s Post-phenomenology 
Merleau-Pontian phenomenology on its own, however, does not explicitly venture 
into the historical or cultural specificities of our lived experiences. Yet as beings-
in-the-world we necessarily exist in a particular time and place and the media 
spaces which facilitate our existence and constitute a perceptual field of potential 
meaning and agency are unavoidably culturally and historically embedded. Ihde’s 
post-phenomenology allows us to take greater account of how infants’ and 
toddlers’ embodied relations with technologies structure and are structured in 
particular ‘lifeworlds’ (Ihde 1990).  In using the term ‘lifeworld’ Ihde 
acknowledges that embodiment exists in a cultural context and understanding it 
requires that we consider both sensory perception and ‘a cultural hermeneutics 
that situates our existential life’ (Ihde 1990, 29-30). Acknowledging that bodies 
are not only existential bodies but are also culturally and historically constructed, 
Ihde notes that the technological ensembles we surround ourselves with, make up 
what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the worldiness of our world, or the facticity of 
our particular lifeworld.  Furthermore, Ihde’s definition of technology, coupled 
with the assertion that technologies mediate our existence and experiences within 
the world, as well as the impossibility of a technology free existence, allows us to 
consider media much more broadly as a subset of mediating technologies (Ihde 
1990).  
If we consider the example of a pram, we may concede that a child-pusher-pram 
complex only exists in certain cultures and environments. In order for such a 
complex to operate as it is intended, it requires a relatively flat and smooth 
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surface. Where these are not available, prams will be of little use. Where children 
primarily occupy spaces which are dirt, grass or other uneven surfaces, strollers 
may be superfluous. Thus, how we may experience the world cannot be 
considered a matter of individual choice, as the idealists would have us believe, 
nor is it imposed upon the powerless by the powerful, but is how the world as it 
presents in a particular time and place with attendant technologies, values and 
beliefs: it is always-already a part of cultural practices specific to our being-in-
the-world.  By virtue of habitual engagement with the tools and technologies as 
part of the flesh of the world, they are incorporated into our own becoming-in-
time. Consequently, as Weiss points out that:   
the techno-body... is...not a future body, but is our own bodies and 
bodily possibilities to the extent that they are discursively represented, 
psychologically constructed, and physiologically re-constructed through 
technological processes (Weiss, 1999: 106) 
A post-phenomenology, or phenomenology of technology, asserts that every 
experience is an experience of something and that we do not experience any 
material element of our world except in relation to us, or in terms of what it offers 
to us (Ihde 1990). As such Ihde offers us a multifaceted account of human-
technology relations which exist along a continuum from embodiment relations to 
alterity relations (Ihde 1990, 101).  Embodied relations are those where we use 
objects to encounter and manipulate things, for example eye glasses or a baby 
walker in a relation that may be diagrammatically represented as ‘(Human-
technology)       World’ (107). Hermeneutic relations involve a ‘reading off’ 
enabled by technology, as in the case with thermometers, x-rays and in some 
instances television, all of which require a technologically facilitated interpretive 
effort, which may be represented as ‘Human      (technology-World)’ (107) . In 
alterity relations, we experience technological artefacts as ‘others’ which possess 
a kind of independence as in the case, of computers and technologically enabled 
toys that speak, or in any other way display characteristics of liveness, represented 
as ‘Human       technology-(-World)’ (107). Ihde points out that this type of 
human-technology relation situates the technology concerned as ‘quasi-other, or 
technology “as” other to which I relate’ (107).  The three relations mentioned thus 
far are all foreground relations but we also experience technologies as background 
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relations; as the context for living which Ihde points out exist at the limit of 
embodiment relations (107-108). Such things include clothing, air conditioning 
and houses. Hence Ihde tells us that there is no one way to conceive of 
technology, but rather a number of ways in which we experience technologies and 
that our experience of technologies amplify or magnify and reduce or limit our 
experiences of the world, mediating how we understand our particular lifeworlds. 
In the case of the walker, for example, the technology amplifies babies’ 
experiences of relatively autonomous mobility but reduces her or his capacity to 
get close to things or to traverse unsuitable surfaces. 
Ihde, however, was not the first to consider the mediating capacity of a wide 
range of technologies, nor the link between bodies and technologies. 
Notwithstanding the prominence of content based media analysis, the term 
‘media’, even in media studies, has more than one meaning. As O’Sullivan et.al. 
point out, while the term is sometimes considered as a means of communication: 
often it refers to the technical forms by which these means are actualized 
(for example, radio, television, newspapers, books, photographs, films and 
records). McLuhan used the word in this sense in his famous dictum The 
Medium is the Message. By this he meant that the personal and social 
consequences of a new technological medium in itself are more significant 
than the uses to which it is actually put: the existence of television is more 
significant than the content of its programmes.  (O'Sullivan et al. 1994, 176) 
McLuhan’s stance argues that any technological medium is more significant than 
its content, in terms of the way it augments and constrains sensory experience. 
Having distanced himself from a preoccupation with content as it is generally 
understood, McLuhan extended his definition to include such things as, the 
spoken and/or written word, clothing, money, cars, games, houses, maps and 
weapons, to name but a few.  In doing so, McLuhan has opened a space to 
consider objects within material culture as mediating technologies, with medium 
specific characteristics in the context of the particularities of time and space. This 
insight allows us to consider an array of material objects as mediating 
technologies within the socio-equipmental environments of infants and toddlers.   
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Mediating Technologies and Material Culture  
The study of material culture is a growing interdisciplinary field which starts out 
from the premise that we cannot fully understand our social existence without 
understanding the materiality of our culture (Tilley 2006, 1). The field is 
primarily concerned with: 
The manner in which people think through themselves, and their lives and 
identities through the medium of different kinds of things…subjects and 
objects are indelibly linked. Through considering one, we find the other. 
(Tilley 2006, 9) 
Hence, as Tilley points out, in studying the ‘things’ with which we co-exist, we 
gain insights into cultural praxes, what they mean in a cultural context and how 
technologies mediate our being-in-the-world. All material objects may function 
on several planes of meaning (Calvert 1998, 69). For instance, Calvert proposes at 
least three planes of meaning, the technomic, the ideotechnic and the 
sociotechnic. The technomic is the practical or use meaning of an object or what it 
can do. The ideotechnic plane says something about the beliefs, values and tastes 
of the owner or user, and on the sociotechnic plane, objects express cultural 
values and beliefs (Calvert 1998, 69). Objects are material-discursive relations. 
As such we can see that material objects are not neutral but are rather discursively 
embedded and reproduce cultural norms and identities within cultures. Lally 
implicitly acknowledges the technomic, sociotechnic and ideotechnic functions of 
technology in her investigation of the significance of computers in domestic 
environments (Lally 2002).  Citing Robert Romanyshyn, Lally comments that: 
… things are perhaps the most faithful witness of all, and in their fidelity to 
us they function as extensions of ourselves, reflections and echoes of who 
we are, were, and will become. Those things in your room, for example, 
those simple, ordinary things mirror who and what you are, and situated in 
that room they give a shape to its space, they form it into a place, they 
outline a world...Staying in their place, they give us our place, and without 
such things in our lives we would have no place at all. (Romanyshyn 1989, 
193-4 cited in Lally 2002, 1). 
The objects with which we surround ourselves enable us to be ‘at home in our 
everyday environments’ (2). They are our way of making what are ostensibly 
houses into homes; turning them into places where we can feel comfortable and 
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secure (2). Lally further agrees with Calvert by stating that we increasingly 
negotiate and mediate social relationships and cultural forms through the 
incorporation of the objects in domestic environments into our own 
understandings of where we stand within the world (2).  As such, these object 
environments create ‘media spaces’ constraining and enabling possibilities within 
them. They mediate infants’ lived experiences within the world. For instance, 
baby monitors amplify babies’ capacity to summon care from another room, 
mediating the space between carer and child, and enabling carer supervision while 
constraining child-free time and space. As such they function on the technomic 
plane, but they also function on the ideotechnic and sociotechnic planes as well. 
On the ideotechnic plane, the use of a baby monitor is indicative of carers’ values 
and the importance they place on being available to their children. On the 
sociotechnic plane the baby monitors speak to the cultural value attached to very 
young children as well as a particular socio-economic status which supports its 
purchase.  
Constellations of artefacts ‘help uncover the nature of the everyday lives of 
children and the assumptions and concerns foremost in parents’ minds at any one 
point in history’ (Calvert 1998, 68-69). Calvert notes for example that the 
‘rejection and re-creation of everyday artefacts of childrearing’ that occurred from 
1750-1850 ‘indicated a profound change in society’s perception of the nature of 
childhood and in attitudes toward children’ (70).  Prior to the mid eighteenth 
century such childrearing artefacts as did exist were designed specifically to 
integrate children into adult society as ‘upright’ human beings as soon as possible 
(71).  By the mid nineteenth century, fears about the animism and unruliness of 
children had abated and a new set of artefacts emerged: ‘the crib, high chair, 
swing, and perambulator all served as barriers between the child and the adult 
world’ (71). The rationale was to contain children who had not yet learned to curb 
their ‘unruly behaviour’. Hence a whole range of artefacts were created to 
facilitate this separation, rather than trying to ‘force’ children to adopt uprightness 
with the aid of previously existing artefacts (70-71). As such, material culture is 
an important indicator of our understandings, not only of the social construction 
of infants and toddlers, but also of the ways in which very young children’s 
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bodies may engage in particular socio-cultural contexts by configuring 
embodiment and posture within containment.  
Particularly within the context of this thesis, our constructions of childhood are 
important, not only because they shape our understanding of what is at stake in 
the debates surrounding this or that effect of media, but also because our 
understandings of what a child is, informs our treatment, expectations and fears 
for children (Calvert 1998). Yet, despite this being an important consideration vis 
a vis the mediating potential of material culture, if we focus too sharply on the 
politics surrounding adult conceptions of childhood, there is a danger that 
children’s agency may be left completely out of the picture. We need to 
understand not only the symbolic meanings of material culture, but also children’s 
experiences of objects and the ontological and perceptual implications this offers, 
which is why the concept of affordances is useful.   
The term ‘affordance’ is used in different ways by two major theorists to inform 
its use. While each recognizes that affordances are a relation between an object 
and an organism Norman’s conception has been adopted primarily in relation to 
design and usability. For Norman: 
Affordances provide strong clues to the operations of things…Knobs are for 
turning. Slots are for inserting things into. Balls are for throwing or 
bouncing. When affordances are taken advantage of, the user knows what to 
do just by looking: no picture, label, or instruction is required. Complex 
things may require explanation, but simple things should not. When simple 
things need pictures, labels, or instructions, the design has failed. (Norman 
1990, 9) 
Affordance, for Norman therefore relates to design and usability in so far as 
particular objects are designed to enhance a preferred use. His understanding is 
thus useful in that it allows us to think about intended and unintended use, which 
is important in the context of very young children who frequently defy intention. 
Moreover, it facilitates an understanding of how things are designed for infants 
and toddlers within cultural frameworks of childhood.  
Gibson, on the other hand, offers an ecological approach which tells us that ‘[t]he 
affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or 
furnishes…It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment’ 
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(Gibson 1986, 127). As such, he conceives of affordances as ‘relation[s] between 
an organism and an object with the object perceived in relation to the needs of the 
organism’ (Hammond 2009, 205). In doing so, he recognizes that any organism’s 
existence is at least partially dependent upon environmental provisions and, that 
organisms act and react in their environment, not only to what is in the 
environment but also in relation to the possibilities, opportunities and threats that 
the environment presents (Sanders 1993, 288). This conception of affordances is 
more closely aligned to a phenomenological perspective, in that affordances vary 
for different bodies in relation to their own corporeal capacities and as such must 
‘be measured in relation to the animal’ (Gibson 1986), 127). Sanders elaborates 
on this understanding of affordances and underlines the usefulness of the concept 
to this thesis, in considering the particularity of the affordance relation between 
any object and very young children. He confirms that: 
What affords sitting down for an adult may not afford the same thing for a 
very young child.  
What aspects of an organism’s environment offer which affordances is thus 
very much a function of the organism’s needs, abilities, and general 
characteristics. Indeed, it is likely to change during the course of the 
organism’s life, as the organism undergoes developmental change. (Sanders 
1993, 291) 
Hence, both the organism and the environment can be considered to have agency 
and exist in a dynamic relation. As Sanders suggests ‘what an environment is is a 
function of the characteristics of the organism; what the environment “provides” 
in the way of “stimulus” is a function in part, of the organism’s activity’ (Sanders 
1993, 288). As such Gibson’s concept of affordances speaks to our imbrications 
with our material environments and resonates with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
flesh of the world. Both Merleau-Ponty and Gibson understand that embodiment 
is always embodiment in relation to environmental contexts and objects.  
Consequently while Norman’s affordances speak to the intentionality of design, 
Gibson allows us to look at the ontological relation between infants, toddlers and 
the things in their environment. For example, a spoon which is intended as an 
eating utensil, to an infant is sometimes an eating utensil, sometimes a percussion 
instrument, sometimes a hairdressing item and sometimes merely an object of 
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curiosity. Gibson’s account, therefore, furthers the contention that the 
incorporation of tools into our corporeal schema is a relation that is mutual and 
dynamic and allows for corporeal development and maturity.   
Winnicott’s Psychoanalysis 
The maturation process is central to Winnicott’s psychoanalytic theory, and also 
situates child psychology in relation to phenomenology, material culture and 
affordances, particularly through the concepts of the facilitating environment, 
potential space and transitional objects (Winnicott 1972). Winnicott’s concept of 
the facilitating environment as a safe holding space necessary for existence and 
maturation reinforces the complementarity of organism and environment and the 
inescapability of our being-in-the-world.  Like the concept of affordances, 
Winnicott’s psychoanalysis and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology allow us to 
consider infants and toddlers in relation to the materiality of their socio-
equipmental environments. The technological texturing of very young children’s 
lived existence is further enabled through Winnicott’s notion of transitional 
objects which enter into potential space, facilitating separation and exploration, 
the texture of which contributes to children’s understanding of how a secure 
world feels. Therefore, Winnicott offers us an understanding of the role that 
material objects play in the transition from total independence to relative 
independence.  
Despite their different foci, psychoanalysis and phenomenology have significant 
points of intersection, and Merleau-Ponty acknowledges the important 
contribution that psychoanalysis has made to our understanding of the importance 
of early childhood experience (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 96n). Crucially, Merleau-
Ponty notes that Freud’s contribution to our understanding of the continuity of 
being forces us to acknowledge that, infancy and adulthood are not disjointed or 
separate states of being but rather points along a continuum of existence. For the 
same reason, post-Freudian psychoanalyst Winnicott argues that the basis for all 
theories of human personality development is the notion of continuity (Winnicott 
1988). That is, we do not stop being one thing (a baby or a child) at some time 
during our lives and become something entirely different (an adult). Rather we are 
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in a constant process of becoming which starts at conception and ceases only with 
death. As mentioned previously too, Merleau-Ponty affirms that we draw along 
all our past experiences and bring them to bear in the present to act in ways which 
will impact the future, reinforcing the body-subjects’ mutability in their 
environmental contexts (Merleau-Ponty 1964). While Winnicott takes up Freud’s 
propensity to study infancy by looking back through the lens of psychopathology, 
he also studies infants themselves, as well as infant-parent and infant-object 
relations. That is, he studies infants’ being-in-the-world and more explicitly 
infants’ becoming-in-time-in-the-world.  
In life, humans pass through the stages of absolute dependence, on a trajectory 
towards relative independence—a state which is not achievable since we are 
always involved within the world along with others—and in many instances back 
again to dependence. We are, whether we choose to acknowledge it or not, 
inextricably linked to the world and its elements, including the other people who 
share it with us. We have already, albeit briefly, discussed the spread of écart and 
flesh of the world and how this situates us in an ongoing process of incorporation 
with the world. Winnicott’s particular take on this is through the notion of the 
facilitating environment and the emergence of potential space, which resonates 
with Merleau-Ponty’s écart as both consider the spread of facilitating 
environments.  
Infant dependency on the maternal provision, according to Winnicott, is a 
statement of indisputable fact and that we all, as a condition of our existence, 
move from dependence through to relative independence and towards 
independence and sometimes back again. The quality of nurture in the infantile 
stage of dependence is crucial to the emotional well-being of the child and 
ultimately the adult that the child will become-in-time. Winnicott’s conception of 
the facilitating environment, enabled in the first instance by the maternal 
provision of the womb environment, and without which there could be no infant, 
constitutes the primary relationship that an infant may have with the world and is 
reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of being-in-the-world which also 
acknowledges that environments facilitate being and offer nurture (Winnicott 
1960). This link between the world and the maternal is reinforced by such  
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matriomorphisms—the attribution of maternal characteristics—as mother earth, 
the mother country, mother nature, mother tongue, mother ship, and significantly 
when we are speaking of technologies, motherboard. Each of these terms 
implicates the safe holding spaces which facilitate and contain being.  
The facilitating environment however, both is, and exceeds the maternal provision 
and refers more generally to spaces of containment (Sofia 2000). While Merleau-
Ponty speaks of écart as the space of non-coincidence, Winnicott suggests that a 
potential space opens between caregiver and baby, a space which increasingly 
expands to enable and constrain access to the possibilities for action and 
experience that socio-equipmental environments afford. The world in both 
phenomenology and Winnicott’s psychoanalysis is the pre-given environment 
which facilitates being, agency and knowledge and the perceiving body-in-the-
world establishes the foundation from which all subsequent knowledge, including 
conceptual knowledge, emerge.  
Very young babies are not aware of a separation between themselves and the 
external environment in which they live (Winnicott 1957, Merleau-Ponty 1964b). 
Through the maturation process, the role of material objects is central to the 
transition from dependence to comparative independence; they intervene into the 
space between perception and cognition (Lally 2002, 28). While mediating 
technologies are not a part of an infant’s body, babies are not yet able to 
completely perceive that things belong to the world beyond the child, or the 
intersubjective world (28).  Winnicott has termed this evolving interface between 
the baby and the world as ‘potential space’ (28). This understanding of the 
continuum between the individual and the elements of the world is consistent with 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of écart, the space of non-coincidence, or ‘the double 
horizon of external and bodily space’ which precisely affords perception 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, 101).  Transitional objects offer us a more nuanced 
understanding of the mediating potential of technologies when used in 
conjunction with facilitating environments. The layering of transitional objects 
and facilitating environments allows us to understand how mediation is 
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overwritten and added to over time, and with experience and social exposure, to 
compound the affordances of environments as well as the mediating potential to 
perception and action.  
Yet, one of the most significant legacies of psychoanalysis is an account of the 
affective and emotional development of the unconscious, and how this contributes 
to conscious, rational cognition and intersubjective action. Ahmed’s account of 
‘happy objects’ makes this link between affect and action (or concern and 
conduct) explicit, noting that we seek to surround ourselves with those things 
which positively affect us, and distance ourselves from those which affect us 
negatively (Ahmed 2010). Winnicott’s account of concern and conduct, 
particularly in relation to transitional objects, links ontological security with 
texture, implicating affect, bodily potential and cognition. Recognising that media 
and mediating technologies are extensions and reductions of bodily senses and 
capacities allows us to consider that mediating technologies are also affective in 
that they elicit certain feelings and consequent action. As Ahmed tells us: 
The relationship between movement and attachment is instructive. What 
moves us, what makes us feel, is also that which holds us in place. Hence 
movement does not cut the body off from the ‘where’ of its inhabitance, but 
connects bodies to other bodies: attachment takes place through movement, 
through being moved by the proximity of others. Movement may affect 
different others differently (Ahmed 2004, 11) 
The foregoing quote underscores the link between affect, affordances and 
embodiment. We are drawn to things which positively affect us and shun those 
which affect us negatively (Ahmed 2010, 32). As such Ahmed notes that affect 
shapes our contact with objects (Ahmed 2004, 5) which necessarily impacts on 
affordances.  As Tom Fisher points out, Gibson’s account of affordances allows 
us to not only take account of ‘ “theoretical” or “cultural” knowledge’ but 
emphasises that knowledge is also gained through our physical interaction with 
objects in relation to the possibilities they afford us (Fisher 2004, 20). 
In écart, or potential space, Merleau-Ponty uses the term ‘chiasm’ to describe the 
primal intersubjectivity of flesh of the world. Chiasm comes from the Greek letter 
‘Chi’ or ‘Χ’ and refers to cross-bandaging (Dictionary.com). In cell biology it 
refers to a point of overlap where fusion and exchange take place in the first 
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stages of division. The major characteristic of a chiasmic relationship is 
reversibility which involves fusion and exchange in division. A chiasm is a 
relationship in which both sides incline or bend towards each other ‘interlacing, 
encroaching, and criss-crossing’ (Wynn 1997, 256). Wynn states: 
The human body is an exemplar sensible, a structure in which is captured 
and exhibited the general structure of the world. This body is in a reversible, 
chiasmic relationship with itself illustrated by the body’s ability to fold on 
itself. Using perception (vision and touch) and motility as his model 
Merleau-Ponty describes how perceptual regions of the body both overlap 
and intertwine (encroach), fold over and spread internally, and also how they 
criss-cross and overlap and intertwine externally with things and other 
humans in the world. (Wynn 1997, 256) 
Chiasmic relationships and the reversibility of flesh inaugurate the bodies of 
newborns into the world of object relations and collective perception (Wynn, 
1997, 256). Infants’ bodies, like all other bodies, are both sensible—able to be 
perceived, and sentient—able to perceive, which is what Merleau-Ponty meant by 
the double-sidedness of flesh. Each becomes a part of the other and 
simultaneously a part of the flesh of the world. Infantile bodies are sentient and 
sensible from the start (Wynn 1997, 256); they bond with their lifeworld because 
the things within their world are part of the same flesh: the flesh of the world. 
Chiasmic intertwining and flesh of the world facilitate our understanding of the 
ways in which we all experience the world on a sensory-motor-affective level 
which is overlain in the process of development with cognition, a position which 
reinforces the importance of studying infants’ and toddlers’ relations with their 
socio-equipmental environments as a way of illuminating the mediating capacities 
of material objects. 
Conclusion 
This chapter underlines the importance of considering the very materiality of 
things and how they become aspects of our embodiment, including our perception 
of the world and our place within it. Bringing together the complementary areas 
of phenomenology, post-phenomenology, the study of material culture and 
psychoanalysis with the concept of affordances allows for a more holistic 
examination of the potential for media and mediating technologies to co-opt very 
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young children’s experiences as part of a spectrum of their technologically 
textured world and the importance of it to their becoming in time.  
In this chapter, I have outlined the theoretical framework which will inform this 
thesis. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology was introduced as a way of restoring 
infants’ and toddlers’ bodies to their centrality in meaning-making. I also 
elaborated on the concepts of being-in-the-world, embodied agency, perception, 
flesh of the world, écart, reversibility, intercorporeality, body habit, incorporation 
and the notion of ‘knowledge in the hands’ and how the things with which we 
habitually engage become incorporated into our bodies enabling us to interact 
with the world through these exosomatic devices.  
The notion of ‘lifeworlds’ was introduced briefly to broaden Merleau-Ponty’s 
approach and enable us to take greater account of the ways in which technological 
ensembles in the domestic environment, and elsewhere, inform and reflect the 
shape of the what and how infants and toddlers may experience in relation to 
mediating technologies. Ihde’s definition of technology allows us to consider that 
technologies mediate our experiences of the world as well as discounting any 
possibility of a medium free existence (Ihde 1990). Ihde’s phenomenology of 
technics elaborates on the ways in which human-technology relations define our 
experiences of the world in a number of different ways by both extending and 
diminishing our perceptual and agentic possibilities. McLuhan’s dictum ‘the 
medium is the message’, opens a space to argue that ‘things’ other than merely 
television, radio, the internet and newspapers are also media, in the sense that they 
mediate our experiences and understandings of the world.  
The study of material culture moreover enables us to examine the potential of 
objects to shape the world that infants and toddlers inhabit and to take account of 
the social context of the objects we use in child rearing. Considering affordances 
in Gibson’s terms, has distanced the approach in this thesis from the behaviourist 
model of media effects by insisting on a relation with, rather than causal effects of 
mediating objects. As a means to further complement the interdisciplinary 
approach I will take in this thesis, Winnicott’s psychoanalysis was introduced to 
reinforce the notion of the continuity of being, facilitating environments, 
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transitional objects and their role within emotional development and cognition. 
Furthermore, this approach has provided us with the means to reflect on the 
importance of the texture of the world as children transition from total 
dependence to relative independence. This led us to consider the concepts of 
reversibility, chiasmic intertwinings, flesh-of-the-world and écart to highlight the 
complementarity of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Winnicott’s 
psychoanalysis, adding another level of complexity surrounding very young 
children’s development in relation to their socio-equipmental environments.  
In the chapters that follow I will apply this compound methodology to deliberate 
on the implications of a range of technologies with which very young children are 
intervolved. In Chapter Two I will initially consider the notion of facilitating 
microenvironments as proposed by Winnicott (Winnicott 1963) before moving on 
to discuss container technologies as an extension of the maternal provision and 
the facilitating environment. In that chapter I will discuss how high chairs, 
playpens, cots and technologies of mobile containment, such as baby capsules, car 
seats and strollers enter into children’s ontological and perceptual experiences of 
space. Subsequently, in the following chapter, I will discuss children’s developing 
understanding of themselves as discrete entities through their emerging object 
relations with feeding technologies, pacifiers and clothing. In Chapter Four, the 
discussion of toys and playthings will mark the introduction of technologies 
specifically designed for play and how these, in many respects, may be said to 
function as transitional objects, but exist on a continuum of technological 
mediation which is a precursor for children’s turn to screens. In Chapter Five, I 
will explore the medium of television, which some argue is still the primary 
entertainment technology with which very young children are involved. In this 
chapter I will suggest that very young children’s perception and ontology are 
mediated by television, regardless of their own understanding of media content, 
but in relation to how the screen has the potential to attract and hold attention, and 
how time and space are organised to facilitate the incorporation of television into 
homes. Finally in Chapter Six, I will elaborate on the relatively new phenomenon 
of infants’ and toddlers’ engagement with interactive digital media, focusing 
specifically on smart phones and tablets.  Ultimately I will suggest that the socio-
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equipmental environments into which infants’ and toddlers’ are born, and to 
which they are gradually introduced, shape children’s perception and ontology in 
relation to the materiality of the mediating technologies in concert which the 
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Being-in-Facilitating-Microenvironments 
It is only on the basis of dwelling that the cheese can be in the cupboard, that 
the wine can be in the flask, that the cave can be in the mountain, or that the 
person can be at home. All positions and locations refer us back to a 
fundamental manner of being-in-the-world, which must be understood as 
dwelling.  
If we take to heart this understanding of dwelling, then our perception of the 
place of dwelling appears changed. The home, the factory, the hospital, the 
laboratory, the city no longer appear in the first place as finished material 
things, as containers of people and their activities; rather these buildings 
themselves make their appearance as a certain embodied grasp on the world, 
as possible human stances, as particular manners of taking up the body and 
the world, as specific orientations disclosing certain aspects of a worldly 
horizon. (Jager 1983, 156) 
Dwelling, as proposed by Bernd Jager (1983) points to the connection between 
residing and bodily inhabitation as being shaped by and shaping how we come to 
be-in-the-world. This is of particular significance in this chapter which examines 
how the spaces infants and toddlers inhabit configure a range of human-
technology relations which texture and shape their world. Infants’ and toddlers’ 
development is necessarily imbricated in inhabitation of ‘technological cocoons’ 
(Ihde 1975, 13) or technologically enabled facilitating microenvironments. In 
what follows, these themes will be developed specifically in relation to very 
young children’s experiences of holding, dwelling and inhabitation in a 
‘technologically textured’ (Ihde 1990, 12) socio-equipmental environment.   
At the beginning of the 20
th
 century the technosphere within which infants and 
toddlers existed was very different to that of contemporary Western societies. 
According to Anderson and Evans (Anderson and Evans 2001, 10) day-to-day 
sights and sounds were familiar, with very little in the way of novelty. They 
suggest that apart from the business at the beginning and end of a large family’s 
daily activities, homes in the early twentieth century would have been relatively 
quiet for very young children, as they were entertained by family members in 
their leisure time with storytelling and music (10). By comparison,  audio and 
audiovisual media, from phonographs, radio, television, videogames, electronic 
toys, computers, and mobile phones have throughout the 20
th
 century turned many 
homes into what Anderson and Evans identify as ‘electronic entertainment and 
information zones’ (10). For this reason ‘there may be little waking time in the 
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lives of many infants and toddlers without the presence of media’ (10-11). 
Despite their rather nostalgic rendering of the pre-electronic domicile, Anderson 
and Evans are undeniably right to suggest that the world which very young 
children inhabit in the early twenty first century is markedly different to that at 
the beginning of the twentieth. As I argued in Chapter One, however, by focusing 
only on electronic or digital media, Anderson and Evans (2001) and others such 
as Jordan and Woodward (2001), and Rideout and Hamel (2006) overlook a 
whole world of mediating technologies and technologically enabled spatio-
temporal arrangements which predate both the child, and electronic or digital 
media.  
In this chapter I will go back to basics to examine the spaces that infants and 
toddlers inhabit, to argue that microenvironments, ‘inform and orient our social, 
personal, and bodily existence’ effectively mediating very young children’s 
experiences of the world and their position within it (Sobchack 2004, 136). 
Focusing on non-electronic environmental affordances is crucial to aiding our 
understanding that the process of mediation does not only include media but 
rather also includes mediating technologies. As such, I will examine some of the 
interconnected microenvironments that contemporary Western infants and 
toddlers inhabit within a post-phenomenological framework, to offer real-world 
illustrations of the theoretical perspective forwarded in the previous chapter. 
Ultimately, I will provide examples of the ways in which technologies of 
containment which hold very young children in various ways intersect with their 
corporeality, ontology and perception in and of the world.  
At this stage, I will not be considering the objects within these microenvironments 
at any length, as this will be dealt with in the upcoming chapters on primary 
objects, toys, screen technologies and interactive media. The bracketing off of 
technologies of containment into a discrete category allows us to consider the 
significance of spaces for very young children, and how these spaces enable and 
determine the perspective that infants’ and toddlers’ may command—their point 
of view—as well as their postures, gestures, orientations and mobility. I argue that 
holding spaces such as baby carriers, cots, playpens, highchairs, walkers, baby 
capsules, car seats, prams and strollers are unique to infants and toddlers—adults 
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are not contained in the same way—and that the specificities of human infants’ 
corporeal schemas in the early phase of absolute dependence significantly delimit 
their agency within the world. Since human babies’ motor skills develop much 
more slowly than many other animals, they rely on carers’ provision of 
nourishment, comfort, warmth, cleanliness and movement within and across 
space. As such, the human infant exists in a state of absolute physical dependence 
which necessitates holding in some form or another (Winnicott 1960, 46). As 
infants mature into toddlers and beyond holding changes and is often facilitated 
by technologies of containment. 
By focusing on microenvironments, this chapter will seek to illustrate that the 
world as it may be for the infants and toddlers in contemporary Western cultures 
constitutes a series of facilitating environments, or small nested environments 
which afford certain types of actions and experiences. In concentrating this 
chapter on the spaces which infants and toddlers inhabit, and how these may 
inform their perception and ontology, I will draw on the crucial concepts of ‘the 
world’, or more specifically ‘being-in-the-world’, as proposed by Merleau-Ponty 
(1962). In this chapter I will consider Winnicott’s (1972) concepts of the 
‘facilitating environment’ and the ‘holding phase’ of complete dependence and 
how holding transforms in concert with infants’ and toddlers’ developing 
corporeality and relative independence (Winnicott 1972).  
For Winnicott there are universally three stages of infant development: absolute 
dependence, relative dependence and towards independence (Winnicott 1972, 9). 
Given the continuity of adult life with childhood, we should recall that although 
we may strive towards independence we will never fully achieve it as we are 
undeniably involved with our environments, and the people and things within it, 
and that these stages are not discrete but rather part of an ongoing process. As we 
continue to be dependent upon environmental provisions, the facilitating 
environment remains an important aspect of our existence throughout life, and our 
being-in-the-world, as part of the flesh of the world, is an ongoing immutable fact 
of our existence. Primarily, however, I will consider facilitating 
microenvironments as they relate to infants in the primary stage of total 
dependence, before moving on to those which are more commonly used as the 
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child becomes more independent, to argue that the types of holding spaces that 
children inhabit allow them to see and touch some things and not others, as well 
as changing the perspective from which they may take in their surroundings. The 
specificity of each of the microenvironments analysed in this chapter—baby 
carriers, cots, playpens, highchairs, walkers, strollers and prams and baby 
capsules – further articulates the position that I have taken thus far, in arguing that 
the specific material properties of mediating technologies variously constrain and 
enable children’s capacities to actively engage with the world.   
Being-in-Facilitating-Microenvironments 
In this section I will revisit the phenomenological concept of being-in-the-world, 
which necessarily involves being in a context. By introducing the notion of 
microenvironments in houses and cars that are specific to very young children, I 
will suggest that they can be considered small environments; environments within 
environments, and often intersect with and overlap other environments. These 
microenvironments are places of significance which are constitutive of and 
constituted by infants’ and toddlers’ place within them, in concert with their 
capacity to aim at the world through them. This in turn, delimits what they may 
perceive, particularly what they may and may not touch, as they are intrinsic to 
the spatio-temporal arrangements of their lifeworld, enabling waiting, anticipation 
and arrival, regulating mobility, reach and sometimes vision, and at times doing 
all of these things simultaneously. In short, the infant- or toddler-world relations 
are mediated in part by technologies of containment. Aside from the facilitating 
environment of the womb or carers’ physical holding, the spaces that very young 
children inhabit are technologically enabled. That is, they are enabled by a 
number of various artefacts.  For example, a cot is one of the first instances of a 
technologically mediated microenvironment or small space which infants and 
toddlers inhabit, informing their early understandings of the world and their place 
within it. As babies’ capacities to move within, or out of them, and into other 
spaces develops, microenvironments become significant spaces of a different 
kind: spaces which can be transformed and traversed. Hence infants’ and 
toddlers’ emplacement within cots becomes more mutable and flexible in both 
significance and agency in response to the child’s developing embodiment.  
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Prior to moving on to speak about the types of technologically enabled 
microenvironments that very young children inhabit, it is worth spending a few 
moments on the concept of space. As Merleau-Ponty points out, his concept of 
being-in-the-world implies that we are all necessarily spatial beings. Just as all 
action and perception cannot help but be spatially situated; children’s developing 
embodiment is always evolving in, and in relation to, space.  As Haim Gordon 
and Shlomit Tamari tell us: 
My body is always at every moment living as a spatial being and relating 
spatially to other beings. Every color and form that I see is in space, every 
word that I hear comes from somewhere in space, as does every odor that I 
smell. All movements, all interactions of my body require that I live as a 
spatial being…Our body is of space because any human perception or action 
or movement in the world requires that the person’s body relate spatially to 
other beings. (Gordon and Tamari 2004, 70) 
Space, therefore, cannot be considered as abstract, absolute or universal, but 
rather must be thought of as an integral aspect of who we are, how we relate and 
interrelate with the world and others, and what we can and cannot do. Space, as 
Henri Lefebvre (1991) points out, is produced by living things moving about in it. 
As Lefebvre argues, ‘Cartesian logic’, which adheres to the primacy of the 
thinking subject, allowed us to consider space as absolute, universal and neutral: 
as an object which is perceived by a subject (Lefevbre 1991, 1). On this 
formulation space exists absolutely and independent of any perception of, or 
action within it, rather than as an integral part of being-in-the-world. 
As the above quote from Gordon and Tamari (2004) illustrates, any delineation 
between object and subject in relation to space is untenable as we cannot be, or do 
anything, unless we are and do in space. As embodied beings with particular 
dimensions we necessarily occupy space, we move about in space, we express 
ourselves in space and importantly we perceive in space. Hence as Gordon and 
Tamari aptly note ‘our body is of space’ (Gordon and Tamari 2004, 70).  
Lefebvre (1991) asserts that, ‘spatial practice consists in a projection onto a 
(spatial) field of all aspects, elements and moments of social practice’ (8). 
Consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) account of being-in-the-world, Lefebvre 
(1991) points out that, ‘human societies, like living organisms human or extra-
human cannot be conceived of independently of the universe (or the “world”)’ 
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(1991, 12). Lefevbre (1991) importantly recognises that space is experienced 
before it is conceptualised, and to assume the primacy of conceptual knowledge 
of space does not take adequate account of lived experience (Lefevbre 1991, 34). 
We should however, approach this assertion with some caution, as conceptual 
knowledge and lived experience are not mutually exclusive, but rather equally as 
aspects of embodiment and our embodied relations with our environment. 
Nonetheless we must recall that in the first instance we are embodied beings and 
that conceptual knowledge develops as a consequence of our embodiment 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962).The foregoing thus speaks to the primacy of embodied 
being-in-the-world and primary intersubjectivity in analogous terms to Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology. While cultural geography argues that ‘place’ is a more 
appropriate term to describe ‘profound centres of human experience’ which are 
sources of ‘security, comfort, stability, nurturance, belonging, meaning and 
identity’ (84), these qualities are inherent in both Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
being-in-the-world (1962) and Lefevbre’s ‘social space’ (1991, 34). Consequently 
throughout this thesis I will adhere to the concept of ‘space’ in this 
phenomenological and embodied sense with all of its implications for the 
specificity of human beings. Moreover it will be used to define 
microenvironments as small spaces that are inescapably lived, experienced, 
secure, comfortable and meaningful but also sometimes threatening and risky. 
Spaces are assigned particular uses, and thus meanings, and are consequently able 
to be considered social spaces, or spaces of social practice (Lefevbre 1991). Space 
produces and is produced by human activity; it constitutes and is constituted by 
embodied agency within the world. Lefevbre suggests that social domestic spaces, 
enclose and allocate appropriate places to people based on age and the general 
organisation of families (Lefevbre 1991, 32).  In this way they may be said to 
contain cultural understandings of the roles and appropriate positioning of bodies 
in familial hierarchies. Hence social spaces may be said to be the bearers of 
intelligence. Citing Gregory Bateson (1987) Sofia tells us that: 
Intelligence is not confined to the deliberations of the intending ego or 
cogito, but can be found in the changing patterns of mutual adaptation and 
co-adaptation undergone within and by the organism-environment ensemble. 
The environment itself is a bearer of intelligence (Sofia 2000, 183) 
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In Container Technologies (Sofia 2000), Zoe Sofia employs Winnicott’s 
theory of the facilitating environment of holding space to argue that 
technologies are facilitating, holding, containing environments, which are 
not empty (dumb) spaces but rather bearers of information. Consequently, 
container technologies, as conceptualised by Sofia, contain space—among 
other things—but space is implicitly smart space (2000). The ‘smartness’ of 
space emerges ‘in the dynamic mutual adaptability of environment to 
organism [and] organism to environment’ (183).  Smart space is thus a 
space of potential meaning and action which facilitates particular ways of 
being. 
As we mature we come to inhabit increasingly expansive and numerous spaces. 
Although Thrift (2006) does not explicitly refer to them in terms of 
‘microenvironments’ or ‘places’ he nonetheless implicates them in the following 
quote, which states that we come to inhabit:  
a constantly expanding universe of spaces and territories, each of which 
provides different kinds of inhabitation – from the border-ing provided by 
the womb, through all the things in the home that are just out of reach, 
through the corporeal traces of buildings and landscapes (1)  
Consequently I have chosen to consider ‘microenvironments’ in the plural, to 
signify the multiplicity of particular environments which very young children 
inhabit, the ‘different kinds of inhabitation’ afforded by them, and in terms of the 
situatedness of embodiment.  
While microenvironments are undoubtedly physical spaces, they are nonetheless 
also ‘social spaces’ which signify social relationships and social ‘standing’ while 
simultaneously facilitating particular points of view. Point of view in this instance 
should be read as emanating literally from our embodied being and thus where we 
are located within spaces, but also, more metaphorically as an ‘attitude to’ or 
‘stance in relation to’ something or other. I have also used microenvironments in 
the plural, to suggest that any one particular child, or indeed adult, may inhabit 
multiple specific environments consecutively and simultaneously, and 
furthermore, that these environments mutually adapt along with the people who 
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inhabit them. In this plurality of spaces, ‘social spaces’ map affinities between 
bodies and meanings (Shields, 2006: 148). As Thrift (2006), tells us, everything 
is spatially distributed, down to the smallest monad: since the invention of 
the microscope, at least, even the head of a pin has been seen to have its own 
geography. Every space is shot through with other spaces in ways that are 
not just consequential outcomes of some other quality but live because they 
have that distribution. (2) 
Infants, like adults, are primarily embodied perceiving subjects or body-subjects, 
who in-habit the world within bodily space which defines their ‘point of view’ at 
the level of embodiment, as the only view of the world that they can have 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, 101). Moreover, it is arrived at from ‘the double horizon of 
external and bodily space’, generating a perceptual field that defines the range of 
possible perceptual options within environments (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 101).  
In this instance I have deliberately chosen to use the collective pronoun, ‘our’, in 
recognition that there is an essential element which binds all living things: bodily 
existence. The notion of bodily existence implicates an ecological or 
environmental intercorporeality, or an intertwining and interdependence between 
living organisms and environments. Thus, as Acampora (1999) notes: 
one promising thread of organismic ontology proposes that existential 
residency might be an elemental world-relation omnipresent throughout the 
carnate (or at least animal) realm (119)  
This resonates with both the phenomenological notion of being-in-the-world as a 
philosophical ecology (Ihde 1990), and Gibson’s understanding of affordances as 
an ecological relation (Gibson 1986), in that each recognises the interdependent 
relationship that exists between ‘organisms’ and their environment. Thus as Wynn 
(1997) states:  
How the infant evolves in his (sic) specificity is dependent on the human 
environment within which he is anchored and its responsiveness to his 
interrogations and explorations. (262) 
As Bateson (1987) points out, ‘the unit of survival is a flexible organism in its 
environment’, which reinforces the contention that we cannot regard ourselves as 
existing as anything but a part of our lived environments (457). To illustrate this 
fundamental dependency, and thus, intrinsic link which we have with our 
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environment we may consider Winnicott’s (1960) argument, that is without the 
facilitating environment of the womb there could be no infant (Winnicott 1960, 
39n). This is an apparent and irrefutable fact of our existence, even with the 
increased possibilities allowed by genetic engineering and other reproductive 
technologies; without the facilitating environment of the womb, an embryo cannot 
grow to become an infant.   
Sofia (Sofia 2000) extends the concept of the facilitating environment to apply to 
it other spaces that we inhabit, in her article Container Technologies, in which she 
adapts Winnicott’s notion of the facilitating environment as the holding space 
which literally and metaphorically facilitates being. Hence, I suggest that it may 
be considered more generally as a space of nurture, or of socio-material provision. 
Sofia signals the reciprocity of our relationship with our environment, arguing 
that if we destroy our environment we destroy ourselves (Sofia 2000).  
The facilitating environments of cots, highchairs, playpens, walkers, baby 
capsules, car seats, prams and strollers are essentially holding environments or 
container technologies which serve to reduce the danger to infants when they are 
solely dependent upon carers  (Winnicott 1960, 47). As such, facilitating 
environments may be considered as not only the maternal provision necessary for 
survival, but environments which bear with them an ‘inherited potential’ to 
establish and maintain a ‘continuity of being’ (Winnicott 1960, 47).  Facilitating 
microenvironments provide the material conditions of existence, which as Lally 
suggests: 
may also act in an 'anchoring ' mode, as 'scaffolding' for the self, as 
placeholders which have a role for individuals in maintaining ontological 
security and a sense of self in everyday life.  (Lally 2002, 25) 
The holding environment is primarily a safe place which protects infants from 
physiological harm, taking account of their sensitivity to touch and temperature, 
their auditory, visual and skin sensitivity, their sensitivity to falling, and ‘the 
infant’s lack of knowledge of the existence of anything other than the self’ (49). It 
is a safe space in other senses, facilitating being in the most literal sense, but also 
enabling infants to develop an understanding of themselves as discrete beings-in-
the-world, by supporting the constancy of being (Winnicott 1960, 47).  However, 
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Winnicott’s notion of the facilitating environment, while taking account of 
facilitation does not allow for the delimitation or reduction of experience, action 
and perception that is implicit in containment.  
Facilitating microenvironments are significant spaces which both are, and exceed 
the maternal provision of nurture. They are spaces which constitute and are 
constituted by social activity, configuring how very young children may 
experience, perceive and act in the world. As such space cannot be considered as 
abstract or neutral but rather must be deemed to be an integral aspect of our 
being-in-the-world. This will be further illustrated in the following section on 
baby carrying technologies. 
Technologically Enabled Baby Carrying: Carer-baby-
technology complexes 
Baby carriers are some of the first and most notable extra-uterine technologically-
enabled facilitating microenvironments (small environments which facilitate 
potential action and perception).  In such a device the spread of écart between 
mother and child is minimal, allowing infant and care giver to move as one. The 
depth of the chiasm between carer, baby and technology constitutes a carer-baby-
carrier assemblage in which the technology becomes an aspect of both the carer’s 
and baby’s embodiment (Ihde 1990).  Consequently, the intertwining of 
caregivers’ and babies’ bodies in the moving-being moved of rocking: 
involves depth because they come close and simultaneously spread away 
into their own particularity. Their determinate qualities in this situation, for 
example, the way that the mother’s body folds over the infant in her arms, 
the corresponding manner in which the infant leans into the rhythmic 
movements of the mother and smiles as he is sung to, and the style in which 
the mother listens to the touches of her infant’s hands, are surfaces of “an 
inexhaustible depth” each brings to the encounter (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 
143). Their depth has been partially formed through a past of former coilings 
over of their own and other bodies, and the given particularities of a body 
that are those first ‘innate’ ways it has of folding into and over the world 
particular to its own contingency’. (Wynn 1997, 255) 
By enabling caregiver and baby to function ostensibly as a single unit, the baby 
carrier affords babies’ experiences of the reliability of the facilitating environment 
which nurtures the illusion in the infant that care happens in response to his or her 
felt sensations of bodily wellbeing or otherwise.  
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That is, it allows the infant to feel the caregiver’s warmth, heartbeat and breath, 
and hear their heart beating and breathing, and in this way allows a somatic 
remembrance of the prenatal experience. The gentle rocking motion generated as 
the caregiver walks acts to partially simulate the prenatal facilitating 
microenvironment of the womb. The baby held in the carrier shown in figure 2.1 
is also close enough to smell the breast milk of a lactating mother, to stimulate its 
production and enable breast feeding. As a secure space of containment which 
protects the child from physical harm baby carriers may be considered 
technologically-enabled facilitating microenvironments which inform infants’ of 










Figure 2.1 – Carer-baby-carrier Assemblage (Portablebaby.com)  (2005-2013) 
In this stage of almost total dependence, while an infant may become aware of 
their discomfort and can increasingly relate them to their own desires, they are 
dependent upon those needs or desires being anticipated and met on their behalf 
(Winnicott 1960, 46). As infants or toddlers move more towards relative 
independence, they develop ways to fend for themselves, at least to some extent 
(Winnicott 1960, 46). This is achieved through a gathering of ‘memories of care, 
the projection of personal needs and the introjection of care details’ which come 
from their developing confidence in the reliability of their environment, or as 
Lally puts it, their growing ontological security (Lally 2002, 25). Yet this should 
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not suggest that the caregiver is active and the child passive, for the world and the 
things and people in it, touch us as we touch them, incline toward us as we are 
inclined to them in a reversible intertwining relationship wherein each is involved 
with the other (Wynn 1997). As such, the move towards relative independence is 
also achieved by the child’s own developing corporeality and their increased 
control over bodily functions and motility as well as the gradually widening of the 
spread of écart and the flesh of the world that rushes in to fill it as the maternal 
provision recedes.  
The mediation of very young children’s being-in-the-world by the technological 
intervention of baby carriers is both historically and culturally specific. For 
example, while baby carrying devices have been used in African and Asian 
cultures for many years, they have only become popular in Western societies 
since the mid-1980s (Rose 2010). According to Rose, ‘the first structured baby 
carrier appears to have been developed in 1969 by a woman called Ann Moore’ 
yet it did not become popular in the United States until 1985 (Rose 2010). Hence 
carrying babies in slings and carriers, such as that shown in figures 2.1 and 2.2, is 
a relatively recent phenomenon in the Western world.  
In Western developed societies, baby carriers are recognised as technologies since 
they are manufactured for the express purpose of baby carrying. Yet this is not 
universal, even within Western societies, and certainly may not necessarily be the 
case in other cultures. For example, baby carrying may be done with the aid of a 
multi-purpose shawl—Rebozo—favoured in Mexico and Guatemala , a piece of 
fabric tied in a knot—Manta or Awayo—used in Brazil and Bolivia, a Pareo 
which doubles as a skirt in Tahiti, or a multitude of cloths or sheets used in 
Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, Egypt, China, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Laos and many other countries (Rose 2010). Each of these are, 
however, technologies, despite our propensity to think of them otherwise: they 
have a material element and enter into human praxes in relation to their 
production, design and use (Ihde 1993). Baby carriers are used differently in 
different environmental conditions and thus speak to an environment-tool 
relation. Blaffer-Hardy suggests that the ‘technological revolution’ of baby 
carrying may have enabled the spread of humanity out of Africa, up to 50,000 
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years ago by enabling mothers to carry food as well as their baby (Blaffer-Hardy 
























Figure 2.2 Example of Western Baby Carrier (Parenting by nature)  (2004-2012) 
There may also be differences between baby carrying practices of nomadic and 
pastoral cultures (Rose 2010). The use of slings for nomadic or foraging mothers 
overcame any need to leave their babies with other care givers while they foraged. 
Pastoral mothers were not faced with such problems as they were closer to their 
babies at all times, but a sling meant that babies could be fed without much 
interruption to daily chores (Rose 2010). Climate and other living conditions also 
influence the position and materials of baby carriers. In warmer climates such as 
those surrounding the tropics like Indonesia, Laos, Vietnam, Kenya, Egypt and 
Mexico, babies need to be fed more often and are thus, usually carried, at least in 
early infancy, on the front of the mother’s body as is also common in today’s 
‘baby wearing’ practices (Rose 2010). In the cooler climates of Scandinavia, 
Canada and other parts of North America babies were often placed in ‘cradles or 
hammocks,’ which were then strapped to ‘cradle boards animals or sleds for 
transportation’ (Solter 2001, 77). Largely, however, the positioning of the baby is 
a consequence of the necessity to be able to perform various tasks.  
In contemporary Western cultures, very young babies are typically carried facing 
towards the wearer as in figure 2.1 and 2.2. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) point 
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out ‘spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we 
have and that they function as they do in physical space’, and because of the sorts 
of bodies we have, our ontology is forward facing since that is the way we would 
normally move (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 14, 16). Yet in Western baby wearing, 
infants are positioned with their backs to the world, which elides babies’ 
possibilities for social interaction, which is consistent with the relatively modern 
notion that babies ‘belong’ to the person who is doing the carrying, and leaving 
them out of the network of interaction is considered appropriate. This is consistent 
with the change from the mid eighteenth to the nineteenth century, when, as we 
have seen, attitudes to children changed; where formerly they had been integrated 
into adult society as soon as possible, barriers were placed between children and 
the adult world (Calvert 1998, 71). The intimate carer-facing position also 
establishes a personal, nurturing and protective space between carer and child.    
The facilitating environment is very young babies’ habitus and includes all of the 
habits of holding and nurture. When things go well, in the holding environment, 
the care, and indeed the carer, go largely unnoticed and are experienced 
prophylactically as a mere continuation of the prenatal environmental provision 
(Winnicott 1960, 46,49). As such, technologies such as baby carriers act as 
exosomatic corporeal devices which mimic, to a greater or lesser extent, the 
maternal provision. Carrying babies in this way not only mimics the maternal 
provision but also affords a minimal spread of écart by allowing a deeper 
chiasmic intertwining of carer and infant.  
Western baby wearing affords caregiver action and perception, but imposes 
orientational, postural and gestural constrains on both carer and child, while 
simultaneously enhancing the carers’ capacities to adjust their own orientations, 
posture and gestures which may not be possible if they were carrying the baby 
without a carrier. See for example, figure 2.2, where the technology of the baby 
carrier allows the carer to carry a sleeping baby and simultaneously squeeze 
lemon into a beverage.  The perceptual horizon of the infant in this case is 
oriented toward the carer and the close proximity of carrier and carried delimits 
the baby’s possibilities for movement within the environment until such times as 
the baby’s embodiment has matured sufficiently to enable them to resist or exceed 
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their containment. Nonetheless, the mother-baby-carrier complex acts as a 
dynamic and variable ensemble which allows the child to experience the world 
through their own and their carer’s embodiment and through the technology of 
the baby carrier. As children get older they tend to be shifted to backpack 
arrangements, widening the spread because the back is further away from the 
‘face’ of the carer, and faces outwards towards the world, allowing more of the 
flesh of the world to fill it, while still providing a safe holding space. The older 
child’s perceptual horizon is thus expanded and their point of view is the same as 
that of the carer, preparing the child for relative independence.  
Cots (or Cribs): Emplacement and Motility 
Another example of a facilitating microenvironment which very young children 
inhabit is the cot, or crib. Cots are not only functional (technomic) spaces for 
infants and young children to sleep in; their design and manufacture is 
increasingly focused on their safety as a holding space. To manufacturers, cots 
mean many of the same things as they do to carers in that the importance of the 
safe holding environment is crucial. Cots, like other spaces of containment are 
manufactured and designed to cater for the variability of affordances they offer, 
and this must include uses for the child. Hence manufacturers need to take 
account of cots’ safety beyond their function as places for sleeping to allow for 
the possibilities of very young babies rolling, and toddlers climbing out. Cot 
manufacturers are painstakingly aware of the need for cots to be safe spaces 
which facilitate carer and infant separation while providing a flexible space of 
containment for babies. Also, in most of the Western world safety features are 
mandated.  As such, for manufacturers, parents and babies, cots are facilitating 
microenvironments. For manufacturers, cots must be doubly safe, given that the 
security of very young children’s embodiment lies in design and manufacture, and 
adherence to safety standards protects cot makers from litigation.  
Australian and New Zealand safety standards in cot construction and design have 
been in place since 1995 and are mandated under AS/NZS 2172:1995 (Australian 
and New Zealand Standards 1995). The standards regulate a number of safety 
requirements for cots and state that: 
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These requirements include material, design, construction, performance, 
labelling and marking, all of which are important for the well-being of 
children who use cots. (Australia and New Zealand Standards AS/NZS 
2172:1995) 
In recognising the need for safety, manufacturers and policy makers have been 
forced to recognise the potential risks that cots may also pose in the face of the 
diverse affordances that they may present infants and toddlers.  
Moreover, if very young babies are placed face down, they are not yet able to roll 
over which has risk implications for suffocation, consequently the arrangement of 
the safe body has changed in the last twenty years. While they cannot roll, from 
very early on, infants are able to ‘squirm’ forward, but not backward, so the 
inclusion of soft toys, or bumpers, like the one shown in figure 2.3, provide 






Figure 2.3 Cot Bumper 
The capacity to ‘squirm’ forward may facilitate a baby’s first encounter with a 
hard surface that does not yield. From this type of encounter babies learn that 
bodies and objects do not coincide, informing the child’s understanding of him or 
herself as a discrete entity in the world along with material objects. Furthermore, 
as cot spaces are usually dimly lit and away from the noise and activity of the rest 
of the house, babies come to learn that there is a place for ‘sleep’, characterised 
by containment, quiet, and limited activity and light. 
The world as it may be for very young babies is a world experienced on the 
sensori-motor-affective level. Yet what they may experience is largely a matter of 
their containment and emplacement within the world in the early months of their 
lives. Since their motor skills are immature, their emplacement within any 
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environment, as well as the physical characteristics of the microenvironments 
themselves, mediate infants’ experiences of the world in an organic relation of 
flexibility, adaptability and resistance (Jager 1983). That is, the physical 
characteristics of the technologies which contain very young children, in concert 
with the child’s developing and gradually organised corporeal schematics 
facilitate and constrain experiences of movement, orientation, posture and 
gesture.  
For example, at the beginning of my research Emily and Kane were unable to 
walk or crawl, although they were able to sit unaided and roll from side to side 
and back to front. Each had their own cot which was positioned against a wall on 
opposite sides of the room, imposing to some extent particular points of view—
what they could see was, in part, a consequence of the positioning of their cots. 
There was a window between the heads of their cots and while each child could 
move sufficiently to see something beyond the window, what each saw was 
limited by their ability to move, crawl, stand, sit or roll over. This configuration 
enabled the experience of light and darkness. The foot of each cot faced, more or 
less directly, towards the bedroom door, permitting them to see people as soon as 
they entered the room as well as the traffic up and down the hallway when the 
door was open. The very doorness of the door is significant too, in that it allows 
caregivers to open or close-off sights and sounds and potentially other 
experiences to the twins.  While the cots themselves were in relatively fixed 
positions within the room, the twins’ developing embodiment enabled them to roll 
over, and change their position within the cot to attend to toys, mobiles, the 
window or the door, albeit in ways which are regulated by the cot-structure and its 
placement within the room. The cot environment may therefore be considered as 
flexibly accommodating the babies’ developing corporeality.  
With their developing embodiment, the twins were able to change their 
perspective and cultivate body habits facilitating use of the cot as an aid to pull 
themselves up onto their feet, enabling them access to broader points of view. In 
this way, the cot enters into an embodied relation with the child to afford 
experiences of the world both with and through the cot, effectively mediating 
perspective and other capacities to act in relation to it (Ihde 1979). Their growing 
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mastery over their own bodily movements, facilitated in the safe space of the cot, 
hence allowed them to adjust their comportment so that they could see each other, 
see out of the window, lie on their backs looking at the ceiling or the mobile, or 
play with their feet or whatever else was at hand. Thus as children’s embodiment 
develops their world expands, and the spread of écart widens, permitting more of 
the flesh of the world to enter into their perceptual fields, literally expanding their 
horizons. As such the cot transforms from a space for sleeping to a more flexible 
holding environment that affords greater possibilities for action.   
Although it is tempting to consider that placing young babies in cots, cradles or 
other technological holding artefacts may only limit what they can experience, we 
must recognise that babies experience a world consistent with cot inhabitation. 
That is, they can see, touch, taste smell and hear things both within and beyond 
the cot which are specific to their emplacement within it and their own 
embodiment. For these reasons, while cots generally are holding environments 
which protect children from harm to their wellbeing, very young children’s 
situatedness within them constitutes a particular cot habitus, with constraints and 
enablements to mobility, and consequent perception, as well as encouraging 
habits of sleep. As babies’ bodies are their opening onto the world, their 
emplacement within cots enables them to take in the world in specific ways which 
are often soft, warm and spacious but which are bounded by unyielding, often 
slatted sides, which facilitate sleep but also visual exploration of the world outside 
the cot in a regulated way. As children grow older too, the relatively static, yet 
flexible environment of the cot may afford a wealth of perceptual opportunities 
consistent with the child’s maturing corporeal schemata. The distance to the 
caregiver is wider for the cot dweller than for the carrier dweller and the flesh of 
the world which fills the widening écart is rich with the textural features of the 
sheet, pillow and/or blanket against the baby’s skin and the smells which 
accompany them, constituting but also mediating how the world is and can be for 
them.  
Apart from being a place to ‘learn’ the habit of sleep, cots serve a number of other 
functions, not the least of which, as I have already mentioned, is to hold babies 
safely in place and to protect them from physical harm. Yet, cots like baby 
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carriers are culturally specific and variable in their use. They can, for instance, be 
used for sleeping, play, watching television or videos, for storage, to keep babies 
safe by preventing them from touching hot or sharp things or prevent pets and 
other children from touching them. They can block a doorway; act as a climbing 
frame, a punishment, a place to read, or even a vehicle within the home! In 
wakeful periods when babies are not crying, cots can afford safe containers for 
young children which allow carers some time and space of their own, or briefly 
engage in other activities, such as a shower, housework, watching television or 
making a phone call. Cots also present opportunities for caregivers to gradually 
withdraw the parental provision, while still being able to reappear reliably to 
reinforce babies’ experience of the continuity of care. In doing so, it allows the 
infant to gradually be introduced to more and more of their environment without 
compromising their ontological security, unless of course the carer does not return 
in response to the babies summons through a call or cry. When the body-cot 
relation is exceeded through corporeal maturation from infant to toddler, the 
assemblage changes to one which affords climb-into-ability, climb-out-of-ability, 
climb-on-ability, yet it still retains the affordances of sleep, play, reading, safety, 
and potentially isolation and boredom.  
Especially in early infancy when babies are fully dependent, they are always held 
in one way or another; whether it is in arms, carriers, cots or prams, their early 
experiences are of holding which shifts from one space to another. As the infant 
develops, this experience includes resistance to, and liberation from holding, as 
containment increasingly becomes a challenge to be overcome. For infants and 
toddlers, the cots’ possibilities are dynamic and flexible in response to the child’s 
own maturing embodiment. Cots offer rich textural features, sensory experiences, 
changing points of view and possibilities for action. They inform the child’s 
understanding of their place in the world at a particular time and place, and while 
they may be waiting or sleeping spaces, they are also playing spaces. Cots too, are 
a part of the flesh of the world which fills the gradually widening space of écart 
between carer and child—which must exist for perception to take place—and 
presents itself to the child, to take into his or her understanding of the world. As 
Merleau-Ponty reminds us, our glances are not ‘acts of consciousness…but 
openings of our flesh which are immediately filled by the universal flesh of the 
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world’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 16). Hence for infants too, it is a safe place which 
facilitates a growing understanding of themselves as discrete beings, who can act 
and be acted upon within the world in relation to the cot as mediating technology. 
They are invocative spaces which nurture an expectation of appearance and 
disappearance. They are places of waiting and arrival. 
Cots are thus microenvironments which facilitate the gradual acquisition of body 
knowledge. The sides of the cot, for instance, present themselves to babies as a 
means to augment their capacity to act within their environment. As any parent 
will know, babies who are not yet able to stand unaided, use the sides of cots to 
pull themselves into a standing position. The perceiving acting body is knowledge 
which is the fundamental corporeal reality that organizes and is organized within 
the world as a ground of meaning and action. Through repetition, babies’ 
corporeality, which is initially relatively indifferent to conscious intention, learns 
the habits of standing, and bouncing by incorporating the cot into their corporeal 
schematics unaided. That is, conscious intention emerges and develops in tandem 
with the capacity of the body to take part in the affordances of the cot. Hence cots 
operate as a field of meaning which augments infants’ agency within the world, 
informing their primary corporeal reality. While cots afford standing and 
bouncing inhabitation, the softness and consequent instability of the mattress does 
not readily afford walking. The repetition of attempts, failures and successes, 
informs the cultivation of body habits which develops into children’s future 
capacity to stand, and ultimately walk. Initially, the cot sides will be at the 
forefront of babies’ attention but as the child’s corporeal schema incorporates 
them into their capacity to act they become an unnoticed aspect of their 
embodiment. The corporeal schema constitutes body knowledge, which is 
forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated in 
detachment from that effort (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 144). That is, our body and its 
instruments combine to act as the medium through which intention becomes 
action. The cot recedes into the background, only to become the focus again when 
the body exceeds the cot, and enablement becomes constraint and barrier.   
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Playpens: Variable Containment 
While cots represent a specific type of containment that encourages habits of 
sleep, playpens, while they may be used in this way, are spaces of containment 
which are designed for safe play. This section will consider how very young 
children experience playpens and how playpens mediate their experiences of the 
world, partially imposing a point of view, but also offering opportunities for 
flexible affordances in response to children’s maturing corporeality, and 
facilitating the cultivation of body habits. A playpen is another highly regulated 
and disciplined space. Playpens come in many shapes, sizes and designs, but the 
common marketing rhetoric surrounding them emphasizes their protective 
qualities. For example, the Baby Equipment Hire webpage describes the playpen 
as, ‘A safe environment out of harms (sic) way for when your back is turned…the 
playpen is a handy safe play area for your child’ (babyequipmenthire.com.au). 
Containment is a key concern and playpens are another mediating technology 
which caters to our concerns for infants’ and toddlers’ safety.  
The mothers who participated in this study expressed a need to be assured that 
they could leave the room to attend to other necessities, like a shower or 
housework, knowing that their children were safely contained in some way or 
another. When I first visited Christine, Steve and the children, I asked them if 
they had a playpen for eight month old Molly. They answered: 
Steve: We have got a playpen but we only tend to use it to put over the top 
of the heater (laughs) (excerpt from interview with Christine and Steve 
15/7/2005) 
This demonstrates the flexible affordances that playpens offer to parents: spaces 
to contain children, but also spaces to contain things that we do not want children 
to touch.  The above excerpt illustrates that safe spaces are not only spaces which 
partially contain but can also be spaces which partially shut out; they are both 
‘keep-in’ and ‘keep-out’ spaces which inform babies’ understanding of reach and 
not-reach, setting up particular body-object-world relations. Yet, while playpens 
determine what very young children may touch and taste, they do not constrain 
audition and only partially inhibit vision, affording a regulated perspective. 
 







Figure 2.4 Wooden Playpen 
 
Figure 2.5 Moulded Plastic Playpen  
Christine’s first playpen was similar to that pictured in figure 2.4. By my last 
visit, Christine had got another playpen. Unlike many playpens which are 
reminiscent of wooden, or aluminium cages like the one in figure 2.4, Christine’s 
playpen was made of moulded plastic (see figure 2.5).  This type of playpen, 
while being more durable and potentially safer from splinters and rough edges, 
offers additional visual and kinaesthetic interest for babies. It is brightly coloured, 
a characteristic which is often used in a number of child specific contexts to 
signify ‘kid’s space’ as distinct from adult spaces. The playpen in figure 2.5 has 
movable parts for its inhabitant/s to manipulate, adding visual, haptic and aural  
interest and affording additional possibilities of play-with-ability, push-out-ability 
and make-noise-ability to name but a few. It has thicker walls, effectively 
rendering it a less visually permeable space than the cage-like playpen in figure 
2.5, yet it allows for things like arms and toys to pass through it.  Playpens are 
also mobile containers which offer different affordances dependent upon the 
places they are put. For example if a playpen is placed on a tiled floor, it affords 
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different experiences to those afforded if it is placed on grass or gravel in the 
yard. The playpen can slide around on the hard, flat, relatively shiny tiles whereas 
the uneven but relatively soft grass will not allow this, and grass or gravel may 
make it easier to catch and topple over if the child attempts to slide it. The feel 
under foot, hand, back, bottom or head likewise may be softer on grass than on 
tiles or on tiles than on gravel. Babies are also more likely to get dirty, cut, bitten 
or eat something which is not necessarily hygienic on gravel or dirt, so the 
placement of a playpen contributes to its ambiguous status of as a safe container.  
Hence the affordances of playpens intermingle with the affordances of the 
environment, such as toppling over or sliding, compromising the safety of the 
child-playpen assemblage. 
On the occasion of my last visit to Christine’s home Emma had dropped her four 
children by for Christine to baby sit while she attended an appointment. This 
meant that Christine had seven children under the age of five in her care—quite a 
handful! As the twins were the only children who could not walk, Christine 
placed them into the playpen in the corner of the playroom where the other 
children were playing. This illustrates the ‘keep-in’ and ‘keep-out’ character of 
facilitating microenvironments referred to above. Not only did the playpen safely 
contain the twins so that they could not hurt themselves, it also protected them 
from being stood on or tripped over by the other more mobile children. The risk 
then, is reciprocal, alleviating risk from others and risk of the child’s own 
exploratory ventures.  
The twins were unaccustomed to being contained in a playpen as Emily did not 
have one. Kane initially sat with his back to one of the side walls, basically 
remaining where he had been placed. Emily sat in front of him at right angles to 
the wall. For several minutes both babies sat relatively immobile on the ceramic 
tiled floor. When Kane and Emily were seated in the playpen, their head height 
coincided with the thick part of the playpen with the brightly coloured shapes in 
it. As such, the playpen afforded particular visual perceptions consistent with 
quasi-aloneness, offering all the pleasure and displeasure of a game of ‘peek-a-
boo’.  









Figure 2.6 Quasi Aloneness 
As children become more able to move about, the visually mediating capacity of 
this type of playpen changes and becomes more mutable. Despite the apparent 
constriction of perceptual opportunities for a relatively immobile Kane, a more 
mobile (older) child experiences it very differently, as will be discussed in more 
detail in the context of Jacob’s engagement with the playpen. Furthermore, while 
playpens compared to rooms constrain less mobile children’s point of view, this 
particular playpen offered different possibilities for agency as places for playing 
than a cot as a place for sleeping or a baby carrier as a place for holding.  
Playpens are bigger than cots, and offer much more room, and consequently, 
opportunity for children to adjust their bodily comportment, including their 
orientation, than in a baby carrier or cot. Hence a baby who is able to roll over or 
crawl can avail themselves of varying points of view both within the playpen, and 
of the world beyond it. Furthermore, this particular playpen offers inbuilt 
activities in the form of the movable plastic shapes which babies can manipulate 
dependent upon the maturity of their embodiment and consequently their capacity 
to move to or reach them. The playpen is also placed in the ‘communal space’ of 
the family room where eating, noise and mess are permitted, further denoting it as 
a play space as distinct from the bedroom and cot which are designated as 
sleeping spaces.  
Although Kane was relatively immobile, in that he was not able to walk or stand 
without assistance, he was able to extend his reach in the world by using the very 
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thing that contained him: the playpen became an aspect of his embodiment.  The 
playpen constitutes a holding space, but more importantly, a facilitating 
microenvironment, which enabled him to act in a way that he could not, without 
it. The playpen thereby functions to augment babies’ developing corporeality, 
supplementing their developing embodied capacity to act. 
While many of us may take standing for granted, we should remember that it is an 
achievement: the realization of repetition and the cultivation of a body habit. As 
also mentioned previously, babies, almost invariably, use things that afford pull-
up-ability to assist their bodies to learn to stand, and often walk. Initially, once a 
baby is able to sit unaided, they reach up and out to come to grips with the world. 
The opening of their flesh is filled with the flesh of the world, including the flesh 
of both cots and playpens. Rather than considering that the child unilaterally 
appropriates the playpen, we should recognise that the playpen presents itself to 
the child as an agentic environment to be inhabited and that the affordances are 
flexible as the child-playpen relation evolves. Like eating or driving a car, 
standing is a body habit which constitutes an achievement of the body for, and 
play an integral role in the primary organization of our own bodies. Our bodies 
come to understand, or experience ‘harmony between intention and performance’, 
in cultivating such habits (Merleau-Ponty 1962). As Merleau-Ponty points out, ‘A 
movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has 
incorporated it into its “world”, and to move one’s body is to aim at things 
through it’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 139). 
Very young babies’ attempts to realise a harmony between intention and 
performance is less successful than that of older children and adults, often leading 
to frustration and anger. The synchronicity between purpose and execution is a 
process in which the playpen, in this instance, plays a part. Due to Emily’s more 
mature mastery over her own body she was standing and playing with a toy that 
had been placed in the playpen. Kane, on the other hand used the playpen to pull 
himself up into a standing position, plopped back down, pulled himself up again 
and then released his grasp on the playpen with one hand to reach out toward the 
activity centre that Emily was playing with. Unable to reach it while still holding 
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on, he sat back down. After another moment, with the assistance of the playpen, 









Figure 2.7 Kane Using Playpen to Stand 
In performing these actions, Kane body was learning to stand and the playpen 
which initially existed in an alterity relation to him, was already becoming an 
aspect of his embodiment and receding into the background of his awareness 
(illustrated by his releasing his grasp on the side with one hand), thus becoming 
an integral part of his ‘I can’. Shortly we will explore how as children’s 
corporeality matures, just like a cot, the playpen returns to become ‘other’ again 
as it loses its significance as a container and enters into a different kind of 
embodiment relation.    
Once Kane was securely on his feet, although he was still holding on to the side 
of the playpen, he explored the side of the pen with his mouth, consistent with 
Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that infants’ bodies are buccal bodies (Merleau-Ponty 
1964 (B)). Buccality is part of very young children’s body-world relation and is 
integral in testing the boundaries of both body and world. Babies primarily 
explore the world with their mouths whereas adults tend to primarily explore the 
world with their hands and eyes. Nonetheless, we should remain mindful that all 
of us experience as a plenary gestalt, using all of our senses to experience despite 
adult tendencies to be ocularcentric. As well as exploring the playpen with his 
mouth, Kane also examined the texture of his containment, exploring the vertical 
bars, and indents and shapes set into the walls with his fingers.   
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He stood for a while, which let him to see over the side, broadening his perceptual 
horizons, and allowing him to watch Jacob who was looking at a book, something 
Kane was very familiar with, since his mother read to the children often. He 
chewed again on the side, exploring its texture with his mouth, then released one 
hand and tried again to reach the activity centre. Emily used the side of the 
playpen too, but since she was already able to stand unaided, she used it to enable 
her to walk around its perimeter, something she would have been unable to do 
without the playpen to help maintain her balance.  
While still holding on with one hand, Kane bent his knees and crouched down to 
touch something on the floor, stood, crouched to touch the activity centre, stood, 
reached out to hold the playpen with two hands, let go, crouched and stood again. 
At this point he smiled in my direction then crouched. He looked through the gaps 
in the playpen as if to check that I was watching, crouched lower, rose up a little 
to look at me, then crouched lower again. His pleasure was obvious by the broad 
smile on his face. The playpen affords a see and not-see experience and functions 
to facilitate a game of ‘peek-a-boo’ which is one of very young children’s first 
jokes. Sutton-Smith (2008) defines jokes as a type of play which displays a 
representational freedom to transform the world allowing children to overcome 
the ‘stuffy and bossy adult word they encounter’, sustaining and generating 
pleasure in the mundanity and even danger of everyday life (Sutton-Smith 2008, 
94) 
While Molly, who was eleven months old was not interested in the playpen at all, 
something about the playpen apparently appealed to nearly thirty two month old 
Jacob. While the twins sat in the playpen, Jacob’s more mature embodiment 
afforded him different body-environment limits so he climbed over the wall and 
into the playpen with the younger children. In this instance, therefore, the playpen 
ceases to be a container and becomes a permeable climbing apparatus. Kneeling 
and holding onto to the side with one hand, he hit the shapes repeatedly with his 
fist until they came out and clattered onto the ceramic tile floor. After a short 
while he put one leg through the hole where one of the shapes had been, steadying 
himself by holding on to the top of the playpen. He then climbed up to sit on the 
side of the playpen in a corner as shown in figure 2.9. What was a flexible, 
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facilitating enclosure for the twins became a climbing frame for Jacob whose 
corporeality was sufficiently developed to allow him to experience the playpen as 
an object to be traversed. 
 
Figure 2.8 Permeable Climbing Apparatus 
Jacob’s interaction with the playpen as well as the previously mentioned ‘keep-in’ 
‘keep-out’ functionality of the playpen for parents, reinforce the distinction 
between Norman’s functional understanding and Gibson’s relational notion of 
affordances. It illustrates that regardless of affordances in Norman’s sense, which 
should signal what a device is meant to be used for, the device affords a number 
of unintentional uses to very young children’s indiscriminate experiencing and 
fragmentary corporeality that has not yet learnt the culturally appropriate way to 
use, in this instance, a playpen. It is for this reason that both Norman’s and 
Gibson’s understandings of affordances are useful to this research in different 
ways: Gibson’s because it takes account of the flexible and dynamic relationality 
between affordances and corporeality, and Norman’s because it allows us to 
access some of the rationale which informs the design and manufacture of objects 
made specifically for very young children.  
With seven month old twins, a three and a half year old and a four and a half year 
old, I asked Emma if she had a playpen. Her response was as follows: 
Emma: No. I would like to but I’m starting to think it’s probably already a little 
bit too late. I think you have to have them in it and used to it before they get 
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mobile. But I’ve got a friend who’s going to give me one hopefully in the next 
week… I think I’m going to have to ‘cause they’re going to start grabbing each 
other and pulling people’s hair and grabbing each other’s eyes…(excerpt from 
interview with Emma 1/7/2005) 
The foregoing excerpt captures the inescapable ambiguity, and her own 
ambivalence to containing children, and hence the ideotechnic meaning of 
containment technologies. Emma’s reluctance to use a playpen despite a possible 
need for it has an ideotechnic dimension that says something about Emma, and 
more particularly her understanding of the affordances of playpens as 
obstructions, constraining exploration and development. That is, Emma preferred 
her children to explore their environment encumbered only by their own 
immature embodiment. Her reluctance to contain her children is encapsulated in 
the following response when I asked her if she had used a playpen for the older 
children: 
 Emma: I didn’t agree with them for my first baby. (Excerpt from interview 
with Emma 1/7/2005) 
She did however concede that having the four children had changed her 
ideas about playpens: 
Emma: I think they make a lot of sense because you can’t have a shower 
without worrying, you know just stuff like that. I’m doing things differently. 
(Excerpt from interview with Emma 1/7/2005) 
Linda and Philip too, offered an insight into their attitudes to childrearing and 
containment generally, and particularly, playpens:  
Philip: She didn’t dig it that much at all to start with and… 
Linda: You put her in there and she would just scream  
Philip: It almost got to the point where we could have used it as a time out 
thing, because she just didn’t dig it you know, ‘that’s it you’re going to jail for 
five minutes’ (excerpt from interview with Linda and Philip 17/7/2005) 
Likening a playpen to a jail not only gives us an insight into Philip’s 
understanding of the type of mediating technologies that playpens are, but is also 
reminiscent of cots, which have multiple affordances including use as places of 
isolation and boredom.   
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In the interview Emma suggests, on the one hand, that children need to learn the 
habits of containment before they are able to go beyond it, yet on the other, she 
points out that the more mobile they become the more they need to be contained, 
to protect themselves as well as others. Emma’s position resonates with 
Christine’s statement which further implies that playpens oscillate between being 
‘keep in’ and ‘keep out’ spaces: 
Christine: I wanted to but because Molly started crawling so young as soon as 
she started crawling I thought “oh well, I’ve probably missed the boat’ ‘cause I 
don’t know that she’d be happy to be stuck in a playpen now that she’s so 
mobile and used to, you know, being able to crawl wherever she likes. (excerpt 
from interview with Christine and Steve 15/7/2005) 
Despite this assertion, Christine and Steve continue to use the playpen to place 
around a heater to prevent the children from burning themselves. Linda and Philip 
made a similar point about the irony of constraining children in playpens, 
suggesting that past a certain point, presumably once they are mobile, the 
constraint ceases to be a viable option.  They described Cassie’s reactions to her 
containment as follows:  
Linda: We don’t have it anymore I’ve given it to [someone] she’s got a little 
baby but um yeah, no, she didn’t dig it. As soon as she learnt that ‘hey, this is 
like, obstructing me from being able to roam the house’ yeah, she’d just stand 
at the side and scream. (excerpt from interview Linda and Philip 17/7/2005) 
Like cots, or baby carriers, playpens allow for flexible orientations, gestures and 
postures commensurate with children’s developing corporeality and their 
inclination towards them. While in many ways they impose a point of view and 
delimit what children can and cannot experience, any constraints or enablements 
are not fixed for all time but are constantly evolving with the child’s maturing 
corporeality. These container technologies nonetheless constitute and are 
constituted by a textured foundation of mouthing, feeling, seeing and hearing 
which informs children’s acquisition of habits of containment, which forms the 
basis of their understanding of the constraints and enablements of containment in 
the life that follows.  As I will discuss in the upcoming sections, other significant 
microenvironments, such as highchairs, walkers, play stations and mobile 
microenvironments like strollers and baby capsules offer other instances of the 
ways in which technologies mediate very young children’s existence.  
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Highchairs: Anticipation, Waiting and Arrival  
Highchairs offer another example of facilitating microenvironments which 
children experience very early in life. Like cots and playpens, one of their primary 
functions is to hold children in a secure environment to protect them from harm. 
Yet highchairs have specific characteristics which render them particularly salient 
as anticipatory, waiting and arrival spaces. Highchairs are designed specifically to 
afford feeding, yet they also afford entertainment, as surfaces that hold books, 
toys, and an array of other feeding, playing and entertainment tools. They also 
afford social interaction, containment and punishment while reinforcing the 
dialectic of risk and safety as children learn how to behave at ‘eating’ times as 
well as times of waiting, anticipation and patience.   
Waiting is often imbued with a sense of nothingness similar to some conceptions 
of space, yet as David Bissell (2007) argues, such a notion comes primarily from 
a productivist discursive position (Bissell 2007, 278). This productivist position 
holds that time spent waiting is lost production time, or time which should in 
some way be spent or filled with some sort of activity. Bissell seeks instead to 
‘open up and animate the event of waiting by tracing a path through the activities 
of the active and engaged body-in-waiting’ (278). In doing so he tells us that: 
This more lively approach that apprehends the animate potentiality of bodily 
capabilities considers the experience and implications of both corporeal 
engagement and withdrawal in these places. Through some of the affective 
resonances brought about through the event of waiting as both active and 
intentional, such as impatience, anger, aggression, and cessation, such as 
tiredness, fatigue and hunger, it turns out that the event of waiting is not the 
immobile being-in-the-world that it first appeared. (Bissell 2007, 294-295) 
Rather than a period of stasis, Bissell emphasises that the embodied experience of 
waiting is a ‘a variegated affective complex where experience folds through and 
emerges from a multitude of different planes’ (Bissell 2007, 277) and that 
urgency and delay are intertwined with activity and acquiescence in waiting. The 
experience of waiting as an event in-and-of-itself, is imbricated with patience and 
impatience, and is mediated by the nature of the event-to-come (279, 289). This is 
readily recognisable in infants and toddlers in highchairs who show signs of 
agitation and impatience when the event-to-come is particularly enticing, like 
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food or a treat, and the longer it takes to arrive, the more agitation is evident. If, 
however they are not particularly excited about the event-to-come they may 
acquiesce and agitation may not manifest. As Bissell suggests, therefore, we 
should recall that as embodied beings we are all actively perceiving and 
experiencing even in periods of relative inactivity. 
Highchair inhabitation is a powerful example of the ‘body-in-waiting’ which is 
always-already embodied and interwoven with periods of activity and inactivity: 
of patience and impatience, of agitation and acquiescence (Bissell 2007, 277). On 
one occasion that I visited, Seb had been placed in his highchair, with a bottle and 
some food, in front of the television. After some time sitting quietly, he 
complained vehemently and pointedly about being there. He changed position 
many times, threw things onto the floor, then pushed against the table. He 
squirmed for a while then twisted sideways in the chair and vocalised his 
complaint; a vocalization; which while not being language as it is usually 
understood, was unmistakable as ‘I want to get out’. As soon as Kate undid the 
safety belt Seb stood up, turned around to face her and then extended his arms 
towards her to be picked up. Seb’s highchair dwelling was habitually a waiting, 
anticipatory and arrival space but once the event was realised the waiting 
experience shifted from acquiescence to impatience.  Seb’s inhabitation of his 
highchair also illuminates the incorporation of highchairs into socio-equipmental-
environments. Those things with which we repeatedly interact form an integral 
part of our intentional agency. As Kate was a single working mother, part of her 
daily routine was to sit Seb in his high chair with a bottle and vegemite toast, 
turning the television on to one of his favourite shows to allow her to feel secure 
that he would be safe (and quiet) long enough for her to get ready for work. This 
represents an early turning or orientational response to screens, which later 
becomes an habitual expectation of relevance as will be discussed in more detail 
in the upcoming chapters on television, mobile phones and tablets.   
We construct our specific understandings of the world from our bodily location 
and our potential for agency, and infants like adults, experience and gather 
experiences according to the point in time and space they inhabit. The highchair 
dweller’s experience affords a perspective which floor dwelling does not; a 
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perspective ‘as if’ they were adults, that is, from a higher point of view—they can 
sit at table height with others. Although this higher perspective may be said to 
facilitate an illusion of being more grown up, it is nevertheless a highly regulated 
space commensurate with very young children’s need to be held securely in place. 
To realise these technomic and sociotechnic functions of highchairs, 
contemporary high chairs have a seatbelt which comes over the child’s shoulders, 
and fastens in front of their abdomen. This facilitates very young children’s 
emplacement in high chairs with some degree of assurance that they will not be 
able to fall or get out of the high chair. Many high chairs also have a fabric strap 
which originates under the child’s bottom, passing up between their legs to attach 
to the seat belt. This is designed to curtail very young children’s exploratory 
experiences and as such enters into an embodied baby-technology-world relation. 
The seat belt is intended to stop babies from sliding out underneath the table and 
falling onto the floor, an activity which can become a game as they get older. 
Again however, while all of these features are ostensibly safety features, 
consistent with the notion of facilitating microenvironments, their inclusion 
mediates very young children’s being-in-the-world in medium and historically 
specific ways, constraining and enabling orientation, gestures and posture while 
simultaneously being embedded in discourses surrounding the risk to, and 
potential of, very young children. 
The seat of contemporary highchairs is a hard moulded plastic shell, extending 
from above a small child’s head down their back, and curves around under the 
baby’s bottom and upper legs, culminating in a footrest at the bottom. This shell 
also wraps around from side to side to encase even the smallest child, enabling 
sitting prior to the child’s capacity to sit unaided. The removable plastic padding 
further enfolds the child’s body, affording frontal, upright sitting, or appropriate 
eating-at-the-table body habits.  
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Figure 2.9 Seb in High Chair 
As can be seen in figure 2.9, the table top on Seb’s high chair crosses at 
chest/mid-upper arm height, imposing gestural imperatives and constraints, 
meaning that he needed to raise his arms from the shoulder to reach the things on 
the table top. Seb’s upper body movement is thus restricted by the table and the 
wrap-aroundedness of the hard shell of plastic and the thick padding that 
constitutes the chair. To take things from the table and put them into his mouth, 
therefore, required the acquisition of body habits specific to his highchair 
dwelling. Seb’s highchair not only had a safety belt but also a bar from the table 
top to the seat to prevent him from sliding down and out from under the table. 
This kept his legs apart at all times, but he was able to bend one of his legs up to 
the side and wiggle his bottom sideways, enabling him to turn partially side-on in 
the chair. Apart from mediating children’s orientation, postures and gestures, 
highchair dwelling facilitates a particular spatial perspective which their stature 
does not—the perspective available to floor dwellers is distinct from that of 
highchair dwelling. When children are floor dwelling too, impediments to their 
line of sight, such as chairs, tables and other furniture, delimit what they can and 
cannot see. This is largely overcome with the aid of a highchair. In a highchair, 
therefore, children’s points of view on the world are higher and more expansive, 
extending the child’s visual possibilities. Vision, however, is either enabled or 
constrained in accord with the direction in which the highchair is placed. 
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Highchairs can be incorporated into table-sitting, gradually introducing children 
to habits of table-sitting and eating, affording a gradual integration into networks 
of social interaction. Hence, while highchair dwelling affords—in Norman’s 
terms (Norman 1990)—cultivation of eating-at-the-table postures, gestures and 
orientation, Seb’s actions within it are indicative of the flexibility of embodied 
actions which highchairs afford young children in concert with their own 
maturing corporeality.  
Since highchairs avail children of spatial perspectives which may not necessarily 
be available to them otherwise, they enter into an embodied relation constituting 
and constituted by a child-highchair complex contiguous with certain postural, 
gestural and orientational imperatives, through which the child experiences their 
environment; including containment. The specific point of view afforded in 
highchair dwelling, however, is not a fixed once-and-for-all position, but a 
dynamic process of becoming. With the passage of time and increased control 
over their own motility within spaces of containment, the world is an agentic 
environment that changes in relation to the child’s own flexible corporeality. 
Movement in space has as its necessary correlate movement in time. Bodies and 
bodily experience is consequently always becoming-in-time. In highchairs, 
waiting for food or entertainment, very young children’s becoming-in-time is 
habitually filled with realised and unrealised potential, entering into a schema of 
past-present-future, in reference to previous experiences of waiting, anticipation, 
arrival and containment. Through the inhabitation of highchairs, very young 
children come to understand that highchairs and chairs more generally are spaces 
of waiting and anticipation of something to come. In the transition from being fed 
to self-feeding, highchairs not only build and reinforce habits of waiting and 
anticipation but they are also spaces of allowable and containable mess. 
Furthermore, highchair dwelling facilitates and constrains particular experiences 
as a regulated anticipatory space which enters into the routines of daily life; 
technologically texturing the world (Ihde 1990).  
Booster seats are an adaptation of highchairs for older children and their use is 
significant of children’s developing corporeality and the acquisition of habits of 
eating at the table. Unlike Seb’s highchair, Cassie’s booster seat, consistent with 
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her more mature corporeality, does not so strictly demand frontal orientation or an 
upright seated posture despite being intended to be used in that way. In the design 
of booster seats, there rests an assumption that children have already learned 
habits of sitting and waiting. 
 
Figure 2.10 Booster Sitting 
Booster seats do not have the character of wrap-aroundness that highchairs do and 
consequently do not delimit gestural agency as strictly as highchairs, as can be 
seen in figure 2.10. As such, while being intended for frontal orientation and an 
upright seated posture, they do not so strictly demand either. In response to 
children’s developing mastery over their own bodily movements and 
comportment, booster seats allow for more flexible seating positions by raising 
the height at which children may sit at the table, ‘as if’ they are adults, while 
compensating for their diminutive stature to further encourage transitional habits 
of table sitting. This is particularly the case with booster seats, since adaptations 
can be made, as they can with some other highchairs, to allow children to get into 
and out of them in response to their maturing embodiment and growing 
independence. Cassie’s seat was at the dining table on a wooden chair that was 
much wider than the booster. As such she was able to climb from the floor to her 
seat, put the tray on, in anticipation of the chocolate cake she was about to 
receive. 
Because infant’s and toddler’s bodies are always-already involved within the 
world within a specific time and space, they are precisely involved within 
particular cultural practices and knowledges, hence their containment is 
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embroiled in discourses surrounding what a baby or toddler is, and should be, in 
the specific society in which they are raised. As we have already seen, perhaps the 
dominant discourse surrounding very young children is one that values children 
and seeks to protect them from harm. As such, just as manufacturers of cots and 
playpens are increasingly aware of safety, safety is an important component of 
contemporary highchair production and marketing in response to changing 
perceptions of infancy and toddlerhood, the ways in which the children we love 
should be treated, and to avoid litigation.  
While booster seats such as that shown figure 2.10 are undoubtedly still holding 
environments, I would suggest that their primary function is not necessarily to 
protect the child from physical risk. Boosters facilitate social engagement 
enabling children to interact with others ‘as-if’ they were adults. Booster seats 
also accommodate the child’s emerging mobility and understanding of where they 
are in relation to other people and objects. Unlike a highchair, booster seats would 
only be used at the table. While the booster still has a table which may prevent 
some accidents, it no longer has shoulder straps which hold the child against the 
back of the chair. This affords more flexible orientations, gestures and postures 
than does the highchair. The table top, which may or may not be used in 
conjunction with the booster seat, as can be seen in figure 2.10, crosses the child 
much lower down on their body, facilitating more flexibility of movement 
consistent with a child’s growing understanding of habits of table sitting. In 
Cassie’s case the tray crosses at hip height allowing her to lean forward across it 
to reach the table, but it also allows her to eat and gesture unencumbered in other 
ways, furthering integrating her into networks of social interaction.  
In this section I have attempted to demonstrate that highchairs exist along a 
spectrum of technologies of containment and act as technologically enhanced 
facilitating microenvironments, which hold infants and toddlers in spaces which 
are, at least partly, designed to protect them from physical risk (Winnicott 1960, 
49). As well as constraining movement through design and manufacture, they are 
spaces of almost constant supervision in very early childhood. But, as we have 
seen, these facilitating holding spaces mediate infants’ and toddlers’ experiences 
in and of the world in a number of medium specific ways, effectively enabling 
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and constraining certain possibilities of being, variably and dynamically, 
according to the purposes of containment.  
Walkers: Not-Quite Spaces 
Another example reveals the medium specificity of facilitating 
microenvironments is the mobile holding space of the baby walker. Walkers are 
not high, like highchairs, and are specifically designed to allow little feet to come 
in contact with the ground as can be seen in figure 2.11.  Obviously very young, 
or short, children would not be able to reach the ground at which point the walker 
then becomes a sitter, or play station. Unlike the highchair, walkers afford 
children autonomous movement, allowing the baby to literally aim at the world 






Figure 2.11 – Baby Walker ( Babees Clothing and Toys) 
Babies’ efforts are amplified in a walker which may at first surprise them, but 
through which they soon learn to surprise their world—ask anyone who has had 
their ankles skinned by a careering baby walker. The affordance of the baby-
walker-complex is, however, contingent on the affordances of the surface upon 
which they are being used. The baby-walker-complex amplifies and exceeds some 
babies’ capabilities to propel themselves hence there are risks in situations of 
uneven ground, loose surfaces or stairs in that the walker can tip over or collapse. 
When I asked Linda and Philip if Cassie had had a walker, they implied in the 
following excerpt, that their space was not as suitable as at Linda’s parents’ 
house:  
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Linda: She did at my parents’ house. 
Philip: We put it at her parents’ house ‘cause she didn’t have the room here 
to get around. It’s too closed whereas they’ve got a bit more of an open space  
Linda: We used to use it outside at their place ‘cause they’ve got a good area 
to… (excerpt from interview with Linda and Philip 17/7/2005) 
Just as the texture of particular surfaces speaks to the mutability of the child-
walker affordance relation, so do the dimensions of the space in which they are 
used, establishing a dynamic child-object-environment relation. Walkers are a 
useful alternative to both play pens and highchairs for more active babies, who 
are always oriented to movement, which is facilitated by the walker, allowing 
them to push the limits of their embodiment. As such, the baby-walker complex 
enters into the dynamic organization of the home, necessitating the inclusion of 
gates across stairs and the removal of obstructions and other objects which may 
put the very young child at risk or which may be put at risk by the augmented 
capacity to move afforded in baby-walker relations. 
Unlike unaided walking, the walker places a barrier between children and the 
things which interest them, and although walkers facilitate proximity seeking, 
they only do so up to a point. The base of the walker which extends beyond the 
body, as can be seen in figure 2.11, bumps up against things and the body of the 
walker places a physical barrier which very young children cannot reach past. 
Thus they provide the child with regulated freedom of movement while creating a 
not-quite effect. That is, the walker affords mobility and reach, but in many 
instances the babies’ who inhabit them, can ‘not-quite’ reach many of the things 
which may be of interest to them.  
Through habitual use, even very young children’s bodies learn that by adjusting 
their orientations, postures and gestures, they can move from one place to another, 
allowing them with increasing confidence to aim at the world through the walker. 
In doing so, walkers are gradually incorporated into the child’s corporeal schema, 
which extends his or her possibilities for action in the larger environment of say, 
the lounge room. As such, the walker also functions as a hyper-vehicular-
corporeal device which amplifies the child’s corporeality often beyond his or her 
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ability to control, which may unsettle the walker’s role as a safe holding 
environment.   
Prams and strollers, while having been around for a long time, are another 
example of a technologically enhanced mode of hyper-mobility, in which infants 
and toddlers mobility exceeds their corporeal capacities to traverse space. The 
terms ‘pram’ and ‘stroller’ both derive from the term ‘perambulation’ meaning 
walking about, or strolling. Unlike a walker which facilitates infants’ self-directed 
mobility, perambulation relies on a carer to propel the vehicle and they are often 
used as a to settle very young children to sleep. The pram or stroller, the child and 
the carer enter into an embodiment relationship with the pram or stroller 
constituting and constituted by a carer-pram-baby complex. Such mobility is an 
extension of the maternal provision, in that it facilitates a moving together.  
Containers Within Containers 
The variety of containers within containers which children may potentially 
inhabit, have burgeoned. Baby capsules, child car seats and booster seats have all 
been designed to hold babies and young children in place, in size specific ways, in 
case of a motor vehicle accident. In this section I will explore how baby capsules 
and child car seats have emerged from discourses of risk and vulnerability which 
speak again to our understanding of the value of children in contemporary 
Western societies. Parental provisions are not experientially neutral; parents (and 
others) enact cultural constructions of children and childhood in all of their fears 
for, expectations of and dealings with their infants and toddlers and the 
equipmental assortment of child technologies (Calvert 1998).  Consequently, the 
notion of a space which protects infants, toddlers and indeed older children, from 
physical and/or psychological harm, while it has a long history, rests on our 
understandings of what an infant or toddler is and how they should be cared for. 
This is reflected in a current propensity to place stickers on cars which proclaim 
‘baby on board’ to remind us to take extra care while we are driving near them, 
reinforcing the notion that children are especially valued in our society, and that 
their safety is arguably more important than the safety of other people.  
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Due to an increasing awareness of safety issues, which has been enacted in 
Australian law since 1978 (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 
2013) children are increasingly encapsulated in the early months of their lives to 
facilitate safe travel. Baby capsules, such as the one shown in figure 2.12 are like 
plastic pods, usually with a faux sheep skin liner. They have a wide strap which 
holds the babies torso firmly in place while not inhibiting, at least not too much, 
the child’s ability to move his or her arms and legs. In doing so the capsule 






Figure 2.12 Baby Capsule: Source: (McIvor 2006) 
Due to the shape of the capsule and the way that it is mounted in the car the 
baby’s orientation is usually towards the roof of the car at the back. Facing 
backwards and moving forward mediates babies’ visual experiences as well as 
potentially confounding their experience of movement; of braking and 
accelerating as well as the up and down movement on uneven surfaces. The 
capsule dweller’s point of view is constrained by the high sides as well as its 
containment within the containment the vehicle. As babies experience movement 
through the double containment of capsule and car, it enters into an embodiment 
relation incorporating baby, capsule and car as an integral part of the baby’s 
experiencing.   
Even more so than the highchair dweller, the capsule dweller is a body-in-waiting 
for either sleep or arrival, and often containment in another form. Many parents 
attach rattles or other playthings to capsules in order for the child to have some 
distraction from the monotony of their visual field, allowing them to enter into the 
socio-equipmental environment of containment within containment, and 
introducing babies to, or reinforcing the child’s gradually growing understanding 
of habits of waiting. The baby-capsule complex is not necessarily always a baby-
capsule-car complex, as the baby-capsule complex is able to be lifted from the car 
and situated in other locations, such as the floor or a shopping trolley, further 
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broadening the incorporation of capsules into the socio-equipmental environment. 
Many supermarket trolleys now also include a capsule on the top so that the baby 
may be moved from capsule to capsule and then transported around on top of the 
groceries, within the mothers’ reach and available to her surveillance, but also 
creating a type of baby-and-capsule agency or mobile containment where the 
child and capsule move as one.  
Car seats are another example of safe containers within containers. Like 
highchairs, car seats generally hold infants and toddlers in an upright posture with 
a forward facing orientation, although they can also tilt backwards to facilitate 
sleeping. Like highchairs, contemporary car seats have high padded sides to 
ensure that even sleeping toddlers are able to maintain a relatively upright 
position, with only minimal capacity for their heads to droop. Also, like high 
chairs, the thick cushiony surrounds and safety belt, constrict children’s capacity 
to move around into other positions, encouraging culturally embedded habits of 
car-sitting. Car seats and capsules within cars, like other containment 
technologies require the environment to flexibly accommodate them just as they 
must flexibly accommodate the environment. The size and rigidity of many of 
these containers as well as the regulations in relation to fastening prescribes how 
and where they are mounted, within cars, reconfiguring spatial relations within 
the vehicle. 
Despite emerging from discourses of safety which dictate design, materials and 
fixings, child car seats, like highchairs, are potentially risky spaces.  Reporting on 
the cervical injuries suffered by children in motor vehicle accidents Lynne Bilston 
and Julie Brown (2005), note that:  
Many of the reported cases of cervical injury in children restrained in 
forward facing restraints are known to have occurred in conjunction with 
restraint misuse (Fuchs et al. 1989, Graham, Kittredge, and Stuemky 1992, 
Henderson 1994) (Stalnaker 1993, Weber, Dalmoras, and Hendrick 1993)    
(Fuchs et al., 1989; Graham et al., 1992; Henderson, 1994; Stalnaker, 1993; 
Weber et al., 1993), however, a number of reports from European and North 
American studies suggest these injuries also occur in correctly worn forward 
facing restraints (Huelke et al. 1992, Janssen et al. 1993, Lowne, Gloyns, 
and Roy 1987, Troisell and Tarriere 1993). (Bilston and Brown 2005, 9) 
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In my own experience, a dear friend who was two at the time suffered a severe 
spinal injury and ultimate paraplegia as a direct consequence of being restrained 
in a forward facing child restraint. Furthermore, the safety of car seats may be 
compromised once the child learns how to undo the fastenings and to climb out of 
the restraint rendering these container technologies. Facilitating 
microenvironments therefore are not only as safe, but also potentially risky 
spaces.  
Conclusion 
Infants’ and toddlers’ perceptual, affective and intellectual grasp of the world is 
initially facilitated by the carer and the milieu to which they introduce the baby 
(Wynn 1997, 262). Taylor argues that time, space and movement are organizing 
principles of perception since our perception in time, and in and across spaces is 
the only way that we can perceive as embodied beings who exist, in fact, in 
particular times and places (Taylor 1990). Enlisting technologies to partition and 
manage time and space, then, cannot help but mediate children’s experiences 
within-the-world. 
For Winnicott (1960), half of the parent-infant relationship is about the maternal 
provision: ‘that is to say the qualities and changes in the mother that meet the 
specific and developing needs of the infant towards whom she orients’ (Winnicott 
1960, 42). The other half has to do with the infant’s journey from absolute 
dependence towards independence, a state which is never completely reached. 
Rather than imply two relatively distinct fields of activity, I would consider 
maturation as relational, meaning that it happens in relation to tools and 
technologies and consequently they must be accounted for as part of our human-
world experiencing, shaping the ways we can be. Since we all exist in a primary 
relation to tools, and to experience our being-in-the world is to experience our 
being in a world with technologies, our lives are technologically textured down to 
the minutiae of our everyday routines and practices (Ihde 1990).  
In this chapter, therefore, I have sought to situate the facilitating environment of 
maternal care in relation to children’s developing corporeal schema to suggest 
that the facilitating environment both is, and exceeds, the maternal provision. I 
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have also sought to illustrate ways in which the microenvironments that children 
inhabit afford particular relations between bodies and environments, both 
enabling and constraining certain ways of being-in-the-world. The interplay 
between various micro and macro environments, both enable and constrain certain 
perceptual possibilities specific to the shape and content of the facilitating 
environments, mediating children’s experiences within the world. They thereby 
privilege certain ways of being over others while simultaneously establishing a 
foundational ontology (fundamental way of being-in-the-world) which is overlain 
with other experiences in a perpetual process of becoming. 
The container technologies dealt with in this chapter safe occupy an ambiguous 
place in our understanding of how they relate to infants’ and toddlers’ 
development and in relation to childrearing practices. Cots, highchairs, playpens 
and mobile containment technologies facilitate holding which seeks to protect 
babies and toddlers from harm, but the safety of the containment is also 
precarious. They can enable hyper-mobility for infants and toddlers, as well as 
constraining and enabling children’s postures, gestures and orientation, 
facilitating and delimiting very young children’s ability to act within them, and 
towards their broader socio-equipmental environment. Yet we should recall that 
facilitating microenvironments are an integral part of our being-in-the-world or 
the ‘situational constitution of “worldhood” ’(Acampora 1999). They flesh out 
our world and our experiences within it. The ‘ontology of residence’ or the nature 
of inhabitation recognizes that we cultivate habits of being (habitus) which 
gradually allow us to come to feel at home in our socio-equipmental 
environments. The type of facilitating environments which infants and toddlers 
children come to inhabit, are experienced in terms of an ever evolving expectation 
of what it is like to feel at home in our containment.  
Facilitating microenvironments and their boundaries constitute some of the 
earliest materials from which we come to understand ourselves as discrete entities 
who gradually but persistently move from undifferentiated activity to intentional 
agency (from experiencing the world on the sensori-motor-affective-level, to 
becoming effective actors within the world). As our corporeal schemas develop 
the dehiscence between carer and child widens allowing us to take more of the 
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world into ourselves, synthesizing perception and experience and informing our 
perpetual process of maturation. It is possible on this basis to suggest, as Sofia 
(1984) does, that all technologies are reproductive (Sofia 1984) of particular 
medium, historically and culturally specific ways of being-in-the-world. By 
placing culturally embedded material, yet dynamic constraints and enablements 
around children’s experiencing, containment both delimits and expands embodied 
agency and perspective.  
Since we come to know the world through repeated perception, the consistency of 
experience and perception in early life enables children to feel at home in their 
environment—to gradually come to know their way around and to feel secure that 
these things are somewhat constant in their lives (Lally 2002). Facilitating 
microenvironmental mediums like cots, playpens, highchairs and walkers 
establish a dynamic array of affordances within very young children’s socio-
equipmental environments. Facilitating microenvironments are intrinsic to a 
foundational and relational ontology which adjusts to children’s emerging 
corporeality and understanding of themselves as discrete beings. They enable 
children to grasp certain aspects of their world, and are a part of the child’s world 
in the only way it may be for them: they are the context of their lives. Hence 
facilitating microenvironments provide children with a foundational ontology 
which will gradually be complexified and overlain with layers of increasing 
degrees of mediation which will shape the child’s point of view on the world. It is 
not possible to say, however, that the effects of containment are universal or 
straightforward, as container technologies afford a spectrum of experiences 
contingent upon the cultural and situational context in which they are used, and 
the child’s corporeality.  
In the next chapter I will examine how children move from dependence to relative 
independence and from introception to object relations. As children mature, the 
space between mother and baby gradually widens to enable to the child to 
experience more and more of their socio-equipmental environment. In doing so, 
the child increasingly comes to understand itself as a discrete being which exists 
simultaneously in a disintegrated and integrated relationship with the world and 
the other things within it, in an ongoing process of perception and discovery. 
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While I have concentrated in this chapter on the notion of being-in-the-world, in 
the next chapter I will broaden this to what I have termed being-with-in-the-
world. I will thus return to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh of the world which is 
crucial to understanding chiasmic intertwining, a concept which facilitates a 
deeper understanding of our primordial intersubjectivity as well as our primary 
relation with the materiality of the objects and other people in our socio-
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Primary Objects and Primal Intersubjectivity 
Within the physical space of the dwelling, the material home is constructed 
through the assembly and configuration of objects, such as furniture, 
decorative items and technologies. These organizations of objects are not 
static, but interact dynamically with those who inhabit them, as the material 
substrate to their patterns of everyday life. (Lally 2002, 10)  
Indeed, things are perhaps the most faithful witness of all, and in their 
fidelity to us they function as extensions of ourselves, reflections and echoes 
of who we are, were, and will become. Those things in your room, for 
example, those simple, ordinary things mirror who and what you are, and 
situated in that room they give a shape to its space, they form it into a place, 
they outline a world…the loss of such things, of those things which bear 
witness to our living, is always something of a tragedy, for in losing them 
we lose something of ourselves, we lose something of our world…things do 
matter in our lives, they do have their place…they are the places around 
which aspects of our world are gathered together, held there, and 
preserved…Staying in their place, they give us our place, and without such 
things in our lives we would have no place at all. (Romanyshyn 1989, 193-
4) 
As we move from facilitating microenvironments to primary objects, in the 
process of maturation as in this thesis, the foregoing quotes remind us of the 
integral role that objects play in configuring our ‘patterns of everyday life’ and 
interacting with our very being; becoming inseparable from who and what we 
fundamentally are. Consequently this chapter moves from the ontological and 
perceptual significance of spaces to that of primary objects. By examining 
primary objects and primal intersubjectivity, we here lay the foundations on 
which the subsequent chapters on toys, television and new media will rest. In the 
introduction to this thesis I suggested that our current understandings of the term 
‘media’ as well as our propensity to study media content sanctions us to think too 
readily that media have little or no significance in the lives of infants and toddlers. 
Models which rely on textual or linguistic analysis do not sufficiently allow for 
perception as our primary relation with the world: the background or context from 
which language emerges. Thus, they take little or no account of the ways in which 
media, by definition, mediate our existence by virtue of our embodied 
engagement with them. I proposed therefore, that by starting off from a point 
which recognises that all technologies are mediating technologies, we might come 
to an understanding of the multitude of ways in which media intersect with very 
young children’s corporeality: their very being-in-the-world.  
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In Chapter One I offered an outline of the dominant theoretical perspectives which 
are being used to develop this thesis: Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of 
embodied perception, with particular emphasis on being-in-the-world, reversibility, 
écart and incorporation; Winnicott’s psychoanalytic theory, particularly the 
concepts of the facilitating environment and transitional objects; Ihde’s post-
phenomenology of technology including his definition of technology, his 
understanding of human-technology relations and the mediating capacity of all 
material objects; the study of material culture; and the concept of affordances as 
relational and contingent as forwarded by Gibson (1982) and Norman (1990).  
In Chapter Two I argued that the facilitating microenvironments which infants and 
toddlers occupy simultaneously enable and constrain particular embodied activity 
in concert with very young children’s own emergent bodily capacities. 
Consequently I discussed that not only do spaces mediate infants’ and toddlers’ 
existence but that they do so in relation to the specific child’s developing 
corporeality and cultural habits of being. While Chapter Two dealt with facilitating, 
holding spaces, which are nested within Ihde’s lifeworlds (1990), the upcoming 
chapter will shift focus from being-in places, to being-with human and non-human 
others in the world. This will be done by incorporating the phenomenological 
concept of chiasmic intertwining with objects as part of the process of maturation. 
As such this chapter will consider the development of object relations: being-with-
in-the-world, or being in the world along with other people and things, and how this 
both mediates infants’ and toddlers’ perceptions and experiences of the world and 
constitutes a primary relational ontology.  
I have chosen to hyphenate with-in and being-with-in as a means of signifying the 
specific sense in which I use the terms. Being-with-in-the-world, as I have 
employed it, takes its lead from the phenomenological concept of being-in-the-
world, yet extends this to take further account of the primordial, intersubjective 
relationship we have with the human and non-human others who coexist in the 
world with us. This notion is supported by Merleau-Ponty’s statement that, 
‘whenever I try to understand myself the whole fabric of the perceptible world 
comes too, and with it come the others who are caught in it’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 
15). ‘With-in’, thus should not only be construed as contained within, although that 
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is an important component of being-with-in. As it is used in this context, I intend 
that it should be taken both as being with and being in: being with-in. It is meant to 
signify coexistence, or mutual involvement with the world and its others, and that 
with repeated perception and interaction, each human or object becomes imbricated 
with the other. In order for this to become more apparent I will briefly reintroduce 
the concept of reversibility, and its attendant concepts of flesh of the world and the 
chiasm to suggest that we all incline towards those things that interest us (Ahmed 
2010). With repetition, each human or object becomes imbricated with the other.   
After elaborating on these concepts I will return to Winnicott’s notion of the 
facilitating environment in more detail and the importance of the holding phase. I 
will then introduce his concepts of potential space and transitional objects to 
establish a continuity of mediating technologies. In appropriating these concepts, 
however, rather than relying on Winnicott’s essentialist notions of the facilitating 
environment as the maternal provision, I will speak of the environmental provision 
of facilitating environments and how the two concepts link to object relations. 
Winnicott’s view of dis-integration in the process of maturation will then be 
complemented by Merleau-Ponty’s concept of écart.  I will then synthesize these 
diverse, yet complementary concepts in an analysis of the first encounters infants 
have along the continuum of object relations as relations of divergence and 
similitude, of integration and disintegration, and dependence and independence. 
Consequently I will consider three primary objects; feeding bottles, pacifiers and 
clothing. This is to set the stage for an analysis of very young children’s developing 
relationship with their environment and the things within it. The theory forwarded 
will be described with examples from my own experience, and from my interviews 
and observations.  
From Introception to Object Relations 
In this section, I will examine in detail the infantile transition from introception, 
which means sensitivity to stimuli originating inside of the body, to object 
relations which constitute and are constituted by babies’ growing understanding 
of themselves as discrete entities in relation to objects. In early infancy, babies’ 
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bodies experience the world, or a sense of space, through their mouths and 
respiratory system: 
After that, other regions of the body intervene and come into prominence. 
All the regions linked to the functions of expression, for example, acquire an 
extreme importance in the months that follow. In waiting for the union that 
will arise between the data of external perception and those of introceptivity, 
the introceptive body functions as extroceptive. In another context, this is 
what psychoanalysts say about the origin of the child’s experiences when 
they show, for example, that the child’s relations to the mother’s breast are 
his first relations with the world (sic). (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 122)  
The process is initially mediated chiefly by the infant’s carers and what they 
provide for the baby. Consequently primary objects are those things which infants 
encounter early in life, as they are coming to understand themselves as discrete 
beings with-in what Acampora calls the particular worldhood of their world 
(Acampora 1999, 123). The child’s world gradually expands as more experiences 
and skills accrue, and thus continue to develop through the child’s growing 
inauguration into his or her socio-equipmental environment (Lally 2002, 28). 
Lally comments that: 
This personal evolution continues, until eventually the individual becomes 
independently capable of seeking out and appropriating novel experiences, 
activities and objects to the self. (Lally 2002, 27-28) 
Early in their lives, infants experience the world introceptively, hence they live 
under the illusion of what Lally and Winnicott call omnipotence or invocation in 
that objects present without infants understanding of how or why (Lally, 2002: 
27). Objects both appear and are called forth—invoked—by even very young 
children. For instance, a pacifier may appear at regular intervals or may be called 
forth by babies’ cries. Omnipotence, therefore, is a problematic term which 
implies a certain egocentrism which cannot be sustained in the case of infants. 
The term omnipotence is thus contentious, in that a sense of ourselves as discrete 
entities is not primitive, but rather emerges as the affordances of facilitating 
environments intersect with children’s maturation. Yet Winnicott’s use of the 
term is not meant to imply a primal egocentrism; rather, he argues that while ‘we 
have to say that the baby created the breast’ we should also be aware that he or 
she ‘could not have done so had not the mother come along with the breast just at 
that moment’ (Winnicott 1980, 101). In the process of maturation Winnicott 
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argues that the gradual withdrawal of the maternal provision in concert with 
babies’ developing corporeality, enables them to ‘come at the world’, facilitating 
an understanding of themselves in their separateness or as agents who can 
manipulate their environment. Winnicott’s insistent reliance on the concepts of 
the maternal provision, the breast, and infantile development in terms of their 
withdrawal as an experience characterised by anxiety and lack are, however, 
problematic as these notions assume that only a mother may provide nurture, and 
that any divergence from breast feeding and mothering is inadequate. Moreover, 
the notion of infantile development as characterised by anxiety and lack, does not 
recognise the joy or discovery, nor the potential for diversity of experiences, 
where some children may actively strive to increase the distance between 
themselves and their caregiver.  At this point, therefore, instead of referring to the 
maternal provision, I will refer to the environmental provision which includes, 
and yet exceeds, the maternal provision as it recognises the wider socio-
equipmental environment.  
The ultimate recognition of inner and outer, and self and other, emerges primarily 
from the affordances of the environmental provision. The distinction between 
internal and external, or between self and other, is generally consolidated in 
children by the time they are about six months of age (Dillon 1990a). Others, 
however, argue that it happens over a period from six to eighteen months of age 
(Weiss 1999, 11). Nonetheless the foundation and significance of the non-
coincident other establishes an ongoing continuum of similarity and difference 
which gradually takes account of all human and non-human others that the child 
will encounter (Dillon 1990b). 
Early in life material objects not only offer a consolatory presence which eases 
the transition from undifferentiated to differentiated experience, as Winnicott 
suggests, but also offer experience and exploration as Lally affirms: 
The role of physical objects is crucial in the transition from total dependence 
to relative independence, in mediating the intermediate area between 
subjective experience and that which is objectively perceived. (Lally 2002, 
28) 
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Lally’s quote alerts us to the capacity of material objects to mediate infants’ and 
toddlers’ experience, and their transition from total dependence to relative 
independence, introception to object relations, and from undifferentiated, to 
differentiated experience. They also facilitate children’s gradual introduction to 
their socio-equipmental environments. The above quote, thus, encapsulates the 
overarching theme of this section which examines the significance of material 
objects in mediating the process of maturation.  
In the process of physical and cognitive development, infants gradually move 
from being entirely dependent negotiate the world with some autonomy. Yet it is 
important to recognise that we do not grow into isolation but rather come to 
understand ourselves in an interdependent relationship with our environments 
and the things within them (Winnicott 1988a, Lally 2002, 27). Object relations 
which coincide with infants’ growing ‘recognition of a true “not-me”’, as both 
Winnicott and Merleau-Ponty suggest, are ‘a matter of the intellect; [which] 
belongs to extreme sophistication and to the maturity of the individual’ 
(Winnicott 1960, 38, Merleau-Ponty 1964b). Merleau-Ponty, nonetheless, offers 
an important adjunct to this by reminding us that intellect is anchored in our 
perception of external events and objects, and that the perception of external 
events is not merely a reflection, or the result of sorting out sense data, but a 
more profound process wherein we organize our experience (Merleau-Ponty 
1964 (b), 98). Hence, it is neither ‘a logical nor a predicative activity’ but rather 
an ‘actual “informing” [Gestaltung] of experience in the child’ (Merleau-Ponty 
1964 (b), 98). Gestaltung, which derives from the term Gestalt refers to a 
structuring of perception and experience into a whole which cannot be described 
solely in terms of its parts. Thus in this instance it refers to an ordering of 
experiences which facilitates a growing capacity to interpret those experiences in 
reference to past experiences and future possibilities: it is a move from the 
undifferentiated experience of very young infants to the differentiated experience 
which gradually emerges.  
Merleau-Ponty notes that things such as intelligence, perception and imagination, 
that is, those things which are referred to as ‘functions of cognition’ in classical 
academic psychology, on closer examination lead us to the precognitive activity  
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of perception, a process facilitated by the child’s own corporeal and social 
conditions (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 99).  More specifically, it is a reversible 
relational ontology of infants’ and toddlers' intertwinings with the flesh-of-the-
world in the transition from undifferentiated to differentiated experiencing in the 
process of maturation. 
While inner or ‘psychic reality’ as Winnicott calls it, is residually personal or 
subjective, babies ultimately come to understand that ‘there is a world that is 
external…that could be called actual’ (Winnicott 1988b, 56-57).  As Merleau-
Ponty notes ‘the internal characteristics of the subject always intervene in his 
way of establishing his relations with what is outside him (sic)’ (Merleau-Ponty 
1964b, 99). As Lally intimates: 
We construct our place in the world through our interactions with a dynamic 
social, cultural and material environment, filled with technologies, mass 
media, mass-produced commodities, abstract objects such as knowledges, 
and other people. (Lally 2002, 8) 
Virtually all human action is associated in some way with material objects, and 
the material culture which constitutes and is constituted by the particular objects 
in our perceptual field, establishes ‘the context for our larger perceptions’ (Ihde 
1990, 18). Our ability to act in and on the world, as well as our openness to be 
acted upon within the world, is limited in some ways and amplified in others by 
the incorporation of tools or objects into our corporeal schemas. The corporeal 
schema specific to infants and toddlers is one in which their capability to perform 
physical tasks with or without conscious intervention is limited by their 
developing mastery of their immature embodiment and objects offer different 
affordances to immature bodies.  
Infantile bodies are at first introceptive; or experienced primarily as bodily 
sensations of degrees of wellbeing, pleasure or displeasure (Merleau-Ponty 
1964b, 121).That is, as Merleau-Ponty tells us, early in life infants are unable, at 
first, to relate external events to their bodily sensations (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 
121).  The significance of material objects to infants’ transition from total 
dependence to relative independence and their growing understanding of 
themselves as discrete beings allows us to understand the mediating capacity of 
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‘things’.  It does not yet, however, facilitate our understanding of the complex 
ways in which media enter into very young children’s ways of being. 
Reversibility, chiasmic intertwinings, flesh-of-the-world and écart 
In this section the concepts of reversibility, chiasmic intertwinings, flesh-of-the-
world and écart will be developed to argue that infants’ and toddlers’ bodies and 
mediating technologies fold over each other, making it implausible to consider 
media as something that exists ‘out there’ to either educate or corrupt very young 
children. Rather it is a fundamental part of what and how infants and toddlers are, 
and literally informs their understandings of themselves and the world. 
 
Winnicott suggests that, ‘infancy is the period in which the capacity for gathering 
external factors into the area of the infant’s omnipotence is in the process of 
formation’ (Winnicott 1960, 37). Francine Wynn likewise notes that ‘infants have 
an amazing capacity to take in the world’ (Wynn 1997, 263). Infants are always 
and inevitably embodied, perceiving beings who inhabit the world within bodily 
space, and who come to understand their world from their particular ‘point of 
view’ with-in-the-world and in relation to a situational perceptual field (Merleau-
Ponty 1962, 101). This is not, however, a one-way process where the child acts on 
or in the world and the world is acted upon. The world and the objects within it 
act on all of us as we act on them. As Merleau-Ponty clarifies: 
 
Everything depends…upon the fact that our glances are not ‘acts of 
consciousness,’ each of which claims an invariable priority, but openings of 
our flesh which are immediately filled by the universal flesh of the world. 
All depends, in short, upon the fact that it is the lot of living bodies to close 
upon the world and become seeing, touching bodies which (since we could 
not possibly touch or see without being capable of touching or seeing 
ourselves) are a fortiori perceptible to themselves (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 16). 
 
Objects touch us as we touch them, rendering any clear distinction between the 
object of perception and action, and the perceiving acting subject untenable. The 
use of the word ‘touch’ in this instance is particularly relevant when we 
reconsider that infants experience the world on the sensory-motor-affective level. 
‘Touch’ should consequently be taken to mean the act of touching, as putting a  
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part of the body in contact with something, and in terms of having an emotional 
affect on something or somebody. That is, it should be considered as concerning 
us.  
Reversibility then, the simultaneity of both perceiving and being perceived, is 
precisely what allows intersubjective relationships between humans. By 
introducing the concept of ‘flesh of the world,’ Merleau-Ponty suggests that the 
world or environment itself has a kind of embodiment and agency, the reliability 
and fluidity of which constitutes a schema of past-present-future informing how 
the child ‘structures his (sic) surroundings’ and consequently, meaningful action 
with-in-the-world (Merleau-Ponty 1964 (b), 98). ‘Flesh of the world’ is crucial to 
our understanding Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility thesis and further calls into 
question the notion of cause and effect in relation to very young children and the 
media. It allows us rather to consider our relationship with the world as reversible, 
and appreciates that the observing eye or touching hand is an integral part of the 
world it perceives; not something that stands apart from it. Flesh, as Wynn points 
out, is characterized by depth, and latency, or potential (Wynn 1997, 255). 
Although chiasmic relationships are reversible, reversibility is never complete 
(Wynn 1997, 257).The depth is dependent upon the spread of écart, rather like a 
rubber band which becomes thinner the more that it is stretched. Wynn (1997) 
comments, that ‘depth is a texture, a thickness, an inexhaustibility’ (255).  
The seeing eye, touching hand, hearing ear, smelling nose, tasting mouth, 
‘must…adjust its own “I can” to the demands of the [perceptual field] it 
interrogates’ (Dillon 1990b, 83). Flesh (le chair), does not refer to or describe 
actual bodies or objects per sé, but is, ‘a mass noun that is similar to the term 
Being…It is a primal element out of which is born both self and world’ (Wynn 
1997, 255). Flesh, therefore, is ‘a kind of circuit’, which does not originate from 
us, but which plays over and between us, and inclines and binds us with the 
human and non-human elements of our socio-equipmental environments (Wynn 
1997, 255).  
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All bodies and objects are part of the flesh of the world, but this flesh is not 
amorphous; all difference between perceiver and perceived or between object and 
subject is never completely obliterated. Since no two material entities can exist in 
the same space at the same time, there is an inevitable distancing, a spread, a 
divergence, or ‘a space of non-coincidence’ (Weiss 1999, 120). The significance 
of this non-coincidence operates at the pre-reflective level as a continuum of 
‘like-me-but-not-like-me’ (Dillon 1990b, 89). The foundations of a self-other 
distinction develops in children in the first two years of life aided by the 
introduction of mediating technologies to facilitate the transition.  The distinction 
will continue to develop, and with the passage of time, grow to incorporate all of 
the child’s experiences with-in-the-world. Thus it will gradually come to take 
account of the recognition of the full range of similitude and divergence in others, 
including non-human others, who are similarly in the world but ‘over there’ 
(Dillon 1990b, 89). It follows then that reversibility facilitates our understanding 
of the relationships we have with other humans and things in our world. As such 
it allows us to account for relationships between humans and humans; and 
between humans and non-humans, all of which are enabled in the space of non-
coincidence, or écart (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 16).  
We can better understand écart and the relational ontology which emerges within 
the space of non-coincidence by considering Winnicott’s conception of ‘potential 
space’. Referring to ‘potential space’ Lally offers a concise explanation of écart: 
Winnicott uses the term 'potential space' to describe the gradually evolving 
and expanding experiential sphere of perception and action which 
constitutes the individual's everyday world. This space, essentially the 
interface between the inner life of the individual and that individual's 
everyday interaction with external reality, is described by Winnicott as 'a 
place for living that is not properly described by either of the terms ‘inner’ 
and ‘outer’’ (Winnicott 1971, 106 cited in (Lally 2002, 28)  
Hence potential space, or the space of non-coincidence, gradually facilitates 
infants’ transition from introception to object relations. While Winnicott uses the 
term ‘potential space’ and Merleau-Ponty uses the term écart they nevertheless 
refer to a gradually widening space of perception and action that enables an  
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understanding of ourselves as discrete beings with-in-the-world, along with other 
beings (or flesh). Just as écart refers to a space which enables perception, so 
potential space includes an experiential sphere which informs our understanding 
of the world, the elements of that world and ourselves with-in it.  
Although chiasmic relationships are reversible, reversibility is never complete 
(Wynn 1997, 257). Non-coincidence, or some degree of physical separation, is a 
central constituent of any chiasmic relationship since such a relationship relies on 
enough disconnection to enable a mutual inclination of being to being without 
collapsing, breaking or one being absorbed into the other (259). Hence it is 
important not to confuse reversibility or incorporation with coincidence. Just as 
infants’ bodies do not merge, collapse into, or coincide with other bodies, the 
world does not collapse into or merge with infants’ bodies despite each becoming 
part of the other. Between the two sides of flesh (infant and world) the spread, 
dehiscence or écart must exist to allow perception to take place (Merleau-Ponty 
1968, 136). Without non-coincidence there is no perception. Therefore, as Dillon 
(1990) notes, by virtue of the non-coincidence of their bodies, infants cannot live 
their mothers’ flesh: ‘at least since parturition, the infant is a discrete body and 
lives its separateness’ although she or he does not initially experience it as such 
(Dillon 1990b, 89). Regardless of whether or not very young babies are 
necessarily or consciously aware of their separateness they nonetheless can only 
ever live their own bodies, as indeed is the case for all of us. This reinforces the 
notion that we all arrive at our ‘point of view’ of the world, precisely from where 
we are situated in relation to it. The reversibility of flesh is the very thing that 
allows us to perceive, or take in the world, however, chiasmic relationships are 
not relationships of possession, with one side of the relationship owning and 
controlling the other, but rather, as Wynn contends, are relationship of 
‘dispossession’(Wynn 1997, 258).  For example, the material properties of, say, a 
child’s plastic toy block, are not owned by the child—their shape, size, texture 
and colour are their own, yet they are not independent of the child either. They 
present themselves to him or her as possibilities or affordances. They 
accommodate an affordance relation, intertwining with the child’s corporeality. 
The chiasm is a relationship of dispossession in that it requires sufficient 
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separation to provide for the mutual inclination typified by the affordance 
relation. 
  
Figure 3.1 Block Affording Chewing 
 
Figure 3.2 Block Affording                                                                            
Banging on the Floor 
For an adult, a block may afford stacking and colour and number identification, 
however, for a very young child they afford chewing, banging on the floor and 
throwing (as shown in figures 3.1 and 3.2), as well as the differentiated 
affordances which adults have come to learn. The object-child relation is initially 
one of undifferentiated experience while the object-adult relation becomes 
differentiated in the process of enculturation. It is nonetheless in both cases a 
relationship of dis-integration which is also always a relationship of integration, 
or perhaps more specifically a relationship of exchange and fusion with each 
accommodating the other. 
Newborn infants are initially integrated with their environment. Childrearing 
artefacts, such as baby carriers, seek to replicate the prenatal maternal provision 
allowing infants to experience a sense of continuity. Yet, as Dillon (1990b) notes, 
only from the philosophical standpoint of a supposed consciousness which 
transcends experience is it possible to infer that the lack of conscious 
differentiation, such as that attributed to very young children, can be equated to 
lack of differentiation altogether (89).  
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Using the example of the block in figures 3.1 and 3.2, we can see that while Kane 
and the block are connected with each other there is, as Wynn contends, ‘always a 
spreading off or a spreading away that Merleau-Ponty calls the spread of écart’ 
(Wynn, 1997, 255). Although baby and object can never coincide or merge with 
each other completely, a folding over, doubling, overlapping of the two-sidedness 
of flesh is always apparent (Wynn, 1997, 255). Each maintains its own 
particularity—even when in the child’s mouth, the objects are still distinct—and 
while the spread of écart is narrow and deep, it nonetheless is a space, or more 
explicitly, the space which allows perception to take place, facilitating a growing 
distinction between self and other. As such both the block and the baby constitute 
the chiasmic relationship that is holding and being held.  
Infants ‘ride on intermingling waves of sight, sound, touch, taste, and, especially, 
smell’ (Ackerman 1991, 289). figures 3.1 and 3.2 offer an illustrative example of 
this ‘translatability of one region of existence with another’; block play is visible, 
touchable, feelable, hearable, tasteable and smellable simultaneously. Hence, for 
very young children playing will always take place within a perpetual circularity 
of perceiving and perceived. This open, sensual, prelogical, nonhierarchical unity 
which is used to describe children at birth is known as coenaesthesia, and is ‘the 
potential and perception of one’s whole sensorial being’; it is neither rare nor 
pathological but ‘exists as the embodied underpinning of later hierarchical 
ordering of the senses’ (Sobchack 2004, 69). The later hierarchical privileging of 
vision and sound is an accomplishment of enculturation and thus, very young 
children, whose bodies have not yet been culturally inscribed ‘experience a 
greater “horizontalization” of the senses and consequently a greater capacity for 
cross-modal sensorial exchange than do adults’ (Sobchack 2004, 69). The 
foregoing not only speaks to what makes very young children sensorily different 
from older children and adults. Organization of the senses comes with maturity 
and is underlain by more fluid movement between the senses. 
Reversibility is the translatability of one region of existence with another but 
also of self and other. The translateability of sight into touch and vice versa 
or the intertranslatability of the seer and the seen. Holding is simultaneously 
a being held. Touching will always be seeable, hearable. Reversibility is the 
notion that every perception has a counter perception. There is an inherent 
circularity in the circuit of perceiving-being perceived. (Wynn 1997, 256) 
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Although on an intellectual level we may prioritize vision, for adults as well as 
young children perceptions are experienced as a unified whole ‘in relation to an 
experienced environment’ (Ihde 2002, 38). That is, we do not experience our 
environment with only one of our senses at any given time, rather ‘our whole-
body perceptions are sensorily synthesized in our interactions with a “world”’ 
(Ihde 2002, 38). Thus, all experience is structured by all of the senses, not just one 
in isolation (38). For this reason, Wynn notes: 
infants initially are in a special relationship with Being because their bodies 
are not yet owned and personalized and enculturated. They live in a 
relatively undifferentiated primordial attunement to the world of motility, 
listening, touching, and feeling. Their bodies reverberate with the world and 
similarly ring out the world. Their social responsiveness and their motor, 
auditory, visual, and tactile structures are not yet channelled and specified, 
they are open to all of the possibilities of the world radiating around them. 
(Wynn 1997, 263) 
As noted by both Wynn and Sobchack, children do not experience as adults do. 
As embodied beings we cannot help but see, hear, touch—even if only the 
pressure of our own weight—smell the air that we breathe, and taste—even if 
only the taste of our own saliva—simultaneously. In Western cultures, however, 
we tend to privilege sight and sound at the expense of our other senses, equating 
sight with truth (seeing is believing), knowledge (I see what you mean), 
objectivity and rationality. We still experience them, but we tend to overlook 
them in our experiencing. Infants and toddlers exist in a primary reversible 
relationship with the mediating technologies. This relationship initially has 
nothing to do with content, but rather is in relation to the world, the possibilities 
of which are open. For infants in particular but also toddlers to a degree, complex 
media interfaces are not experienced any differently than any other objects, or 
tools in Ihde’s sense (Ihde 1990): for very young babies  ‘it is all a first 
experience’  which will be repeated to inform infants’ growing realisation that 
they are distinct individuals who exist apart from ‘others’ (Winnicott 1988d, 94-
95).  
Transitional Objects—Textures of Flesh 
Infants, according to Winnicott mature through the process of dis-integration, 
which is also always a process of integration (Winnicott 1988a, 44). In dis-
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integrating from primary caregivers, infants are integrating towards the elements 
of the world—spreading off and folding over. For Merleau-Ponty this integration 
and disintegration nexus is part of the child’s perpetual movement towards the 
world (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 144-5). Winnicott suggests that infants experience 
anxiety associated with dis-integration and that the extremes of disintegration, or 
attachment and detachment, or as Winnicott posits, being and annihilation, are 
softened by the adaptation of caregiver or caregivers (Winnicott 1988b, 44-57). 
As Lally succinctly puts it: 
It is essential to the successful unfolding of potential space that the 
individual is able to have confidence in the continuity of his or her 
experience—that ontological security is maintained. In earliest infancy, this 
is achieved by the repetitive and reliable nature of parental management. 
(Lally 2002, 28) 
Lally notes that ontological security has its genesis in the reliable and recurring 
affordances of the facilitating environment which are gradually displaced by 
things such as transitional objects. Transitional objects are ‘objects [which] are 
not part of the infant’s body yet are not fully recognised as belonging to external 
reality’ (Lally 2002, 28). They are the objects—things extraneous to the child’s 
body—which ease the transition from dependence to independence, from 
introception to extroception, self to others, which intervene into the potential 
space between carer and infant and provide for babies’ and toddlers’ exploratory 
adventures. Winnicott’s rather negative and traumatic interpretation of the role of 
transitional objects and children’s experiences of transition underplays the 
revelatory capacity of the potential space as babies’ opening onto the world—an 
exploratory holding. Transitional objects are the beginning of very young 
children’s technology-object relations in which all objects are tools, or openings 
onto the world, and all tools are understood as mediating technologies.  
Transitional objects are infants’ first possessions which fill the space between 
introception and exteroception; between carer and child. That is, they are often not 
explicitly recognised by the child as existing apart from him or her, but gradually  
facilitate the child’s understanding of him or herself in relation to objects, 
increasingly allowing the child to experience ‘human action employing artefacts to 
attain some result within the environment’  (Ihde 2002, 12). Drawing significantly 
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on Winnicott’s psychoanalysis, Lally observes that: 
Material culture shapes subjectivities and social identities through the 
profoundly relational engagements we form with our everyday personal 
environments of action and interaction. It is not that the objects of material 
culture act as a 'human mirror', passively reflecting or making identity, but 
that they are actively involved in the construction of human subjects in the 
social and cultural world. (Lally 2002, 24) 
Here Lally explicitly recognises how technologies mediate children’s developing 
understanding of their own being-with-in-the-world by affording diverse 
experiences of exploration and discovery, by their embeddedness into the rituals 
and practices of everyday life and by intermingling with very young children’s 
understandings of themselves as discrete yet connected entities within the world.  
Babies’ facility for textural understanding of their socio-equipmental environment 
is also demonstrated in their use of transitional objects: 
where there is all the difference in the world for the baby between silk, 
nylon, wool, cotton, linen, a starched apron, rubber, and a wet napkin. 
(Winnicott 1988c, 30) 
That is, the way that children ‘feel’ the world in affective terms—how children 
are moved by, and act in the world—is informed by the way the world feels to 
them in sensorial and material terms. In other words infants come to a relational 
understanding of comfort as associated with texture and deep chiasmic 
intertwining. Just as a held baby will experience warmth, softness and a general 
feeling of bodily wellbeing which assists in settling them to sleep, so too 
transitional objects seem to the child to give warmth or to display some 
characteristic of life, and often become indispensable when settling babies 
(Winnicott 1980, 6). Transitional objects occupy the ‘indeterminate area of 
experiencing, to which inner reality, and external life both contribute’ (Winnicott 
1980, 3). Transitional objects must be able to withstand biting, sucking, throwing, 
caressing, pinching, banging onto and into things, as part of the variable 
affordances they offer and babies’ indeterminate uses of them. As the spread of  
écart between carer and infant widens the flesh of the transitional object rushes in 
to supplement and finally exceed the maternal provision and affording 
exploratory experiences. 
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Feeding Technologies 
Relations with others are “not secondary and subordinate” but facilitate the 
child’s perceptual, affective and intellectual grasp of the world. (Merleau-
Ponty 1964b, 99) 
Infants are initially introduced to their particular socio-equipmental environment 
by their caregivers. The type of socio-equipmental environment is thus embedded 
in a pre-existing socio-cultural habitus in which babies progressively take up 
dwelling. That is, they come to inhabit, or learn habits of being. The relations we 
have with human and non-human others are primary yet not solely of our own 
making. The types of objects we introduce into infants’ and toddlers’ experience 
not only constitute, but are also constituted by the particularities of the lifeworlds 
that babies come to inhabit. As such, they are partially determined in relation to 
social expectations about childrearing. For example in contemporary Western 
Cultures it is generally considered more appropriate to provide very young 
children with fluffy toys and soft objects than the metal or wood toys which may 
have been given fifty years ago. This is consistent with the concept of ‘risk 
culture’ proposed by Ulrich Beck and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim (Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim 2001), wherein children, as a symbol of hope, need to be 
protected  (Spigel 1998, 111). As such, very young children’s initial grasp on the 
world is a taking in which has been shaped for them partly by societal norms, but 
also, in part by individual carer values and beliefs, along with perception and 
agency of the objects.  
This is particularly notable when considered in relation to the cultural and historic 
specificities of feeding technologies. In what follows, I will initially consider the 
historical changes in the technological artefacts which intervene into the feeding 
experience, configuring carers’ and children’s experiences in terms of the mouth-
feel associated with various food tools, and the texture of the materials from 
which these mediating technologies are made. Subsequently, I will speak to the 
embeddedness of feeding technologies within the palimpsests of their attendant 
sterilizing technologies as well as the technology of baby formula. 
Feeding technologies, like all other technologies, change over time and are 
embedded in cultural habits of being.  For example, in Ancient Roman times, 
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earthenware, swan shaped bottles like the one shown in figure 3.1, filled with 
either milk or water, were used to nurse infants (sciencemuseum.org.uk).   
 
Figure 3.3  




Figure 3.4  
1770- 1835 England Bubby Pot for Infant Feeding  (sciencemuseum.org.uk) 
 
 
From 1770 in England, ‘Bubby pots’ like the one in figure 3.2 were used.  
Prior to the introduction of milk powder or condensed milk in the 1860s, bubby 
pots, fashioned after teapots, were filled with a liquefied mixture of bread, flour, 
sugar and milk. This mixture was sucked through the perforated spout which was 
often covered with a cloth (sciencemuseum.org.uk). 
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A mixture called ‘pap’ which was a mixture of bread or flour and water, similar to 
that used in the English bubby pot, was sucked through the metal (silver) 
mouthpiece of the feeding bottle from Germany used in the 1700s (figure 3.3 ) 
(sciencemuseum.org.uk). ‘Panada’, another mixture used to feed infants was 



















Figure 3.5  


















1935-1945 English Infant Feeding Bottle (sciencemuseum.org.uk) 
 
The bottle in figure 3.6, which was manufactured  from the 1930s to 40s had a 
rubber teat at one end and a valve at the other to reduce the amount of air that 
babies swallowed, allegedly to reduce the incidence of colic 
(sciencemuseum.org.uk). The inclusion of a brush for washing is significant of 
the value attached to children towards the end of the Second World War.  
 





















1950s Infant Feeding Bottle (Dunn 2010) 
 
By the 1950s the shape of bottles had changed to the shape that is more familiar 
to us today. Bottles, such as the one shown in figure 3.7, were still made of glass 
with rubber teats attached to the end by a Bakelite ‘nut’. This was to reduce 


















Contemporary Infant Feeding and Sterilising Package (Heart 2011) 
 
Contemporary feeding bottles are generally made of plastic to prevent breakages 
and potential cuts. As we have become increasingly aware of hygiene, bottles are 
also routinely sterilised in apparatuses like the one shown in figure 3.6. The 
historically specific experiences of the above feeding technologies are consistent 
with the cultural understandings of babies, health, safety and risk of the time. For 
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instance, the use of earthenware, porcelain or glass would be considered risky by 
today’s understandings; sugar mixture, bap and panada were replaced by nutrition 
technologies; cloth was recognised as unhygienic and replaced by sterilisable 
materials and sterilising technologies. Sucking panada through a cloth covering a 
metal spout makes the sucking harder, both in terms of being more difficult but 
also in terms of hardness on babies’ mouths and gums. Today’s bottles are made 
of plastic with soft rubber teats, each of which is sterilized and cleaned before 
being filled with prescribed amounts of liquid prepared in prescribed ways. As 
such they enter into a hermeneutic relation with caregivers, where prescribed 
amounts are ‘read off’ the bottle, which has a measuring scale on the side, and the 
strength of the mixture is read off the instructions and then again in the 
measuring. The experience of a rubber teat is a softer feel than that of metal, 
porcelain or glass, and the risk of breakage, leakage, potential choking and 
disease is reduced in modern feeding technologies. There are, however, issues of 
preparation and cleaning time and monetary costs involved in adopting the newer 
technologies.  
Winnicott assures us, against charges of sentimentality that psychoanalysis has to 
some extent over emphasized the importance of the actual breast, which should 
instead be understood as an analogy of mothering and parenting more generally. 
He argues that ‘holding and handling are more vitally important indications of 
management than is the actual fact of a breast-feeding experience’ (Winnicott 
1988c, 25). A great deal of the richness of engagement between mother—or 
father or other caregiver—and the baby can be maintained in bottle feeding 
(Winnicott 1988c, 30). Accordingly he cites such things as eye contact and touch, 
or closeness. He does speculate, however, as to whether ‘the whole taste and 
smell and sensuous experience of a breast-feeding is something that is absent 
when the baby engages with a rubber teat’ (Winnicott 1988c, 25). Given that we 
experience with all of our senses in concert, it is perhaps more appropriate to 
suggest that the quality of the experience of breast and bottle feeding are different 
but neither is more or less sensory than the other.   
Both bottle and breast feeding can afford the warmth of body on body contact but 
the quality of touch is different. The shape, density and consistency of breast yield 
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to the touch, but obscures baby’s perception of the world beyond it, yet its 
warmth and relative softness afford caressing, the quality of which is changed 
from breast to bottle. While physical closeness and eye contact are able to be 
maintained in a bottle feeding situation, it is not a necessary condition as it is in 
breastfeeding, as bottle feeding may take place without any physical contact 
between a carer and a baby. Bottle feeding can be delegated to fathers, siblings 
and other child care providers, but it can be facilitated by the inclusion of other 
technologies such as pillows on which the bottle can be supported.  
Winnicott argues that ‘the baby’s development cannot take place except in 
relation to the human reliability of the holding and the handling’ (Winnicott 
1988d, 97). Holding, however, does not necessarily only relate to physically 
holding, rather it is also implicit in the ‘repetitive and reliable nature of parental 
management’ (Lally 2002, 28). This holding, which is part of a spectrum of 
holding in babies’ own perpetual holding state—held by gravity, held in arms, 
held in containers.  As such we may concur with Lally who points out that, the 
facticity of material objects; their tangible existence, their ‘permanence from 
moment to moment’ anchor us in the ‘real world’ (Lally 2002,26).  
When we consider Winnicott’s statement as implying both a literal and 
metaphorical holding we obviate the binaries of and judgments associated with 
physical holding which are inconsistent with a phenomenological understanding 
of the reversibility of flesh and the subject-in-the-world in that holding takes 
place with or without actual holding and holding is afforded in a variety of ways. 
In figure 3.9, taken from my own photo album, eye contact and touch, or 
closeness are indeed maintained in the holding, body-body relation. The space of 
non-coincidence between us is minimal: the chiasm is deep. For my niece, the 
mouth-feel, or tactile sensation that food gives to the mouth, gums, tongue and 
lips, while similar, is nonetheless different to breast feeding.  Fluid flow from a 
bottle relies more on gravity and is generally faster than the flow from the breast. 
It is also constant and supply can be guaranteed which is not always the case with 
breastfeeding. The production and flow of milk from the breast is stimulated and 
maintained by the baby’s tongue or jaw movement which initiates the ‘let-down’ 
122 | P a g e  
Primary Objects and Primal Intersubjectivity 
response (Inoue, Sakashita, and Kamegai 1995). As Ihde points out with every 
amplification there is a concomitant reduction and it is important to recognise 
both, if we are to gain a greater understanding of the ways in which young 
children’s existence is technologically textured, or mediated (Ihde 1990). While 
the bottle still requires effort in terms of breathing and swallowing, it is 
nonetheless an amplificatory technology which improves the yield for the amount 











Figure 3.9 Bottle Feeding 
Breastfeeding and bottle feeding also afford different experiences of taste, smell, 
touch, sight and sound. As can been seen in figure 3.9 bottle feeding allows for a 
variability of provision in that it is possible for the bottle to contain a number of 
different liquids, which can be hot, cold, or anything in between. In the picture, 
the bottle contains apple juice. As a baby, I could not tolerate milk, so my mother 
would cut a larger hole in the teat and mix strained baby food with evaporated 
milk to feed me. The contents of a bottle can be sweet, sour, acid or bitter 
depending upon what is put into it, yet a breast only yields colostrum or milk, or 
in the case of mastitis, a mixture of colostrum or milk with blood. Unless breast 
milk is expressed and refrigerated for later use, it remains at body temperature 
while bottles cool down. The consistency and taste too, of breast milk, are not 
able to be manipulated as they are in bottle feeding. The sound of breastfeeding 
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and bottle feeding are also different. Bottle feeding is not only accompanied by 
the sounds of slurping and murmuring that breast feeding is, but the baby-bottle 
relation produces sounds of bubbling when the milk runs low or the baby has 
created a vacuum with their sucking creating a different auditory relation to the 
baby-breast relation. Breastfeeding too, can be accompanied by maternal sounds 
of pain in the case of mastitis, when babies try their new teeth out on the nipple or 
when they scratch in their caressing, something that does not accompany bottle 
feeding. 
There are circumstances under which breastfeeding is not possible, or not 
feasible, and bottle feeding becomes a desirable and workable option in which 
much of the richness of the experience can be maintained (Winnicott 1988c, 25). 
For instance Emma, who already had a three year old and a four year old, 
breastfed her twins for the first six weeks of their lives before abandoning it as an 
unworkable situation. While we understand that the breast is flesh, we should also 
be mindful that the bottle is also flesh in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, albeit hard flesh, 
which rushes in to fill the chiasm between carer and child. Bottles may be 
considered as one of the first fresh instruments which babies incorporate into their 
own being, opening an exploratory space; the spreading off of écart is greater in 
bottle feeding than in breastfeeding, affording the baby access to their socio-
equipmental environment beyond the mother.    
As Ihde remarks our existence in the world is not only technologically textured in 
terms of big things, but ‘also with respect to the rhythms and spaces of daily life’ 
(Ihde 1990) and it is through the rhythms of everyday life that the mediating 
potential of feeding bottles is most apparent. If breastfeeding goes as planned, 
babies’ needs can be met ‘on demand’ and a ready supply of milk is available, 
which is not only the right temperature but requires no measuring and mixing.  
Yet, breastfeeding does not always go as planned and consequently sometimes 
there is not enough milk. With bottle feeding we can be assured that infants 
receive regular amounts and that it is of consistent quality, although mixing 
measuring heating and sterilising may render it not as readily available ‘on 
demand’. 
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In the service of scientific rationality, measuring, comparing and categorization 
came to the fore in Western societies in the post-enlightenment era of modernity 
(Romanyshyn 1989). This preoccupation provoked and maintained the emergence 
of a number of specialist fields. For example, as Rima Apple points out: 
In the nineteenth century pediatrics did not have the status of a defined 
medical specialty, and few American physicians devoted any time to 
pediatric research; but doctors were not totally uninterested in or oblivious 
to child health. In popular medical manuals physicians covered a wide range 
of health topics, sometimes including a section on infant feeding. A few 
physicians began to construct theories of infant feeding and to devise 
‘scientifically’ correct infant formulas. (Apple 1987, 6)  
 
Infant management and feeding became a science which could only be undertaken 
under ‘expert medical guidance’ in the nineteenth century (Bryder 2009, 55). The 
introduction of, not only the bottle, but its attendant sterilizer, heating apparatus, 
formula and so on, transform the temporal and spatial organization of infants’ and 
carers’ daily lives.  Even when the formula is prepared in advance it requires 
heating and once the liquid is gone, the bottle and teat are sterilised in preparation 
for subsequent feeds. Furthermore, the timing of feeds is measured to ensure 
adequate feeding and a regular routine. The quantity of food given, particularly 
while bottle feeding, is also measured. Even in breast feeding, mothers are 
encouraged to allow the baby to feed for x number of minutes on each breast at 
intervals which are set out by the ‘ideal’. For instance, KidsHealth.org suggests 
that: 
 
A newborn baby needs to be fed every 2 to 3 hours. If you're breastfeeding, 
give your baby the chance to nurse about 10-15 minutes at each breast. If 
you're formula-feeding, your baby will most likely take about 2-3 ounces 
(60-90 milliliters) at each feeding. (KidsHealth 2010) 
 
This is part of the broader measurement strategies and milestones that monitor 
infant growth. Every aspect of infant development became measurable and 
regulated. Babies’ weight and length are measured soon after birth, as is their 
heart rate, response to stimuli and grimace
5
, and this continues throughout infancy 
                                                          
5
  Immediately after being born, babies are given an APGAR score out of 10. APGAR is an 
acronym for Appearance, Pulse, Grimace, Activity, and Respiration (KidsHealth 2010). 
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and is recommended into childhood, with height and weight measured on a 
regular basis and compared to the norm. KidsHealth offer a growth chart so that 
babies’ height and weight can be compared to the standard.  
 
Formulas are measured to ensure the right strength and consistency – too little 
powder and the baby will not get enough nourishment; too much may cause 
constipation. The water that the formula powder is added to should be no less than 
70 degrees but it should not be given to the baby when it is either too hot or too 
cold. Of course the primary benefit of this level of measuring, in contrast to 
breastfeeding, is that caregivers can know how much, and what strength of 
formula the baby is consuming. The amount of sleep babies get is also a matter 
for measurement and comparison.  Infant care thus becomes embedded in a series 
of hermeneutic relations where the instruments of measurement are ‘read off’ to 
make decisions in the normative discourse of childrearing.  As Ihde points out, in 
Western scientific discourse, ‘[t]o be known, phenomenon must fall into the 
horizon of intentionality, and fall into it in a certain way. This is what the 
instrument makes possible’ (Ihde 1979, 23). In the case of infant care ‘the horizon 
of intentionality’ to which Ihde refers is technologically informed decision 
making aimed at the goal of normal development. As such, infant care becomes 
instrumental, carried out through culturally and historically specific set of praxes 
along with attendant technological apparatuses. 
The ways in which very young children’s time and space are organized, and the 
sensory qualities of feeding routines synthesise to constitute the texture of the 
situated lifeworlds which infants inhabit, establishing habits of being. Bottles are 
technologies, with a material component, which enter into a set of human praxes, 
which are not produced, used, developed and so on, in isolation from their 
cultural context (Ihde 1993); and, crucially they intervene into the space between 
carer and child, mediating the feeding experience for both. Baby bottles mimic 
certain aspects of the maternal provision and indeed the maternal body with 
varying degrees of success.  
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As children’s embodiment matures, the affordances of the technologies change 
along with them. As babies become toddlers, their increased mobility changes the 
relation between the child and the breast or bottle and the bottle can take on a 
different significance as a mobile container. Anecdotally, some toddlers who still 
take a bottle, can be seen walking around with the teat clasped firmly between 
their teeth with the rest of the bottle left hanging from their mouths. Initially, as 
babies mature, the feeding tools they use change from fingers to spoons and 
ultimately to knives, forks, spoons, bowls, cups and so on as they learn body 




























Figure 3.11 Early Spoon Feeding 
For babies at about five or six months of age, spoons afford mash-into-the-hair-
and face-ability, painting-the-table-ability, throw-ability, drop-ability and bang-
ability, as well as ultimately feed-ability as a graspable aspect of their 
embodiment. Hence spoons afford a range of sounds and tactile experience which 
are not consistent with their intended use. It is only through disciplining the body 
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through repetitive experience that babies learn the ‘appropriate’ way to use eating 
utensils. Ultimately, with practice the fragmentary embodiment in relation to 
eating technologies becomes structured and spoons and other eating implements 
are incorporated into the child’s own bodily actions allowing very young children 
to realise the intended use of utensils and the incorporation of feeding tools into 
their corporeal schema. 
Dummies-Pacifiers 
When I first met two and a half year old Jacob, he had two pacifiers in his mouth. 
The second youngest of four children, Jacob’s parents had been advised that they 
should stop him from having a pacifier as it would ruin the shape of his teeth. 
Trying to follow the dentist’s instructions they were vigilant in not allowing him 
access to it, yet this did not help since Jacob reverted back to sucking his thumb 
when the dummy was taken away. This illustrates the point which Lally makes that 
while 'new technologies displace earlier ones, that displacement is neither complete 
nor simple' (Lally 2002, 3).  
Perhaps the most widely recognised theory of the use of transitional objects like 
dummies is to mitigate some of the trauma associated with ‘withdrawal of maternal 
breast and then mother herself’ (Dillon 1990a, 21).  Despite pacifiers’ capacity to 
reduce buccal exploration, dummies and other transitional objects are not gap fillers 
but mediators between very young children’s bodies and the world. Transitional 
objects are not part of the infant’s own body nor are they ‘fully recognised as 
belonging to external reality’ (Lally 2002, 28). As Lally suggests, transitional 
objects—in this case pacifiers—are thus ‘the interface between the inner life of the 
individual and that individual’s everyday interaction with reality,’ occupying the 
ambiguous space between introception and extroception (Lally 2002, 28). As 
children move along the developmental continuum towards relative independence, 
as Jacob has, a pacifier may become what Winnicott suggests is the child’s first 
possession; one of the things necessarily provided for them, but over which the 
infant retains control (Winnicott 1980, 3). Pacifiers may not necessarily seem to 
‘have a vitality or reality of [their] own’, which is one of Winnicott’s criteria for 
transitional objects, but they do have a shape and texture which mimics the nipple 
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or at least the teat of a feeding bottle, affording some of the sensory experience of 
feeding. Dummies thus, literally fill the space between inside and outside, 
mediating the experience of sucking and mimicking aspects of care.  
Winnicott suggests that transitional objects are ‘excitedly loved and mutilated’, that 
is, they must be able to survive loving, hating and even aggression, and they must 
not be changed unless the child changes it (Winnicott 1980, 6). To project adult 
conceptions of love and hate onto babies is problematic, in that it implies an 
emotional and cognitive understanding and intention that we, as adults, cannot 
know whether very young children possess.  Nonetheless, transitional objects, 
while being provided for babies, are their first possessions or primary objects over 
which the child has some control. In my experience with my son, my younger 
siblings and my own attachment to a pacifier, regardless of the age or condition of a 
pacifier, attempting to replace it with a new one is accompanied by complaints on 
behalf of infants and toddlers. Hence dummies and other transitional objects must 
to tough enough to withstand multiple sterilizations as well as dragging in the dirt 
and biting. Dummies thus become different types of things, changing affordances 
when babies’ get teeth or start to crawl or walk. This is one example of the ways in 
which transitional objects adapt to a range of use-contexts and embodiment 
changes. 
There are degrees to which our experiences of the world are mediated by the 
materiality of technologies (Ihde 2002, 17). Human-technology-world relations 
exist along a continuum of experiences. At one end are embodiment relations where 
we experience the world through the technology as an aspect of our embodiment, 
exemplified in the previous chapter by the baby walker which becomes a part of 
babies’ capacity for movement and where the focus is not the walker but realisation 
of a goal that baby-walker relations affords . At the other end is the hermeneutic or 
alterity relation which signals an experiencing of rather than through or with 
technologies. In this instance the technology becomes an ‘other’ from which we 
‘read’ information, as in the case of the baby bottle where we may read off the 
correct amount of fluid for the baby to drink (Ihde 1979, 10-13).  As Ihde notes, ‘in 
hermeneutic relations the machine becomes “other”.  But precisely because it 
becomes “other” it now has different possibilities’ (Ihde 1979, 12). Relations with 
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dummies are some of the first embodiment relations which sometimes oscillates 
between embodiment and alterity as experiences of  mediating technologies (Ihde 
1979, 11).  Dummies are experienced as quasi-others by babies and this has 
implications for their use as transitional objects, as is apparent when trying to 
‘break the habit’. Human-technology relations are not fixed, but oscillate between 
embodied, background and alterity relations where the former is an experience of 
the world with the technology and the latter where our experiences are experiences 
of the technology (Ihde 1979, 12).  
Clothing  
Clothing represents another type of relational ontology which infants and toddlers 
have with mediating technologies.   If we again visit Ihde’s preliminary definition 
of technology we are reminded that technologies must have a material element, or 
object status, and must enter into a set of human praxes (Ihde 1993, 47). As such, 
they enter into a set of human-technology relations specific to affordance relations 
with our own embodiment and experiences in and of our particular environmental 
provisions. In the case of clothing, it can scarcely be denied that clothing mediates 
experience. Clothing may be seen as technics or artefacts which have been put to 
human use to achieve a result in an environment, and which necessarily mediate our 
experiences in and of the world (Ihde 2002, 12). 
Clothing, like most technologies, do not only exist in one immutable relation but 
may exist as relations of various ilks simultaneously. As adults, we all experience 
the world through our clothing. For example, we experience our comfort and 
warmth through the clothing we wear. Yet, clothing as fashion takes on a 
hermeneutic relation from which we may ‘read’ style, taste, class as well as many 
other markers of cultural affiliation, in this way we can see that clothing functions 
on all three planes of meaning—technomic, sociotechnic and ideotechnic. We 
may be said to inhabit our clothing, scarcely aware of its existence in a 
background relation sometimes, and as a hermeneutic relation at others, and often 
simultaneously.  Varying infant-clothing relations will be discussed in the 
following example from my observations of Emily and Kane, on an occasion 
when they were dressed in baby sleeping bags (figure 3.10). 
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The sleeping bags to which I refer are made of a polar fleece fabric which is both 
soft and warm; hence despite being winter the babies were able to experience a 
soft warm environment. Yet these bags mediate very young children’s experience 
in other ways. The baby sleeping bag, like an adult sleeping bag is, as the name 
suggests, a bag that contains the body of the wearer. Unlike an adult sleeping bag, 
however, baby sleeping bags have sleeves which free up babies’ hands and arms. 
Garments such as these are designed primarily to keep babies warm and covered 
while they sleep yet they are hybrid, sleeping bag-clothing items as they are also 
used as house clothes in the winter months, particularly for babies who are not yet 
able to move about.  Emily had just starting to crawl when I visited and watching 
her in her sleeping bag it was apparent that the bag constrained her capacity to 
move about her environment as it became tangled and caught up underneath her 
(figure 3.12), making crawling more difficult.  Even Kane, who was not yet able 












Figure 3.12 Baby in Sleeping Bag  
The bag extends from the back of the neck to beyond their feet and consequently 
made bending forward more difficult as the bag pulled down at the back of their 
necks and became tight across their backs. Clothing thus may considered as both 
constraint and enablement, oscillating between a background relation of 
inhabitation and to an alterity relation of otherness as it transforms from 
experiencing with to experience of when it becomes uncomfortable or restricts 
mobility. By disabling her ability to move about in the house, Emily’s experience 
of the world was reduced to the status of immobility. That is, her ability to act 
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was inhibited by the clothing which simultaneously facilitated warmth and 
normally comfort when she was immobile. As the affordances change so too do 
the human-technology-world relations.  
To further elaborate on the mediating potential of clothing, had the children been 
sitting naked on the polished wooden floor of the lounge room, they would have 
experienced their world very differently; not only would they have been cold, but 
their mobility would not have been constrained except by their own corporeality 
and the affordances of the environment.  As Ihde notes, experiencing through 
artefacts as opposed to ‘in the flesh’ experiencing involves a transformation of 
embodied experience (Ihde 1990, 9). Borrowing from Ihde, I would suggest that 
the relatively transparent relation which even very young babies have with that 
which enfolds them enables clothing to be taken into their ‘experiencing of what 
is other in the World’, amplifying bodily warmth yet restricting cold and 












Figure 3.13 Baby in Growsuit 
Another example of how clothing may mediate very young children’s 
experiences is apparent in the extensive use of growsuits.  As can be seen in 
figure 3.13 Molly had a growsuit which was too large for her.  The ‘feet’ 
consequently folded over, alternatively constricting her toes or hanging off the 
ends of them. As a new toddler, her capacity to walk was compromised by the 
encumbrance of her clothing. Nonetheless, her clothing was still experienced as 
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an aspect of embodied relation, literally as a second skin through which she 
perceived the world. The materiality of infants’ and toddlers’ footwear also has an 
impact on children’s capacities to walk, climb and crawl, mediating how they may 
experience their environment.  Toddlers, who are literally learning to stand on their 
own two feet and come at the world, are initially unstable as they have not yet 
mastered all of the body habits of standing and walking—hence the term 
‘toddler’—so soft shoes, particularly soft soled shoes, afford greater flexion of feet 
and ankles, rendering walking more achievable than rigid shoes while rigid soles 
may afford stability, protection from sharp objects underfoot, and greater surface 
area for balance. As anyone who has worn ‘stiff’ shoes will know they do not 
initially flex and conform to our foot shape or footwork, resulting in blisters and 
possibly bunions, transforming our human-technology-world relation from a 
background relation and embodied relation to include an alterity relation 
simultaneously.  Although wearing socks or stockings mediates the rubbing, they 



















Figure 3.14 Kane Scratching at Fluff on Growsuit 
Very young children are very aware of their clothing and it occupies an 
ambiguous status in terms of human-technology relations. Infants and toddlers not 
only inhabit their clothing, they also play with, chew, suck, smell, and handle 
their clothing implying a simultaneity of background and alterity relations. As 
Winnicott notes, texture matters significantly to very young children (Winnicott, 
1988, 30). On several occasions during my research, I observed Kane and Emily 
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actively engaged in pulling at the loose fitting feet of their growsuits, scratching 
at the fluff which had become caught up in the fabric and fingering fasteners on 
their clothing in much the same way as they engage, in early childhood with 
newly ‘found’ fingers and toes as extraneous objects. This points, not only to the 
ambiguity of the relations they have with their clothing and their own 
embodiment, but it signals distraction as very young children’s fundamental way 
of being.   
As Lally remarks ‘personal possessions can be regarded in some way as an 
integral part of the self or as a kind of extension of the self' and this is nowhere 
more evident than in relation to clothing (Lally 2002, 8).  Clothing is a particular 
type of mediating technology which is removable and put-on-able, it affords both 
comfort and discomfort, and it can both allow and constrain movement and 
consequently experience. In a variation of the well-known example of the blind 
man’s cane used by Merleau-Ponty, wherein the man senses the world through his 
cane (Merleau-Ponty 1962), Ihde argues that in writing on a blackboard with 
chalk or writing on a piece of paper with a pencil that the writing implement is 
not primarily experienced ‘as either thematic or as an object’ but that the paper, or 
the blackboard is experienced through the pencil or chalk and that these 
implements are taken in to our ‘self-experiencing’ (Ihde 1979, 7). By analogy, 
whether it be to feel good, to look good or merely to shield us from the elements, 
clothing is often taken for granted and recedes into the periphery of our 
experiencing. Nonetheless, whether as background, embodied or hermeneutic 
relation or all three at various times or even simultaneously, clothing never ceases 
to mediate our experiences of ourselves and the world (Ihde 1979, 11).   
As human-technology-world relations oscillate between background, embodiment 
and alterity they inform very young children’s growing understanding of 
themselves as discrete individuals, facilitating the transition from dependence to 
relative independence and fleshing out their worlds and mediating the space 
between carer and child. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that material objects figure prominently in infant’s 
and toddlers’ development and experience of the world from birth. Using 
examples of feeding technologies, pacifiers, clothing and returning ultimately to 
revisit microenvironments I have suggested that material objects mediate 
children’s passage from total dependence towards relative independence, 
affording different uses as children’s embodiment and understanding of 
themselves and the world mature, and informing how they may experience the 
world and their own embodiment within it. By introducing Merleau-Ponty’s 
concepts of ‘flesh’ and the ‘chiasm’ I suggested that in some ways each of the 
objects to which I have referred is an integral aspect of children’s corporeal 
schema. Winnicott has offered significant insights to this chapter, yielding 
understandings of the importance of the texture of objects and the foundation of 
ontological security. I have argued, using Ihde’s critique of measurement, and in 
terms of the mediating capacity of technologies in relation to the spatiotemporal 
rhythms of life and the reductive and amplificatory capacities of mediating 
technologies, that while technologies are implicated in virtually all human activity 
that they each mediate children’s existence in ways which are specific to the way 
technologies as transitional objects are embedded in a particular habitus. For 
instance, I suggested that while bottle feeding has the capacity to retain much of 
the physical closeness and eye contact of breast feeding, it also enables this 
particular aspect of nurture to be delegated to either other people or indeed other 
technologies, for example a pillow. I have also suggested that bottle feeding 
allows infants to be fed on schedule rather than on demand, potentially imposing 
an instrumental regularity – an affordance supported by time technologies.  
I have also discussed the transitional objects which, unlike Winnicott, I do not 
take to be gap fillers of compensation for lack of the maternal breast but rather as 
mediating technologies which both amplify and reduce very young children’s 
experiences and exploratory activity. In the process they facilitate a growing 
understanding of otherness, existing at the interface of inner and external reality. 
In this chapter, texture featured prominently as did the object’s ability to 
withstand the variable affordance relations they have with very young children. 
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In the section on clothing I examined the relation into which children and clothing 
enter to suggest that with maturing corporeality, the affordances relations we have 
with clothing also changes, reinforcing the connection between the textured 
environment and the move from indeterminate to determinate experiences. The 
technologies which with we coexist inform and are informed by our own 
developing corporeality, overlain with cultural and historical expectations of ways 
of being-in and -with-clothing. 
The objects referred to in this chapter are those which infants encounter at a very 
early stage in their lives and form the basis for self-other distinctions to follow. 
Initially these objects are experienced as bodily sensations of pleasure or 
displeasure, but in the process of maturation the same objects come to be 
recognised as originating from outside of the infants’ own body, which 
establishes a foundational understanding within the child, that they are discrete 
beings. After clothing, feeding technologies, dummies and technologies of 
containment, toys are also objects which enter into the space of écart, fleshing out 
very young children’s worlds and in-forming their understanding of themselves as 
well as the human and non-human others who likewise inhabit their lifeworlds. In 
the next chapter I will take up the themes that have been forwarded in this chapter 
and those preceding it to discuss how toys mediate infants’ and toddlers’ 
experiences of the world in particular ways, prior to moving on to television and 
new media in the final two chapters. The organization of chapters in this thesis is 
partly to illustrate the order in which infants and toddlers encounter various 
mediums but also allows for a layering of levels of complexity, thereby 
establishing a continuum of experience from the most basic technologies to 
interactive digital media, with each subset having its own formal, physical 
characteristics, affordances and implications for very young children’s 
experiences of themselves in relation to the world and the technological 
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Toys are us: Playing is being 
 
This chapter represents a crucial shift in this thesis which has thus far primarily 
examined the early relations children have with their socio-equipmental 
environments. This has been done by considering space, containment and 
emplacement in relation to very young children’s developing corporeality through 
the mediums of incubators, cots, playpens, walkers, clothing and feeding 
technologies; things which children encounter and experience early in life, which 
are not generally considered media. This chapter will move us closer to our 
conventional understanding of media or ‘high’ technology, not only because of 
the discourse surrounding toys and playthings, but also because of their status as 
objects specifically for entertainment, as well as the materiality of such 
playthings, and how they enter into very young children’s ontology and changing 
relations with mediating technologies. Moreover, it is at this point that the 
distinction between what we would normally consider media and what we 
consider playthings, becomes ambiguous, as more and more toys incorporate 
aspects of media, whether that be through licenced products or through the 
inclusion of screens and digitalisation in the toy itself. Additionally this chapter 
will consider the affective dimensions of these particular material objects, their 
affordances specifically in relation to infants and toddlers and consequently how 
they serve as transitional objects. 
In this chapter I will first consider the status of playthings and the importance of 
play before moving on to toys. In doing so, I argue that the historical and cultural 
specificities of toys in the early twenty first century, which are expressly designed 
in accord with contemporary understandings of what toys should be, alongside 
our conceptions of infancy and toddlerhood, configure very young children’s 
understandings of and activity within the world. As such, I will argue that toys, 
just as much as television or computers are mediating technologies in that they 
intercede into and shape infants’ and toddlers’ experiences and understandings of 
the world, as well as communicating something about the cultural context, 
societal beliefs, and expectations of adults.  Even if we consider media narrowly 
as a means of, and intervention into communication (O'Sullivan et al. 1994) we 
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may still concede that all material objects serve to communicate meaning on one 
of three planes: the technomic, sociotechnic or ideotechnic. The technomic plane 
is one on which the appropriate use of any technology is communicated as value 
or otherwise. The sociotechnic is the plane on which societal aspirations and 
status are communicated and the ideotechnic reveals the personal beliefs and 
values of individuals is communicated. The relevance of these concepts will 
become more apparent in the discussion later in this chapter which deals with 
parental aspirations for their infants and toddlers, and the consequent proliferation 
of ‘educational’ toys. 
In this chapter we will return to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the ‘body habit’, or 
knowledge in the hands, in which we come to inhabit those things with which we 
frequently engage, incorporating them into the dynamic organization of our 
bodies, enabling us to experience a harmony between intention and action 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, 139). Doing so will reinforce the notion that playthings and 
toys are integral in shaping infants’ and toddlers’ modes of existence through 
particular postural, orientational and gestural adjustments, mediating their stance 
within the world and in relation to the elements of that world (Merleau-Ponty 
1962). As we have discussed, infants and toddlers infants and toddlers literally 
inhabit multiple simultaneous and consecutive microenvironments each with their 
specific constraints and enablements. This inhabitation shapes infants’ and 
toddlers’ experiences of space as well as constraining and enabling certain 
embodied and sensory perceptions, contingent upon the children’s own 
developing corporeality and the affordances of the techno-materiality of 
containment. The notion of inhabitation is grounded in the phenomenological 
concept of being-in-the-world but also in our understanding of habitus as 
habitual, consensual ways of being (Tilley 2008). In relation to children’s 
developing corporeal schemas, Heft (2003) notes that among the ‘physical-bodily 
attributes’ that individuals bring to an encounter are: 
body size, muscle strength, postural stability, locomotor skill, and fine motor 
control. Ongoing changes in attributes such as these alter over time the 
affordance properties of environmental features that are perceived relative to 
the individual (Heft 2003, 174) 
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Consequently, the interplay between body and environment configures the 
particular ways in which we all may be in-the-world. The facilitating environment 
as a holding space then, protects infants from risk, not only physical and 
psychological, but also in terms of exposure to experiences which are considered 
inappropriate for small children. Sofia’s (2000) elaboration of facilitating 
environments as container technologies emphasizes that these spaces cannot be 
considered empty or dumb spaces but are filled with cultural beliefs, values and 
expectations which communicate meaning. Using the examples of incubators, 
cots or cribs, high chairs, play pens and walkers, I argued that the constraints and 
enablements afforded by such container technologies in concert with children’s 
developing embodiment situates very young children in the world in particular 
ways at the level of a primary relational ontology, which informs all future 
relations with the world and the things within it.   
The phenomenological concept of being-in-the-world has enabled us to take 
account of being-with-in-the-world, or being-in-the-world-with other not-mes. I 
suggested that being with-in has significant ontological and perceptual 
implications for children’s becoming-in-time, in that children and adults alike 
exist in a primary relation with technologies. This was done by developing 
Winnicott’s concept of the facilitating environment, as self-evidently an 
environment of containment or holding. I suggested that the holding phase of 
early infancy constitutes and is constituted by a chiasmic intertwining with 
objects as flesh of the world. Such intertwining is primarily achieved through the 
environmental provision of a facilitating environment but gradually expands 
during maturation to include the experience of broader socio-equipmental-
environments. By concentrating on Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of flesh-of the-
world, the chiasm and reversibility when referring to primary objects, I suggested 
that as the space of non-coincidence increases children are gradually introduced to 
their environmental context through a process of integration and disintegration, or 
incorporation and separation, in a process of layered mediation.  
In the upcoming chapter I will again draw upon the theoretical concepts of flesh 
and the chiasm to suggest that toys ‘flesh out’ children’s worlds, filling the space 
of écart as it steadily widens between carer and child to allow the textured flesh 
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of diverse objects of play to enter. This will be supplemented by Merleau-Ponty’s 
reversibility thesis, in which we must consider toys as an integral part of 
children’s corporeality; toys like other objects are literally an aspect of our bodily 
schema. In this chapter I will look at the affordances offered by specific toys and 
examine in some depth the discourses surrounding childhood and toys and the 
ascription of particular stages to children’s corporeality.  The notion of 
transitional objects will again be used in this chapter to consider how material 
objects which mediate very young children’s initial I-world relation, enable and 
constrain infants’ and toddlers’ experiences in their socio-cultural-environments.   
As Romanyshyn notes, ‘it is the simple things which give shape to any space, 
transforming it into a place, which gives us our place and without which we 
would have no place’ (Romanyshyn 1989, 1 cited in Lally 2002, 1). Hence the 
playthings and toys that infants and toddlers engage with on a regular basis help 
to establish and scaffold significant places where children may feel at home. Yet, 
different types of playthings and toys afford different possibilities to very young 
children than we, as adults, might expect. Consequently this chapter will also 
consider the intentional design and marketing discourses, their implications for 
the types of toys we provide for very young children, and unintentional uses. In 
the first instance, however, I will consider definitions of play to signify the 
tension between adult conceptions of the purpose of play, and very young 
children’s experiences of it. 
Playing is being  
One of the recurrent themes in debates surrounding children and the media is the 
potential impact, or otherwise, that media content may have on children’s psycho-
social development, particularly at the level of pro- or anti-social behaviour.  
However, Fiske (1987) and others (see for example Buckingham, Willett, and 
Pini 2011) suggest that the relationship that children, and audiences more 
generally, have with media texts, is often playful and interpretive (Fiske 1987). 
Therefore, before moving on to discuss toys and playthings explicitly, it is worth 
considering the concept of play due to its persistence throughout the lifespan, and 
to link play with a range of objects of which media are a part. Play is understood 
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in particular ways by adults in contemporary Western societies, which are 
significant in that they potentially reconfigure, or mediate, children’s experiences 
of play, its importance to children’s development and our ideas in relation to what 
constitutes appropriate playthings and play environments.  
One of the most important things a child can do is play. Play is the essential 
joy of childhood and is also the way children learn about themselves, their 
environment and the people around them. As they play, children learn to 
solve problems, get along with other people and control their bodies as they 
enrich their creativity and develop leadership skills. (The American Toy 
Institute 1994)  
The above quote from The Toy Manufacturers American Guide to Toys and 
Play—Revised Edition (The American Toy Institute 1994) gives some indication 
of the burden of responsibility which play carries in contemporary Western 
understandings of the term. Boucher and Wolfberg suggest that play is universal 
in humans although it takes various forms which makes definition elusive 
(Boucher and Wolfberg 2003, 340-341).  From an adult perspective, play can 
include: 
lap play (peek-a-boo,‘round and round the garden’); sensation seeking and 
motor exploration; rough and tumble; verbal experimentation; constructional 
toys (bricks, jigsaws, Lego); playground play (swings, slides, trikes); sand 
and water; representational toy play (dolls, cars and so on); clapping and 
singing games; chase and hide games; pretence and role play; teasing, jokes 
and humour; word games, card and board games; team games and sports; 
and so on and so on.(Boucher and Wolfberg 2003, 340) 
Play as adults understand it, however, is not necessarily how children experience 
it. Danforth (2011), who also speaks to the universality of play and the 
elusiveness of a definition, suggests that it is an activity which can range from 
aimlessness to intentionality, from fun to fiercely competitive and focused 
(Danforth 2011, 58). Brian Sutton-Smith also suggests that play is not only fun or 
even pleasurable for its own sake, but rather infuses the rest of our lives and 
‘makes it possible to live more fully in the world, no matter how boring or painful 
or even dangerous ordinary reality might seem’ (Sutton-Smith 2008, 95).  
Frank and Theresa Caplan (1974) who have written extensively on play suggest 
that play is ‘a voluntary activity which permits freedom of action, diversion from 
routines, and an imaginary world to master’ (Caplan 1974, ix). Catherine Garvey 
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(1977) likewise points out that play is a pleasurable, spontaneous and voluntary 
activity and Winnicott (1980) tells us that, children play primarily because they 
enjoy it (Garvey 1977, 4-5).  The importance of play in early childhood is further 
illustrated in the following quote: 
During the entire sensorimotor period of children’s development (birth to 
age 2), exploration of environmental objects (including toys and people) is a 
common activity. Play expands exploratory acts by attempting to test the 
range of affordance possibilities—that is, by finding out what the player can 
do with the object, not just finding out what actions the object affords 
perceptually (Bergen et al. 2010)  
Play, for very young children, is an indeterminate activity which involves both 
fun and seriousness (Huizinga 1970). As such, infants in particular do not 
distinguish play from being, exploration, experience or work, as such, it may be 
considered as a foundational ontology. It is only with age and experience that play 
becomes bracketed off from other types of activities, and ultimately defined in 
opposition to not-play (Huizinga 1955). For very young children, in particular, 
play does not need a reason, but is ‘experimental; it is experiential; it is 
exploratory’ (Danforth 2011, 58). Play facilitates the creation, ownership and 
control of often imaginary microworlds in an otherwise largely uncontrollable 
world. Hence, what we consider play is dependent upon the context and indeed 
the orientation we, as adults, adopt towards it (Garvey 1977, 5).  
Nonetheless, adult understandings of the purpose and value of particular types of 
play mediate how, what and with what children play, introducing children to 
particular cultural habits of being. In early infancy, the most common type of play 
with objects involves a move from indeterminacy to determinacy through the 
‘repetition of similar actions, and then elaboration of these actions into a broader 
range of actions’ (Bergen et al. 2010, 2). The development of very young 
children’s corporeal schemas, which is initially fragmentary (lacunaire) gradually 
becomes ‘precise, restructured, and mature little by little’ is enabled, in part by 
repetitive play (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 123). Since play, for children, is indivisible 
from being, it facilitates infants’ developing corporeal schemas enabling them to 
move from random, or unintentional action, to specific and intentional action 
through the cultivation of body habits (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 139).  
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The role of Playthings in transition: dis/integrating babies 
Consistent with Winnicott’s notion of potential space, Merleau-Ponty suggests 
that early childhood experience results in children coming to see that their bodies 
are, after all, closed in on themselves (Merleau-Ponty 1964 (b), 119). Winnicott’s 
potential space is analogous to the space of non-coincidence—écart—which 
precisely allows for the incorporation of exosomatic entities into children’s 
corporeal schemas (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 91). It is the specific space which allows 
a mutual inclination and intertwining between children and the flesh of the world 
(Wynn 1997, 255). That is, it is a space of potential meaning and action: a space 
to play. As the spread of écart widens, it is immediately filled with fleshly things 
with which infants and toddlers will play. Hence, play in the potential space 
between mother and child, is elaborated to play with a piece of fabric, or a toy, 
and ultimately may become play with media texts.  
Sensorimotor play is the first stage of play, which occupies infancy to about 
two years of age, and coincides with the stage of early childhood when 
children gradually gain control over their bodily movements and learn to 
coordinate their gestures and perceptions of the effects of those gestures 
(Garvey 1977, 6). Hence it is a time rich with learning new body habits: a 
time when children are literally coming to grips with, or coming to 
understand where and how they stand in the world (Merleau-Ponty 1962). It 
is a time when children are gradually coming to experience the 
synchronization of activity and intention (Merleau-Ponty 1962). 
At nearly nine months of age, Molly has a Fisher-Price
®
 Kick and Learn Piano 
toy, tied to the end of her cot. The Kick and Learn Piano (pictured in figure 4.1) 
has been developed specifically to facilitate infants’ sensorimotor play which 
allows them to come to a synchronization of activity and intention.  The official 
Fisher-Price
®
 website informs us that the Kick and Learn Piano is ‘a great way to 
encourage baby’s natural kicking motion’. The ‘natural kicking motion’ also 
speaks to the specificities of babies’ embodiment, whereby feet, as well as hands 
and mouths are used to explore the world, until such time as they become used for 
walking.  











Figure 4.1  Kick and Learn Piano (Fisher Price
®
 Website)  
Christine told me that Molly ‘seems to like her Kick and Play Piano because I 
think she’s worked out that you touch them and different things happen’(excerpt 
from interview 15/7/05).  The move from fragmentary random action to precise 
action supports a sense of achievement, empowerment and enjoyment which 
comes from the eventual realization of a harmony between intention and action.  
As Merleau-Ponty tells us, ‘the body is much more than an instruments or a 
means; it is our expression in the world, the visible form of our intentions’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 1964, 5). Thus, Molly’s apparent enjoyment of this toy is the 
manifestation of the harmony that she experiences between intention and 
performance. The manipulation of tools—in this instance of play—is learned 
‘when [the child] has incorporated [the tool] into its “world”, and to move one’s 
body is to aim at things through [the tool]’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 139). Toys, thus 
act as exosomatic corporealisation devices which extend children’s reach and 
increase their agentic possibilities, consequently mediating their experiences with-
in the world. 
Generally speaking, babies initially play alone or with their mothers, fathers, 
siblings and other caregivers. Their demand for playmates, extending to a broader 
social sphere or cultural milieu increases with their maturity and exposure to 
others along with the child’s ability to explore and discover. This brings us to one 
of the most compelling psychoanalytic and phenomenological reasons why 
children play: to facilitate integration of both experience and action, and between 
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their inner personal reality and external shared reality (Winnicott 1942, 151). 
Consequently Winnicott suggests that play ‘links ideas with bodily function’ 
(151), which again reinforces the notion of a move from indeterminate action and 
experience to intentional action, and strengthens the connection between emotion, 
cognition and action.  
Both Winnicott and Merleau-Ponty in the foregoing comments remind us that all 
behaviour emanates in the first instance from lived bodies and our bodily abilities 
to act within the world in ways that are meaningful to us (Merleau-Ponty 1967). 
As Taylor (1990) puts it, ‘that one is so touched, concerned, non-indifferent is a 
primitive fact about subjects, and this fact is what we are exploring in examining 
… subjectivity’(Taylor 1990, 2). All behaviour or action emerges primarily from 
a sensori-motor-affective complex which persists with varying strength 
throughout our lives. Much of what children and adults do, like teasing, jokes and 
the use of humour could be considered as play (Boucher and Wolfberg 2003, 
Sutton-Smith 2008). For children there is no difference; in early childhood 
experience and play are synonymous and configured within their changing I-
world relation. It is commonly understood that early childhood experiences 
influence and may actually determine the adult life that follows it (Merleau-Ponty 
1964 (b)). How play is conceived and configured then, has an enduring impact on 
the habits of being we carry into adult life.  
The initial lifeworld is, according to Winnicott, the primary playground or the 
facilitating environment, or more precisely the potential space between babies and 
their carers (Winnicott 1980, 55). Lally suggests that this potential space is ‘the 
interface between the inner life of the individual and that individual’s everyday 
interaction with reality’ (Lally 2002, 28). Winnicott proposes that this space is ‘a 
place for living that is not properly described by either of the terms “inner” and 
“outer”’(Winnicott 1980). Hence it is a space of testing, playing with the 
boundaries of inner and outer. In Merleau-Pontian terms, this potential space is 
the space of non-coincidence which precisely allows for the incorporation of 
exosomatic entities into the child’s corporeal schema (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 91). 
It is the space which allows chiasmic intertwinings of the flesh of the world 
(Wynn 1997, 255). The infant’s ‘openness to’ the spatially non-coincident flesh of 
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the world, precisely allows objects of play to be incorporated into their own 
developing corporeal schematics. The spread of écart defines the depth, texture 
and thickness of flesh somewhat like a rubber band which becomes thinner the 
more it is stretched (255). Hence, as Ihde has argued ‘our existence is 
technologically textured’, and as mediating technologies change, so do our 
experiences of the world change (Ihde 1990, 1,12).  
Playthings simultaneously limit and amplify infants’ and toddlers’ abilities to act 
in, and be acted upon within the world. Through repetitive play, children come to 
in-habit their playthings just as they in-habit other spaces and objects within the 
socio-equipmental-environment. In-habit with the hyphen signals that in this 
instance the term refers both to dwelling and the acquisition of body habits in 
relation to playthings. While infants and toddlers act on playthings, so too do 
playthings act on children, through a chiasmic intertwining, which mediates their 
perceptual and experiential possibilities. For example, in figure 4.2 the block 
enters into Kane’s embodied relation with the world, combining to aim at the 
world, through the mediating technology of the block. That is, Kane is able to aim 
at the world by manipulating the block as an extension of himself. Moreover 
blocks afford a number of possibilities, some realised while others remain 
‘potential’ such as stacking and throwing. One of the realised affordances is 
banging on the floor which makes a relatively loud sound. To do the same with a 
bare hand makes a dull thud. The feel of hitting polished floorboards too, changes 
as playthings change. To hit the floor with a bare hand is to feel the spread, 
temperature and texture of the floor while hitting it with the block, the floor is felt 
through the medium of the block. The block in this instance enters into an 
embodied relation where the focus of Kane’s action is the floor-hitting, rather 
than the block in and of itself (Ihde 1979). The block therefore becomes an aspect 
of Kane’s corporeality which simultaneously amplifies and reduces his 
experiences of the floor. 
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Figure 4.2 Kane Playing with a Block 
In the process of maturation, we pass along a continuum from indeterminate to 
determinate activity within the world. The process is facilitated by our ongoing 
incorporation of objects which are in varying degrees, like me but ‘over there’, 
into our capacities to act in the world. In what follows, I will consider how toys 
function as transitional objects which facilitate infants’ gradual disintegration 
from primary caregivers and their integration into their wider socio-equipmental-
environment which is shaped in part by mediating technologies, of which, media 
are an aspect.  
Transitional objects facilitate the baby’s transition from complete dependence 
towards relative independence (Winnicott 1980, 17). They enter into the potential 
space between carer and baby to facilitate experience and recognition that we 
cannot inhabit another’s flesh (Winnicott 1960, 44). Thus the whole world resides 
in the indeterminate space of écart which allows us to intertwine with the world, 
yet not all of it is available to our perception. As mentioned previously, the 
process of disintegration is always also a process of integration. Thus as Varney 
notes: ‘parents give their children toys to bond with them but also to 
simultaneously facilitate separation’ (Varney 2002, 2). Hence, she suggests that as 
the meaning of childhood has changed over time, ‘toys have become a major 
means of demonstrating and defining love between generations, between genders 
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and between humans and commodities’ (Varney 2002, 1). While Winnicott’s 
assertion that transitional objects primarily ease the anxiety of separation, which 
paints a rather dismal picture of infancy, I argue that despite potentially meeting 
that need, they exceed it and offer opportunities for exploration and experience. 
In very early infancy, carers’ anticipation of, and adaptation to babies’ needs and 
desires, facilitates the illusion that objects just appear and ‘things just happen’ in 
response to the baby’s sense of its own embodiment: hunger thus equals food, 
assuming all goes well. For this reason Winnicott states that while transitional 
objects are external to babies from an adult perspective, very early in life infants 
do not experience them in that way (Winnicott 1980, 6). Transitional objects have 
a tangible material reality that can be felt, tasted, smelt, seen or heard: they are 
not imaginary, and thus they occupy the indeterminate space which links inner 
and outer, not neatly belonging to either, but simultaneously inhabiting both. Very 
young babies’ understanding of themselves as discrete entities is immature, and is 
complicated by the object, which presents itself to the baby to be perceived, and 
becomes part of the child’s embodied being-in-the-world. To constitute a 
transitional object in Winnicott’s terms the infant must be allowed to ‘assume 
rights over it’ (Winnicott 1980, 5). That is, it must belong to the child, and the 
child’s growing understanding of the mine-ness of the object necessarily involves 
at least a rudimentary recognition that the object exists, at least in some respects, 
apart from the child’s own body. That is, it implies some movement along the 
continuum of divergence and similitude. 
One of the most important characteristics of transitional objects is that they must 
be able to be chewed and sucked, since the infant’s body is initially a buccal body 
(Wynn 1997). The buccal body refers to a ‘buccal space’ which coincides with 
early infancy and means ‘that the limit of the world for the child is the space that 
can be contained in, or explored by, his [sic] mouth’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964 (b), 
122).  Chewing is also partly a biological imperative in that biting things helps 
babies’ teeth to emerge. This play with inner and outer is crucial to babies’ 
growing understanding of themselves in their separateness, ultimately establishing 
as it does a permeable boundary between body and world. One example of the 
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developmental specificity of buccal exploration, which came from my 
observations, was an instance when three year old Kaitlan was attempting to fit 
pieces into a wooden puzzle while her eight month old brother, Kane, chewed on 










Figure 4.3 Buccal exploration 
Anecdotally too, anyone who has been involved with young children will 
undoubtedly have numerous accounts of babies ‘eating’ seemingly inappropriate 
things like dirt, paper and snails. The buccal body speaks to the developmental 
specificities of affordance, or the specific relationship which babies have with 
individual objects in their environment (Sanders 1997). It is not until later that 
children learn what they should or should not eat or put into their mouths. 
Such inner-outer indeterminacy is also evident in Winnicott’s argument that the 
lot of transitional objects is, at various times, to be enthusiastically loved or 
horribly disfigured (Winnicott 1980, 6). Despite the problematic ascription of 
love and hate to infants, we can easily identify the spectrum of affordances which 
need to be taken into account in toy design and manufacture. Toys must be able to 
withstand whatever a child may do with them in exploring what they afford. For 
example, Baby’s 1
st
 Doll (figure 4.4) is huggable, chewable, kissable, hittable, 
throwable, hit-on-the-floorable, sit-onable, drag-aroundable, scratchable, 
rattleable and importantly washable, offering diverse affordances, while 
maintaining its structural integrity. 









Figure 4.4 Baby’s 1
st
 Doll 
Toy manufacturers, since at least the 1950s in the Western world have become 
increasingly aware of the need for transitional objects to withstand variable 
affordances, and have become mindful of a need for ‘safe’ toys in line with the 
requirements of facilitating environments. For instance, rattles are now made of 
plastics which are durable and washable (allowing germs to be eradicated), rather 
than porous, germ incubating wood or beads (with splinters and choke hazards), 
and manufacturers of plush toys are now more mindful that they are made of 
‘baby safe’ and washable materials and do not have small parts which come off 
easily, at least for children under the age of three.  In recognition that infants are 
buccal and respiratory Australian and New Zealand Standards suggest that a 
primary concern for manufacturers is that toys for very young children should be 
free from choke and aspiration hazards. Consequently they suggest the following 
toys as suitable for children under the age of three: 
Squeeze toys, teethers, crib exercisers, crib gyms, crib mobiles, toys 
intended to be affixed to a crib, stroller, playpen or baby carriage, pull and 
push toys, pounding toys, blocks and stacking sets, bathtub, wading pools 
and sand toys, rocking, spring, and stick horses and other figures, chime and 
musical balls and carousels, jack-in-the-boxes, stuffed, plush and flocked 
animals and other figures, and pre-school toys, games and puzzles, riding 
toys, dolls and animal figures, cars, trucks and other vehicles that are 
intended for use by children under the age of three (Australia and Zealand 
Standards 2013, 74)   
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While the standards acknowledge that ‘the propensity to put non-food objects in 
the mouth does not disappear at the chronological age of 3 years’ (Australia and 
Zealand 2013, 74), they nonetheless suggest that toys should be ‘safe for the 
intended user’ and fall within the ‘skill and interest level’ of average children of 
that age (74). They also suggest that ‘a parent remains the best judge of whether a 
child is at the appropriate development stage for safe play with a particular toy’ 
(74). 
In addition to the inner/outer indeterminacy, transitional objects must give the 
illusion of being alive, and some of the ways in which such an object achieves 
this is by moving, giving warmth or having a particular texture, for example, 
fluffiness (Winnicott 1980, 6). In saying this, Winnicott makes the assumption 
that very young babies know what is and is not alive, which is problematic at best, 
since in the sensori-motor-affective level of development, almost everything may 
appear to be alive. Turkle found that many children up to the ages of seven or 
eight remain ‘concerned with whether the machines think, feel, are alive’ (Turkle 
1984, 18).  
Based on Piaget’s The Child’s Conception of the World (Piaget 1967), Turkle  
has, since the 1980s, been concerned with human computer relations and one 
particular aspect of her research explores whether children consider computers 
and computerised toys as ‘alive’ (Turkle 1984).  Piaget seeks to understand the 
way children think about aliveness by asking children questions about the 
aliveness of a number of different objects such as rocks, clouds and animals. Not 
only does Turkle seek to understand what children think, but also what they feel 
about objects which are afforded the marginal status of ‘sort of aliveness’ (Turkle 
1984). Using computerised toys Turkle observed and interviewed children 
suggesting that what they say and how they act in relation to such marginal 
objects can be at odds. What children consider alive is ambiguous as Turkle 
points out: 
Sit silently and watch children pulling the wings off butterflies, staring at the 
creatures with awesome concentration. When they do this, children are not 
simply being thoughtless or cruel. They are not playing with butterflies as 
much as with their own evolving ideas, fears, and fantasies about life and 
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death, about what is allowed and what is not allowed, about what can be 
controlled and what is beyond control. (Turkle 1984, 31)  
The butterflies in the foregoing example are marginal objects which occupy a 
‘sort of alive’ status. As such they may be considered transitional objects in that 
they exhibit some of the characteristics of aliveness but their marginal status on 
the borders of alive and not alive, or which occupy the space between imagination 
and reality, afford such manipulations as wing removal.   
In many instances transitional objects share the baby’s cradle, cot, bed, highchair 
or playpen through several years yielding a consolatory presence when the child 
is otherwise alone. Many of the toys which are manufactured for, and given to 
very young babies, have faces, forwarding the impression of liveness. 
Longstanding research suggests that infants recognise and show a preference for 
faces from a very young age (Otsuka 2014). As, Yumiko Otsuka elaborates: 
Developmental studies of infants have provided evidence that this important 
ability exists at birth and that the face-processing biases found in adults are 
also evident early in infancy. (Otsuka 2014, 76) 
Winnicott’s formulation in relation to the appearance of liveness is thus implicit 
in toy manufacturing. Security blankets, articles of clothing and pieces of fabric 
exist at one end of the spectrum of transitional objects, through to plush toys, and 
as I will argue in the upcoming chapters, television, mobile phones and iPads are 
towards the other extreme, all either giving warmth or exhibiting some aspects of 
aliveness and entering into the space of écart to flesh out children’s worlds. 








Figure 4.5 Moooo-sical Cow (Toywebb)  
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Many stuffed toys are fashioned after animals, or at least quasi animals; they 
generally have two eyes, a mouth, a nose and two ears, two arms, two legs, a torso 
and a head. Their plushness and softness also render them huggable and 
chewable, and they give warmth and texture. These toys have a robust spectrum 
of affordances, potentially give the illusion of liveness, and the rights of 
ownership of these toys are afforded to children. Many contemporary toys also 
have incorporated sounds, sights and smells which further facilitate the illusion of 
life-likeness. For example, the Lamaze Moooo-sical cow (pictured in figure 4.5) 
is designed specifically for babies from birth upwards.  Toywebb—an online toy 
store—suggests that this ‘soft, huggable pal is one of baby’s first friends’ . It has 
vanilla scented hooves which ‘give off baby-friendly scent’ and each hoof plays a 
different note when it is squeezed .   
Another such example is the Busy Baby Mirror, which is designed for infants 
from birth upwards and features a ‘baby-safe’ mirror, and soft, brightly coloured 
animals that make sounds when they are squeezed or touched.  Winnicott’s 
criteria for transitional objects suggest that they: ‘must seem to the infant to give 
warmth, or to move, or to have texture, or to do something that seems to show 
that it has vitality or reality of its own.’ (Winnicott 1980, 7). While the Busy Baby 
Mirror may or may not give warmth, it has texture and while it does not move, 
except as it is moved, the animal faces and noises it makes when squeezed, and 
the mirror, in which babies child can see their own faces may make it appear to be 
alive as well as facilitating babies’ understandings of themselves as discrete 
entities in relation to the world. Considering that young infants are not aware of 
themselves in their separateness, as Winnicott points out, virtually anything that 
gives warmth, moves or makes a noise may be considered alive (Winnicott 1980).  
Other objects too, such as a piece of cloth or a blanket, which may be considered 
to give warmth or texture, and are movable and transportable, may be considered 
as transitional objects as they are often some of the first things that children can 
assume ownership of.  Hence, the Mooo-sical Cow encapsulates many of the 
features which constitute transitional objects: they are able to be chewed, they are 
children’s first possessions, they occupy the indeterminate space between inner 
and outer, and they facilitate the illusion of aliveness.   
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Babies can become extremely attached to transitional objects, with a great number 
forming a strong reliance on them, and with many such objects becoming 
indispensable in settling children to sleep. My younger sister, for instance formed 
a very strong attachment to one of her baby blankets, and when Mum washed it 
and hung it on the line, my one year old sister chased the blanket around, arms 
stretched out and crying until it was removed and given back to her even though it 
was still wet. For as Seigworth (2010) states: 
Affect arises in the midst of in-between-ness: in the capacities to act and be 
acted upon. Affect is an impingement or extrusion of a momentary or 
sometimes more sustained state of relation as well as the passage (and the 
duration of passage) of forces or intensities. That is, affect is found in those 
intensities that pass body to body (human, nonhuman, part-body, and 
otherwise), in those resonances that circulate about, between, and sometimes 
stick to bodies and world, and in the very passages or variations between 
these intensities and resonances themselves. (1) 
Winnicott suggests that once transitional phenomena have passed into our 
understandings of the world and ourselves the objects which we used to help ease 
the transition lose their affective intensity, but are not necessarily forgotten 
(Winnicott 1980, 6).  So, while the conditions which initially may have led to the 
significance attached to the object itself may cease or decrease, the facility of 
objects to ease and comfort remains to a greater or lesser extent throughout life. 
Just as mothers and other caregivers enter into a background relation in terms of 
our understandings of ourselves as attached and unattached, so too ‘transitional’ 
objects may recede into the background until such time as we are faced with a 
situation in which we feel insecure, at which time we may again call upon them, 
or something else, which engenders the same feeling. As Ben Highmore tells us, 
‘the sticky entanglements of substances and feelings, of matter and affect are 
central to our contact with the world’ (Highmore 2010, 119).  
Winnicott suggests that transitional objects should remain constant unless the 
child changes them, deciding for herself when and how the transition has taken 
place and thus when she is ready to move on. My sister’s obvious distress at 
having her blanket taken away from her and washed is an illustration of the 
importance attached to this particular criterion of transitional objects. Transitional 
objects inform how the world feels. As such, the types of affordances, such as 
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chewability and huggability offered by toys or other transitional objects lay the 
foundation against which all other feelings of security or insecurity are measured. 
What we provide for infants and toddlers to play with, have the potential to 
configure their understandings of themselves in the world, including their 
orientation towards and stance in relation to the others in the world. 
As transition is a constant, normal mode of existence, we may assume then, that 
the primary relations which infants form with transitional objects lays the ground 
for a relational ontology which is initially delineated by parental provision but 
ultimately comes to encompass the full range of experiences with objects in the 
world more generally.  
Playthings and Toys 
In the introduction to this chapter I mentioned a distinction which adults make 
between toys and playthings. Playthings are anything that a child is inclined to 
play with, while toys are the things that are designed and provided to children for 
the explicit purpose of play. While such a distinction may appear unimportant, the 
difference speaks to the ways in which adults’ perceptions of, and consequent 
action towards, children including the things that we provide for them, 
technologically texture how the world may be for infants and toddlers. Toys have 
defined parameters of playability while playthings offer more open affordances.  
All objects have the potential affordance of toyness for young children. Hence in 
the most generic sense of the term, toys are anything that a child or children are 
inclined to play with (Gorman n.d., 3). Children are very good at, and happy to 
find objects, and invent games (Winnicott 1942, 149). Anecdotally, some parents 
suggest that babies appear to get just as much, if not more, enjoyment out of the 
wrapping paper, as they do from the toy.  My son, for instance, despite being 
surrounded by toys, got a lot of enjoyment from scrunching, tearing, chewing and 
shaking brightly coloured department store catalogues. On one of my observation 
visits, Emma placed an activity centre within reach of her eight month old twins. 
Neither Emily nor Kane showed any interest in it. Emily instead crawled towards 
a piece of fibrous cloth which was nearby. She picked up the fabric, shook it up 
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and down with one hand, entangled her fingers in it, separating the fibres, and ran 








Figure 4.6 Emily’s Piece of Fabric 
Emma provided her children with many playthings, such as pieces of fabric and 
paper, that they chewed, waved in the air and screwed up as figure 4.6 illustrates. 
It seems to have made little difference to them whether it was a LeapPad, a piece 
of paper (figure 4.7), or both simultaneously that they played with; all were 










Figure 4.7 LeapPad or a Piece of Paper 
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In his The Philosophy of Toys Charles Baudelaire makes a similar distinction 
between toys and playthings contrasting what he calls ‘the barbaric…primitive 
toy’—which he equates with the playthings of the poor that are made as simply 
and cheaply as possible—with ‘scientific toys’(Baudelaire 1964, 3,4). He 
suggests that one problem with ‘scientific toys’ is their cost, but more 
significantly, unlike ‘primitive toys’ which allow for the creative exploration of 
the world, the ‘scientific toy’ defines its own potential delimiting conditions of 
possibility. Baudelaire here speaks of the distinction that I have made between 
toys and playthings where the ‘primitive toy’ or found object is a plaything and 
the ‘scientific toy’, is the technological facilitated toy designed specifically to be 
played with. The ‘scientific’ or technologically enabled toy with defined 
affordances also speaks to the amplificatory and reductive capacity of 
technologies generally (Ihde 1979). The distinction Baudelaire makes, however, 
is fraught when we reconsider Ihde’s definition of technology. Toys and 
playthings are both technologies in that they have a material element, which enter 
into human praxis (Ihde and Zaner 1977). The adult distinction between the two 
allows us to take more account of the relations ‘between the technologies and the 
humans who use, design, make or modify the technologies’ and how this plays 
out in the lives on infants and toddlers (Ihde 1993, 47). With this in mind, the 
term, ‘technologically augmented’ may be considered a misnomer as it rests on 
the assumption that scientific toys can ‘develop in the mind of a child the taste for 
marvellous and unexpected effects’ (Baudelaire 1964, 4) without taking account 
of the constraints to exploration and discovery they may also afford, or that 
children may just as readily experience discovery and wonder through the 
medium of playthings.  
Although all technologies have the potential to both augment and diminish our 
experiences within the world, the term ‘technotoys’ as it is used here refers only 
to an augmentation of the toys through technological means. For example dolls 
which are not ‘augmented’ afford a range of imaginative play scenarios. 
However, more recently dolls have increasingly included technological 
augmentation to simulate more lifelikeness, for instance, ‘Baby Alive My Real 
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Figure 4.8 Baby Alive (Hasbro website) 
Bergen and Hutchison (2010) tell us that elements of technological enhancement 
are increasingly incorporated into toys designed for very young children, and that 
this has been a cause of concern (Bergen et al. 2010). Accordingly they suggest 
that: 
A common belief is that such technology-enhanced toys may affect 
socializationation during play because no adult presence or interaction is 
needed. Another concern is that technology-enhanced toys may detract from 
using imagination during play, conjuring up images of children engaging in 
solitary play with few communication interactions and minimal elaborative 
play actions. The technology-enhanced toys also may detract from time 
young children spend playing with non-technology-enhanced toys and 
engaging with fundamental play with objects. (Bergen et al. 2010, 1-2) 
Such claims stand in stark opposition to the understandings of technology 
forwarded in this thesis which insists that all toys and playthings are tools but 
that, dependent upon the material characteristics, the child’s inclinations and 
corporeal development, they are experienced differently in different contexts. 
Both toys and playthings must be considered as technologies in that they self-
evidently have a material element, and as Gorman tells us, they are ‘tools of play’ 
(Gorman n.d., 1) so they enter into a set of human praxes. Through habitual 
engagement toys and playthings become a part of the dynamic organization of 
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children’s bodies, constraining or enabling children’s actions within the world in 
ways that are specific to the affordances of the technology-child couplet—its 
chewability, throwability, stackability, rollability or any one of a multitude of 
possibilities dependent upon the particular child’s predilection and capacity to act 
in terms of the maturity of his or her corporeal schema. The relation between toys 
and the humans who use them is thus multidimensional. Toys and playthings are 
many things simultaneously and consecutively, but undeniably, on Ihde’s 
definition, they are technologies, and as he comments: 
Technologies do not determine directions in any hard sense…while humans 
using technologies enter into interactive situations whenever they use even 
the simplest technology—and thus humans use and are used by that 
technology, and all such relations are interactive—the possible uses are 
always ambiguous and multistable. No designer can build in some single 
purpose or use, and thus there is no clear unidirectional determinability to 
even the simplest example (Ihde 2002, 131) 
While any technology may be used in a multitude of intended and unintended 
ways, the material properties of more highly technologised toys have a predefined 
range of possibilities. This was particularly noticeable when I took a Little 
Touch™ LeapPad
®
, shown below, along on my visits. 
 
Figure 4.9 LeapPad 
The LeapPad
®
 is designed specifically for guided interaction between caregiver, 
baby and toy. It is intended to enrich the baby’s experience of being read to, and 
to encourage an interest in reading. Story books are installed onto the top of a 
tablet, and sensors on the tablet play music or words when pressed, dependent 
upon the particular properties of the software. Left to their own devices with the 
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toy though,  Kane and Emily either crawled over the top of the LeapPad
®
 or leant 
on it, sometimes producing results as intended by the manufacturer and other 









Figure 4.10 Kane and Emily in the Presence of the LeapPad
®
 
Seb and Molly, who were a couple of months older, were more interested in the 
box that the LeapPad
®
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Figure 4.12 Seb and the LeapPad
®
 Box 










Figure 4.13 Cassie Leaning on the LeapPad
®
 
After Philip showed her what to do, however, and with a little practice, she was 
able to, and enjoyed her independent play with it, illustrating a move from 
indiscriminate to discriminate action. 









Figure 4.14 Cassie Playing with the LeapPad
®
 
So, the affordance of any toy or plaything, despite its intended use, can be seen as 
an interplay between the particular characteristics of the object, children’s 
predisposition to engage with it in a particular way, and their capacity to perform 
certain bodily movements (Heft 2003). 
While the ways in which toys or playthings mediate very young children’s 
existence are ambiguous, we should nevertheless remain mindful that their 
material specificity and the child’s corporeal development are intertwined in an 
irreducible relation, which changes over time and with experience.  For example, 
a block may afford diverse uses, yet its throwability or stackability, for instance, 
may vary dependent upon the child’s ability to throw or stack, and its rollability 
may be diminished by its shape and texture, just as a rubber ball’s rollability is 
enhanced by its shape and texture in concert with the surfaces on which it is used.  
Furthermore, the playthings and toys provided for very young children’s play are 
embedded in our specific historical and cultural understandings of what a child is 
and how they should be raised. As such, what we provide for our infants and 
toddlers in early twenty first century Western cultures reflect fine gradations of 
childhood development, speaking to our definitions of childhood, our aspirations 
for our children, our own social aspirations and the technological environment in 
which we raise children.   
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 Toys as culture 
At this point, therefore, I will turn my attention from playthings, which are 
anything that infants and toddlers are inclined to play with, to toys as objects 
designed specifically as tools of play, to consider how our definitions of play and 
very young children are reflected in the types of toys we deem appropriate for 
them. By focusing on toys, so defined, this section will examine the ways in 
which toys intersect with the particular socio-cultural conditions of very young 
children’s existence in contemporary Western cultures to mediate their experience 
in and of the world.  
Through play, children learn culturally appropriate responses to situations which 
helps to facilitate their acceptance as socio-cultural beings, enabling them to 
communicate in ways which are not otherwise available to them, making self-
directed cultural engagement possible. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology allows 
us to consider that as the spread of écart widens, it is filled with the flesh of the 
world which, for very young children, is play. This spread ultimately comes to 
encompass the entirety of children’s socio-equipmental-environment informing 
where and how children are situated in relation to the world. Thus as play theorist 
Johan Huizinga notes, play is not merely a function of physicality but also a 
socio-cultural phenomenon (Huizinga 1970, 18). For very young children, 
physicality is play, yet toys are designed to organize play in line with social 
expectations and ideals. 
As historical artefacts toys can aid our understanding of the past, allowing us to 
become, at least empathetically closer, to the people who owned them (Gorman 
n.d., 10). Gorman suggests that, ‘antique toys, as part of our human heritage, 
provide us with objects that allow us to reach across time and learn about our 
past’ (Gorman n.d., 1). Initially in this section, I will explore the socio-historical 
significance of toys as material culture which convey our changing conceptions of 
childhood and inform our understanding of the historic specificity of the 
conditions of childhood. Analysing the historical significance of toys allows us to 
assess how the conditions of childhood have changed over time and relate such 
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changes to changing conceptions of childhood which coincide with wider cultural 
issues. As DeMause (1974) notes:   
a society’s child-rearing practices are not just one item in a list of cultural 
traits. They are the very condition for the transmission and development of 
all other cultural elements, and place definite limits on what can be achieved 
in all other spheres of history. (DeMause 1976, 3) 
Museums of childhood provide a valuable resource for scholars of the history of 
childhood, adult representations of childhood and of the ways in which material 
culture shapes and is shaped by conceptions of childhood. In this respect, Prout 
reiterates the important role that material artefacts play in constructions of 
childhood suggesting that: 
like adults, children’s capacities are extended and supplemented by all kinds 
of material artefacts and technologies, which are also hybrids of nature and 
culture. This shapes the constitution of childhood and the experiences and 
actions of children. (Prout 2005, 4) 
Hence the potential of material culture to allow us to gain insights into the lives of 
those who have used them, has for some time seen enduring connections emerge 
between  scholars of history, and museum curators (Shepherd 1994). 
The Western Australian Museum of Childhood is one such resource. On a visit to 
the museum, I was struck by the ways in which children’s toys have changed over 
time in line with wider social changes which implicate the ways in which children 
can experience childhood in any given historical context.  The 1950s in Australia, 
like the 1950s in the United States and England, was a time of great change. 
Consumerism, supported by almost full employment, low rates of inflation, 
consumer credit and mass marketing, ‘warranteed’ the realisation of material 
happiness as an attainable ideal for many Australian wage-earners (Evans and 
Saunders 1992, 191). The increase in the standards of living had been a gradual 
process which began in the closing decade of the nineteenth century when rapid 
industrialisation increased the supply of materials, notably including toys (Kline 
1998, 101). As Featherstone (1982) suggests: 
the development of scientific management, with its new techniques of work 
organization and assembly line production, in the early decades of the 20
th
 
century, dramatically increased productive capacity. (Featherstone 1982, 19) 
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The increased productive capacity allowed manufacturers to exceed people’s 
needs and forced them to increasingly segment and target their marketing to 
specific niches in the market. Targeted advertising thus became the means to 
generate desire for multiple goods that people had not needed or wanted 
(Featherstone 1982). Hence, Featherstone tells us that from the 1920s: 
Advertising became the guardian of the new morality enticing individuals to 
participate in the consumption of commodities and experiences once 
restricted to the upper classes. (Featherstone 1982, 19) 
Simultaneously, while aging became ‘invisible’, an increased focus on youth and 
the potential to market to it emerged (Featherstone 1982). Gary Cross suggests 
that by the mid-1980s Hasbro and Mattell had become the dominant players in the 
American toy industry and that: 
Both giants helped to transform an industry which had primarily addressed 
the needs and values of parents into one that appealed directly to the 
longings and imaginations of children. (Cross 1997, 5) 
Capitalising on the recognition of what has been termed the ‘four-eyed, four-
legged consumer’ wherein mother and child act together as a purchaser-influencer 
whole (Coffey, Siegel, and Livingston 2006) a lucrative market in mass produced 
toys became an actuality. In Australia alone, the retail toy and games industry 
generated $2 billion in revenue according to the 2011 Toy, Game Retailing in 
Australia Market Research Report (2011). The Hasbro website addresses the 
purchaser-influencer complex:  
Take good care of your MY REAL BABY doll and she'll "play" with you, 
just like a real baby! This cute little baby doll just loves it when you wave 
your hand in front of her to tickle her tummy -- and she loves it so much, 
she'll even "giggle." She moves and "wiggles" to play with you and, with 
50+ phrases, your adorable little one always has something to say. From "I 
love kisses!" to "Let's play together," your baby doll just loves to "chat" with 
you! When it's snack time and you "feed" her with her bottle accessory, she 
even "pees" or "poops." She'll need you to change her diaper and then kiss 
her and hold her close, just like a good mommy should! (Hasbro) 
The language which is directed at children can only be accessed through a carer’s 
capacity to read and speak. As such it reinforces parental desires to revisit their 
own childhood, and experience their children’s childhood vicariously, while 
delivering a direct message to carers on how children should be treated. 
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Gorman tells us that handmade American folk toys, made from ‘wood, scraps of 
cloth, corncobs or whatever was at hand’ for their own use have remained a part 
of American heritage since colonial times and epitomize the skilled craft and 
imagination of the artisan (Gorman n.d., 6). On the trip to the Western Australian 
Museum of Childhood, it was particularly noticeable that with increased mass 
production, the materials from which toys were made changed from wood, metal, 
rag and ceramic, to primarily plastics and nylons around the 1950s.  The British 
Toy & Hobby Association confirms that: 
Before the commercial production of plastics in the 1950s, many children’s 
toys were made out of non-ferrous metals, particularly lead and tin. Lead is 
now known to be an accumulative poison so is completely unacceptable to 
use in the manufacture of toys. (The British Toy & Hobby Association, 6)  
Hence in our contemporary Western societies, plastics have become the 
predominate toy making material since the 1950s due to their suitability for low 
cost mass production as well as their relative safety compared to wood and metal.  
The plasticization of toys has implications for the texture of the socio-
equipmental-environment that very young children inhabit. Tom Fisher (2004) 
considers the physical and affective perceptions that consumers have of plastics, 
illuminating some aspects of our relationship with the materiality of plastic 
(Fisher 2004). Accordingly he states that: 
Particular ‘invariant’ properties of plastics seem to be significant in 
reactions to them. Plastics have a ‘fleshy’ quality, shared by no other 
material – they can be ‘skin-like,’ and because of their mode of production 
they often are seamless. They are warm to the touch and ‘trauma’ to their 
surfaces is evident, but irrevocable. Their objective properties help us to 
conquer some aspects of our human nature, and to defend ourselves from 
external nature. Plastics are part of a ‘humanized’ nature with which 
consumers are familiar through constant sensual exploration of objects. 
(Fisher 2004, 30) 
Notwithstanding Fisher’s questionable use of the term ‘objective’ which is 
inconsistent with a phenomenological understanding of perception and 
experience, the ‘invariant properties’ of material objects render them texturally 
significant in our experiencing of the world. Fisher refers to the ‘fleshy’ or ‘skin-
like’ texture of two particular types of plastic: polyvinylchloride (PVC) and 
polyethylene (PE). Other words to describe these plastics include: ‘glossy’, ‘oily’, 
‘fatty’, buttery-smooth’, ‘slick’, and ‘sticky’ (Fisher 2004, 27). Of particular 
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significance is the description of plastic as ‘tacky’ which not only implicates our 
cultural understandings and aesthetic values in relation to plastics, but also refers 
to the sensorial dimension of ‘judgments of instrumental fitness’  and the ways in 
which plastics challenge margins reminding us of our own ‘mushy insides’, of 
sweat, blood and other bodily fluids (23).  Hence Fischer found that plastics had 
the potential to elicit reactions of disgust, as well as a perceived potential to 
contaminate food, in particular, with their plasticy taste (28). Nonetheless, part of 
the move towards plastics, mainly polyethylenes, polycarbonates and vinyl was 
motivated by a desire for hygiene and safety; affording washability and even in 
some cases sterilisability. Most toys for very young children are bought by adults 
and the foremost considerations in influencing the decision to purchase are that 
they are safe, and sturdy enough to withstand the capacities of children in 
transition (The British Toy & Hobby Association).  
Historically toys were not made for education but distraction (Gorman n.d., 6), 
yet in contemporary Western society, 
Many parents like toys to be educational as well as fun. They like toys that 
will stimulate their children’s creativity and improve their knowledge, 
memory and concentration and encourage problem solving. (British Toy & 
Hobby Association, 3) 
Just as old toys serve to convey us to an earlier period, so today’s toys offer us a 
mirror through which we may be able to arrive at a better understanding of our 
selves (Gorman n.d., 10). For instance, toys, like other objects, are not solely 
practical, but also convey messages about those who own or buy them as well as 
expressing cultural beliefs and values (Calvert 1998, 69).  As such, they define us, 
not only to others but also to ourselves (69). Thus, as Calvert suggests, the link 
between cultural constructs of children and artefacts makes the examination of 
material objects a significant way of accessing social anxieties which are so 
emotionally laden as to resist discussion, and cultural beliefs which seem so basic 
that they are rarely openly expressed (68). The anxieties and cultural beliefs 
surrounding child rearing, despite being emotionally laden, have since the 1900s, 
become increasingly scrutinised by paediatricians, child psychologists, toy 
manufacturers and media commentators. The surveillance of childhood has  
167 | P a g e  
 
become manifest in increasing expectations that parents protect children from the 
corruptive influence, and simultaneously promote the educative potential of 
media (Tichi 1991). This is also the case in relation more broadly to mediating 
technologies.  
A significant growth in childrearing ‘experts’ and manuals in the 1900s espoused 
a rational approach to childrearing, which Gary Cross has dubbed ‘scientific 
motherhood’ (Cross 1997, 121).  This term signals a combination of the 
discourses ‘buying into’ childrearing practices and refers in the first instance to 
Samuel Taylor’s scientific management model which argued for the ‘one best 
way’ to manage businesses to realise profits, and maximise efficiency, based on 
methods of measurement and statistical standardisation (Taylor 1911). Taylor’s 
scientific management model has persisted and been of great influence in 
modernity. As Dimitrios Koumparoulis and Dionysios Solomos note: 
the principles of scientific management have become a machine of universal 
efficiency since there was a widespread use of scientific management 
worldwide and beyond the scope of the workplace (Koumparoulis and 
Solomos 2012, 149) 
‘Scientific motherhood’ thus came to represent the best and only way to ‘do 
childrearing’ based on statistics, experiment, measurement and hierarchical 
categorisation. Scientific parenting drew on an established tradition of 
developmental and educational psychology of Piaget and others ‘who believed in 
the educational potential of play’ (Ito 2009, 32). As Cross notes: ‘[a]s children 
were removed from the workforce, parents increasingly saw play as the core 
activity of childhood’ (Cross 1997, 123-4 cited in Ito 2009, 32).  Hence a move 
toward more educational toys emerged consequent to changing conceptions of 
children as ‘the future’ in the early 20
th
 century (Prout 2008, 25). Prout states that: 
The advent of compulsory schooling in the industrializing societies of 
Europe and North America gave children as a social group unprecedented 
visibility. Much ‘bioplolitical’ concern, to use Foucault’s term, was 
generated through research and discussion about the physical and mental 
state of what came to be seen as a national resource for international military 
and economic competition. Children became a target for investment and 
were seen as the ‘children of the nation’. (Prout 2008, 25) 
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This type of attitude led to a distinction between ‘high’ toys for learning and 
‘low’ toys for distraction (Ito 2009, 33). Hence, as Ellen Seiter (1993) argues, 
educational toys have more to do with the social ambition of parents than any 
goal of providing ‘healthy amusement’ for children (Seiter 1993, 194).  She goes 
on to suggest that: 
toys incite in parents strong feelings that are a tangle of nostalgia and 
generational and class values. Attitudes toward toys are social and strongly 
tied to educational background and cultural capital. Many parents believe 
that what is given to children in terms of material culture is an important 
communication about the future (Seiter 1993, 193).  
As such, Seiter (1993) contends that one of the most contentious issues in relation 
to toys is the difference between educational or classic toys targeted to the social 
aspirations of parents, and those which are mass-marketed promotional toys 
designed to catch the attention of children (Seiter 1993, 193).  Contentiously, 
Seiter maintains that what the toy industry call promotional toys fill the shelves of 
stores such as Toys ‘R’ Us and educational toys are more likely to be found in 
boutique toy stores. To suggest such a dichotomy, however overlooks that many 
of the toys from educational niche manufacturers, such as Fisher Price®, Lamaze, 
Playskool and Little Tykes®, are increasingly available in stores like Big W, 
Kmart, and significantly Toys “R” Us, rather than being confined to boutique toy 
stores, which are a rarity in the Australian retail market.  
Targeting parental aspirations for their children through the potential educational 
benefits of toys has established a niche market which has allowed manufacturers 
such as Fisher-Price®, Little Tykes®, Playskool and Lamaze to increasingly 
segment the market to target specific developmental levels and learning outcomes 

















Figure 4.15 Screenshot of Fisher Price
®
 Webpage (Fisher Price
®










Figure 4.16 Screenshot of Lamaze Webpage (Lamaze website) 
The brainchild of child developmental specialists Jerome and Dorothy Singer, 
Lamaze toys are designed in conjunction with Lamaze™ International, a leading 
childbirth and early parenting organization in the United States . Like Fisher-
Price®, the Lamaze Toys Infant Development System offers to guide parents 
through four phases of infant development, enabling them to choose toys which 
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‘satisfy baby’s increasing energy levels, challenge maturing skills, and captivate 
the imagination’ further reinforcing the notion of scientific parenting. The 
promotional piece at geniusbabies.com states that from the early weeks through 
the toddler years Lamaze Toys have a toy that is ‘just right’ to ‘inspire babies to 
reach new developmental milestones’. 
As well as the plethora of websites which tell the computer savvy parent the 
features of their toys and the value of the Lamaze Infant Development System the 
packaging of their toys also serves as a promotional tool which speaks to parental 
aspirations, potentially shaping an aspect of very young children’s socio-














Figure 4.18 Developmental Claims on Lamaze Packaging 
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The ‘Infant Development System’ segments infancy into three stages as can be 
seen in figures 4.16 and 4.18. Their website tells us that ‘educational toys’ for 
infants in stage one—from birth—‘are especially created to introduce your baby 
to the world of colors and sounds’ (Lamaze 2010c). In stage two: 
Toys for babies 6 months and up from Lamaze (Lamaze Infant Development 
System Stage 2 toys) offer interesting shapes to grasp, fun sounds to hear, 
and intriguing textures to touch and chew. These toys help baby to develop 
his (sic) motor skills, hand eye coordination, and build confidence. (Lamaze 
2010a) 
In stage three: 
Baby plays in new ways now that she (sic) can sit alone. She is learning the 
concept of ‘object permanence’ – what’s hidden isn’t necessarily gone. 
Toys for babies 9 months and up from Lamaze (Lamaze Infant Development 
System Stage 3 toys) include items to sort, stack and arrange. Together, you 
and baby can use them to explore shapes, spatial relationships, sounds and to 
sharpen motor skills. (Lamaze 2010b) 
 
The marketing effort which aims to capitalize on parental desires cater to the 
perceived developmental benefits for their children is accentuated by a panel on 
the side of the box that informs them of the potential developmental benefits that 
purchasing such a toy will have for their baby with the indirect inducement that if 
they are not bought, then parents, or other adult consumers, are not doing the best 
for their baby. 
Fisher Price
®
 is another such toy manufacturer which targets parental aspirations 
for their infants using developmental milestones as a means of segmenting their 
market. Founded in 1930, Fisher Price
®
 is a well-established manufacturer of toys 
which its website claims is ‘the most trusted name in quality toys’. Its stated 
philosophy is one which: 
Believe[s] in the potential of children and in the importance of a supportive 
environment in which they can grow, learn, and get the best possible start in 
life. (Fisher-Price.com)  
Fisher Price
®
 toys are developed, manufactured and marketed relying on 
understandings gained from developmental psychology which holds that very 
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young children fall into relatively distinct stages of development characterised by 







Figure 4.19 Fisher Price
®
 Take-Along Play Blanket 
The ‘Take-Along Play Blanket’ (figure 4.19 and 4.20) is designed for children 
from birth upwards. It features an ‘extra-large, super-soft fleece blanket’ with 














Figure 4.20 Side of Take-Along Play Blanket Package 
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The front of the box states that the ‘Take-Along Play Blanket’ develops motor 
skills as well as comfort and security, the latter of which, suggests a reference to 
Winnicott’s understanding of a transitional object. It is also ‘soft and cuddly’, and 
features a vinyl zebra head, again speaking to the illusion of liveness that 
Winnicott suggests is necessary for transitional objects. The zebra head becomes 
a complete wipe-clean carry bag when the blanket is folded away. The warm 
‘skin-like’ texture of the plastic zebra head, rattles and teethers combined with the 
soft, fluffy feel of the blanket give warmth and to some, the experience of carers’ 
bodies. The side panel of the box (figure 4.20) elaborates on the developmental 
benefits that Fisher Price
®
 attribute to the blanket. 
 Extra-large, super-soft fleece blanket enhances baby’s comfort & 
security 
 Butterfly teethers & birdie rattle keep baby busy & boost fine motor 
skills 
 High-contrast & touchable textures: Stimulate baby’s senses. 
The ‘Take-along Play blanket’ satisfies Winnicott’s prescription for transitional 
objects, due to its textural characteristics, its transportability, the noises it can 
make, and its face to further simulate liveness.  It affords hug-ability, chew-
ability, rattle-ability, shake-ability, drag-around-ability, throw-ability, hit-on-
something-ability, wrap-up-in-ability, lie-on-ability and lie-under-ability. Fisher 
Price
®
 ascribe specific developmental benefits for babies from birth. The 
contrasting colours of the blanket ‘stimulate baby’s senses’ and the density, 






Figure 4.21 Apptivity Monkey 
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The ‘Apptivity™ Monkey’ (figure 4.21) which comes complete with free 
monthly ‘apps’ encompasses both sensory and cognitive development, teaching 
‘[l]etters, A-Z, [n]umbers & counting’, [s]hapes & [c]olours’ and ‘[a]nimal 
sounds’ as can be seen above. By incorporating ‘songs, sounds & fun phrases’ 
and bright colours ‘enhance[s] sensory development’. Fisher Price
®
 claim that the 
device’s touch screen renders it ‘[e]asy to use’ encouraging ‘eye-hand 
coordination & fine motor skills,’ and that the toy which ‘[r]esponds to baby’s 
touch’ teaches the user about ‘cause & effect’. It is also the forerunner of other 
touch screens, and screens in general, which as will be discussed in the upcoming 
chapters, enabling children’s early learning of how to be-with-screens.  
These toys are designed specifically for infants, who are not yet cognitively fully 
developed and could just as easily come to understand themselves as discrete 
beings through any number of other material objects. They also speak to the 
assumption that babies need multi-sensory stimulation but more tacitly, it implies 
that the toy is necessary for the child’s wellbeing and development. Again this 
speaks to parental aspirations to accelerate their baby’s development through 
multi-sensory stimulation which Lamaze and Fisher Price
®
 claim can be easily 
achieved through play with these toys. The Baby Alive My Real Baby referred to 
earlier is another example of the ways in which toys are marketed to the parent-
child complex but which speaks to parental aspirations and prevailing notions of 
the ways in which children should be treated. This is particularly the case with the 
final sentence being, ‘She'll need you to change her diaper and then kiss her and 
hold her close, just like a good mommy should!’  which resonates with Cross’ 
notion of scientific parenting (Cross 1997). 
The ability of toys to act as powerful media of communication has been taken up 
in marketing, to communicate, among other things, the appeal of consumerism as 
an expression of love (Varney 2002, 1). While, as Varney notes, the messages 
conveyed in advertising and marketing toys are not closed, ‘toys, like other 
media, often privilege particular readings [which are] favourable to the 
marketplace’ (Varney 2002, 1). Hence, she tells us that: 
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Each toy makes its own grab for attention, often promising love or one of its 
components, but usually working within a framework of short-term 
gratification, infatuation, obsession, the yearn to possess and elicitation of 
guilt. (Varney 2002, 3) 
Toys mediate very young children’s experiences within the world by configuring 
or engineering what constitutes appropriate play for children of a particular age. 
Since Playthings and toys that, with repetitive use, enter into children’s corporeal 
schemas, informing how children are oriented towards the world, including what 
they can and cannot experience, we must surely concede that all playthings are 
tools for learning. Moreover, as transitional objects, toys offer a consolatory 
presence which aids in the transition from total dependence to relative 
independence, and from indeterminate to intentional experience, in-forming their 
growing understanding of themselves as discrete entities with-in-the-world along 
with others who are more or less like them, but ‘over there’. While it could be 
argued that the proliferation of mass produced and consumed toys which 
configure play in contemporary Western societies may lead to an homogenisation 
of childhood experiences, this does not take account of the unintentional 
trajectories, or the flexible affordances furnished to infants and toddlers by any 
type of plaything, or that each child has a unique relation with particular 
playthings. As such, regardless of the foregoing critique of the potential for 
learning afforded by toys which are used as a marketing strategy, aimed at 
parental aspirations for their child/ren, the children themselves may experience 
them very differently. For example, both the Busy Baby Mirror and the Moooo-
sical cow are chewable, throwable, sit-onable, huggable, bang-on-the-floorable, 
so despite the manufacturers, designers and parents intentions for the toy, what 
children make of them is fluid and dynamic, changing with children’s inclinations 
and developing corporeality. 
Whoever has the Most Toys Wins! Transmediatic Toys 
As we move toward the conclusion of this chapter on toys and towards the final 
chapters on television and interactive digital media, it is timely to consider the 
transmedia phenomenon as it relates to toys as a prelude to more conventionally 
recognised media. As Ito (2009) tells us, with the advent and rise of television in 
the late 1950s: 
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cultural and social dynamics changed quite dramatically, and the Victorian 
parental orientation toward childhood discipline and intellectual 
development was overshadowed by the influence of fast-paced, commercial, 
fantasy-based children’s popular culture. Attitudes toward restraint and 
denial in children’s consumption eroded in the face of television and the 
ubiquity of children’s popular culture. Educational toys were marginalized 
in an era of novelty toys and discount toy retailers, though they were still an 
important niche market, particularly for pre-schoolers. (Ito 2009, 33) 
The foregoing discussion of Lamaze and Fisher-Price
®
 is representative of 
persisting Victorian bourgeois attitudes to very young children in the face of a 
changing children’s cultural landscape. Hence as Ito suggests: 
As commercial children’s culture has taken hold, however, many families 
have been part of a countervailing tide of resistance to children’s 
commercial culture. A large volume of publications aimed at the educated 
middle-class argues against children’s exposure to media and licensed 
commodities, ranging from conservative calls to family values to left-wing 
attacks on negative stereotypes in commercial media. (Ito 2009, 33) 
The toyscape in contemporary Western cultures is characterised by the transmedia 
phenomenon, where characters from one media form, say television or movies, 
also manifest as toys, clothes and a number of similarly themed products, adding 
another dimension to the mediating capacity of toys. Marsha Kinder (1991) 
examines the programming and advertising conventions of television and spin-off 
products, which rely on intertextuality for commercial success. She goes on to 
explain that networks of intertextuality constructed around a figure or a group of 
figures from popular culture can manifest in entertainment supersystems (Kinder 
1991). In addition, to constitute a media/commercial supersystem these networks 
of intertextuality 
must cut across several modes of image production; must appeal to diverse 
generations, classes, and ethnic subcultures, who in turn are targeted with 
diverse strategies; must foster ‘collectibility’ through a proliferation of 
related products; and must undergo a sudden increase in commodification, 
the success of which reflexively becomes a ‘media event’ that dramatically 
accelerates the growth curve of the system’s commercial success. (Kinder 
1991, 122)  
Intertextuality in this instance, refers to an individual text, whether that be a 
movie, toy, article of clothing, or whatever the case may be, the meaning of which 
may only be understood in reference to a background of other texts on the same 
theme (Kinder 1991, 2). While not referring to transmedia intertextuality per sé, 
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Varney (2002) reinforces the notion in the following quote which relates to mass 
marketed toys, which she notes: 
act as powerful media, transmitting messages, offering interpretations and 
interacting with other toys and commodities, particularly in terms of 
communicating the appeals and joys of consumerism on which their 
existence so heavily relies (Varney 2002) 
Cross suggests that the transmedia phenomenon, where there is a crossover 
between toys and other media, can be traced back to the 1930s ‘with the advent of 
Mickey Mouse and Shirley Temple dolls’ (Cross 1997, 121). Perhaps the most 
recognizable and earliest example of this type of phenomenon, is the Disney 
phenomenon, where movies, television shows, books, clothing, accessories and 
toys modelled on Mickey Mouse reinforce each other to ensure the commercial 
success of the Mickey Mouse brand.   
More recently the simultaneous release of a children’s movie, toys in fast food 
packages, clothing, DVDs and music videos, and other licensed merchandise 
offers a readily recognizable instance of transmediatic proliferation. Linda and 
Philip, speak to the effectiveness of transmedia intertextuality in target marketing 
to children. 
Linda: the marketing that those companies have is just amazing; the way 
that they can get kids 
Linda: Yeah, ‘cause like Sara just wants the toy 
Philip:  Oh yeah, definitely 
Linda: When you drive through the drive through and she’s in the back seat 
going ‘I want the toy, don’t forget the toys mum’ 
Philip: Yeah, we’re sitting there all stressed out, two kids in the back, trying 
to figure out what we want, you know, I’ll sit there and take a minute to 
decide and then Linda’ll take another couple of minutes and Sara’ll sit there 
the whole time ‘I want the toy, I want the toy, I want the toy, I want the toy’  
Linda: Those toys, that was the smartest thing they ever did I think, she 
doesn’t care about the cheeseburger and the chips, she just wants the 
toy. (Excerpt from interview with Linda and Philip 17/7/2005) 
Even very young children may recognize the characters around which toys have 
been promoted from story books, cartoons or other forms of media exposure, and 
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even if they do not, point-of-sale merchandising offers an opportunity to inspire 
such recognition (Seiter 1993).  
It appears to be the case that consumer goods do not communicate well 
when they exist in isolation or in heterogeneous groups. The meaning of a 
good is best (and sometimes only) communicated when this good is 
surrounded by a complement of goods that carry the same significance. 
Within this complement, there is sufficient redundancy to allow the observer 
to identify the meaning of the good. In other words, the symbolic properties 
of material culture are such that things must mean together if they are to 
mean at all…It is the cultural, meaningful aspects of goods that help to give 
them their secret harmonies. (McCracken 1987, 250 cited in Seiter 1993, 
204) 
Jenkins suggests that the significance of transmedia phenomena rests in 
transmedia storytelling which unfolds across a number of media, which add to our 
accumulative understanding of the world (Jenkins 2006, 293). He suggests that 
‘transmedia storytelling is the act of world making’ or the creation of a fictional 
world which is detailed enough to allow a number of different stories to emerge 
but consistent enough that all of the elements and stories fit together to create a 
cohesive whole (Jenkins 2006, 21, 294).  
Ito prefers the term ‘media mixes’ to transmedia, to describe how ‘children’s 
media relies on a synergistic relationship between multiple media formats’ (Ito 
2008, 7). Ito’s ‘media mixes’, are analogous to Jenkins’ notion of world making 
where a whole world of collected fictional characters from various media forms 
can be collected. The concept of world making has particular poignancy in 
relation to very young children and transmedia collectability. Very young children 
are able to participate in world making through physically having and owning 
transmedia toys, clothing, curtains, bedding and furniture. Each item that the child 
owns contributes to a sense of belonging to their wider socio-equipmental-
environment.   
The Pooh phenomenon typifies Kinder’s transmedia intertext and Jenkins’ world 
making in that it cuts across several modes of production. A young friend of mine 
has Pooh stuffed animals, Pooh DVDs and videos, Pooh shoes and Pooh clothing 
and I, myself, have Pooh pyjamas, a Pooh screensaver, Pooh document folders 
and a Pooh pen. A quick internet search also reveals that Pooh branded products 
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come in many different forms, including: pink satin boxer shorts, a cigarette case 
and slash fiction. Now, it is entirely possible to be woken up by one or more Pooh 
alarm clocks, climb out from between Pooh sheets and from under a Pooh doona. 
Babies can wear Pooh nappies and sleep suits and toddlers can wear Pooh 
pyjamas. Once out of bed, there are Pooh slippers, Pooh dressing gowns, Pooh 
pictures, wall hangings and curtains, Pooh lamps, numerous Pooh toys, Pooh 
dummies with a Pooh clip, Pooh baby bottles, Pooh toothpaste, Pooh bowls and 
cutlery, Pooh mugs, Pooh videos and DVDs, not to mention Pooh on broadcast 
television, Pooh books and Little Touch LeapPads have Pooh interactive books, 
Pooh video games, Pooh websites, Pooh furniture and a vast array of other Pooh 
clothing and footwear. Literally, potentially a world of Pooh! This transmedia 
enabled microworld constitutes a facilitating environment of recognition and 
familiarity.  
Pooh’s apparent ‘liveness’ makes him an ideal transitional object. Much as 
‘Baby’s 1
st
 Doll’ offers warmth, has a face, arms, legs and a torso, is able to 
withstand the variable and diverse uses a very young child may subject it to, and 
is carryable by infants and toddlers themselves, they may constitute a child’s first 
‘not-me possessions’. Gorman tells us that even in our own lifetime, stumbling 
across or touching an old toy takes us back to special moments, allowing us to re-
experience feelings, thoughts and times which have been significant in our lives 
(Gorman n.d., 10-11). Gorman’s suggestion resonates with the notion that 
transitional objects remain significant throughout life. Although rather 
nostalgically, Gorman adds that: 
As personal treasures, toys represent an innocent and simple yesterday and 
are a bridge from our not too long ago childhood to today. And “once you 
pass its borders, you ne’er return again…” except in that corner of your 
memory (Gorman n.d., 11). 
Despite his appeal to the myth of the innocent child and a sentimental longing for 
a better time, that may or may not ever have existed (Jenkins 1999), Gorman not 
only speaks to the enduring affect often associated with transitional objects, but 
also to the cross-generational appeal of transmedia phenomena.  Cassie, for 
example, has Pooh clothing because Linda likes it. Likewise Seb, who is not 
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really a Pooh fan—he prefers Bob the Builder—has a Pooh couch, a Pooh ball 
and a Pooh plate; Jake has a Pooh beanie pal and Cassie has Pooh clothing.  In 
Seb’s case, many of his toys and clothing were handed down from friends of 
Kate’s which again speaks to the transmedia condition of cross generational 
appeal but also to the ways in which parental attitudes and tastes configure the 
ways in which infants and toddlers may experience the world. Pooh and other 
transmedia toys appeal to our own nostalgic attachment to the stories from our 
own childhood, which has benefits for marketers in that when infants and babies 
are too young to specifically request the items, adults are motivated to set up at 
least an initial transmedia world which can be taken up as children are old enough 
to build on that world themselves.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that playthings and toys, as particular types of material 
objects, in-form children’s being-with-in-the-world in ways that are particular to 
cultural mores, and historical periods. While relying on the underpinnings of an 
extension of Merleau-Pontian phenomenology and Winnicottian psychoanalysis, 
this chapter has moved into the socio-historical realm which links to consumer 
culture and child rearing artefacts, to suggest that the types of material objects 
which enter into infants’ and toddlers’ perceptual fields are indicative of adult 
values and aspirations for their babies’ development and conceptions of 
childhood.  
Initially play was defined as a complex which in-forms children’s maturing 
corporeal schemas. The affective notion was explored by considering toys as 
transitional objects which fill the potential space between carer and child, fleshing 
out the world and enabling the transition from indeterminate to intentional 
experiences with particular textural qualities that mimic the maternal provision.  
Early in the chapter, I made the distinction between playthings, as anything that 
children are inclined to play with, and toys, which I defined as material objects 
which are specifically designed for children to play with. This was done to aid our 
understanding of the socio-equipmental environment that very young children 
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inhabit in contemporary Western societies, where primarily plastic toys are 
designed and produced not only to amuse children but also to target parental 
aspirations for learning potential and a ‘smart child’. In that section I argued that 
regardless of whether children are inclined to play with a plaything or a toy, it is a 
learning experience that informs how the child may be in the world. Furthermore, 
what children learn from playing with any plaything is fluid and dynamic in that 
affordances flow from one thing to another, and change with time. 
The specificities of the play environment for children in contemporary Western 
societies in relation to the transmedia phenomenon was ultimately reviewed to 
suggest that media intertextuality configure very young children’s play while 
simultaneously allowing for world making, both at the parental level and in 
informing infants’ and toddlers’ understandings of the world. 
Toys, like other mediating technologies, have the potential to shape very young 
children’s lived existence in specific ways, reinforcing a schema of past-present-
future informing all subsequent activity within the world. In their various forms, 
toys span developmental stages, dynamically changing throughout life and as 
such, their role as transitional objects can be paralleled with our own transition 
from one life stage to another. While primary objects and microenvironments also 
span the entire development process, toys are perhaps most notable at the time of 
life when children are starting to understand the self-other distinction. As such the 
role of toys in facilitating several types of transition are particularly pronounced. 
Since early childhood experience is critical in informing the individual and 
intersubjective life that follows it, and toys are an integral part of infants’ and 
toddlers’ corporeal schemas then, likewise, one must accept that toys are also a 
fundamental part of us, an aspect of our being. 
In the upcoming chapters on television and interactive media I will argue that 
these broad categories embody unique modes of engagement which have partially 
been ‘prepared’ for in toy play. As the transmedia phenomenon suggests, clear-
cut distinctions between one form of media and another can be problematic, yet a 
toy phone, a land line and a mobile phone are ontologically significant in different 
ways. I will explore this in greater detail in the final chapter on interactive digital 
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media, but prior to that, we will turn our attention to television, which is perhaps 
the most hotly debated, and arguably the predominant medium in the lives of 
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Screening Infants and Toddlers: The Ontological 
Significance of Television in the Lives of Very 
Young Children 
Since its inception, television has been heavily embroiled in debates vis a vis how 
it intersects with children’s development.  The form of the criticisms leveled at 
television and its hybrid technologies—video cassette recorders (VCRs), console 
games and digital video discs (DVDs), cable and satellite TV and media 
players—are as diverse as the technologies themselves, and range from concerns 
over the amount of time older children spend engaged with them
6
, arguably to the 
detriment of other activities, to the perceived appropriateness or otherwise of the 
messages they introduce into the nostalgically perceived sacrosanctity of the 
home. Yet, despite over fifty years of research into television there has been 
surprisingly little investigation into how any of the divergent conclusions arrived 
at, may translate to infants and toddlers. This may be attributed in large part to the 
textual or content based methods of analysis which predominate in the field. Such 
methods may lead some to conclude that since pre-linguistic and newly linguistic 
children may not understand the messages within the content of television 
programming in the same way as older children that television is of little or no 
relevance to infants and toddlers. As I will argue, such deficit models frame very 
young children’s understandings of television in terms of ‘lack’. We need to 
recognize that the content of media messages is only one aspect of infants’ and 
toddlers’ experiences of television and that the relation between very young 
children and television needs to be understood in phenomenological terms; in 
relation to the materiality of television, its potential to attract and hold attention, 
and its capacity to reconfigure time and space in the socio-equipmental 
environment.   
                                                          
6
 2009 figures from the Australian Bureau of Statistics indicated that in of 97% of children over 
the age of five had watched television, videos or DVDs in the two weeks prior to being 
interviewed. This was compared with 48% who had been involved with arts and crafts.  A further 
79% had accessed the internet and 31% owned mobile phones. According to this data children 
spent on average ‘17 hours watching television, DVDs and videos, and 11 hours doing other 
screen based activities’ (2009a) 
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By focusing primarily on media messages, much of the research which has been 
done in relation to children and television does not allow us to take adequate 
account of the specificity of the medium to which we refer (Weber 1996). As 
such, content analyses alone do not consider the integral role that television plays 
in infants’ and toddlers’ experiences of everyday life in the early twenty first 
century. Samuel Weber thus observes that the prevailing tradition of textual 
analysis may just as readily refer to literature as it does to television, ‘leaving the 
specificity of the televisual medium itself unaddressed’ (Weber 1996, 108). 
Preceding Weber, Roger Silverstone (1994) suggests that by focusing on content, 
researchers: 
fail adequately to come to terms with the significance of the media in 
general, and television in particular…The everyday escapes, and in that 
escape television escapes too. (Silverstone 1994, 3) 
Consequently, what little research has been undertaken into the intersection 
between infants, toddlers and television, does not allow for the ways in which 
young  children’s experiences within the world are shaped in medium specific 
ways through the incorporation of television into the patterns and rituals of 
everyday life (Ihde 1990).  
There are, however, several examples of analyses vis a vis children and media that 
are noteworthy in their focus on the materiality, rather than the content of 
television.  Lyn Spigel (Spigel 1992b), and Cecelia Tichi (Tichi 1991) for 
example, both look at the organization of domestic space around television, 
yielding useful insights into the spatio-temporal arrangements necessitated and 
facilitated by the introduction of a television set into domestic spaces in the post-
war era, reconfiguring the activity and material organization of homes. Adopting 
a phenomenological approach, Paddy Scannell (Scannell 1996), provides another 
example which speaks to the everydayness of television as contributing to both 
the foreground and background of our experiences in the world, a position which 
resonates with Ihde’s texturing of everyday life through ritualistic praxes (Ihde 
1990). While Scannell (1996) does not deal specifically with children, his 
approach gives us an insight into the domestic dynamics which mediate children’s 
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interpersonal, spatial and temporal existence. Roger Silverstone (Silverstone 
1994)1994) offers arguably the most thoroughgoing treatment of the ontological 
significance of television in everyday life, as well as how it functions as a 
transitional object, which fleshes out the world, facilitating infants’ growing 
recognition of themselves as discrete entities in the world. Such analyses which 
focus on the role television plays in texturing our experiences of the world 
provide valuable insights that further our understanding of the ontological 
significance of television in the lives of infants and toddlers, which are not 
reducible to adult modes of understanding. These perspectives will inform this 
chapter which considers the ways in which television, as a material object, has 
changed over time, and how these changes intersect with the changing ontology 
of everyday life.  
Prior to moving on to my argument proper, I will recap some of the major themes 
which have emerged in this thesis thus far, and foreground how these concepts 
will be put to use in the upcoming chapter. As we have seen in previous chapters 
even the most fundamental technologies fill the chiasm which develops between 
primary caregivers and infants, fleshing out babies’ worlds in the process of 
maturation and mediating their experiences of the world. In many instances 
children experience the world through technologies, or at a distance; where the 
technology intervenes between the experiencer and the experienced. Such 
interventions therefore, change the texture of the world for very young children as 
well as having an impact on their potential embodied engagement with other 
human and non-human others with which children share their domestic 
environment. 
In chapter one I offered a theoretical approach which draws on phenomenology, 
psychoanalysis and phenomenology of technology, with an emphasis on the 
concepts of embodiment, materiality, affordance, transitional objects and 
facilitating/holding spaces. Recognizing that we do not move from one existential 
or ontological state to another, but rather are always involved in a process of 
becoming, I argued for the an acknowledgement of the continuity of existence and 
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experience, such that all tools constrain and enable our ways being in the world in 
some way or other. This chapter will further suggest that very young children, like 
adults, exist in relation to television but that this relation is dynamic, oscillating 
between types of relations which are interdependent with our socio-equipmental 
environments and our own corporeality. The physical properties of mediating 
technologies, in conjunction with children’s maturing embodiment, afford infants 
and toddlers, who are in the process of learning the rules of engagement with their 
socio-equipmental environments, a range of different interactional opportunities 
from those afforded adults or older children. Hence, infants and toddlers 
experience mediating technologies and media differently to adults as they develop 
an understanding of what the technologies are, and what it means to co-exist with 
them.  
The discussion of microenvironments in chapter two primarily relied on a 
combination of the phenomenological concept of being-in-the-world (Merleau-
Ponty 1962), Winnicott’s notion of the facilitating environment (Winnicott 1963) 
and Sofia’s rendering of container technologies (Sofia 2000). This was done to 
emphasise the importance of spatiality and the primacy of embodied existence in 
space which is always-already embedded in the socio-equipmental environment 
particular to specific times and places. These concepts will again be used in this 
chapter to signal the importance of domestic spatial arrangements around 
televisions and how very young children may experience television within the 
home. The theme of facilitating microenvironments will be resumed in this 
chapter to suggest that television is a particular type of container technology or 
holding space, that not only provides a context or background from which other 
experience and knowledge grow, but which also holds content and gradually 
realized potentials of relevance and action. In chapter three, I extended the notion 
of being-in-the-world to being-with-in-the-world to elaborate on the primordial 
intersubjectivity that allows us to understand the importance of the relations that 
we have with the human and non-human others who are, like us, part of the 
universal flesh of the world. I suggested, like Wynn (1997) that the holding 
environment may usefully be considered as a chiasmic relationship, a notion 
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which acknowledges mutual inclination and reversibility, and allows us to 
consider that not only does television act upon children, but that children also act 
upon television. By reinterpreting the holding environment as a chiasmic 
relationship I elaborated on the ontological significance of material objects which 
inform our perception and experience in and of the world. The importance of 
transitional objects and their capacity to facilitate infants’ and toddlers’ 
exploratory activities in the world will again be taken up in this chapter to argue 
that television acts, in some ways, as a transitional object.  
We are now in a position to reinterpret television in the model adopted thus far in 
this thesis. I will therefore, in this chapter, expand the theoretical perspectives as 
applied to more basic technologies discussed in the previous chapters, rather than 
adopting the traditional, content based findings about older children and 
extrapolating these to younger children. This chapter will be punctuated by 
anecdotal examples based on observations of families in relation to television. 
Initially I will offer a phenomenological history of television to suggest that the 
changing materiality of television has co-opted time and space in ways which are 
particular to the materiality of the device in specific points in history. I will later 
provide a phenomenological account of screens and their ontological and 
perceptual significance in the lives of very young children. I will also suggest that 
television is part of a trajectory of holding and safety which begins with such 
technologies as clothing, highchairs and cots and moves towards interactive 
digital technologies. In doing so, the notion of attention will be discussed, not 
only in terms of how very young children learn to attend, but also as to how 
television potentially attracts and holds the attention of older children and adults, 
as infants’ and toddlers’ significant others.  
By considering distraction as very young children’s way of being, I will discuss 
how background television gradually becomes foreground not only as children’s 
understanding of media messages grows, but also as children learn habits of 
attention and being-with-television. Yet, I will argue that the television-child 
relation is not linear or unidirectional—from background to foreground—but 
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rather is dynamic and oscillates between embodiment, hermeneutic and 
background relations (Ihde 1979). In embodiment relations, through repeated use, 
technologies become a part of our corporeal schema and we experience the world 
through them. This was illustrated in the example of the baby walker where the 
walker and the baby combine in a baby-walker complex to act as one entity, 
affording regulated mobility and reach without which the baby’s immature 
corporeality would not achieve (Ihde 1979, 6-11). Alterity, or hermeneutic 
relations, are those where the technology is regarded as ‘other’, or as the focal 
point of experiencing. In such cases not only does the technology pass from 
background to foreground, as in the case of a cot, but messages can be ‘read off’ 
them as with a television (Ihde 1979, 11-13). Background relations are those 
where the technology, functions in the periphery of experience, barely noticed as 
liminal embodiment relation. An example of this is where television acts as 
‘moving wallpaper’ or the backdrop or context of other activities (Ihde 1979, 13-
14).  
Consequently, I will offer a critical analysis of television, not only as a conveyor 
of positive or negative content, but rather, as a significant non-human other in the 
lives of very young children. In doing so I will revisit the concept of the holding 
environment, discussed at length in chapter three, in relation to the holding power 
of television and as a technology of containment. I will argue that television 
constitutes a facilitating microenvironment which very young children inhabit by 
virtue of their corporeal engagement with the mediating potential affordances of 
television. Simultaneously this chapter will consider how television as a material 
object, affords different things to very young children than it does to adults and 
older children. Accordingly I will examine the role of television as a transitional 
object, functioning in some of the same ways as toys do, to facilitate children’s 
growing understanding of their contiguous separateness and intersubjectivity in 
the world. The concept of television’s holding power will be used to revisit the 
notion of television as a holding space or facilitating microenvironment, before 
concluding that television mediates infants’ and toddlers’ lifeworlds, performing a 
role similar to other, more basic technologies in their lives. That is, that television 
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is one among many technologies along a continuum which gradually unfolds in 
response to our growing relative independence. 
In what follows I will attempt to fill at least some of the gaps that exist in research 
into children and the media, principally television. In particular, I will propose 
that we might gain a greater understanding of the intersection between very young 
children and television by concentrating on the ways in which television 
intercedes in material, corporeal ways into infants’ and toddlers’ experiences of 
their lifeworlds, rather than focusing solely on content. While very young children 
may or may not understand media content in terms of the messages it conveys, I 
suggest that they do understand it with an understanding that comes from 
experience. That is, they primarily experience and come to understand television 
in its materiality at the level of embodiment; they understand it as they understand 
the people in their environments, as they understand the home in which they live, 
as they understand their playpen, and as they understand their playthings. They 
understand it at the level of their lived experience in relation to the materiality of 
their socio-equipmental-environment, specifically from their situatedness in 
relation to it and their capacity to act upon and be acted upon by it. Hence, despite 
the importance of media content analyses, they serve to situate infants and 
toddlers understanding of television in terms of ‘lack’ and potential irrelevance; in 
contrast I argue that television has paramount significance in terms of infants’ and 
toddlers’ ontology.   
By centralizing the body as a fundamental corporeality Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology offers an account of the ways in which bodies are flexibly altered 
in relation to tools and technologies. To suggest that media technologies such as 
television are ‘out there’ to corrupt children is an over simplification of the 
complex relation between children’s corporeality and their socio-equipmental-
environment (Weiss 1999). Thus, as Richardson (2003) argues, what is needed is 
an account of how television is corporealised in its medium specificity 
(Richardson 2003, 166). In other words, we need to understand ‘the way in which  
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TV impinges on [very young children’s] corporeal schemas and vice versa, 
shaping and shaped by [their] perception and experience of the medium’ (166).   
Television as Transitional Object 
As elaborated in the foregoing chapters, Winnicott pays particular attention to the 
importance of transitional objects in negotiating the gradual move from 
dependence to relative independence. Drawing on this concept, in what follows I 
will suggest that television and video technologies perform many of the same 
functions as transitional objects. As very young children do not initially 
experience themselves as apart from the world, but rather as a part of the world, 
transitional objects facilitate the transition which ultimately allows them to 
recognize themselves as discrete entities with-in the world. As previously 
mentioned, in the primary state of total dependence infants ‘do not experience 
themselves in their separateness and live just as readily in others as they do in 
themselves’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964 (b), 119). As the child matures, the unhurried 
spreading of the chiasm, between carer and baby enables the flesh of the world to 
enter, gradually allowing him or her come to grips with the other elements of his 
or her socio-equipmental environment. The infant in this way comes to 
understand him or herself as a fleshly being in relation to the other fleshly beings, 
which make up her or his world (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 5).  This widening of the 
space between carer and child produces a potential space, or as Silverstone rightly 
suggests, ‘a space for potential’ (Silverstone 1994, 9). That is, a space for 
potential agency and meaning: a gap, or interval between inner and outer, 
between carer and infant, and ultimately between personal and shared experience.  
The correlation between television and transitional objects is not a new one, yet it 
is often overlooked in media studies and education discussions surrounding the 
impact that media may have on children’s psycho-social development, which tend 
to focus more on the content of media than its ontological significance. In  
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contrast, I will reflect on the possibility of television as a transitional object by 
drawing on the works of Roger Silverstone (Silverstone 1994), Turkle (Turkle 
1984), Lally (Lally 2002) and Winnicott (Winnicott 1960).  
The most thoroughgoing treatment of television as a transitional object is that 
proposed by Silverstone (1986) who devotes an entire chapter of Television and 
Everyday Life (1986) to the ontology of television and its function as a 
transitional object (Silverstone 1994, 1-23).  As Silverstone argues, in many 
instances television occupies the potential space, which was once occupied by 
‘teddy bears, blankets and the metaphorical or literal breast’ (13). Just as the 
security blanket, the teddy bear or the baby bottle have mediated the space of non-
coincidence between caregivers and children, so too television rushes in to flesh 
out children’s worlds as the chiasm widens between mother and child.  Speaking 
of broadcast television Scannell (1988) elaborates by suggesting that television 
provides a framework for our everyday lives: giving spatio-temporal structure to 
our existence (Scannell 1996). As such, it continues to provide ontological 
security in everyday life, which offers a level of stability and reliability in an ever 
changing world. Hence, television, which is necessarily provided for infants and 
toddlers by caregivers, bear with them an intrinsic potential to be part of a 
continuity and predictability of care and being (Winnicott 1960, 47). 
Winnicott lists several criteria specific to the relationship which very young 
children have with transitional objects: they have a material reality, they are the 
child’s first possessions, they must be able to withstand whatever uses the child 
puts them to, they must display characteristics of liveness, and they will, in time 
lose their affective significance (Winnicott 1980). We have already critiqued the 
limitations of Winnicott’s criteria suggesting for instance instead, that transitional 
objects may just as readily be hard, as they are soft, and that Winnicott’s 
understanding of the  type of things that are ‘appropriate’ for young children to 
have should be viewed it its historical context.   
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In relation to rights of ownership, we must recognize that the dynamics of 
possession are complex and exceed the television itself. While a television set 
may be said to belong to everyone in the environment, there are hierarchies of 
proprietorship, which dictate who can watch what when and for how long, as well 
as what can and cannot be done with, or to, the television. For instance, very 
young children are not necessarily afforded rights of ownership over hardware of 
the television, DVD or video players per sé and they can, and often are, managed 
by those other than the infant or toddler. Since very young children are often 
ranked at the base of the hierarchical pyramid in relation to televisual hardware 
their rights of ownership are heavily regulated. Yet the proliferation of TVs in 
various rooms of the house, which ‘belong’ to one or more members of the 
household, the television in ‘common space’ is often the domain of very young 
children, allowing surveillance and control by older members of the family 
(Bittman and Sipthorp 2011). Moreover, the increase in content designed 
specifically for very young children, particularly on DVD, affords very young 
children regulated rights of ownership over the content, the operation, and the 
time and place of use. For instance, crawlers and toddlers often carry around the 
case of their favourite DVD and insist on having it played over and over again, as 
a display of attachment and ownership of ‘the television’.  
This is consistent with Winnicott’s suggestion that transitional objects will be 
‘affectionately cuddled as well as excitedly loved and mutilated’ and that they 
‘must survive instinctual loving, and also hating, and, if it be a feature, pure 
aggression’ (Winnicott 1980, 7). We have already critiqued the ascription of 
‘loving and hating’ to very young children and I would suggest that it would be 
rare for children to ‘cuddle’ a television set, yet anecdotally toddlers will kiss the 
screen and they do cuddle DVD cases as an extension of TV. Children display 
attachment to say, a favourite DVD or video case, and even to some extent to a 
remote control device, over which they can exercise some of the rights of 
ownership, and which are durable enough to withstand the many affordances that 
they furnish children. Elaborating on this particular characteristic of Winnicott’s 
criteria, Silverstone suggests that: 
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The account of the transitional object depends on a kind of reality testing in 
which the infant is presumed to follow a sequence in relation to it. The 
sequence begins with the infant’s relating to the object, then ‘finding it’, and 
then, at least in fantasy destroying it, but since it survives destruction (it exists 
despite all my efforts to deny it) it can be used, adored and depended upon 
(Silverstone 1994, 15)  
That is, infants ‘find’ television by turning it on or having it turned on for them, 
and ‘destroy’ it by turning it off or having it turned off, but the television 
‘survives’ to be turned on another time. Materially too, infants and toddlers, are 
taught rules of engagement with television sets, DVD players and VCRs at a 
young age which prohibit the potential mutilation or destruction, even if 
occasionally they might slip up and ‘shove a vegemite sandwich into the DVD 
player’ (interview with Christine 15.7.05), hence the criterion is tenuous unless 
we consider the ‘software’, or DVD case which will often be thrown, chewed, sat 
on or cuddled. As such, we can concede that even if television is turned off, it 
survives to be turned on again. Likewise DVD cases afford, and generally 
survive, a range of uses that very young children may put them to. That television 
and DVD cases survive to be used again when they are wanted or needed they act 
as a source of dependability, comfort and security (15). Furthermore, Silverstone 
suggests that ‘the continuities of sound and image, of voices or music, can be 
easily appropriated as a comfort and a security, simply because they are there’ 
(Silverstone 1994, 15). Another example of continuity and safety can be seen is 
where television content attracts and holds an ‘other’, particularly a significant 
other in close proximity to the child, creating togetherness, which constitutes a 
carer-TV couplet, or a layering of comfort and security.  
Perhaps the most salient characteristic of a transitional object, is that it must 
appear to have a life and reality of their own (Winnicott 1980, 7). This is evident 
in television, in that it mimics habits of care by reliably returning and surviving 
‘destruction’, yet it appears to have a life of its own in other ways. Television 
content displays simulations of reality, particularly with talking heads and content 
which directly addresses the viewer as well as entering into the rhythms of 
everyday life and patterns of behavior within the household. As Palmer notes, 
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‘television is an integral part of the daily routines, thinking and behavior of most 
children’ (Palmer 1986, 144). 
Adopting a Piagetian framework, Turkle (1986) makes the point that ‘children see 
almost everything in the world as alive in one way or another’ (Turkle 1984, 33) 
and that this ‘animism’ suffuses the child’s thinking until they develop a capacity 
for conceptual thought, which she suggests is at about seven or eight years of age 
(Turkle 1984, 18). She subsequently asserts that: 
Children build their theories of what is alive and what is not alive as they 
build all other theories. They use the things around them: toys, people, 
technology, the natural environment; a rapidly running stream, the wind that 
dies down and starts up again, the jerky movements of a wind-up toy – these 
are objects to think with, to build with. (Turkle 1984, 44) 
Particularly for infants therefore, the line between alive and not alive is blurry, at 
best (Turkle 1984, 33). This was illustrated in Turkle’s account of four year old 
Ralph who, when asked to draw something that was ‘not alive’, drew a spider, 
suggesting that it is not alive, because it can be killed.  Despite the obvious 
contradiction, Ralph’s conclusion is embedded in cultural understandings, as 
Turkle points out: 
As children observe behavior in the world (a world in which bugs, spiders, 
and caterpillars are often treated as though they were not alive), what people 
are reluctant and not reluctant to kill enters into children’s ideas about what 
is alive, not alive, and how to talk about it all. (Turkle 1984, 59) 
For Ralph, therefore, spiders apparently occupy a ‘marginal status as a living 
thing’ (38). The value and status afforded to television may also give the 
impression of liveness as it is cared for and protected by the members of the 
family in much the same ways as a living creature may be. Likewise, with the 
capacity to show user generated content and connect to such online applications 
as Skype, wherein family and friends may appear on screen, and speak directly to 
children, reinforces the notion of television’s apparent liveness.    
The changes in TV screens from glass to plasma filled plastic may also impact of 
children’s perception of liveness, since they may see themselves reflected in the 
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screen even when it is turned off although the reflection is rendered more 
distinctly on glass than the particular satin finish of the plastic surface of 
contemporary screens. Hence, although the perception of liveness inherent in 
reflections may have changed in character, it nonetheless remains a material 
property of televisions.  For this reason, as well as television’s screening of 
people and things which are alive, situating it in the status of marginal objects, 
which exist on the borders of the physical and the psychological, as ‘sort of alive’ 
entities, so the material properties of the television itself may also reinforce this 
status (Turkle 1984, 31).  
This ‘sort of alive’ status is further supported by Reeves and Nash’s argument 
that, not only children, but adults too, treat computers and television like real 
people, in that we talk to, and react to, and interact with them as we might to 
human others, ascribing agency to screens as children do to toys (Reeves and 
Nass 1996). As such, they can be said to satisfy the criterion of liveness as 
Winnicott’s transitional objects. Televisions as objects which have movement, 
may appear to the infant who sees practically everything as alive, to have a reality 
of their own which affords a continuity of care, comfort and security in the 
absence of their caregiver. On this basis, it would appear that like the 
impermanent but reliably reappearing mother, screens might carry significance 
for children, which remains largely under acknowledged.  
Silverstone also suggests that the Winnicott’s emphasis on the material softness 
and warmth of transitional objects should not be taken too literally, but that it 
does not alter their status as such (Silverstone 1994). He does not either mention 
the liveness of television but rather focuses on how television enters into the 
potential space between the primary care giver and infant in the process of 
maturation and reliability of care. As such, Silverstone argues that, ‘our media, 
television perhaps preeminently, occupy the potential space released by blankets, 
teddy bears and the breast, and function cathectically and culturally as transitional 
objects’ (Silverstone 1994, 13).  
196 | P a g e  
 
While the materiality of transitional objects as forwarded by Winnicott should 
not, as Silverstone suggests, be taken too literally, considering the materiality of 
television is crucial to our understanding of how the changing texture of worldly 
flesh mediates children’s existence by comparison to say, a teddy bear or security 
blanket. The materiality of television has changed significantly since its inception.  
In the past ten or so years, and where screens were made of glass, they are now 
made of soft plastic, making them more expensive and much more vulnerable to 
damage and affording different visual, auditory and play-with-ability experiences 
than their earlier counterparts. For instance, how children may interact with 
television is more closely monitored and regulated due to the expense and relative 
fragility of newer TV screens.  
Another characteristic of Winnicott’s transitional objects is that they are 
perceived by very young children, although not by adults, as coming from the 
marginal space between personal and shared perception—from neither without 
nor within. This resonates with their status as marginal objects and their ‘sort of 
alive’ status to very young children. Turkle (1984) argues in relation to 
computers, that they occupy the ambiguous space between self and not self. The 
same may also be said for television: it occupies the ‘potential space’ or écart, 
which is the interface between the inner life of imagination, sensation and feeling, 
and its interaction with external reality (Lally 2002). In Winnicott’s terms 
potential space is a place we inhabit for which neither of the terms ‘inner’ nor’ 
‘outer’ is an adequate description (Lally 2002, 28).  
The ultimate fate of transitional objects is generally to be discarded as the 
transitional experience passes. On this point, Turkle remarks that: 
As the child grows, the actual objects are discarded, but the experience of 
them remains diffused in the intense experiencing throughout life of an 
intermediate space. (Turkle 1984, 119) 
The security and reliability of transitional objects mimic the maternal provision of 
holding and ease the transition as an experience of ontological security, and as 
Turkle suggests, despite the actual object often being discarded, the attachment to 
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it does not necessarily diminish. Yet, as a persistent transitional object, television 
is unique in that it stays with us throughout life, evolving into other screens; it is a 
fundamental part of our experiencing. That is, while in Winnicottian terms, the 
transitional objects are destined to lose their significance in terms of easing 
transition, television is not outgrown but rather carries on, occupying potential 
space with varying degrees of magnitude and significance throughout our lives 
(Silverstone 1994, 15). Some of us retain a strong attachment through the feeling 
of security associated with the adoption of television as a transitional object and, 
throughout our lives, particularly in times of transition, return to the 
‘maternalizing call’ of television as a way to console ourselves (Ronell 1989).  
Hence, as Silverstone suggests, beyond infancy, like all other material objects, 
television has the capability of engendering some level of security, dependence 
and attachment which is, in part, due to the routine or habitual use of TV screens. 
In the case of television, he suggests that: 
These attachments are over-determined by the content of the media, and in 
television’s case through its schedules, genres and narrative. Television is a 
cyclical phenomenon. Its programmes are scheduled with consuming 
regularity (Silverstone 1994, 15) 
For example, Sesame Street, or Play School are scheduled and screened at 
particular, regular times of the day which are thus designated as children’s TV 
time, usually in the morning when carers are likely to be busy, preparing 
breakfast, or clearing the dishes, or in the afternoon, just before the older children 
get home from school. Hence, through the regularity of scheduling and 
consumption, and the placement of bodies, habits of watching are learned.   
Silverstone’s statement, however, should be understood in its historical context. 
In the past twenty years the technological advancements surrounding television 
have considerably changed television viewing experiences. In 1994 broadcast 
television may have been the predominant mode of watching, although since at 
least the 1980s television has served as a conduit for VCRs and DVD players as 
well as video games. The foregoing quote has little currency unless we are only 
considering broadcast television devoid of capacity and desire to record and 
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replay at any time. For very young children, in particular, the age appropriateness 
or otherwise of broadcast TV has seen many children watching DVDs or recorded 
programming more regularly than TV in and of itself.  In today’s televisual 
environment, DVDs as the holders of content, afford the ontological security of 
transitional objects; as controllable, virtually indestructible containers of 
reappearing ‘nurture’ over which many very young children exercise rights of 
ownership. Even very young children exercise some regulated rights of ownership 
over television, but more specifically DVDs, being able, at a young age to operate 
the device, choose a particular DVD and play it repeatedly. Even if they are not 
able to operate the technology, and rely on the carer-TV couplet, infants and 
toddlers are able to control what they watch and when, to a large extent. This 
aspect of television, as a conduit for other types of hybrid technologies, is also 
translatable to console, and later, computer games. Unlike many other transitional 
objects, however, television does not necessarily lose its affective significance but 
rather oscillates between the foreground and background of children’s attention; 
between hermeneutic, background and embodied human-technology relations 
(Ihde 1979). That is, it exists in the space between imagination and reality, easing 
transition and standing in for care. Television is at various times, the background 
for other activities, the focal point of our attention and as part of our corporeal 
schematics, facilitating split attention and distraction. 
We should also recall, importantly, that as these technologies fill the space of 
écart, they are also instrumental in widening the chiasm between caregivers and 
young children. This is an achievement of the capacity of technologies to mediate 
our concerned orientation and consequently, our ways of being with-in-the-world. 
Television precisely occupies the space between inner and outer, and between 
personal and shared experience and, constitutes at least an aspect of lifeworlds of 
very young children; all this at the time in their lives when they are literally 
coming to grips with the world, and formulating the bases of conceptual 
knowledge. The status of aliveness afforded to television, encourages habits of 
orientation which are precursors of a later ‘turning to screens’ as part of our 
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collective embodiment.  Hence, as I will discuss in the next chapter, familiarity 
with TV partially determines infants’ and toddlers’ relation with later screens.  
Television as a Facilitating Microenvironment 
Considering television as an environment is not new yet this characteristic is often 
only referred to fleetingly in relation to children and media. Consequently, its 
ontological significance is often left relatively unexamined. One sense in which I 
argue that television may be considered environmental refers to the understanding 
of a medium as a ‘pervading or enveloping substance, or environment’ in that it 
wraps around us, holding us in relationship with the screen (OED, 554). As 
Taylor reminds us, ‘what I am perceiving is a world with which I am already 
engaged, which envelops me, of which I am a part, where I am situated’ (Taylor 
1990, 12). Television conditions space, texturing our environment and gathering 
us in relation to it. The pervasiveness of television in the early twenty first century 
can scarcely be denied. The ubiquity is such that as long ago as 2001, Amy Jordan 
and Emory Woodard claimed one in six two-to-three year old children in the 
United States, ‘has a television set in his or her bedroom’ and that ‘he or she will 
spend more than 4 hours each day in front of a screen’ (Jordan 2001, 4). Thus, the 
ever present television constitutes a part of the enveloping space in which infants 
and toddlers live and grow as part of the material conditions of their existence. 
That is, TV is a part of the texture of very young children’s socio-equipmental-
environment, as a part of ‘the natural setting of, and field for, all [their] thoughts 
and all [their] explicit perceptions’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962, xi). On the premise of 
the ‘television environment’ Tichi argues that ‘“environment” is no television 
synonym’ (Tichi 1991, 3). Rather, it is a ‘symbolic’ or metaphorical environment 
which is largely transparent and into which we are born in Western societies, as 
such it is ‘an encompassing surrounding’ (Tichi 1991, 3). As Lucas Introna and 
Fernando Ilharco (2006) suggest, television holds us but the holding is not a 
physical holding, just as the holding environment is not necessarily a physical 
holding, but rather an enveloping: it surrounds us and attends to us as we attend to 
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it. This simulation of other facilitating microenvironments informs very young 
children’s relations with later screens, such as videos and computers. 
Television may be considered a facilitating microenvironment in at least two 
respects.  Firstly, television acts as a holding space, or container of content and 
potential relevance, and secondly, it is a small, albeit virtual environment, which 
in some instances calls and holds us in an arguably safe place (Livingstone 
2007a). Both of these aspects of television as a facilitating microenvironment will 
be discussed in what follows. Silverstone suggests that television, 
will become a transitional object in those circumstances where it is already 
constantly available or where it is consciously (or semi-consciously) used by 
the mother-figure as a baby sitter: as her or his own replacement while she 
or he cooks the dinner or attends, for whatever length of time, to something 
else, somewhere else (Silverstone 1994, 15)  
Just as become a transitional object in such circumstances, so it may also become 
a facilitating microenvironment in similar circumstances. For instance, Emma, 
who does not like television, and particularly some content, admits that if she 
needs an hour she will put the television on and she knows that the children will 
be happy for that hour: ‘you know, you want to get the housework done and you 
just do it. It’s so embarrassing’ (interview with Emma 1.7.05). The facilitating 
environment is essentially a holding, or container environment which acts to 
reduce risks to infantile physical or psychological safety (Winnicott 1960, 47). As 
such, it exceeds Winnicott’s characterization of the maternal provision necessary 
for survival in that it bears with it an ‘inherited potential’ to establish and 
maintain a ‘continuity of being’ or ontological security (Winnicott 1960, 47, Lally 
2002).  The role of the facilitating and holding environment serves infants’ needs 
on both the physiological and the psychological level (Winnicott 1960, 48). It is a 
safe place, which protects very young children from physiological and 
psychological harm (49). As Rideout and Hamel suggest: 
 
Parents use TV or DVDs as a “safe” activity their kids can enjoy while the 
grownups get dressed for work, make a meal, or do the household chores... 
when children are grouchy, or hyper, or fighting with their siblings, moms 
and dads use TV as a tool to help change their mood, calm them down, or 
separate squabbling brothers and sisters. Media are also used in enforcing 
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discipline, with a TV in the bedroom or a handheld video game player 
offered as a powerful reward or enticement for good behavior. Everyday 
activities, such as eating a meal or going to sleep, are often done with 
television as a companion. And media are used to facilitate moments of 
transition in daily life: waking up slowly while groggily watching a couple 
of cartoons on mom and dad’s bed, or calming down to a favorite video 
before bedtime. (Rideout and Hamel 2006, 4)emphasis added. 
The foregoing quote therefore implies, as I argue, that television and DVDs 
function in much the same way as both transitional objects and facilitating 
microenvironment. It is also a safe space which facilitates particular habits of 
being, discovery, exploration and play as well as enabling the development of an 
understanding of self-other in relation to children’s socio-equipmental-
environment. The continuity of ‘care’ that television provides is safe in other 
ways too. Children can be left in the care of television with the assurance that 
they will not get into trouble, and that they will have access to ‘safe’ content. Yet, 
the safety of television is a precarious safety, particularly with broadcast 
television, for at any moment it could be interrupted by content which may be 
considered inappropriate. This is illustrated in Christine’s experience of the 2005 
London bombings: 
…there was no warning, like ‘parents we’re about to interrupt this…’ and it 
was the middle of an ABC kids program and it’s just straight away, you 
know, like one second ‘we interrupt to tell you this breaking news’ and 
straight away, footage of blown up buses and everything, people and I was 
just straight away like ‘right TV off’ you know. That really annoys me when 
that happens (excerpt from interview with Christine 15.7.05) 
 
One of the justifications for a proliferation of media in contemporary Western 
homes is the perception that public places, such as parks are no longer safe places, 
but rather are increasingly perceived as potentially dangerous (Livingstone 
2007a). Particularly in our ‘risk society’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001), as 
Livingstone notes, ‘ “outside” spaces are seen as ever more risky for children, 
“home” takes over as the focus of their safety, identity and leisure’ (Livingstone 
2007a, 302). While the direct impact of considering unsupervised outdoor play 
may only be peripheral to discussions of infants and toddlers and the media, very 
young children cannot be left unattended. Livingstone points to a shift from 
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outdoor recreational pursuits to indoor ones with parents generally considering it 
no longer safe to play outdoors, in parks and public spaces (Livingstone 2007a, 
302). Livingstone makes an explicit link between a retreat to the home and 
increased media consumption, hence, despite the potential risk of harmful content, 
the mediasphere en large may be considered as a facilitating microenvironment or 
holding space which protects children from harm. As infants’ and toddlers’ 
mobility grows so too does their understanding of content, hence television can 
become a way of holding children without physical restraint. 
Turkle discusses the capacity of televisual media at length in relation to the 
holding power of computers (Turkle 1984). In doing so, she speaks to the notion 
of computer addiction, yet her discussion can just as readily be applied to screen 
media more generally. Television is a holding space or container technology 
which not only contains content, but also holds infants, toddlers and all of us who 
have, through repeated perception, come to attend to it as part of our habits of 
being; holding both our attention and physical proximity (Introna and Ilharco 
2006). This conception enables us also to think about televisual technologies as 
holding environments, in Winnicottian terms (Winnicott 1988) or, more 
specifically as the chiasmic intertwining of flesh of the world (Wynn 1997).  
Television also sets up a horizon of possibilities which facilitate infants’ and 
toddlers’ dis/integration from their carers and into society by functioning as both 
transitional objects and facilitating microenvironments. That is, television, like all 
other human and non-human objects in-form very young children’s understanding 
of the world, and integrate them into their socio-equipmental-environment while 
simultaneously, disintegrating them from their primal connectedness with their 
carers—television literally fills in. Television becomes part of who we essentially 
are; a part of the world as it may be for us. In phenomenological terms, as the 
chiasm between child and mother widens, television as an all pervasive part of the 
flesh of the world, rushes in to fill the space of écart.  
  
203 | P a g e  
Screening Infants and Toddlers 
 
Mediating the Domestic Facilitating Microenvironment: A Detour 
into the Phenomenological History of Television 
Our screened world has changed considerably since the inception of television 
and the materiality of very young children’s socio-equipment environments have 
changed along with it. As such, it is worth a brief detour into how television’s 
materiality has changed over time in order to gain a greater understanding of how 
television is implicated in changes to the context of family through spatial 
arrangements within domestic space: producing a multiplicity of media spaces, 
coopting family and individual activity around and in relation to TV, and 
producing hierarchies of inclusion and exclusion through everyday practices and 
rituals enabled and constrained, in part, by the television itself.   
In this section I will focus on how television mediates domestic holding spaces, 
with the understanding that space and time are inextricably intertwined and one 
cannot be considered in complete isolation from the other. In doing so, I will 
consider how spatial arrangements have changed, and are continuing to change, to 
accommodate television and how such changes have implications for infants’ and 
toddlers’ lived experiences in relation to their televisually mediated  lifeworlds.  
From the mid-twentieth century television has become an increasingly integral 
part of very young children’s socio-equipmental environments coopting both 
temporal and spatial arrangements in households in various and often 
contradictory ways. As discussed extensively in Chapter 2, we are all primarily 
embodied beings-in-the-world and the shape of our world shapes our perceptions 
and experiences, consistent with our own corporeality and the technologically 
mediated spaces that constitute it.  
Our perceptions and experiences are shaped in space but space cannot be 
considered as an empty container, devoid of human subjectivity and activity 
(Burgin 1996, 26-27). Instead, as Lefebvre (1991) argues, space is not only 
produced, but also produces human activity, and significantly, it is through the 
body that space is perceived and lived (Lefevbre 1991, 162).  Since the late 
twentieth century there has been an increasing recognition of space as a 
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qualitative context, or space of potential (Shields 2006, 147). Drawing on 
Winnicott’s notions of the facilitating environment and potential space, 
Silverstone points out that it ‘is the space of illusion: the capacity to imagine, the 
capacity, indeed to create meaning’ (Silverstone 1994, 10). Consequently, as 
Sofia tells us space becomes ‘a bearer of intelligence’ or at least of potential 
meaning (Sofia 2000, 182). This is also consistent with Yuri Lotman’s claim that 
the production, reception and circulation of meaning happen in relation to space 
(Lotman 1990, 123-125). Hence we need to understand space, not only in terms 
of spatial relations and the distance between things in the world but as a socially 
produced order of difference (Shields 2006, 149). That is, we need to understand 
spatialisation as it is achieved through historically specific everyday practices and 
rituals, particularly of inclusion and exclusion (149). As Silverstone notes:    
Our domesticity is the product of a historically defined and constantly 
shifting relationship between public and private spaces and cultures, a 
shifting relationship to which television itself contributes. That domesticity 
is at once a phenomenological, a socio-cultural and an economic reality. 
(Silverstone 1994, 25) 
Prior to 1935 television was not electronic but rather the screen ‘had a small 
motor with a spinning disc and a neon lamp, which worked together to give a 
blurry reddish-orange picture about half the size of a business card!’ as can be 
seen in figure 5.1 (2001). Hartley and O’Reagan (1985) suggest that: 
Among the general reasons for television’s easy assimilation into people’s 
lives was the existence of media, especially radio and cinema, that had 
already ‘trained’ people in the necessary skills for watching and enjoying 
TV. (Hartley and O'Regan 1985, 204)  
As can be seen in figure 5.1 the small screen size—‘half the size of a business 
card’—and the reddish orange blurriness of early TV images, demanded close 
attention in order to ‘watch’, introducing us to new ways of watching that neither 
cinema nor radio demanded. Television viewing, at least in its infancy, became an 
activity specific to the new medium which was quite unlike those that had gone 
before it. Early television thus required us to learn new ways of attending to 
screens.  
205 | P a g e  



























Figure 5.1 1928 Popular Mechanics Magazine (1928) 
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The size of the screen and the implications of television’s insertion into domestic 
space in terms of spatial organization and attention are illustrated in the article in 
Popular Mechanic Magazine shown in figure 5.1. As the article tells us, the 
television is built into a large cabinet with control knobs on the front, and, ‘above 
them, at eye level of the seated spectator, [notably in the singular] appears a three-
inch-square window, behind which is the screen on which images are formed’ 
(1928, 529)  
Such early models also introduced us to a hierarchy of viewing which enabled 
some to see and some not, as shown in figure 5.1. The size of the screen and the 
poor image quality allowed only a small audience, at very close proximity to the 
screen to view what was being shown. The small size of the screen sets up a 
hierarchy of viewing consistent with dominant family relations of the time with 
the father, as the head of the household, located directly in front of, and close to 
the set.  Mother stands behind him and the children are arranged increasingly 
further away from and at a greater angle to the screen. It is doubtful from this 
image, whether the children would be able to see anything at all.  The image, 
however, does illustrate how early televisions set up the conditions of attention 
for later screens, as Hartley and O’Regan (1985) suggest that ‘television was 
watched with an intensity, concentration and lack of conversation that would be 
unfamiliar today’ (204). The image, moreover, gives a visual representation of the 
ways in which television’s incorporation into the family home, not only changes 
the spatial organization of the room in which it is placed, but also enters into 
family power relations, giving priority to some members of the household at the 
expense of others.  
The cabinet housings also implicate the notion of television as furniture referred 
to in Hartley and O’Regan’s 1985 Quoting Not Science but Sideboards: 
Television in a New Way of Life (Hartley and O'Regan 1985). The incorporation 
of TV into family homes, thus, was not an easy one, as Spigel (1992b) and 
Hartley and O’Regan (1985) acknowledge; existing furniture and family 
interaction needed to be rearranged to ‘make room for TV’ (Spigel 1992b, Hartley 
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and O'Regan 1985). The example in figures 5.1 is particularly notable in terms of 
television’s role in the spatial reorganization of domestic spaces. Figures 5.1, 5.2 
and 5.3 which were taken from advertisements and magazine articles, not only 
illustrate spatial configurations around the television but given the era in which 
they featured were early in television’s adoption, may be considered as 
instructions for how television should be attended to.  
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the size of the screen relative to the volume of their 
housings. In these figures we can see that the large cabinets filled spaces which 
would otherwise have been empty or filled by some other item. When television 
was first introduced into Australian homes, it was discursively and physically 
situated at the centre of family life, purportedly taking the place of the piano, the 
fireplace or the radio as the hub of family activity and communication (Spigel 
1992a, Hartley and O'Regan 1985). Television’s ultimate destination for the 
family home is further captured in the General Electric advertisement in 











Figure 5.2 1939 GE Sales Brochure (Genova 2001d) 
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During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the technology developed, becoming 
electronic, consequently producing better quality images and sound. These 
characteristics enhanced the medium’s desirability as an inclusion into the family 
home. The 30s and 40s also witnessed increased screen sizes, and cabinet sizes 
signaling its suitability for incorporation as a domestic appliance, article of 
furniture, although few were privately owned at this time.  
There was understandably somewhat of a lull during the Second World War, but 
as Tom Genova tells us: 
The time period after World War-II is considered the last and final birth of 
television.  Families had accumulated savings during the war years, and 
were eager to purchase homes, cars and other luxuries denied them during 
the war.  Television sets were soon added to the 'must have' list.  The 
explosion of sets into the American marketplace occurred in 1948-1949.  
The post-war sales boom for England followed a few years later (2001). 
Australia lagged behind the rest of the Western world in terms of the uptake 
of television and the first broadcast did not take place until the 1956 
Melbourne Olympic Games (Hartley and O'Regan 1985). By the fifties in 
the United States, however, television had already embedded itself as a 










Figure 5.3 1950s Family Watching Television (2013) 
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As television became a more accepted part of the domestic environment, both 
screens and the cabinets which held them, increased in size as can be seen in 
figure 5.3. Consequently, making way for the TV as well as facilitating viewing 
necessitated a further reconfiguration of domestic space. As can also be seen in 
figure 5.3, furniture and bodies were arranged with more or less success to 
facilitate watching.  
Milly Buonanno (2008) reminds us that private television ownership was initially 
rare in Australia in the 1950s and that: 
For a number of years so long as having a television set was the exception 
rather than the rule, families with a set would throw their homes open to 
relatives, friends and neighbours, welcoming them into the rooms of the 
home – sitting room, parlour, dining room, breakfast room – where the 
furniture would be rearranged so as to make room for small seats and 
‘theatres’ with the chairs sometimes brought along by the guests themselves) 
arranged in a row or a semi-circle. (Buonanno 2008, 15)  
The quasi-cinematic experience of watching television with a group aided 
television’s incorporation into the home and blurred the distinction between 
public and private spaces (figure 5.4). The arrangement of guests’ and families’ 
bodies in a row or semi-circle is illustrated in figures 5.1 and 5.4.  Buonanno 
asserts that such activity reinforced the notion that television ‘brings the world to 








Figure 5.4 Television as a social Event (2009b) 
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In her examination of domestic space Spigel (1997) relies on the metaphor of the 
theatre as the model for architecture from Victorian times where homes were 
separated into distinct ‘upstage’ and ‘backstage’ areas, which corresponded to our 
contemporary understanding of the distinction between living and family rooms 
(Spigel 1997, 219).  
With the introduction of colour, increased screen size and increasingly 
sophisticated electronics enabling better image quality, television viewing became 
a more immersive experience, creating a powerful illusion of ‘being-there’(Morse 
1998). By the late fifties in the United States, television had become the norm, 
rather than the exception in homes and they became more stylized and elaborate 













Figure 5.5 Television as Furniture Piece (Genova 2001h) 
 
As television became more commonplace in households, watching TV, ‘began to 
lose its quasi-cinematic, social aspect, and to take on its more recently 
characteristic patterns – it was a private, family activity, with just one family per 
set (Hartley and O’Regan 1985, 65). In the second half of the twentieth and early 
in the twenty first centuries, the landscape changed with a burgeoning in 
television ownership. Where families initially had one set that they shared and 
fought over, gradually with decreases in cost and improvements in portability 
they have become more personalized, and now: 
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[f]rom being a collective experience shared with family, friends and 
neighbours, watching television may take place simultaneously in different 
rooms in the same household, individually by members of the same family 
(Bignell 2008, 26) 
Hence television not only got larger, it simultaneously became smaller and more 
mobile as television become an indispensable part of everyday life for many 
families, signaling the shift from a shared experience to an individual experience 















Figure 5.6 5” Tummy Television (Genova 2001f) 
This may be considered as consistent with trends towards mobility and 
privitisation referred to by Raymond Williams (1992) who suggested that 
television ‘an at once mobile and home-centred way of living: a form of mobile 
privatisation’ countering the contradictory demands of modernity for both of 
mobility and privacy (Williams 1992). It is also reminiscent of Ulrich Beck and 
Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim’s notion of individualization, which implies 
simultaneous ‘disintegration of previously existing social forms…[and] new 
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demands, controls and constraints are being imposed on individuals’ (Beck 2001, 
2). As such, it signals is a systematic shifting of responsibility and risk associated 
with life choices away from the ‘state’ and onto individuals (Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim 2001).   
As television became accepted, manufacturers worked towards improving the 
television experience so improved audio quality, colour, increased and 
simultaneously smaller screen size, better picture quality, 3D and ‘smart’ TV 
became ways to increase demand. Consequently, Samsung launched a £7 million 
advertising campaign to support the promotion of the ‘Smart’, internet enabled 










Figure 5.7 LG Smart TV (Owen 2011) 
With changes to the technology of television, not only spatial layout within the 
lounge room changed, but also architectural allowances began to be made for 
specific media rooms. Livingstone notes that since the mid twentieth century, the 
burgeoning of ‘domestic mass media’ has significantly altered the lifeworlds of 
children (Livingstone 2007a, 303). The two trends she identifies are a shift in the 
delineation between home and the outside world which was facilitated by 
television, and later, with increasingly mobile and private media, the delineation 
between ‘family life and the private life of the child’ (Livingstone 2007a, 303). 
The two trends of demarcation, Livingstone likens to changing boundaries of the 
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‘front door’ and the ‘bedroom door’ (303). Where in the early years of 
television’s integration into the family home, entertainment was no longer 
something that necessitated leaving home, the proliferation of ownership by 
multiple family members meant that media consumption become a much more 
private experience. Despite relatively enduring architectural trends which 
attempts to carefully delineate private and public spaces:  
the living room is increasingly deserted for the bedroom, and in which 
private experience is prioritized even in public spaces, through the sound 
bubble created by headphones, the personal ownership of a television set, 
and the individualized mediascape of the mobile phone and iPod.  















Figure 5.8 Contemporary Floorplan (2014) 
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Just as mobile privatization, and individualization may be considered as 
oxymoronic concepts, so too is the history of television and the ways in which it 
has reconfigured domestic time and space. While screens have become more 
mobile and private they have also become more cinematic in recent times. As 
such the move to personal spaces of media consumption prevails so too 
communal and familial spaces are increasingly incorporated into architectural 
trends.  Even budget homes such as that shown in figure 5.8 now include a theatre 
or media room, something which could scarcely have been imagined in the 1950s.  
This signals the ambivalent relationship we have with television, where on the 
one hand it is afforded status as a means to bring people together and on the other 
it is only available at certain times and to certain members of the family. 
Prior to our capacity to record televisual content too, network scheduling entered 
into the rhythms of everyday life, aligning content with the procession of time. 
Marking off, not only times of inclusion—children’s programming time—and 
exclusion—adult programming time—but enlisting this to configure spaces of 
inclusion and exclusion. For instance, in Kate and Seb’s lives early morning is, 
for a short period of time, Sunrise and news time for mum, and then when she is 
getting ready for work, it becomes Bob the Builder time for Seb. As Kate told me: 
So usually I shower him and get everything organised and get him dressed 
and put him into his high chair and put Bob on for him and that gives me a 
chance to get my shit together for the day and get his bag ready and 
whatever else because he’s quiet (excerpt from interview conducted 
19.11.05) 
Children’s shows, in particular, are scheduled in regularly designated children’s 
TV time, usually in the morning when carers are likely to be busy, preparing 
breakfast, or clearing dishes, or in the afternoon, just before the older children get 
home from school or as dinner is being prepared (Silverstone 1994). As 
Silverstone suggest, our attachments to television ‘are over-determined’ by the 
showing of content with ‘consuming regularity’ (Silverstone 1994, 15). Although 
network scheduling does not figure as prominently today, in terms of content, our 
use of DVDs still allows a regularity of screening which enters into the rituals of 
everyday life, marking and segmenting times to watch, and mediating our 
215 | P a g e  
Screening Infants and Toddlers 
 
experiences of time. The overlaying of virtual space onto physical space will be 
dealt with in greater theoretical depth in the next chapter, but at this stage it is 
worth mentioning in terms of the ways in which time and space started to be 
reconfigured to fit in with television viewing.  
The lifeworlds of children have changed in relation to spatial modifications to 
which television has contributed, but to suggest that this is straightforward or 
generalizable is to discount televisions’, families’, spaces’, and children’s uneven 
development. Nonetheless, we may infer that television’s incorporation into 
domestic environments reshapes those environments and children’s experiences 
within, and in relation to them. This is particularly so, when we consider that as 
‘private’ screens have become dominant, television is now often the domain of 
very young children (Bittman and Sipthorp 2011).  
Television’s introduction into domestic spaces literally reconfigured domestic 
holding spaces, changing the habitat and the habitus of those dwelling within 
them in multivariate ways, constraining and enabling particular modes of being, 
interacting and watching. As Hartley and O’Regan (1985) note: 
[C]ulture, knowledge and experience are themselves forms of 
communication, but communication is based as much on spatial relations, 
tactile qualities and tensions as on sights, colours and sounds. In such a 
context, the arrival of television in Perth can be looked at physically, as it 
were, as its subsequent changes and developments can be traced in the ways 
that people consumed space and time; how they learnt, or were encouraged, 
to accommodate their bodies to the TV and the TV to their physical 
environment. (Hartley and O'Regan 1985, 63)  
As Silverstone (1994), Spigel (Spigel 1997), Livingstone (Livingstone 2007a), 
and Hartley and O’Regan (Hartley and O'Regan 1985) point out, television’s 
introduction domestic space has contributed to significant shifts in domesticity, 
reconfiguring relationships of public and private spaces, daily routines and 
patterns of activity in the home. The status afforded to various domestic screens 
in diverse contexts implicates notions of attention; a problematic concept that will 
be dealt with in the upcoming sections. 
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A Screened World 
As well as considering the specificities of television, it is important to consider 
the phenomenological implications of screens more generally, as well as the 
notion of a screened world, since the way that television calls and holds our 
attention is simultaneously part of, and a precursor to, our engagement with other 
screens, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  In the early 
twenty first century, young children and adults alike are inescapably in the world 
with screens, which demands a being-with-screens.  As Introna and Ilharco (2004) 
suggest, the proliferation of screens and their intertwining with our everyday lives 
means that we now inhabit a world in which there are more screens than there are 
people. 
Whether at work, at home, travelling, or immersed in some form of 
entertainment, most of us find ourselves increasingly in front of screens – 
television screens, cinema screens, personal computer screens, mobile phone 
screens, palmtop computer screens, and so forth. The last decades have witnessed 
a massive diffusion of television screens into people’s day-to-day lives…It seems 
evident that screens are increasingly a medium, a way, or a mode into the real as 
well as a part of that same reality. The world we encounter is increasingly a 
screened world (Introna and Ilharco 2006, 57-58) 
 
As such, screens are not only a way of accessing and informing us about reality 
but they are also increasingly more significant as an integral part of our reality 
(Introna and Ilharco 2006, 57-58). That is, as an ever more ubiquitous 
accompaniment to our lives, screens technologically texture our lifeworlds, 
literally and metaphorically putting us ‘in the picture’ and simultaneously 
configuring time and space to accommodate them. Consequently, our being-in-
the-world is mediated more than ever by the co-location of screens in our 
everyday lives. While I am focusing on television and screens in general in this 
chapter, the broader implications of a screened world will be explored in the next 
chapter on mobile phones and tablets. 
Generally when we attempt to analyze screen based technologies we are inclined 
to look at screens in terms of what appears on them—that is in terms of content—
rather than the screen itself. This is a sentiment which echoes medium theorists 
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like McLuhan (1964), Silverstone (1994) and Weber (1996), who hold that the 
specificity of media technologies rather than content alone should be paramount 
in any attempt to understand the ways in which media enter into our lived 
experience of the world. Thus, television content is only part of the equation, 
since it is imbricated in the context of viewing, the role that television plays in the 
household and the size and placement of the screen.  Drawing on Martin 
Heidegger’s phenomenology (1927/1962) Introna and Ilharco (2006) suggest that 
due to our ‘familiarity with screens’, we tend to overlook the screen-ness of the 
screen: ‘we never seem to look at a screen, as a screen’ (Introna and Ilharco 2006, 
62). That is, because we are so accustomed to being-with-screens we often fail to 
notice the specifics of screens, or the characteristics which distinguish them from 
being any other surface (62-63). Introna and Ilharco (2006) suggest, however, that 
we need to be aware that screens, in their screening: 
present, show, exhibit, what is supposed to be relevant information in each 
context,…Screens exhibit what was previously chosen, captured, processed, 
organized, structured and finally presented on the screen (Introna and 
Ilharco 2006, 63) 
In their screening, therefore, screens are always-already implicated in ongoing 
human activity (63). Since screens screen what is supposed to be relevant, they 
intercede into our ongoing activity and involvement in-the-world when we turn 
them on, prompting orienting responses and proximity seeking behaviours, the 
configuration of spaces around a screen or screens, and hierarchies of viewing.  
As such, Introna and Ilharco (2004) point out that screens condition ‘our 
engagement with certain surfaces in as much as we comport ourselves towards 
them as screens’ (Husserl 1913/1964 cited in Introna and Ilharco 2006, 58). Our 
inclination towards, or chiasmic intertwining with screens, reveals itself through 
proximity, posture, orientation and gesture, most noticeably with a frontal 
orientation and generally a lean back or lounging posture—although this has 
evolved over time from a leaning forward posture as we have seen which is 
indicative of a shift from focused attention to a more relaxed style of interactivity 
with the set which allows other flesh to enter the broadening space of écart.  
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As such, Introna and Ilharco (2006) argue that because screens concern us, we 
conduct ourselves towards them. Scannell (1996) offers a useful elaboration on 
the concept of ‘concern’ which reminds us that: 
Concern is all such things as noticing, remarking upon, attending to, 
observing, picking out, foregrounding and bringing to bear a focused 
attentiveness upon phenomena (upon each other and our selves and 
circumstances) in such ways as to find and make the matter to hand 
significant and meaningful in some way or other. Concern is being caught 
up in. It is engagement with, involvement in. (Scannell 1996, 144) 
Concern, therefore, is a bodily engagement with, an involvement and an 
intertwining with those things that affect us, that attract not only our attention but 
also our proximity and orientation to them, entering into our ongoing activity 
with-in-the-world.  It is on this point that content becomes significant, in so far as 
it can attract the attention of very young children, but importantly can attract and 
hold the attention of other people in the infants’ and toddlers’ socio-equipmental 
environments. Adults concern with and for screens, particular to specific contexts 
(for example the office or the airport) are ‘often the focus of our attention’ (63).  
When adults attend to screens, however, we do not only see content but we also 
and arguably more fundamentally see a ‘way of being in [the] world’ which ‘is 
consistent with our ongoing involvement in that world’ (66).  As adults turn to 
screens, very young children learn habits of being-with both screens and other 
people.  
Introna and Ilharco also suggest that screens implicate our activity and 
participation in-the-world at the moment we turn them on (2006, 63). In doing so 
they allude to the most fundamental aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility 
thesis, which acknowledges that we touch screens just as they concern or touch 
us, asserting a mutual intertwining of human and technology. Our involvement 
with screens, therefore, must be considered as an interaction rather than being an 
action which is done to either party by the other.  As such, by turning on the 
screen we are complicit in a particular way of being in a ‘world where screens 
screen’ (Introna and Ilharco 2006, 68).   
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Introna and Ilharco (2006) argue that we have an originary relationship with 
screens as objects that matter, and that they are revealed to us as the types of 
things they are because they matter (60).  As such, they suggest that: 
in th[e] ongoing horizon of human existence, things show up as that which 
they are, not simply because we choose to take them to be this or that thing, 
but rather it is possible to take them as this or that thing because they are 
already revealed as such, within and through the ongoing referential whole 
of ongoing human existence. This already-worlding of the world is exactly 
what allows the familiar and useful to show up as familiar and useful, in the 
first instance. (Introna and Ilharco 2006, 60) 
Introna and Ilharco (2006) also suggest that ‘attention, relevance, and the world’ 
are intimately intervolved ‘in the meaning of the screen’ (66).  In an argument 
which resonates with Norman’s (1990) notion of affordances, Introna and Ilharco 
(2006) suggest that the meaning and intended use are clearly apparent to all and 
that ‘things always and already have their meaning as this or that familiar and 
useful thing’ (60).  
Certainly, in the early twentieth century, screens are an always-already present 
aspect of the world into which many children are born and, as such, they inform 
very young children’s emerging understanding of ways to be in the world, and 
others in that environment, in terms of familiarity, relevance and affordances. I 
would suggest, however, that their meaning and relevance as screens is not 
immediately apparent to infants and toddlers for whom all things are fresh 
instruments, the use, meaning and relevance of which is learned through their 
own ongoing activity in-the-world. That is, screens become relevant, familiar and 
useful to very young children in reference to social experience, patterns of 
everyday life, their own and other people’s orientational, postural, gestural and 
proximal actions towards, and the spatial and temporal rules surrounding 
engagement with screens. The world as it is for very young children is not the 
same as the world for older people; it is a world in which experiences are 
gradually enabled through parental or carer provision. Familiarity, usefulness and 
relevance are learned just as modes of attention are learned, in part through 
habitual and routine engagement with screens and not necessarily what is 
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screening on them. Attention is not a universal which is available to all in the 
same way, consequently in what follows I will examine and problematize 
attention as a concept and consider the ways in which attention differs for very 
young children from how we perceive it as adults. 
Problematizing the Notion of Attention 
Just as ascribing adult conceptions of relevance and usefulness to very young 
children is problematic, so too is attributing adult notions of attention. In the 
longitudinal study Infants and Television (1988), which was conducted in Sydney 
between 1988 and 1994 Cupitt and Jenkinson tracked the ‘use and experience’ of 
television and video by children, in the first two and a half years of their lives 
(Cupitt and Jenkinson 1998, 7). The authors make a distinction between watching 
television and being exposed to it. According to this distinction, being exposed to 
television means that the television is on when the child is in the room, whereas 
‘watching’ is taken to mean a ‘sustained attention to, and comprehension of, 
content – as opposed to sporadically responding to visual and auditory stimuli’ 
(7).  The mothers who participated in the study ranked their infants’ attention to 
and comprehension of television content, on a ‘five point scale from “hardly 
watches,” “watches a little,” “watches half the time,” “mostly watches,” to 
“watches with great concentration” ’ (7). The data suggested that in early infancy 
a large proportion of four month olds hardly watch or watch only a little 
television though many infants are exposed to television for an average of forty 
four minutes per day, increasing to sixty two minutes per day by the age of twelve 
months and eighty four minutes a day by the time they are two and a half (Cupitt 
and Jenkinson 1998, 7). By equating watching with attention, however, Cupitt and 
Jenkins rely on adult conceptions of attention and consequently do not consider 
that for very young children, attention is not only visual, but haptic, auditory and 
motile. Moreover, the very notion of ‘attention’ is problematic as it focuses on 
content rather than perception. 
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The distinction made by Cupitt and Jenkinson, between exposure to, and 
engagement with, media is a central theme in Anderson and Evans’ Peril and 
Potential of Media for Infants and Toddlers (2001) prompting them  to worry that 
television’s capacity to produce orienting responses may have implications for 
young children’s play. Accordingly they argue that: 
visual and auditory changes, as well as motion detected in the visual 
periphery, can produce strong orienting reactions in which ongoing activity 
is suspended as the child orients to the source of the motion or change. 
(Anderson and Evans 2001, 12) 
and that: 
It is possible that such orienting reactions disrupt very young children’s 
ongoing play schemes, making it difficult for them to resume sustained play 
at a mature level. (Anderson and Evans 2001, 12) 
Yet, for very young children distraction, like play, is their mode of being and as 
discussed in the previous chapter, the argument can be made that distraction, in 
itself, is a form of play. Play specifically takes place in the liminal space of 
potential between introception and extroception as distraction. 
As I have suggested, Introna and Ilharco (2006) suggest that screens screen not 
entirely by virtue of the content they carry, but rather they come into being as 
screens, attracting and holding our attention as: 
focal entities, presenting, displaying, relevant content for our involvement 
and action in the world…Thus, a screen screens – captures our attention and 
holds it—in and through our particular involvements in the world (the world 
of entertainment, the world of work, etc.) (Introna and Ilharco 2006, 65-66) 
As such, Introna and Ilharco argue that screens attract and hold our attention by 
creating and reinforcing an expectation of relevance. Certainly, the constant 
novelty of audiovisual stimuli sets up an expectation of relevant content, but to a 
very young child, the relevance of the content is analogous to the reliability of 
care, with its reappearing stimuli, which initially attracts their attention and then 
holds it, in anticipation of the next new thing (Anderson and Evans 2001). Thus 
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the orienting responses children have towards television may be considered as not 
only setting up an expectation of relevance but also of care, which is the basis of 
ontological security (Winnicott 1988). From here, we may surmise that the 
repetitiveness and reliability of television’s almost constant presence in some 
homes might enhance children’s ‘confidence in the continuity of [their] 
experience’ (Lally 2002, 28). Ontological security, however, is an outcome that 
resides alongside the potential ‘insecurity’ of inappropriate or frightening content. 
The ontological security of television is, therefore, precarious. This signifies 
another aspect of the complexity of television—it is both reliable and unreliable.  
Hence, ontological security, insecurity, and security in the presence of perceived 
violence, or all three are possible outcomes. Ontological security is a background 
relation; a way of experiencing which is not based on attention.  
Certainly, very young children who are exposed to television may intermittently 
attend to content which is meant for adults when, say, a familiar song or sound is 
heard. Often though, for very young children, the banality of television content 
does not so much call to children, or us, but rather acts as background noise that 
accompanies other activities like play or conversations, which have little or 
nothing to do with the TV or its content.  Consequently, exposure to and adult use 
of TV may just as readily impart the notion of television’s irrelevance to children 
as it does its relevance. Hence very young children’s as well as adult relations 
with television may oscillate between the types of relation proposed by Ihde – 
embodied, hermeneutic or background (Ihde 1975). For example, we may, 
through repetitive orienting responses come to master spilt attention—attending 
intermittently while doing other things—which is a particular mode of embodied 
perception. On the other hand, we may enter into a hermeneutic relation with 
television, ‘reading off’ media messages and making sense of our experiencing in 
relation to television, or we may have it on as background noise, to which we pay 
scant regard.  
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Figure 5.9 Modes of Attention Source: (ACMI) 
 
It is also important to note that there are different, conflicting and contradictory 
ways of ‘watching’ television, not only with children but also with adults. These 
may range from the gaze of focused attention through to the occasional glance 
and the visually disengaged, as figure 5.9 illustrates.   
The distinction between watching and being exposed to television may also not 
hold true when we consider that what a television affords a very young child is 
not the same as what it affords adults and older children. For instance, even when 
a television is not turned on, it affords a number of sensori-motor-affective 
opportunities to babies. To us, it may just be a box in the corner but to a floor 
dweller, crawler or toddler it may literally act as a mirror, reflecting the child, 
other people and aspects of the outside world, it may be a prop to assist standing 
or kneeling and it can act as an obstacle to reaching the world (power point, wires, 
dust, wall or toy) behind it. Hitting the screen with a bare hand, a peanut butter 
sandwich or a toy yields particular haptic, visual and auditory perceptions which 
may also engage a young child’s and others’ attention.  Such actions, along with 
turning the television off and on, or changing channels, or turning the volume up 
or down also attracts attention and reveals television as an object surrounded by 
rules and hierarchies of use, mediating the domestic space. Hence, even without 
yet considering content, the screen may still call and hold a very young child’s 
attention, creating an expectation of relevance.  As such, to consider television as 
worthy of research only on the basis of the content it carries is to overlook a more 
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fundamental engagement with the material objects with which we share the world 
and the affordances that these offer very young children. The assumption, then, 
that media may be somehow irrelevant to very young children misses the 
significance of media as mediating technologies, of background television, or 
television as a backdrop for everyday life and the flexible affordances of 
television sets. Therefore, while the distinction between exposure and engagement 
is potentially an important one, in terms of content, the relationship which very 
young children have with television is more complex, providing both content and 
context for children who are coming to grips with their socio-equipmental 
environment. 
As Lally remarks, ‘despite their ubiquity these everyday objects are, for the most 
part, completely taken for granted, forming an invisible backdrop to our day-to-
day lives’ (Lally 2002, 26). The foregoing statement may seem somewhat 
contradictory to Introna and Ilharco’s statement that screens consistently draw 
and hold our attention, yet as we have already seen, attention is not a universal, 
especially as it relates to infants and toddlers. Through habituation we may not 
necessarily be explicitly and ongoingly aware of television’s presence, it is 
always there and on, waiting for us to attend to it, just as a toy may be put aside 
but remains there to be played with when the child is so inclined.  In much the 
same way as we cease to experience our clothing, or the shape of the rooms and 
home in which we live, or as we cease to hear the hum of air conditioning, 
television is often just there as part of the background of our existence (Ihde 
1990).  That the human-television relation may just as readily be a background 
relation, as an embodied or hermeneutic relation, problematizes any straight 
forward attention and complicates any assertion of media effects.  
While adopting background and foreground media as their preferred terminology 
Anderson and Evans (2001) agree with Cupitt and Jenkinson (1998) that 
background media become foreground media with children’s developing 
cognitive and linguistic skills which enable them to understand more media 
content (Anderson and Evans 2001, 11). Or, as Introna and Ilharco (2006) put it, 
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there is growing expectation of relevance. While children may ultimately come to 
attend more closely to television’s audio and visual content as their cognitive and 
linguistic skills develop, along with their expectation of relevance develop, such 
an assumption overlooks other modes of attention, the blurry distinction between 
attentional engagement and varying modes of distraction. Distraction is a primary 
modality for infants and toddlers, and that when they do attend to screens they do 
so in ways which are different from adults or older children: prolonged attention 
is not possible for very young children. Adult relations with screens are embedded 
in ocularcentrism, a cultural conditioning of sense ratios which has not yet been 
learned by very young children. Focusing on the theoretical distinction between 
background and foreground media obscures the material existence of television 
and how it enters into very young children’s ways of being and their developing 
capacity to rapidly oscillate along a spectrum of attention and distraction. 
Assuming a background foreground distinction closes off the notion of oscillating 
attention and distraction. Likewise it occludes the materiality of television and 
how TV enters into very young children’s ways of being along a spectrum of 
human-technology relations, in terms of rules and hierarchies of viewing, or how 
often and how much television other members of the household watch, who can 
control what is watched, what can and cannot be done to televisions, and the 
spatial arrangements of furniture and bodies around the television. Hence, the 
variable child-screen relation cannot be considered in isolation from the status 
afforded to screens in the child’s socio-equipmental-environment. 
Thus it is not only the screen in its screening which enters into infants’ and 
toddlers’ being with-in-the-world, which mediates their experience of the world 
and of the non-human and human others in the world (Introna and Ilharco 2004, 
230). Seb, for instance at fourteen months, is very accustomed to television.  
Kate, his mother, told me: 
…probably because I’ve grown up with it myself, like the first thing I do 
when I get up in the morning is get him…his milk and then…I usually flick 
the tele on (excerpt from interview with Kate 19/11/05. 
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As part of Seb’s learning to be with television, while Kate is heating his milk: 
He knows when the milk has to come that he’s got the couch, he’s got a spot 
on the couch where he’s got one of those u-shaped pillows and he goes in 
there and gets ready for his milk and the tele...(Kate 19/11/05) 
By associating milk with television watching, Seb has started to learn the ways to 
watch as well as ways to be in relation to television specific to his socio-
equipmental environment. This is further reinforced by the provision of the 
majority of his meals in his highchair in front of the TV. Hence, while we may 
come to attend to television, this is a learned habit, and not something that is 
innate. Moreover we learn ways of being-with-screens specific to our own socio-
equipmental environments. Any expectation of relevance, comes with experience 
and regulation from which children learn how to be with screens. 
Conclusion 
Television as it relates to children’s development has remained a vehemently 
debated field of research for over fifty years. Yet any impact it may have on 
children up to the age of three remains under researched. Furthermore, the little 
research that has been done tends to take findings in relation to older children and 
unproblematically apply them to infants and toddlers, hence it is often based 
around issues of content. Relying on content as the dominant mode of analysis, 
however, does not account for the primacy of perception, the ways in which 
television interacts with the rhythms and practices of everyday life, effectively 
reconfiguring time and space. Nor does it take adequate account of the complex, 
but primary relation between carer, baby and television which evolves and 
oscillates between attention and distraction—between embodied, hermeneutic and 
background relations.   
Founded on the recognition that perception is the basis of meaning and conduct 
within the world Ihde’s post-phenomenology offers us a way of considering how 
infants and toddlers make meaning of their lifeworlds in relation to television. 
Children, as well as adults, come to know environments, including where they 
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stand within and in relation to them, through repeated perception. That is, through 
repeatedly acting and being acted upon within the world in ways which become 
habits of being. Any potential effect which television may have on children’s 
development must incorporate a more comprehensive understanding of the 
ontological and perceptual significance of television in the everyday lives of very 
young children. For this reason, to enable a more full bodied analysis of the 
potential effects that television may have on very young children it is important to 
return to ‘the pre-objective order of the flesh’ which is flesh of the world, our 
relation to which is expressed it through the postures, gestures and orientation of 
living bodies (McCleary 1964, xxi-xxii).  
Referring again to Winnicott’s notion of transitional objects, in this chapter I have 
argued along with Silverstone (Silverstone 1994) and others that television may 
be considered such an object,  since it functions in many of the same ways as, say 
a teddy bear or a blanket, by intervening into the space of non-coincidence 
between carer and child, facilitating infants’ developing understanding of 
themselves as discrete beings and fleshing out their world. Television, however, 
despite functioning in many ways like a transitional object, is also distinct from 
traditionally used and cited transitional objects. For instance, children would 
normally assume rights of ownership over transitional objects, but their rights of 
ownership over television is regulated and often contested. The ownership is 
shared with other members of the household.  As a conduit for video tapes and 
DVD’s, however, even very young children can assume ‘my-time’ and ‘my-
content’ within the negotiated viewing time and space of shared ownership. The 
criterion of ‘liveness’ is crucial to television’s function as a transitional object and 
while it does not necessarily afford warmth or a texture that we would normally 
associate with such objects, it nonetheless occupies a ‘marginal status as a living 
thing’ (Turkle 1984, 38). Television’s sort-of-alive status offers a reliably 
reappearing constancy in an otherwise changing and uncertain world. Unlike 
many transitional objects, television does not lose its capacity to ease transition 
and remains with us, existing as a background of existential continuity, or 
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ontological security, resurfacing with varying degrees of affect throughout our 
lives as a persistent transitional object. Television also acts as a holding space or 
facilitating microenvironment, a comparatively safe space for children to 
experience their world, but also as a container of content.  
In this chapter too, I have again used the concept of affordances, to suggest that 
we cannot attribute adult or older children’s experiences of television to infants 
and toddlers who have not yet learnt the appropriate habits of interacting with 
television: what television affords older children and adults, is not necessarily 
what it affords floor dwellers, crawlers and toddlers, who may just as readily 
experience it as moving wallpaper, something into which to squash a peanut 
butter sandwich as they do a container for their favourite DVD, or something 
which calls and holds carers’ attention and proximity to the screen. Hence, as 
Marsh suggests any potential impact that television may have on very young 
children’s development is ‘contingent and context-specific dependent upon the 
particular field they [are] located in at any one time’(Marsh 2005, 22). 
By way of a phenomenological history of television, I suggested that content is 
imbricated in the context of viewing which includes hierarchies of viewing, the 
status afforded to screens and the ways in which time and space are reconfigured 
around the television, and consequently the ways that television enters into the 
rhythms and patterns of everyday life. By revisiting Lefebvre’s (1991) 
theorizations around space as produced by, and producing activity within in it, we 
went on to consider in more detail the ways in which domestic space has been 
reshaped to accommodate television and how this has changed over time, creating 
and recreating television spaces. The ways in which space is produced and 
ordered hierarchically around the TV set was discussed as a means of illustrating 
how television may mediate how and where very young children may be in the 
domestic environment. At this point, televisual content’s importance became 
apparent, not in that the content may help or harm infants and toddlers but how it 
effects parental perceptions and management of TV-watching and very young 
children’s bodies. 
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Subsequently I offered a perspective on the phenomenological implications of 
living in a screened world, as television is a precursor for later screens which will 
be discussed in the next chapter. Introna and Ilharco (Introna and Ilharco 2006) 
propose that screens attract and hold our attention, creating an expectation of 
relevance. I argued, however, that while TV may, in some instances, function in 
this way, there are variables not taken into account in Introna and Ilharco’s 
analysis, such as the variable spectrum of attention in relation to very young 
children, the context of viewing, the status afforded to screens, hierarchies of 
viewing, the content that is screening, and very young children’s primary 
ontology which precludes focused attention, calling Introna and Ilharco’s 
formulation into doubt as it relates to infants and toddlers. Despite television’s 
potential to attract and hold attention which may have implications for carer-child 
relations, Introna and Ilharco do not take account of the fluidity of our relations 
with television which oscillate rapidly between embodied, hermeneutic and 
background, and between attention and distraction. Within these relations, TV 
content is a confounding variable which can change the dynamic around the 
television set, while sound also has the potential to illicit orientation responses. 
Nevertheless, repeated orientation, whether that comes from sights, sounds, or 
following other people’s turning towards screens may form the basis of body 
habits which incline very young children towards the TV. Ultimately this chapter 
has argued that, like all material objects television mediates very young children’s 
experience in and of the world but it does so in complex ways which are 
particular and specific to the medium itself. Yet, television like other mediating 
technologies, exist along a spectrum of affordance relations.  
Many infants and toddlers are now growing up in an environment where the 
television is almost always on and while very young children may attend to the 
content sporadically, adults and others in children’s socio-equipmental 
environments do. Television enters into the spatio-temporal arrangements in the 
home, shaping patterns of engagement with the television and the others in the 
environment, informing children’s emerging understandings of ways to be-in-the-
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world. As such, we can no longer regard television as purveyors of content which 
very young children do not yet understand on a cognitive level, but rather as 
material objects which exist along a spectrum of mediating technologies, all of 
which enter into very young children’s experiencing, functioning as a transitional 
object and a facilitating microenvironment. Television informs very young 
children’s turning to screens as a fundamental mode of being, a theme which will 
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Today—20 years after the birth of the World Wide Web, 13 years after the 
launch of Google Search, eight years after the start of the first social 
networking site, six years after the first YouTube video, four years after the 
introduction of the first touch-screen smartphone, three years after the 
opening of the first ‘app’ store, and a little over a year after the first iPad 
sale – the media world that children are growing up in is changing at 
lightning speed. Nine-month-olds spend nearly an hour a day watching 
television or DVDs, 5-year-olds are begging to play with their parents’ 
iPhones, and 7-year-olds are sitting down in front of a computer several 
times a week to play games, do homework, or check out how their avatars 
are doing in their favorite virtual worlds. Television is still as popular as 
ever, but reading may be beginning to trend downward (Rideout 2011, 7) 
As the foregoing quote confirms, there can scarcely be any doubt that the socio-
equipmental environments in which infants and toddlers are raised have 
significantly changed from those of even a decade ago. Over the last ten or so 
years, not only have the number of television sets increased to a point where it is a 
rarity to only have one set per household, this acceleration has also seen a rapid 
increase in the number of homes for which a personal computer is a vital 
inclusion. As long ago as 2004, when Gerard Goggin edited Virtual Nation: The 
Internet in Australia (2004) computer screens had already become ‘a part of the 
everyday lives of many’(Goggin 2004) and were rapidly becoming part of the 
context of infancy and toddlerhood. The increasing affordability, miniaturization, 
mobility, networkability and consequent proliferation of screen based media 
devices such as mobile phones, iPods, Blackberries, personal DVD players, 
PVRs, tablets and hand held games has interesting and important implications for 
very young children’s being.  
This chapter explores the ways in which infants’ and toddlers’ experiences of the 
world are at least partially shaped and textured by the incorporation of interactive 
and mobile screens as ubiquitous aspects of their lifeworlds in the early twenty 
first century. Initially I will discuss the terms ‘televisual technologies’, ‘virtual  
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space’ and ‘new media’; the latter often used interchangeably with digital and/or 
interactive media, both mobile and not. In doing so I will explore definitions of 
new media, which have been modified over time to reflect the changing 
characteristics of the types of media devices to which I will refer and signalling 
how these changes intersect with very young children’s experiences within their 
socio-equipmental environment. From there I will explore how telephonic 
technologies have transformed from their fixed line auditory communication 
beginnings to the visual, haptic, auditory, mobile media technologies that have 
acquired the status of ‘snug and intimate technosocial tethering’ devices (Ito 
2005, 1). In doing so I will extend Ito’s 2005 characterisation of phones as 
‘personal device[s] supporting communications that are a constant, lightweight, 
and mundane presence in everyday life’ (Ito 2005, 1) to include their capacity to 
carry media content and how this plays out in the lives of very young children. 
This will lead us to consider how the prominence and affordances of new media 
situate ever younger children as users and create multiple and diverse media 
spaces which infants and toddlers come to inhabit.  
Ultimately I will offer a descriptive analysis of my observations of very young 
children’s engagement with mobile and digital technologies, to illustrate that 
media effects are not universal or straightforward, but rather are complex and 
diverse. The analysis will take account of materiality (including texture), 
transitional objects, affordances and containment within facilitating 
microenvironments. This will be done to suggest that ‘new media’ represents 
another layer of mediation which is different to other material objects but which 
exists along a continuum of mediating technologies. This spectrum extends to 
encompass the socio-equipmental environments which very young children 
inhabit in its entirety. In doing so I will suggest that these media shape very 
young children’s experience in ways that are specific to the types of objects they 
are, including their capacity to invoke virtual space and enable telepresence, two 
concepts which will be examined in the upcoming section.  
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Virtual Space, Telepresence and New Media. 
Prior to moving on to discuss interactive mobile media in depth, it is worthwhile 
devoting a few words of clarification to the terms ‘virtual space’ and ‘televisual 
media’ since television, telephones and interactive digital media are all implicated 
in the terms. While we cannot know if or how very young children experience 
virtuality and telepresence, it is important to understand how these effects are 
experienced by carers and others within infants’ and toddlers’ socio-equipmental 
environments to illustrate how time, space and attention are apportioned, and the 
consequences of the incorporation of telepresencing technologies into the 
everyday lives of very young children. 
The prefix ‘tele’, which comes from the Greek ‘telos’,  refers to distance, or 
operating at a distance, particularly in relation to transmission over geographic 
space. Television, thus, literally means ‘seeing at a distance’ and implicates a 
range of media, which enable or enhance our capacity to see at a distance. As 
such television is revealed as not only a medium but also a way of seeing. 
Television—as a way of seeing—creates a capacity to view distant times and 
places, but it confounds our sense of place as geographically rooted in the 
physical space which our bodies inhabit. Yet, in doing so, it fosters an ‘as if’ 
perceptual horizon: as if we were there in that place. The ‘as if’ or ‘in between’ 
space is a virtual space which is often associated with video and computer games 
but is just as appropriate when speaking about other televisual technologies. 
Television, as a way of seeing, emerges out of virtual space, or the space in 
between the screen and the viewer.  
Virtual, or ‘as-if’ space may just as readily be considered as the space of non-
coincidence—écart—in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, and potential space in 
Winnicott’s psychoanalysis. Merleau-Ponty suggests that virtual space is defined 
by a person looking to where another person is pointing, enabling both to see the 
object or event being shown, at the same time but from slightly different 
perspectives (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 116). This sets up a chiasmic intertwining 
with other people and the world by establishing a space of virtual coincidence, 
hence a relation of intersubjectivity, and shared perception is enabled. Virtual 
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space accordingly presumes that we inhabit space which extends beyond our 
bodies and that it is ‘a centrifugal and cultural space’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 7). 
That is, it is a space that is constituted by, and constitutes shared understandings 
of the world which derive from the object or event and are distributed to those 
viewing it. This is particularly notable in relation to TV, where each member of 
the audience has access to what is screening, or shared perception, but it does not 
obviate each person’s particular perspective or point of view. Virtual space, 
therefore, acts in concert with our embodied situatedness within the world 
enabling us to perceive what others perceive, and reinforcing very young 
children’s understandings of both connectedness and separateness. Televisual 
technologies are therefore excellent examples of technologies which create virtual 
spatial environments. 
Virtual space which emerges from our engagement with televisual technologies is 
thus superimposed upon physical, geographical space, such as the lounge room 
for example. It is also a space which is produced by human activity in relation to 
the screen which sets up a ‘system of correspondence’ between our own spatial 
situation and that of others (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 7), enabling us to be virtually 
with human and non-human others from places and points of view that our body 
is not, and often cannot be (Weber 1996, 116).  
‘Virtual space’ and ‘telepresence’ are generic terms which may be applied to a 
wide range of technologies and phenomena that create an illusion of presence-at-
a-distance. Televisual media may, therefore, be anything from television and the 
adjunct technologies of DVD players and game consoles, to web cameras and 
their concomitant internet and computer screens, through to smart phones and 
tablets. Televisual technologies and more specifically interactive televisual 
technologies, in combination with human activity, therefore produce virtual 
spaces: potential spaces in which to act and interact (Morse 1998, 17). Virtual 
space, and telepresence however, do not only emerge from televisual 
technologies, but also from telephonic devices with which we interact.  
As Margaret Morse, in her seminal work Virtualities suggests, ‘interactivity is a 
kind of “suture” between ourselves and our machines’ (Morse 1998, 16). In using 
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the term ‘interactivity’ Morse refers specifically to our capacity to engage with 
the medium to facilitate an outcome which is often communication based. For 
example interactivity as it relates to a telephone involves an engagement with the 
technology to facilitate a virtual engagement with distant others. As Morse points 
out, in relation to telephones, virtual space is the ‘no place in which…two [or 
more] people…meet’ (Morse 1998, 17). It is a space which opens between 
interlocutors, which creates a correspondence or intersubjectivity, allowing us to 
‘meet’ and become involved with distant and near others and places 
simultaneously. For Zhao and Elesh (2008), co-location is ‘a spatial relationship’ 
while co-presence is a social relationship which ‘renders people mutually 
accessible for contact’ (565). Interactivity as it is referred to here, thus allows us 
to be copresent with others in virtual space who are not necessarily co-located 
(telepresent) affording a capacity to act and interact in places in which our bodies 
are not.   
Our experience of ‘virtual space’ and ‘telepresence,’ are had by way of metaphors 
of embodiment (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) which are grounded in our experiences 
of being-in-the-world as forward facing bipeds with opposable thumbs, who have 
a capacity for locomotion, reach and communication. For example, we experience 
telepresence in virtual space in terms of up, down, forward, backward and left to 
right, just as we do in physical space. ‘Telepresence’ and ‘virtual space’ are 
emblematic of our embodied experiences of action, movement, interaction and 
inhabitation in physical space, as mature embodied human beings. The 
incorporation of sound, vibration and an accelerometer to mimic our embodied 
experiences of physics (gravity, movement and direction) in smart phones and 
tablets further our feeling of immersion in virtual space and our experience of 
telepresence. In doing so, they compensate for the haptic aspects of our embodied 
experiences in physical space which would not otherwise be available in virtual 
space.  
It is important to recognize that physical space and virtual space are no more 
mutually exclusive than are co-presence and telepresence. Rather, both virtuality 
and ‘reality’ are perceptual experiences which are enabled by embodiment as are 
co-presence and telepresence. To experience anything, including virtuality, is 
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predicated on being a body, and we cannot separate perception out from our 
embodiment which is necessarily and inescapably embodied-being-in-the-world, 
along with all the sensory perceptions that implies. Although virtuality and 
‘reality’ are discursively constructed in opposition to each other, once we have 
come to inhabit the technologies which facilitate telepresence, they are 
experienced concurrently with our attention oscillating rapidly between tele-
presence and co-presence. This is particularly notable in the case of networked 
and location aware devices configuring hybrid experiences of presence and tele-
presence through ‘net locality’ (Gordon and de Souza e Silva 2011). As Gordon 
and de Souza e Silva elaborate: 
Net locality implies a ubiquity of networked information—a cultural 
approach to the web of information as intimately aligned with the perceptual 
realities of everyday life. We don’t enter the web anymore; it is all around us 
(Gordon and de Souza e Silva 2011, 2) 
Twenty first century mature humans who have learnt habits of oscillating 
attention, colocation and co-presence, allowing for alternation between modes of 
presence, in some instance prefer telepresence over presence in the actuality of 
‘RL’ (real life) (Turkle 2011, xi). We cannot know if very young children 
experience virtuality and telepresence, or if they experience it in the same way as 
adults do, yet the ‘presencing’ effect enabled through tele-technologies has 
implications for very young children in terms of carer attention. As adults, having 
learned habits of being-with tele-technologies, our attention oscillates rapidly 
between screens and other activities, sometimes calling and holding our attention, 
and becoming the focus of our concern, and other times acting as moving 
wallpaper or background noise. Now, with several networked teletechnologies 
devices in many homes, calls for attention come from an abundance of sources 
with varying degrees of urgency implicating the speed and constancy of shifting 
modes of presence and attention. This effect is further amplified in the case of 
mobile devices which are taken with us wherever we go as ‘intimate’ aspects of 
our embodiment (Merleau-Ponty 1968).  
The foregoing, while having discussed virtual space and telepresence, has not yet 
considered what we mean by the term, ‘new media’, nor the characteristics of 
devices which enable virtual co-presence. Therefore, I will now briefly consider 
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what we mean by the term and its connection to virtuality and telepresence.  In 
using the term ‘new media’ we may too readily equate it with any media which is 
novel (Flew 2008, 1) but as Lev Manovich points out, and as experience tells us, 
new (taken as novel) media are not new for long (Manovich 2001). Nonetheless, 
the characteristics of computer and media convergence, networkability, mobility 
and interactivity are particularly significant to our understanding of the type of 
object that new media is, by comparison to older media such as television.    
At this point it is worth considering the concept of convergence by way of 
clarification of the term ‘new media’. Lev Manovich (2001) suggests that the 
merging of computers and media technologies lay at the heart of any attempt to 
define ‘new media’ (20). Much has happened since 2004 when the mobile phone 
screen was lauded as the ‘third screen’ ‘[n]ext to television sets and computers 
monitors’ (Ives 2006). Gerard Goggin (2006) notes that: 
The coming together of photography and telephony in the form of the 
camera phone is only one part of the merging of formerly distinct 
communications platforms, technologies, audiences, and cultures in which 
cell phones and mobile technologies are being fervidly embraced, if not 
fetishised. (Goggin 2006, 162) 
The above quote, taken from the chapter Mobile internet and television, speaks to 
the notion of ‘mobile convergences’, or the transformations which have taken 
mobile phones from solely telephonic devices, to tools which are capable of a 
number of functions including accessing the internet and watching television.  
Perhaps the operative word in the foregoing quote is ‘segment’ as it speaks to a 
particular market niche, and thereby calls into question the notion that 
smartphones will, or have become, the primary, or only, screen. As Goggin 
rightly notes while the term ‘convergence’ may have been useful in the 1990s, its 
validity has since been called into question due to the inherent divergent use of 
convergent media. As Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford and Joshua Green (2013) argue, 
there are multiple conflicting and complementary media systems ‘whose 
intersections provide the infrastructure for contemporary communication’ 
(Jenkins, Ford, and Green 2013, 39). Even as long ago as 2001 Jenkins argued 
that convergence is not an ‘end state’ but rather a period of flux which will lead 
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us to both homogeneity and diversity, through divergent and convergent uses of 
burgeoning and multiple technologies which we will use in relation to one another 
(Jenkins 2001, 93).  Hence Jenkins suggests that media convergence ‘represents a 
cultural shift as consumers are encouraged to seek out new information and make 
new connections among dispersed media content’ (2006, 3) rather than a 
technologically enabled functional amalgamation of media in one device (3).  
The term ‘new media’ has been in use for nearly twenty years, when it referred to 
‘the Internet’ (Sikes 1997, xiii) or even computers, which by then had become 
routine despite being less than a generation old (Fidler 1997, 2-3). Manovich’s 
The Language of New Media, is limited by the historical context in which it was 
written; where ‘conditions of the production and distribution of knowledge were 
rather different than they are today’ (Galloway 2011, 377). For this reason, 
despite Manovich’s comprehensive treatment of ‘new media’ he does not account 
for the developments in media technologies which have occurred since, where 
computers, media and communication are all afforded in multiple, diverse, 
individual devices. Increased mobile phone speeds, web-capable and location 
aware devices, and the development of the internet have undoubtedly led to the 
‘convergence between communications and computing’ as it was initially 
proposed by Manovich (West and Mace 2010, 275; Manovich 2001). As Joel 
West and Michael Mace tell us: 
Based on the evolution of the communications and computing industry, a 
vision of mobile convergence devices emerged in the 1990s that provided 
voice and data communications in a mobile computing-enabled device. 
These devices arose from the confluence of mobile phone and personal 
digital assistant (PDA) design paths, and today the category is normally 
referred to as the ‘smartphone’ segment of the mobile phone market (West 
and Mace 2010, 275) 
Nicholas Gane and David Beer (2008) adopt as their preferred definition of new 
media one which was forwarded by Tony Feldman (Feldman 1997) in relation to 
digital media more generally (Gane and Beer 2008). Of particular significance 
Gane and Beer note that the manipulability of digital media, ‘at the point of 
delivery [as well as production] means something quite extraordinary: users of the 
media can shape their own experience of it’ (4) enabling user-generation and 
customizability of media content. Networkability is another key aspect of ‘new 
239 | P a g e  
Infants, Toddlers and Interactive, Screen-based Digital Technologies 
media’ which further enables telepresence but also content sharing in through 
means which have only relatively recently become available. The incorporation of 
Web 2.0 service provision, which enables uploading and sharing of content, into 
mobile phones and tablets, allows users to produce and share as well as consume 
online content informing our understanding of the term ‘new media’. Viewed 
together, the characteristics of networkability and manipulability afforded by Web 
2.0, and its incorporation across a number of platforms, has empowered users to 
exercise greater control over content than ever before. This is particularly relevant 
in reference to very young children’s experiences as it means that personalized 
content can be created and consumed, which literally speaks directly to them and 
which can contain places, people and things with which the child is familiar. For 
example, photos and videos can be created stored and shared through a range of 
social media, but children can also interact in real time with significant others via 
Skype™ or Apple’s Facetime. Talking to Granny on Skype
™
 or Facetime, 
viewing, sharing and manipulating user generated content via applications such as 
Face Changer, Hair Style, Instagram, SnapChat, Facebook and YouTube, add a 
creative or productive element which distinguishes new media from their 
predecessors. 
The extent of the interaction and control afforded, particularly over the content 
contained, consumed and shared through new media devices make them distinct 
from television in significant ways, and have a potential to shaped very young 
children’s perception and ontology. For example, infants and toddlers, like adults, 
may now interact with distant others in real time. While this has been something 
that could be done on the telephone, today’s mobile media are also visual, web-
capable, location aware and ‘always on’, always handy.  
Morse states in relation to computers that screen-human relations are ‘bubbles or 
pockets of virtuality in the midst of the material world’ (Morse 1998, 7), and in 
doing so, speaks to our experiences of and with virtual spaces, as containers or 
facilitating microenvironments (Sofia 2000). It is here, however, where the 
datedness of Morse’s claim is most apparent as it cannot take account of the 
hybrid experience of presence, co-presence and telepresence, or the rapid 
oscillation between virtuality and co-location enabled by a plethora of newer 
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technologies, including those which are location aware (Gordon and de Souza e 
Silva 2011).  
Referring specifically to screen media, Morse notes that machines’ capacity to 
respond and feedback almost instantaneously, produces an impression of 
‘liveness’ (Morse 1998, 15). Hence such interactivity underlines the capacity of 
‘new media’ to fulfil the role of transitional objects. Complete with the 
impression of aliveness, familiarity and consolatory presence, new media flesh 
out the lives of infants and toddlers as they fill the space of écart, informing 
children’s perception and understandings of being-with-media,  just as they do for 
adults. By affording generation, manipulation and sharing of media content, these 
mediating technologies reconfigure children as producers and creators as well as 
consumers of media content through, for example, Xeon or YouTube. Hence, for 
the purposes of this chapter, I have taken new media to mean interactive, digital 
and often screen based media like mobile phones, video and computer games, 
tablets and other interactive technologies, many of which are not designed 
specifically for very young children but which have nonetheless entered into the 
socio-equipmental environments into which they are born.  
Morse’s (1998) description of interactivity as ‘a kind of “suture” between 
ourselves and our machines,’ which was referred to earlier, despite being rather 
dated, remains useful. Above all, such imagery resonates with the ways in which 
we incorporate a range of material objects into our being, particularly with 
repeated use (Merleau-Ponty 1962). Hence, it allows us to reframe interactivity as 
a chiasmic intertwining between users, and both media content and technologies 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968). The very term ‘usage’, however, becomes questionable in 
relation to very young children, as it implies a level of conscious intention which 
is not necessarily evident in their undifferentiated exploration and discovery of 
their socio-equipmental environment.  Nonetheless, the built in approximation 
inherent in touch screens, configures ever younger children as users, enabling 
possibilities of use which would be constrained in the use of a joy stick, keyboard 
or mouse, by their developing corporeality. In the upcoming section, therefore, I 
will explore how telephonic media have changed over time to ultimately 
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incorporate web-capability, media content and touch screens, situating ever 
younger children as users of new media. 
From Telephones to Peripatetic Media: Phenomenology of 
Telephone Use 
Despite the problematic use of the term ‘convergence’ the delineation between 
media technologies and functions cannot be as readily sustained as it may have 
been ten or even five years ago. After all, a television set is no longer merely a 
television, which receives broadcast content, but a monitor, which also receives 
cable and in some cases interactive television, can be used to play games, videos 
and DVDs, and also be used as a computer monitor, displaying home movies and 
slideshows of family or familiar things. Likewise, a telephone is no longer just a 
phone, but a mobile multimedia apparatus which incorporates a mobile phone 
with instant messaging options, a music player, computer screen, TV screen, 
access to the internet, a calculator, a camera, a video camera, a clock, a calendar 
and a games console.  
Telephony, by definition, is the technological enablement of our capacity to 
converse remotely in virtual space. As such, telephones set up an aural 
intertwining in virtual space. In the past, voice communication across distance 
facilitated by the telephone necessitated particular adjustments to our gestural 
comportment so that the receiver was held in one hand or the other and placed to 
an ear, from where the mouthpiece roughly coincided with the mouth enabling 
both speaking and listening. In doing so, we set up an embodied relationship with 
the telephone, insofar as the apparatus acted as an auditory and vocal extension of 
ourselves and positioning bodies in certain ways. Once habitualised, it becomes 
an aspect of our embodiment (Merleau-Ponty 1962).  
Prior to cordless and mobile phones, it was also necessary for us to situate 
ourselves in close proximity to the phone outlet. Doing so still allowed fairly 
flexible postures and orientations. For example, as a teenager, I would lie on my 
back on the floor with my feet against the wall while talking on the phone. Yet it 
constrained other possibilities, like moving around the room or the house, not to 
mention going outside or taking it further afield. The advent of cordless phones 
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afforded more flexible mobility, yet the necessity to use one hand to hold the 
phone to an ear still constrained our ability to engage in other activities.   
The first commercially available mobile phone was put into operation in Tokyo in 
1979  and this saw the beginning of a change to the ways that we experience 
telephony. In 2007 Australia had the highest incidence of mobile phone 
ownership in the Western world (Downie and Glazebrook 2007, 3). The 
Australian mobile device ownership and home usage report 2014 suggests that 
this high rate of ownership persists with ‘65% of Australian adults (those over 18 
years of age) owning’ a smart phone (Deepend 2014,10). The Australian 
Communication and Media Authority (ACMA) suggests further, that ‘at June 
2013, there were 31.09 million mobile services in operation in Australia’ 
(abs.com.au).  Within eight years of the inception of the mobile phone, over one 
million subscribers worldwide had taken up the option (Downie and Glazebrook 
2007). This has now increased to 6.9 billion subscriptions (Mobiforge 2014). 
Mobile phones, at least in some instances, have many of the advantages of 
cordless and hands free phones while affording additional mobility (as the name 
implies). In order to use it as a telephone it is still, in most cases, necessary to 
hold the device to our ear, however many now have a capacity for Bluetooth 
speakerphone which modifies those particular postural, gestural and orientational 
constraints.  
To suggest that the text messaging function of mobile phones revolutionized 
telecommunications is not an overstatement. Not only did it transform 
communication practices using truncated short messages but it transformed 
phones from solely auditory devices to audio visual ones. The incorporation of a 
screen into mobile phone design potentially attracts and holds our audiovisual 
attention more closely than previous phones had done. Relying on Ihde’s 
conception of human technology relations, Robert Rosenberg (2010) suggests that 
phone use employs a combination of embodied and background relations in what 
he calls field composition, which he elaborates as ‘a technology’s potential to 
reorganize the overall structure of one’s field of awareness as the technology is 
used’ (Rosenberg 2010, 66).   
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With the additional capacity to text message, take photos and play games built 
into even the most basic contemporary phones, Turkle suggests that we 
increasingly incline towards the phone and away from other elements of our 
lifeworld, as can be inferred from figure 6.1 (Turkle 2011). As such, she argues 
that it is common to encounter a group of people who are co-located, yet are 
primarily engaged with their mobile phones rather than the people physically 
within the group (Turkle 2011). Hence in figure 6.1 certainly there may be 
sporadic close attention to the phone screen but this is interspersed with 
conversations about what is on screen, screen sharing and moments when the 
screen ceases to be attended to at all. This calls into question Turkle’s claim that 
human-technology engagement effaces human-human engagement. For example, 
mobile phones may be passed around in a group to share the content on one 
device with co-present others. This ready oscillation of attention is typical of our 
experiences with mobile phones. Parents and friends likewise will often share 
photos or videos they have taken of themselves, their children or other significant 
others with their infants and toddlers, which creates a shared experience and 
encourages a level of intersubjectivity specifically enabled by the device. Hence, 
being able to video call, send and/or store photos has the potential to enhance or 
constrain being-with either at a distance or proximally near depending upon the 






Figure 6.1 Co-located Friends on Mobile Phones 
With the advent of mobile phones comes an increased expectation that we will be 
available to distant others whenever and wherever they are inclined to make 
contact, and while content is not the focus of this thesis, an ability to share photos, 
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jokes and videos, enhances the appeal of the telephone. As Turkle notes, the mid 
1990s marked ‘the development of a fully networked life’ (Turkle 2011, xii) and: 
As connections to the internet went mobile, we no longer “logged on” from 
a desktop, tethered by cables to an object called a “computer.” The network 
was with us, on us, all the time. So, we could be with each other all the time. 
(Turkle 2011, xii) 
The term ‘tethered’ in the foregoing quote deserves a few lines of clarification as 
it has a number of varied interpretations which are significant. Although the quote 
refers specifically to being tethered to a particular location by the need to be 
physically attached via cables to a ‘base station’ Turkle also uses it to discuss our 
ability to be ‘present’ to our children when we are not collocated (Turkle 2011, 
155).  
Tethering, to distant others through mobile phones can also be construed as a 
tethering to the device itself. Consequently, Turkle suggests that ‘we bend to the 
inanimate with new solicitude’ (Turkle 2011, xii). This literal and metaphorical 
bending or inclination towards mobile phones can readily be seen in the above 
photo and is a mode of chiasmic intertwining (Merleau-Ponty 1968).  The term 
‘tethered’ speaks to the concept of connectedness (Turkle 2011) and reinforces 
the notion that new technologies, like older ones, function in some respects like 
transitional objects, facilitating exploration and discovery while simultaneously 
introducing children to their socio-equipmental environment without completely 
severing ties with carers. As we have seen, the process of maturation is 
characterized by infants’ movement from a state in which they are unaware of 
themselves in their separateness, experiencing themselves and their world 
indiscriminately, to one of awareness and ability to act in, and manipulate their 
environment with some degree of intentionality and independence (Lally 2002, 29 
emphasis added). As Ito points out, our relations with mobile technologies, or 
‘keitai, [which] roughly translate[s] to “something you carry with you”’ in many 
ways constitute ‘a snug and intimate technosocial tethering’ (Ito 2005) which is a 
quality of transitional objects. 
Mobile phones are also often given to young children as a distraction, or to ease 
the anxiety, stress or boredom of a particular situation, or facilitate separation as 
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are other transitional objects. Often an old phone which is relegated to the child, 
but if it works at all it can become a precious plaything, made all the more so 
because it is a ‘grown-up’ quasi-toy. In this respect too, mobile phones take on 
some of the characteristics of transitional objects. That is, they may be 
experienced by the child as a quasi-possession, albeit one that must be 
surrendered upon request; they can stand in for a carer, to enable discovery and 
fill the space between carer and child, but also due to their capacity to simulate 
aliveness through their audiovisual capacities. As such, for very young children, 
the experience of a mobile phone is not necessarily about communication, but 
rather as a transitional object which resembles Ito’s (2005) keitai  (1).  
If the phone is still connected it may only be given to the child under strict 
supervision. The ‘toy’ may become even more precious again because the owner 
will undoubtedly keep checking to make sure that the child has not indeed called 
someone accidentally or doing anything else potentially damaging to the phone, 
like throwing or chewing it. In this respect, a mobile phone may resemble a 
television, where regulated rights of ownership are conferred on the child, but the 
value of the technology may lead adults to ensure that children do not ‘hurt’ or 
‘kill’ the phone, furthering the impression of quasi-aliveness. The attention which 
is directed at the phone-child couplet may, in reference to past experiences of 
attention, be taken by the child as an extension of nurture, and simultaneously 
reinforcing that their engagement with the phone is the appropriate way to be-
with-phones. 
While we use the term audiovisual when we talk about media, research tends to 
focus, primarily, on the visual aspects of the media. The only exception to this in 
relation to children and the media, is when critics argue that the seemingly 
nonsensical sounds made by the characters in TV shows like Teletubbies and 
Boobah ‘corrupts language’ (1998). The ability of mobile phones, however, to 
play sounds adds another interesting and significant dimension to our 
understanding of very young children’s experiences of them. While mobile 
phones are by no means unique in this respect, their capacity to play an array of 
sounds from random single notes to songs and ringtones offer very young 
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children an aspect of play that was not present with fixed land line phones nor the 
majority of older cordless phones.  
Before moving away from telephones to discuss other forms of interactive digital 
media in more detail, it is worth considering the phone-as-toy to help flesh out our 
understanding of the ways in which phones enter into the rhythms and 
experiences of infants and toddlers socio-equipmental environment, informing 
their understanding of ways to be-with-phones.  Very young children are also 
often given toys shaped like telephones, to practice using a phone: learning habits 
of being that they will deploy when they get older. Toy telephones, however, have 
changed over time to reflect changes in actual telephones as can be seen below. 
Over time they have gone from rotary dial phones (as shown in figure 6.2) to 
mobile (figure 6.3). 
 
   
 
 






         Figure 6.3 Toy Mobile Phone 
Toy phones can be used safely—without any risk of an hour-long phone call to 
another country. This reinforces the notion that technologies or technological 
ensembles act as safe, facilitating, holding microenvironments and that they fill 
the potential space between caregivers and very young children, fleshing out their 
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lived experiences and filling the indeterminate space between the me and the not-
me. Many of these toy phones too, incorporate physical characteristics of faces or 
bodies, which coupled with the capacity to play sounds, gives them the 
appearance of having a life or reality of their own, rendering them ideal as 
transitional objects. 
Telephones, like televisions have a capacity to call and hold our attention, yet 
they may only do so sporadically. Hence it is not only screens but tele-
technologies generally which have potential to facilitate oscillations of visual, 
auditory and haptic attention and distraction. While Anderson and Evans (2001) 
argue that media may ‘distract’ young children from play scenarios, I argue that, 
for very young children, it is difficult to distinguish between play and distraction 
as both distraction and play are fundamental ways of being for them. In the 
upcoming sections, I will consider the implications of the dynamic of attention 
and distraction of new media in terms of their potential holding power, but also 
how they may distract parents’, carers’ and children’s attention, facilitating a 
spectrum of attentional possibilities implicating not only distraction, but also 
screen sharing and/or looking together. 
In the upcoming sections I will discuss the ways in which interactive digital 
media as an always-already present aspect of very young children’s existence in 
the early 21
st
 century may intervene into their development, potentially 
amplifying and reducing their experiences of the world. This will be done by 
describing scenarios in which various interactive touch-screen technologies are 
used with varying degrees of expertise by young children. Each scenario will 
draw together the themes of containment, facilitating microenvironments, 
affordances and embodiment, which have emerged throughout this thesis.  
Interactive Digital Technologies in the Lives on Infants and 
Toddlers 
Interactive digital technologies have become an increasingly significant aspect in 
the lives of infants’ and toddlers’ in the last couple of decades, yet Rideout (2011) 
suggests that ‘TV continues to dominate children’s media use’: 
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Time spent with new mobile media, while gaining lags far behind larger screen 
media among this age group. Children 0-8 spend a total of just five minutes a day 
using cell phones, iPods, iPads, or similar devices to play games, watch videos, or 









Figure 6.4 Baby and Laptop Computer (Van Camp 2011) 
Based on an online survey of 1,384 parents with children up to the age of eight 
years conducted in 2011, Rideout suggests that children under one year old do not 
play video games, watch television or videos on a computer, mobile phone or 
tablet (Rideout 2011). Yet 4% have used a computer, 3% have played console 
games and 10% have ‘used handheld game play, cell, iPod, iPad for games, apps 
or video’ at some time (Rideout 2011, 18).  
Figure 6.4 was initially sourced from a Google Image search and comes from a 
page entitled Digital Trends, a website authored by Jeffrey Van Camp (Van Camp 
2011). The site, formerly called Designtechnica Corporation offers consumer 
news, reviews and guides of electronic and digital devices. The picture was the 
representative image that accompanied a news story Study: Kids Learn How to 
use the Web Before they can tie their shoes (Van Camp 2011). The story reports 
on a study commissioned by internet security company AVG in 2010 which 
surveyed 2200 mothers with internet access (Van Camp 2011). The study 
suggests that by three years of age 57% of children are able to turn a computer on 
and off, 25% can make calls on a mobile phone, 58% know how to use a mouse, 
44% can play basic online games, 18% can open a web browser, 4% know at least 
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one email address, 9% know at least one web address and 17% ‘can operate at 





Figure 6.5  Baby with Mobile Phone  (Peabody 2013) 
A quick Google or YouTube search yielded thousands of photos of very young 
children engaging with digital and mobile technologies, suggesting that it is not as 
uncommon as Rideout et al., (2011) indicate.  As use is undoubtedly increasing, 
the effect of computer and mobile media on very young children becomes more 
significant yet remains under researched. As AVG suggest, even before birth, and 
certainly shortly afterwards, children born in the early twenty first century are 
already enmeshed in a world where interactive, digital technologies are a crucial 






Figure 6.6  Baby Chewing iPad (Powell 2012) 
When traced back to its source the image in figure 6.6 comes from a blog entry 
entitled Baby Tech: Cool Tools for Raising a Child in 2012 (Powell 2012). The 
blog, which is strangely authored by a real estate agent, outlines, as the name 
suggests, ‘cool tools for raising a child’. The blog initially goes into the services 
that Amazon.com offer for parents including Amazon Mom subscriptions which 
deliver savings on products and shipping from their baby store. Of more 
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relevance, however, the page also refers to the iPad and its contingent 
applications. The blog offers us interesting insights into the various ways in which 
such devices may intervene, both directly and indirectly, into the lived 
experiences of infants and toddlers. For instance, Powell writes that: 
The iPad is great for anyone, but it makes sense for new parents because of 
its ease to hold and use. A mom who is nursing or a dad who is rocking a 
baby to sleep can scroll with one hand. (Powell 2012) 
As discussed in Chapter 3, some of the intimacy of feeding and holding is 
established and maintained through eye contact. Powell’s suggestion adds a layer 
of mediation between carer and child where colocation and co-presence are not 
necessarily interdependent, but rather attention may potentially oscillate between 
physical and virtual worlds.  
Much of the research surrounding interactive digital media deals with older 
children and adults. Yet, the ways in which these same technologies mediate 
infants’ and toddlers’ experiences of the world is also significant. In what follows, 
I will describe three situations of interactive digital media use by very young 
children from my observations and interviews. These observations and the 
descriptions forwarded are consistent with the phenomenological method of 
‘thick’ description (Merleau-Ponty 1962) which facilitates our understanding of 
how mediating technologies enter into very young children’s experiences of 
everyday life. The scenarios also serve to support the sensory ethnographic 
methodology proposed by Pink (2007), which holds that:  
Ethnography is a process of creating and representing knowledge (about 
society, culture and individuals) that is based on ethnographers’ own 
experiences. It does not claim to produce an objective or truthful account of 
reality, but should aim to offer versions of ethnographers’ experiences of 
reality that are as loyal as possible to the context, negotiations and 
intersubjectivities through which the knowledge was produced. (Pink 2007, 
22 cited in Pink 2009, 8)  
In what follows, we will consider an example which illustrates some of the ways 
in which mobile phones enter into infants and toddlers ontological and perceptual 
experiences of through detailed description of the first of three situations. This 
will be followed by a more complex account of the ways in which media devices 
may be considered as container technologies (Sofia 2000) and the multiple levels 
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of containment in contemporary family car trips. Finally, a description of the 
ways in which tablets facilitate particular perceptions, and ways of being in 
relation to the technology will be offered.   
Scenario One—Infants, Toddlers and Mobile Phones—Jenny and 
Caleb 
A friend and I recently caught up for a coffee and a chat. Jenny brought her five 
month old baby boy, Caleb, with her and parked him in his stroller next to the 
table. When he got restless Jenny initially handed him a toy which kept him 
quietly amused for about five minutes before he became restless again. Jenny 
repeated the process several times and then gave Caleb her mobile phone to play 
with.  
Jenny’s phone is an Android, which is an operating system designed specifically 
for use with smart phones, tablets and other touch screen technologies.  Initially 
financed and now owned by Google, the open source code and license allows 
developers to change, make and distribute applications primarily through Google 
Play which can be accessed on Android enabled devices . As at 20
th
 October 2014 
Android had 1,373,342. October 2012 (appbrain.com), of which over one 
thousand fall under the category of ‘baby apps’ as can be seen on the screen shot 
in figure 6.7. A further search using ‘toddler apps’ (figure 6.8) as key words 
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Figure 6.9 Baby and Toddler Apps 
A number of the apps for babies and toddlers have locks to disable certain 
functions. For instance, Marco Nelissen’s Toddler Lock app locks the child out of 
‘making calls or starting other apps’ but also ‘optionally enables airplane mode 
while application is active’ (Nelissen 2013). Jenny has this capacity on her phone 
in an app, called Baby Touch! that was developed by Shigeo Matsu. Two versions 
of this app are available; one free, which does not have the lock function, and also 
allows pop up ads which can be tapped, and the other is AU$1.80 to buy. Baby 
Touch! is designed specifically for very young children and in the most basic 
modes it features large brightly coloured shapes which can be moved about the 
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screen, and which make sounds when they are touched or moved. In this basic 
mode, there are single or multiple shape modes, as shown in figure 6.10.  
There are several setting options which can be activated to change the types of 
sounds (laughter, comical and sci-fi options), the colour of the background (only 
black or white), the volume of the sound, in/activate vibration, as shown below, 








Figure 6.10 Screenshots of Baby Touch App Source: (Matsu) 
Jenny initiated this program with the locks in place and gave it to Caleb. She had 
set the sound to ‘laughter’, something that Caleb appeared to enjoy very much for 
a short period of time; laughing along with the sound of the child or children’s 
laughter that accompanied touching the shapes. Just as even very young children 
are ‘sensitive to facial expressions’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964 (b), 115) they are also 
sensitive to other sensory cues, such as crying, and laughing, as part of their 
primary intersubjectivity which is the precursor of intentional imitation.  
Nonetheless, with the screen locked Caleb became bored with the game after 
about half an hour and started to squirm. Eager to continue our conversation 
Jenny popped Caleb on her knee, opened the photo album on her phone and 
helped him scroll through the pictures. He giggled loudly and squealed when he 
saw photos of himself, Jenny, their dog, Grandma, and all of the other faces he 
recognized. Some he appeared to find particularly funny and pushed Jenny’s hand 
to position the phone so that I could see the picture too. When I smiled or 
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laughed, he squealed with excitement. The incorporation of capacities to store and 
share this type of user generated content reinforces the notion of the intimacy of 
mobile phones and their capacity to simulate liveness. In the case of Skype
™
 or 
Facetime, the touch screen and app act in concert to simulate liveness and 
immediacy, enabling interaction to occur quickly and relatively seamlessly, and 
acting in some ways like a transitional object, wherein the object appears to have 
a life of itself, acts as a consolatory presence which eases transitional phenomena, 
and enters into the space of écart to flesh out the child’s world.  
Mobile phones are increasingly an aspect of very young children’s socio-
equipmental environments, quasi-toys complete with apps designed specifically 
for infants and toddlers. They are familiar and relevant objects which simulate 
aspects of liveness through user-generated content like photos and videos as we 
can see with Caleb’s use of the phone. The capacities of the touch screen affords 
very young children with agency to interact with the technology as well as 
enabling screen sharing, which become part of their emerging habits of being-
with screens, and configuring ever younger children as users of a range of 
interactive digital technologies, which will be discussed in the upcoming section.  
Scenario Two—Containers in containers: The Family Car Trip. 
A mother, father and three children, aged seven months, three and six years, 
embark on a car trip which is several hours in duration. The car is equipped with 
standard master and slave DVD player and screens in the back of the front seats to 
keep the children amused on the trip. The master and slave DVD player is 
characterized by one central player which displays content onto both of the 
monitors simultaneously. Consequently, before they embark on their journey, 
each of the children is encouraged to choose a favourite DVD to take along. As 
we have already discussed, for very young children, DVDs can act as first not-me 
possessions, over which they may exercise regulated ownership. Certainly, 
ownership may be exercised over the DVD case which then functions as a hard 
transitional object as well as a facilitating microenvironment or holding space, 
which holds content and potentially also holds children’s attention and proximity 
to the screen.  
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Figure 6.11 Dorothy Rockin’ Christmas (ABC Shop Website 2013) 
The youngest child chooses ‘Dorothy’ The Dinosaur – Rockin’ Christmas’ in 
which, ‘Dorothy’ (of Wiggles fame) hosts a Christmas show with the other 
Wiggles characters including Captain Feathersword and Wags the Dog (2013).  
Themed around Christmas, Dorothy, who is a graduate of the Royal Academy of 
Dinosaur Dancing, sings and dances her way through the DVD with the other 
characters including a special guest performance by Santa Clause, who sings 
Jingle Bells (2013). This DVD is one of Joshua’s favourites and has been played 
repeatedly since Christmas, often to the annoyance of all the other members of the 
household, signalling his strong attachment to it and reinforcing its status as a 
transitional object. At home, Joshua carries the Dorothy DVD around with him, 
and can sit through the whole of this DVD in thrall. Since he’s been able to crawl 
and pull himself up on the furniture, he can often be found ‘face to face’ with the 
TV screen bouncing up and down, hitting the screen with his open hand or the 
DVD case and ‘singing’ along with Dorothy and her friends. 
Jamie chose a series of Dora the Explorer, an animated adventure series where 
Dora and her monkey friend, Boots, solve puzzles and overcome obstacles in each 
episode. The more complex content signals her level of development in 




Figure 6.12 Dora’s Ultimate Adventures DVD Collection (Allen, 2003) 
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Like Joshua, Jamie has watched this series many times and it is her first choice 
when going to stay the overnight with her grandparents, or while being babysat 
while Mum and Dad are out. As such, Jamie uses Dora in much the same way as 
she might use a teddy bear or blanket: as a portable object which eases transition 
and offers a consolatory presence which fills the widening space of écart. Jamie 
enjoys the faux interactivity of Dora the Explorer and yells and points at the 
various objects that Dora needs to find along her journeys. She has also picked up 






Figure 6.13 Ben 10 Alien Force (Lambert, 2008) 
Jacob chose Ben 10 Alien Force as his DVD. Being an avid fan, he also insists on 
wearing his Ben 10 t-shirt and his toy omnitrix—the watch-like device which the 
character Ben Tennyson uses to (often unreliably) change forms (2003-2005). The 
spin-off products of a t-shirt and toy omnitrix also signal the transmediatic Ben 10 
phenomenon.  Jacob also brought the Nintendo DS™ and some games that he got 
for Christmas along for the trip. The Ben 10 Alien Force/ DS™ ensemble offers a 
compelling example of multiple containment, which resonates with the multiple 
holding of a television set, and its content. The game cartridge is contained 
primarily in a case, before being inserted into the DS™ console. The screen 
contains Ben Tennyson and his allies and nemeses, along with a microworld that 
is a mixture of earthly and unearthly locations. Ben’s omnitrix contains a plethora 
of characters which can be deployed at will. Moreover the DS device is personal 
and interactive, which has the potential to hold Jacob’s attention. This holding is 
further compounded by Joshua being in a seatbelt in a car, layering the 
containment even more. As such, the DS™, and its contents act in concert, and 
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individually, as containment technologies and facilitating microenvironments. 
The portability and interactivity of the DS™, the Dorothy and Dora DVDs may 
also be said to give the appearance of liveness, as well affording very young 
children with transient rights of conditional ownership. Moreover, through their 
capacity to ease the boredom of waiting (Bissell 2007) and the tedium of 
transition, they flesh out the space of non-coincidence between children and their 
carers in much the same way as other transitional objects.  
As touched on briefly in the previous chapter, televisual spaces are often 
contested spaces, particularly in instances where one mediating technology needs 
to be shared amongst several people. Cathy, the mother, considered it prudent that 
Dorothy be played first since Joshua would fall asleep early into the trip. After a 
short distance Joshua began to resist his containment and express his boredom. 
With his car seat in the middle of the back seat, he was between two screens, and 
although the seat by virtue of its height and positioning afforded him a more 
expansive view of the road in front and the scenery surrounding the car, it 
restricted his view of the screens. He became unsettled and started to complain 
and squirm within the constraints of the seat, reaching out in an attempt to grab 
the DS™ from Jacob. The postural and gestural constraints of the car seat along 
with his own immature corporeality frustrated Joshua’s attempts to reach the 
DS™. Jamie became annoyed with Joshua’s complaining and began to protest to 
her parents that she could not hear Dorothy. Jacob, likewise, complained to Cathy 
about the noise and the incessant grabbing, which was interrupting his gameplay. 
Cathy, who was a passenger, suggested to Jacob that he should ‘just give it to 
him’, a suggestion which was met with ‘but it’s mine. I got it for Christmas. He 
doesn’t even know how to use it properly!’ To use the DS™ in the way it was 
intended to be used requires particular postural (generally hunched forward), 
orientational (forward facing) and gestural habits (button pushing in appropriate 
sequence) which Joshua’s maturing embodiment had not yet mastered: he was 
still learning.   
Jacob’s assertion reinforces the notion of the transitional object where rights of 
ownership are exercised over objects which act as intermediaries during times of 
change and waiting (Winnicott 1957, Bissell 2007). Yet, the statement is also a 
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significant illustration of the difference between Norman’s (1990) and Gibson’s 
(1982) notions of affordances. In Norman’s terms, the affordances (or intended 
use) of the DS™ is apparent to Jacob but not to Joshua, since Joshua had not yet 
learnt the body habits suitable for being-with-the-DS™, yet in Gibson’s terms the 
affordances are whatever the child is able to do with the object. Jacob’s more 
mature understanding of ‘correct’ use combined with the disputed rights to 
control what he considered ‘his’ led to the complaint. Despite Jacob’s complaint, 
we should remain mindful that while the DS™ affords him certain uses in line 
with the designers’ intention, it does nevertheless afford Joshua particular uses in 
relation to his developing corporeality. For Joshua, the DS™ affords banging on 
things, chewing, throwing, hitting other children, rubbing on his or other 
children’s head and hitting the controls. It’s throw-ability also potentially affords 
hitting the driver in the head or at least creating a distraction which reinforces the 
tenuousness of the safety of even multiple containment. None of the ‘-abilities’ 
are considered suitable by Jacob. As such, Jacob was able to exercise the rights of 
ownership typical of transitional objects, over the DS™ even though he was not 
able to do so in relation to the DVD player.  
Cathy tried to reason with Joshua that the DS™ belonged to Jacob and that he 
should continue to watch ‘his movie’.  She understood that if even if Jacob parted 
with the DS™, then he would not be happy to watch Dora or Dorothy and would 
insist on watching his own DVD as a trade-off. If that happened, then Jamie 
would be unhappy as she did not like Ben 10 at all. Cathy attempted to satisfy all 
three children by passing her tablet to Joshua. Before handing him the iPad, she 
initiated the ‘Music Studio’ app. The screen is configured as a keyboard and it can 
be set to produce the sounds of various instruments and rhythms. Even with very 
young children’s corporeality being undifferentiated, they can hit the screen with 
their open hand or a fist to produce something resembling music. As their 
corporeal schema develops and they learn the habits of play, they can use their 
fingertips to produce more readily discernible music.  Joshua played happily for a 
little while. Before too long, however, Jacob complained that Joshua did not know 
what he was doing, that he was not using it properly. This again signals that the 
affordances that the iPad-app-Joshua ensemble furnished were not considered 
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appropriate by the corporeally more mature Jacob who had learned the habits of 
playing most apps in accord with their intended uses. Jamie started to complain 
too, that Dora was boring and she wanted to use the Finger Paint app on the iPad 
to draw some pictures.  Then, Joshua decided to chew on the corner of the tablet 
which brought about another raft of disapproval from the older children and 
Cathy. Consequently Cathy took the iPad from him, admonishing him for 
chewing it and telling him that he could not do that—it was not a toy, despite the 
fact that he had been playing with it and had played with it on many occasions 
before. Cathy suggested that they play together on the iPad if that was what they 
all wanted to do, but this nonetheless brought about issues of hierarchical use: 
who should control it, who should hold it, who could choose the app and who 
could see it if someone else was holding it. At this point, Cathy decided that there 
was nothing to do but to let the children sort it out amongst themselves and 
console herself until the journey ended by playing classical music on the car 
stereo and trying to ignore them. 
Since at least 2004, DVD screens have become standard features in Australian 
luxury cars (Silkstone and Milovanivic 2004) and anecdotally many car 
enthusiasts have installed after-market DVD screens in both the front and back of 
their cars. PC World suggests that the reason people like to have a DVD player in 
the car is because: 
in-car kiddie wars become a thing of the past—especially if you've got the 
twin screen player so everyone in the back seat gets a good view. The kids 
are happy and you can concentrate on finishing that long holiday drive and 
arriving with all family members intact. (2008, 1) 
The implications of this quote are significant in terms of facilitating 
microenvironments, holding spaces and containment technologies, suggesting that 
not only will ‘in-car kiddie wars’ be eliminated, but also that the family will 
arrive safely as a consequence, echoing the notion of the role of the facilitating 
environment, or holding space: to provide a ‘safe space’ to protect  children from 
harm (Winnicott 1972). As we can see, however, holding is always also 
precarious, as safety relies on everything going to plan, yet as we have seen, 
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disputes over ownership, space, orientation, and use may render the family’s 
containment risky, potentially causing an accident.  
In the scenario above, we can identify multiple containment; not only of the 
children, but also of the parents. In the first instance, all of the members of the 
family are contained within the vehicle. The two youngest children are secured in 
a baby car seat and a booster seat respectively, and each member of the family is 
restrained, by their seatbelts. The driver’s attention is captivated, by the view of 
the road, rear view mirrors and windows of the vehicle, through which he or she 
is able to see to navigate, scan for, and (hopefully) avoid hazards, as well as the 
instruments on the dash from which he or she can ‘read off’ the speed, the time, 
the fuel supply, the temperature of the engine and so on in simultaneous 
embodied and hermeneutic relations. The passengers are variously intertwined 
with the DVD player, the iPad and the DS™ and potentially a satellite navigation 
device, or phone, magazine or book.  
Each layer of containment affords specific enablements, while constraining 
others. For example, the car enables vehicular transport. For the passengers, it 
enables flexible orientations which are also constrained by the mediation of 
seatbelts, seats and, for the driver, a need to attend. The seat belts delimit the 
orientational possibilities otherwise afforded by the car by sustaining the upper 
body in a forward facing and upright position. While gestural affordances are 
flexible in most of the positions in the car, the baby car seat slightly constrains 
Joshua’s gestures due to the wrap-aroundness that is the car seat. In addition to 
these readily recognizable containers, the DVD has the potential to occupy the 
children’s attention partially in relation to the content, but also partially, in the 
context of multiple containments which hold their bodies in particular postures for 
watching. The DS™ too may attract and hold Jacob’s attention by way of the 
screen, the interactivity and the app, and as we have seen, it may also attract the 
attention of his younger brother. The portability and interactivity of the DS™ 
renders it a more flexible holding than the seatbelt as it allows for the potential of 
adopting other postures, while constraining orientation and gestures. Multiple 
containment, such as that described above, illuminates the interdependence of 
physical and media holding. Each is implicated in the etymology of the word 
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‘hold’ which comes from the old English ‘to contain, grasp; retain; foster, 
cherish’ and the Gothic ‘to keep, tend, watch over’ (Dictionary.com). This 
resonates with the previous ascription of both media and physical holding in 
facilitating microenvironments.  
As well as creating multiple mobile micro media spaces, this example allows us 
to consider the capacity of mediating container technologies (Sofia 2000) to stand 
in for parents, holding children safely and protecting them from harm, at least in 
theory. As we have seen, while screens have a potential to attract and hold 
attention, their capacity to do so is context and content dependent.  
Scenario Three—Gemma, the iPad and the Jigsaw Puzzle 
When visiting a friend recently I watched her eleven month old playing with an iPad 
while we were talking.  Gemma, the toddler, had been ‘using’ Mum’s mobile phone and 
iPad since she was about six months old so she knew how to access her favourite apps 
without help. Furthermore, her corporeal maturity had developed sufficiently to enable 
her to point and press icons with her index finger to initiate various apps. She was 
playing with a Jigsaw app, which I have since downloaded onto my own iPad to 




Figure 6.14 iPad Jigsaw App positive reinforcement 
Like a physical, actual jigsaw, irregularly shaped virtual pieces are to be placed in the 
appropriate places to complete a picture. There is a picture on the screen to guide the 
placement of pieces, making it accessible to quite young children. It appeared that 
Gemma did not really know where the pieces fit but she touched them and slid them 
across the screen with her finger, dragging them around until they ‘dropped’ into place.  
As each piece fit into the puzzle it made a ‘clack’ sound. She repeated these actions and 
received the same reinforcing ‘clack’ sound until all of the puzzle pieces were in the 
appropriate place and a voice announced ‘horse’ and showed the word ‘Fantastic’ as can 
be seen in figure 6.14.   
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Watching Gemma play with the jigsaw app reminded me of an occasion when Kane was 
playing with a wooden jigsaw puzzle, and illustrated the difference between the 
experience of a traditional jigsaw puzzle and on a touchscreen puzzle. Gemma, a couple 
of months older than Kane, was able to readily complete one puzzle after another. Kane, 
on the other hand, had only one puzzle and did not complete it at all. The built in 
approximation afforded by the touch screen negates the need for precise fine motor 
function that is required with the wooden version. This facilitates an enhanced experience 
of control and achievement which is not contingent upon fine motor skills which come 
with maturing corporeality, situating Gemma as an expert user and informing her 
understanding of herself as a potent agent who may choose of a range of activities, and 
master them despite still mastering her own bodily movements.  
The ‘feel’ of the iPad screen and consequently the pieces, was consistent across all of the 
puzzles, and indeed all of the apps. Furthermore, an iPad affords a range of activities 
without the mediating instruments of pens or paintbrushes, so whether Gemma was doing 
a jigsaw puzzle, painting, colouring in, finding objects, tracing letters and numbers, or 
playing music, the texture of the experience was much the same: smooth, hard, relatively 
cool and contained in a rectangular frame. The wooden puzzle that Kane used was 
likewise contained within a rectangular frame. Within the frame, the shapes of the pieces 
were cut out which acts as a guide for the correct placement of pieces. The pieces had a 
peg on top allowing them to be picked up with a thumb and forefinger, further enabling 
placement within the base of the puzzle. Unlike the iPad, the physical constraints of 
manoeuvring wooden pieces into indents, requires a corporeal maturity which children do 
not attain until quite late in their toddlerhood. Hence a wooden jigsaw puzzle and a 
touchscreen puzzle yield fundamentally different ontological experiences at the level of 
materiality and manoeuvrability. With the wooden jigsaw puzzle, the shape of each 
individual piece can be explored with hands and mouth, enabling infants and toddlers to 
explore the difference between them, as can in figure 6.15, which is something that the 




Figure 6.15 Wooden Puzzle 
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Each piece of a wooden jigsaw can be thrown, banged against things, chewed, scraped, 
lost and damaged which the virtual pieces of the iPad cannot. In addition to the haptic 
and visual elements, including a picture of what the finished puzzle should look like on 
the iPad, the aural experience of doing a wooden and a virtual jigsaw puzzle are different. 
The iPad app makes a ‘clack’ sound which alerts the player when they have successfully 
placed a piece in the right spot, as well as receiving verbal verification of what the 
finished product represented. The wooden puzzle remains relatively silent and gives no 
affirmation of a job well done. Hence, while the iPad affords amplified control, in terms 
of discriminate action, it supplants a range of haptic, auditory and affective experiences 
that a wooden puzzle affords. The ‘abilities’ afforded by both touch screen enabled 
jigsaws and wooden jigsaws are a complex combination of haptic, auditory and visual 
magnifications and reductions. 
Touch screens generally, and tablets in particular, afford even very young children with 
increased possibilities of control and manoeuvrability, situating them increasingly as 
potent users of the technologies. Although sophisticated use of a tablet or other touch 
screen technology requires a fairly mature control over gestures, the built in 
approximation inherent in the screens allows even very young children to produce a 
response. This became even more evident recently when my five month old grandson 
(and his parents) came to stay with me. Although he had not been given a tablet to play 
with previously, I too started the Music Studio app and handed over the iPad. At first my 
grandson reached for the edges, and attempted to chew on them, but after I showed him 
how it could make noise, he hit it with the flat of his hand and giggled, something he 
repeated several times, then he rested his palm on the screen and scratched it, producing 
different effects. I had, however, not engaged aeroplane mode (a facility which blocks 
capacity to connect to the internet) so, not surprisingly, I had to grab it back from him 
hastily as he connected to the ‘in app’ purchasing option.   
The very mobility of mobile media technologies has transformed practically all spaces 
into tele-spaces where we may increasingly interact with distant others, potentially at the 
expense of those who are proximally close. Yet increased mobility is not a characteristic 
that is unique to phones. Hand held video games, for example, date back as far as the late 
seventies with Mattel’s LED-based Handheld’s release in 1977-78 (Melanson 2006). This 
enabled children to take their gaming spaces with them, virtually wherever they went, as 
was elaborated in the earlier scenario. The trend became such that many schools actively 
banned such games. Particularly on long trips in the car however, such toys were 
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considered by many parents as somewhat of a boon. These devices made it possible for 
children to be occupied for protracted periods of time, alleviating the incessant ‘are we 
there yet’ chant or squabbles that inevitably ensue on long trips, or in times of boredom 
generally.  
I would suggest that the most important implication which can be taken from this is that 
televisual media create facilitating microenvironments. That is, they create a safe place, 
which will hold children and prevent any harm coming to them, although that safety is 
precarious. Televisual media, moreover, fill the space of non-coincidence between 
caregiver and child, and by doing so act in that space as a transitional object, which eases 
infants’ dis-integration from their primary caregivers, while simultaneously integrating 
them with their wider cultural milieu. That screens can seem to have a life of their own, 
adds weight to the comforting, and exploratory potential of this particular type of media 
to act in some of the same ways as transitional objects. Infants and toddlers also form 
carnate, affective attachments to these media which help them cope with the increasing 
dis-integration from one or more significant human others while enabling an integration 
with other significant human and non-human others.  
That specific technologies afford some uses and not others is particularly noticeable in 
relation to small children, whose developing corporeality means there is a world of 
difference between using a mouse, a keyboard or a touch screen as each offer 
significantly altered experiences and capacities for action. As such, touch screens offer 
infants and toddlers opportunities for interaction which their developing corporeality may 
preclude in relation to keyboards or a mouse and while AVG suggest that many children 
can ‘point and click’ by three years of age, touch screens allow the channeling of body 
habits towards more sophisticated use as their motor skills develop as can be seen in the 
case of Caleb’s use of the mobile phone and Gemma’s tablet jigsaw game. As we have 
also seen, however, what a technology affords very young children may not coincide with 
the intended use, as is evident in Joshua and Jacob’s dispute over the use of a tablet.   
The foregoing scenarios illustrate how interactive screen-based digital technologies, as 
part of very young children’s socio-equipmental environments, enter into their 
experiencing in a number of ways. The particular characteristics of touch screens 
configure ever younger children as users of media, as is evident by the volume of apps 
being designed specifically for infants and toddlers. The family car trip and the mobile 
phone scenario, additionally offer us opportunities to understand that interactive screen-
based digital media also operate as transitional objects and facilitating 
265 | P a g e  
Infants, Toddlers and Interactive, Screen-based Digital Technologies 
microenvironments, fulfilling the function of a consolatory presence and a holding space 
enabled by the technologies. 
Conclusion 
Infants and toddlers are increasingly growing up in environments where user-
generated content such as home movies and photo slide shows, as well as 
television on demand, internet TV and YouTube are common televisual 
experiences. With the capacity to customize content, record, play, fast forward, 
rewind, pause and replace (record over) the television shows and movies 
problematizes our traditional understanding of televisual media as solely, or even 
predominantly, broadcast media, meaning that children have access to user 
generated content which is both familiar and relevant, pre-empting future being-
with-screens.  
Evidence of using tablets and mobile phones in particular, as not necessarily 
babysitters, but certainly transitional objects standing in for parental care, can be 
seen readily and in a number of different situations. What Rideout et.al., and 
AVG’s figures do indicate with a degree of certainty, however, is that media, 
including new media, are becoming an increasingly pervasive facet in the lives on 
infants and toddlers, fleshing out, texturing and digitising the gradually widening 
space of non-coincidence between carers and children, and facilitating very young 
children’s growing understanding of the world and themselves as discrete, yet 
‘tethered’ entities within it.  
With the proliferation and potential holding power of new media amplifying and 
magnifying fragmented colocation and co-presence, mediating how we ‘attend’ in 
the early twenty first century. Infant and toddlers experiences in the world are 
thus mediated, informing very young children habits of being-with-screens which 
fill the gradually spreading space of écart, how they can come to grips with the 
world, and ultimately how they understand their place with-in it. Acting as quasi 
facilitating microenvironments and transitional objects, or consolatory objects 
which ease the transition from total dependence to relative independence, new 
media act in many of the same ways as toys, dummies and television, but with 
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particularities which also make them distinct. It may be said therefore, that new 
media are situated at one end of a continuum which encompasses all mediating 
technologies from clothing and feeding technologies to mobile phones and tablets 
and potentially beyond as children gradually learn habits of being-with interactive 
digital media. 
This chapter has acknowledged that while the primary televisual medium with 
which very young children are engaged in Australia is still television, interactive 
digital technologies, particularly those with touch screens, are an increasingly 
ubiquitous and important part of very young children’s socio-equipmental 
environments. Prior to discussing particular instances in which very young 
children engaged with touch screen technologies, I explored the implications of 
virtual space, televisual technologies and new media to provide the broader 
contexts of use. I then traced the evolution of the telephone from its fixed line 
beginnings to its status as a mobile media device. In doing so, I suggested that the 
physical characteristics of telephonic media have reconfigured adult experiences 
of presence, communication and space.  
Very young children do not initially experience ‘new media’s’ capacity as 
information and communication technologies in the same way as adults, but 
rather as merely an aspect of the world as it always already has been for them. 
That is, very young children experience new media as just another part of their 
socio-equipmental environment; sometimes a plaything, sometimes the focus of 
attention, sometimes a box that just sits, sometimes a transitional object and 

















How You Connect ‘em  





























  267 | P a g e  
How You Connect ‘em Will Affect ‘em 
How You Connect ‘em will Affect ‘em 
If we accept that changes in communications are embedded in larger shifts 
around technology, social structure and culture then there can be little doubt 
that there are implications for young children (Carrington 2005, 13). 
Infants and toddlers growing up in Western societies in the early twenty first 
century, more than ever live in technological cocoons. Media products and texts, 
in the since the late twentieth century which are designed specifically for very 
young children have burgeoned. This has led some commentators to suggest that 
very young children’s immersion in a world of interactive and electronic media is 
a potentially revolutionary phenomenon (Rideout, Vandewater, and Wartella 
2003). Yet, while there can scarcely be any doubt that media have become an 
important and pervasive part of the lives of very young children and families 
generally, there remains little research into how this plays out in the lives of 
infants and toddlers. Moreover, much of the small amount of research which 
seeks to understand the potential impact media may have on infants’ and toddlers’ 
development either takes conclusions from research done on older children and 
applies them to infants and toddlers, or uses the same methodological approaches 
used to investigate older children and attempts to explain very young children’s 
relation to media relations in the same terms. Such research tends to focus on 
various aspects of the content of media.  
Reliance on textual or content based modes of analysis, however, makes it too 
easy to overlook any impact that media may have in the lives of infants and 
toddlers who are not yet fully linguistically or cognitively developed to 
understand media messages in the same way as adults or even older children do. 
By relying on a model that centralizes embodiment as the primary way of 
knowing the world, this thesis has offered us a way out of relying on verbal 
language or cognition, affording us with an approach which rests on the primacy 
of infants’ and toddlers’ embodied being-in-the-world (Merleau-Ponty 1964 
(b)).While cognitive and linguistic meaning are important, they nonetheless 
remain a posteriori ways of knowing the world and making meaning; meaning 
emerges in the first instance as a matter of perceptual access. While we have long 
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since been aware that media messages are not fixed, and multiple meanings are 
always available, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology allows us to understand how 
meaning making is intricately intertwined with embodied action and experience in 
a complex set of relations that are in a constant state of re-evaluation. 
Furthermore, by exploring the chiasm and the spread of écart, inclination, attitude 
and orientation take on new significant and corporeal dimensions which facilitate 
our understanding of the ontological and perceptual significance of media in the 
lives of very young children. Hence, the potential impact that media may have on 
infants’ and toddlers’ development cannot be understood solely in terms of media 
content, but must consider the ontological and perceptual significance of a range 
of mediating technologies in relation to infants and toddlers corporeality. 
As well as focusing primarily on media content, much of the research in relation 
to children and the media concentrates its efforts on particular ‘high tech’ media 
technologies. I have argued throughout this thesis, however, that to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the intersection between media and very young 
children we need to consider that television, computers and their hybrid forms of 
‘high’ technology, despite their particularities, exist along a continuum of 
mediatic material objects which in-form children’s understandings of themselves 
in relation to the world. Therefore, I have offered analyses of a range of 
technologies from clothing and incubators through toys, televisual and interactive 
digital technologies to suggest that even the most seemingly innocuous and basic 
technologies mediate very young children’s perception and ontology in particular 
ways. Therefore, I have argued that all technologies are mediating technologies, 
or material objects which enter into human praxis, as part of the flesh of the world 
which exist in a primary relationship with infants, toddlers and adults alike. Our 
primary embodied relation with technologies in-forms our inhabitation of the 
world, mediating our perception and ontology. This thesis has consequently taken 
account of the specificities of mediating technologies and very young children’s 
embodied being-in-the-world to argue that we need to understand very young 
children’s relations with the object world before we can hope to understand media 
effects. 
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By focusing on children from birth to three years of age, and insisting on the 
continuity of experience, this thesis has maintained that children and adults alike 
exist in a primary and primal relationship with technologies which mediates our 
existence in, and experiences of, the world in medium, historically, culturally and 
socio-economically specific ways. I have also reasoned that due to their 
developing corporeality and emplacement within media saturated environments, 
which act in concert with adult conceptions of infancy and toddlerhood, very 
young children’s experiences and understandings are mediated in ways that are 
different from adults. However, given that children learn patterns of interaction 
with-in the world in the first few years of life, which become part of their habitual 
schema for being, these patterns of inter/action in-form subsequent knowledge 
and action within the world, and persist in varying degrees into adulthood. Hence, 
the importance of early childhood experiences in relation to their object world, to 
the adult life that follows it, cannot be overstated (Merleau-Ponty 1964 b).  
Despite arguing that media affect infants and toddlers at the level of their 
embodied being, I have argued that media effects are neither universal nor 
straightforward, causing children to behave in one way or another. Rather, I hold 
that the physical characteristics of specific mediating technologies incline us 
toward human and non-human others in particular ways. Moreover, we cannot 
consider media as something which exists apart from us as that which corrupts or 
illuminates, rather I recognize that through our repeated use, mediating 
technologies become a part of our corporeality: a part of our capacity to act and 
be acted upon within the world. Through repetitive and ongoing engagement with 
mediating technologies, therefore, very young children learn habits of being in the 
world, with technologies. As such, I have sought to arrive at an understanding of 
infants and toddlers from the facticity of their embodied being-in-the world, in 
relation to mediating technologies, as an integral part of that world.  
I have argued that very young children’s developing control over their bodily 
movements, their bodily motility and emplacement within the world, as well as 
their limited experience of and in the world (compared to that of older people) 
render them a special case for study. This thesis may be seen as a departure from 
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much of the literature surrounding children and the media in several crucial 
respects. Firstly, by focusing solely on infants and toddlers, secondly by 
considering a range of material objects which are generally not taken to fall 
within the gamut of media, and thirdly by drawing on the complementary 
theoretical perspectives of a phenomenology of embodiment, post-
phenomenology, psychoanalysis, the study of material culture and the concept of 
affordance. Such an approach has enabled us to understand that infants and 
toddlers, are in the first instance, embodied beings, who exist in a world which 
matters to them: touches, concerns and literally moves them, and that their being 
is in a constant state of transformation, and that the ways in which material 
objects intertwine with very young children’s experiences in and of the world, 
mediates their understandings of themselves, the world and the human and non-
human others who simultaneously inhabit their socio-equipmental environments. 
Where We Have Been 
In the introduction to this thesis, I discussed the preponderance of research in the 
general field of children and the media to suggest that despite volumes having 
been written there remains little research into how the media may impact on 
infants and toddlers. As outlined above too, I suggested that the term ‘media’ as 
we commonly understand it, is inadequate to the task of gaining an understanding 
of the ontological and perceptual significance of mediums in the lives of infants 
and toddlers. Consequently, I proposed an alternative definition of media which 
takes its impetus from Ihde’s post-phenomenology of technology, which suggests 
that technologies must consist of a material element, or object, which also enters 
into human praxes as a human-technology-world relation, and which 
simultaneously recognizes that all technologies mediate our experiences of the 
world (Ihde 1990). This definition allowed us to consider how a range of 
mediating technologies, of which media are a part, from incubators to tablets, 
mediate infants’ and toddlers’ understandings and experiences of themselves and 
the world. 
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Initially I reviewed the key themes that have arisen in the field of children and the 
media to highlight that while there have been some useful insights, the emphasis 
on older children, ‘high’ technologies and/or content based analyses as the 
primary modes of analysis has not allowed for an in depth understanding of the 
ontological and perceptual significance of media in the lives of infants and 
toddlers, which accounts for a paucity of research in this area.  
Chapter One expanded on the theoretical model forwarded in the introduction, 
initially reiterating the fundamental tenet on which this thesis rests: the centrality 
of embodiment as a precondition of any knowledge of the world. Although this 
position asserts that we are all embodied beings, very young children’s bodies 
present a special case. The affordances that any technology furnishes very young 
children are different to those afforded to older children and adults, who through 
enculturation have learned ways of being with technologies which are yet 
immature in infants and toddlers. Embodiment is overlain, through the process of 
maturation, with cultural expectations and regulations which inform habits of 
being generally, and ways of being with technologies specifically. Hence, adult 
conceptions of infancy and toddlerhood and consequently what we believe is 
culturally appropriate for them to be, do, have and know are implicated in the 
types of technologies we use to ‘bring them up’, and these material elements of 
the world mediate how children may experience the world. As such, I argued that 
all knowledge of the world is predicated on having or being a body which exists 
in fact in the world, but also that infants’ and toddlers’ embodiment is not neutral, 
but rather is entangled in multifarious relationships between material effects and 
the socio-cultural conditions of existence.  
Moreover, I argued that as embodied beings in the world, we are all what we do, 
and those things that we interact with on a regular basis become incorporated into 
our habitual ways of being and acting within the world, establishing a foundation 
from which all other knowledge, including linguistic and cognitive knowledge 
emerges. Hence, I again revisited the debates which have emanated from the 
broad field of children and the media to critique the capacity of content, linguistic 
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or cognitive models to adequately take account of the significance of media and 
mediating technologies in the lives of infants and toddlers. 
In expanding on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment, I argued that 
the world and its elements are not merely a neutral tableau of sense data but rather 
that they matter, concern, touch or move very young children—and adults—and 
that the only way infants and toddlers can literally ‘come to grips’ with the world 
is in relation to those things in the world which concern them. Furthermore, I 
argued that while infancy and toddlerhood is a time of prodigious capacity to take 
in the world, that this should not be considered as a one-way process but rather 
one in which very young children and the world each become a part of the other. 
In making this argument I relied on Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility thesis, which 
emphasises that infants and toddlers both act on and in, but are also acted upon, 
by the world.   
Despite the value of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to our understanding of 
knowledge which predates verbal language and cognition in relation to infants’ 
and toddlers’ primary relations with technologies, a ‘pure’ phenomenology would 
not have allowed us to take account of the ways in which infants’ and toddlers’ 
bodies may be acted out and acted upon in particular socio-cultural contexts. On 
its own, therefore, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology would not have been 
sufficient to take account of the ways in infants’ and toddlers’ bodies are not only 
existential bodies but are also socio-cultural bodies. Hence Ihde’s post-
phenomenological understanding of ‘lifeworlds’, the mediating capacity of all 
technologies as well as his development of Merleau-Ponty’s thesis allowed us to 
understand how very young children may come to experience the world through 
and in relation to technologies.  Hence, Ihde’s insights have allowed us to not 
only take account of the materiality of culture and the ways in which infants’ and 
toddlers’ bodies are acted out and enacted in relation to the technological 
ensembles which constitute and are constituted by their particular lifeworlds, but 
also has enabled us to revisit McLuhan’s dictum that the medium is the message. 
In doing so, it reinforced the notion that content is a secondary medium, and that 
the mediating technology, in and of itself, conveys meaning. Furthermore, it has 
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facilitating our understanding of the specificities of the ways in which very young 
children co-opt mediating technologies into their experiencing.   
The concept of affordances, as set out by Gibson, has further allowed us to 
recognise that the opportunities that particular technologies afford are contingent 
with our developing corporeality and permitted us to take account of the 
specificity of very young children’s embodiment in relation to the object world. 
Norman’s concept of affordances was also introduced to further our 
understanding of intentional design which gives us insight into the types of things 
that are made specifically for very young children.   
Winnicott’s psychoanalytic theory was ultimately introduced and outlined to 
reinforce Merleau-Ponty’s assertion of the continuity of being and how early 
childhood experiences impact on the adult life that follows it. Moreover, in his 
account, the maturation process from total dependence towards relative 
independence is facilitated initially by the maternal provision of a 
facilitating/holding space. This gradually gives way to the introduction of 
transitional objects which offer a consolatory presence to ease the anxiety of dis-
incorporation from the maternal body, enabling an incorporation of the things of 
the wider world. Hence the importance of objects in informing feelings of 
ontological security as well as assisting very young children in coming to 
understand themselves as discrete entities in the world can be understood through 
a synthesis of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Winnicott’s psychoanalysis.  
Throughout the subsequent chapters, which dealt with particular types of material 
objects that are commonly used in childrearing in the early twenty first century in 
Western cultures, additional concepts from the various theories were introduced 
and expanded in relation to facilitating microenvironments, primary objects, toys, 
television and ‘new media’. Ultimately, I suggest that such a phenomenological 
approach has made it possible to deem that media exist along a continuum of 
mediating technologies, which overlap with very young children’s developing 
corporeality and understandings of themselves in the world.  
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Chapter Two, Being-In-Facilitating-Microenvironments examined the spaces that 
infants and toddlers inhabit, to argue that microenvironments form, inform and 
position us in terms of our embodiment in relation to our socio-equipmental 
environment, mediating very young children’s experiences of the world and their 
position within it (Sobchack 2004, 136).  By focusing on microenvironments, the 
chapter argued that the world as it may be for the infants and toddlers in 
contemporary Western cultures is constituted through, and constitutes, a series of 
facilitating environments, or small environments which facilitate certain types of 
actions and experiences. Focusing on the spaces which infants and toddlers 
inhabit, and how these inform very young children’s perception and lived 
existence, I drew again on the crucial concept of ‘being-in-the-world’, as 
proposed by Merleau-Ponty (1962) which sets up a primary relation between 
embodiment and space. I reasoned that ‘the world’ is analogous to Winnicott’s 
notion of the facilitating environment (Winnicott 1960) and Sofia’s container 
technologies (Sofia 2000). I therefore maintained that the ensemble of specific yet 
interconnected technologically enabled environments that hold very young 
children, in concert with the child’s developing corporeality, shape the way the 
world may be for them: delimiting their postural, gestural and orientational 
capacities and their ability to traverse space, and imposing points of view within 
their particular socio-equipmental environments. While it may be argued that 
space per sé is not a technology in that it does not comprise a material element, 
the boundaries of spaces are often technologically enabled as in the case of 
incubators, playpens and highchairs to name just a few, and hence may be 
considered as consisting of a material element which enters into human praxis. 
Before moving on to an analysis of particular spaces that infants and toddlers 
inhabit, I discussed the concept of space as proposed by Henri Lefevbre (Lefevbre 
1991). This was done to establish a synergy between his argument and Merleau-
Ponty’s concept of being-in-the-world and Winnicott’s facilitating 
microenvironment, all of which acknowledge that space is not a neutral, nor 
absolute ‘concept’ but rather that space is primarily lived, experienced and shaped 
through that living and experiencing (Lefevbre 1991, 12). For very young 
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children space thus becomes imbued with affect and meaning as nurturing, 
security and comfort: holding spaces in Winnicott’s terms. Hence infants’ and 
toddlers’ experiences are simultaneously constrained and enabled by their 
developing corporeality and emplacement within holding spaces and their 
perspectives and ontology develop in relation to the spaces provided for them. I 
also argued that since space produces and is produced by human activity, that 
they are assigned particular uses, with each affording specific types of 
inhabitation (Thrift 2006, 1).  
The facilitating environment in Winnicott’s terms is a holding space with 
one primary function, to reduce adverse psychological and physiological 
encroachments into infants’ sense of security, allowing them to experience a 
reliability of parental care which is crucial to very young children’s 
transition from total dependence through relative independence and towards 
independence. In this chapter I used the examples of incubators, baby 
carriers, cots, playpens, highchairs, walkers, and the mobile 
microenvironments of baby capsules, car seats, and prams and strollers to 
argue that each of these facilitating/holding spaces, or container 
technologies mediate children’s experiences of the world, affecting them at 
the level of their embodiment, but also that the affordance offered by each is 
fluid and dynamic in response to children’s developing corporeality. 
Chapter Three discussed the importance of the development of object 
relations through the lens of primary objects, or those things which infants 
encounter early in their lives, in mediating the transition from total 
dependence to relative independence, in-forming their understandings of 
themselves as discrete beings with-in-the world: in the world in relation to 
human and non-human others. I elaborated on Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
écart and its analogy to Winnicott’s concept of potential space to suggest 
that meaning is primarily made in the gradually widening space between 
primary caregiver and baby, which is filled with the stuff or flesh of the 
world and gradually comes to take in the whole of the world as it may be for 
infants and toddlers.  
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Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of chiasmic intertwining and reversibility were 
elaborated upon to reinforce our understanding that the world and its 
elements both touch or concern, and are touched and concerned by us, in a 
mutual inclination, configuring both children’s and mediating technologies’ 
activity in the world. This chiasmic intertwining, with repetition enables 
infants and toddlers, as well as adults, and the elements of the world to each 
become a part of the other, not annihilating the other but rather each in-
forming the other. Hence while Winnicott argues that the move from 
dependence towards independence is a process of disintegration, I 
contended that it is always a process of simultaneous integration and 
disintegration.     
Using the specific example of feeding technologies I suggested that the 
experience of feeding is a rich experience for both carer and baby, but that the 
experience is qualitatively different depending on the particular technologies used 
in the process. While functionally the result is the same whether, for instance 
babies are breast or bottle fed, the texture of the experience is different for both 
parties involved hence the medium specificity of feeding technologies mediate 
infants experiences of the world in particular ways, not the least of which is in the 
rhythms of everyday life. As such, I reasoned that the ways in which very young 
children’s time and space are organized, and the sensual qualities of flesh of the 
technics of feeding kinaesthese to constitute the texture of the situated lifeworlds 
which infants inhabit, establishing habits of being. 
Winnicott’s concept of transitional objects was then dealt with at length to 
suggest that the textures of the flesh of the world which rush in to fill the gradual 
spreading of écart in-form very young children’s understandings of how the 
world feels, shaping babies growing understandings of themselves and the world 
through their affective and relational involvement with the elements of their 
world, and their capacity to act and interact within it (Lally 2002, 24). 
Transitional objects stand in for the breast and in some ways have similar 
characteristics. Hence as Winnicott tells us, babies’ facility for an affective 
understanding of their world is demonstrated in the use of transitional objects: 
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where there is all the difference in the world for the baby between silk, 
nylon, wool, cotton, linen, a starched apron, rubber, and a wet napkin. 
(Winnicott 1988, 30) 
That is, the way that children feel about the world in emotional terms is informed 
by the way the world feels to them in physical terms, cementing the link between 
embodiment and emotion. Staying with the concept of transitional objects, I 
moved on to discuss dummies and their capacity to not only function as 
transitional objects, but also to mediate the experiences that infants and toddlers 
may have in the world by occluding buccal exploration. In this section I also 
discussed the particularities of baby sleeping bags and grow suits in relation to 
babies’ developing corporeality, both constraining and enabling babies’ capacity 
to act in the world in ways that are meaningful to them. 
Through habituation, environments and objects become part of our experiencing, 
as embodied relations which facilitate our feelings of security, or being at home in 
relation to our materiality. As children grow and move towards independence, 
ontological security is realized by the child’s gradual introduction to the diversity 
of things and experiences in all their complexity and children become 
increasingly able to explore and experiment with the world about them from the 
safe haven of holding spaces. As children encounter difference, whether that is 
new people, technologies, objects or places, these encounters inform the child’s 
understanding of him- or herself in relation to new experiences, places and things, 
which not only transform the child but also transform the rhythms and spaces of 
daily life. 
In Chapter Four, Toys Are Us: Playing is Being I embarked on an exploration of 
mediating technologies designed specifically for entertainment, signaling a shift 
to media as it is more traditionally conceived. Recognizing that those things we 
use on a regular basis become part of what we essentially are, thus adds a new 
dimension to our previously held notions of the relationship between children and 
the media. The chapter also explored the concept of texture which was introduced 
in the previous chapter to suggest an increased plasticization, mass production 
and transmediation of infants’ and toddlers’ lifeworlds. In that chapter too, I again 
drew upon the theoretical concepts of flesh and the chiasm to suggest that toys 
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‘flesh out’ children’s lifeworlds, filling the space of écart with the textured flesh 
of the world as it steadily widens between carer and child. 
Chapter Four also considered the affordances that toys furnish, and examined the 
particular socio-historical context, which informs the types of toys we provide for 
infants and toddlers, consequently configuring how they may experience the 
world. Hence I made a distinction between playthings, as anything that a child is 
inclined to play with, and toys as things designed specifically for play. Initially, 
however, the concept of play was discussed to take greater account of the playful 
and interpretative nature of human-media interactions and therefore to further 
establish a continuity of both existence and media. Winnicott’s understanding of 
transitional objects was again used to elaborate on the texture and reliability of 
these first possessions in creating and maintaining ontological security informing 
how very young children experience reassurance in transition.  
In Chapter Five, Screening Infants and Toddlers: The Ontological Significance of 
Television in the Lives of Very Young Children, rather than concentrating on 
television content I examined the material specificity of television and its hybrid 
technologies and how their incorporation into domestic spaces have reconfigured 
ways of being in relation to them. As I noted, our propensity to analyze screens in 
terms of what appears on them rather than the screens qua screens, predisposes us 
to overlook the ways in which screens enter into our experiences in and of the 
world in other ways (Introna and Ilharco 2004, 224). 
In the first instance, I considered how television functions in many of the same 
ways as other transitional objects; filling the gradually widening space between 
carer and child, standing in for nurture, and offering a consolatory presence which 
enables carers to be absent for differing periods of time. Television, like other 
transitional objects, gives the illusion of liveness through talking head content, 
particularly that which is directed at children. Yet, even when the television is not 
turned on, its constancy and capacity to mimic the reliable return of nurture 
situates it in the marginal status of sort-of-aliveness. As television has evolved its 
capacity to screen user-generated content allows the furthering of the illusion of 
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aliveness. The notion of aliveness is also supported by the ways in which adults 
and older children relate to television, alternatively answering it, yelling at it, or 
agreeing with it. With the ability to act as a conduit for VCRs and DVDs, children 
are also able to exercise regulated rights of ownership of television software, but 
not always the hardware. 
From television’s capacity to function as a transitional object I moved on to 
consider how it may be considered a facilitating microenvironment. In this 
section, I revisited Winnicott’s take on the facilitating environment and Sofia’s 
notion of container technologies. I argued that the primary function of the 
facilitating environment is to ‘hold’ children safely, to protect them from 
psychological and physiological harm and in this way the connotations for 
container technologies is apparent. Television, not only contains content and 
potential relevance, it also contains particular ways of being at the expense of 
others. Carers often use television to hold children’s attention and keep them out 
of trouble while busy, but the status afforded television often also holds parents in 
place and near the child, furthering its capacity for nurture. As an aspect of human 
activity, engagement with television creates an enveloping space between the 
screen and the viewer enabling our understanding of television as a facilitating 
microenvironment. 
Subsequently I proceeded to a phenomenological history of television, tracing the 
ways in which the materiality of television has changed over time and its 
implications for reconfiguring the domestic environment, confounding both our 
sense of space and time. The history of television is not linear, but rather it 
developed in differing and often conflicting ways, simultaneously becoming a 
personal screen and a cinematic screen. Early television on a small screen 
conditioned us to particular ways of being with television that no other 
technology had done: teaching us to attend to it carefully and setting up 
hierarchies of viewing, some of which continue to this day. Television also 
entered into domestic environments, replacing the piano, fireplace and radio as 
the centre of family activity, both discursively and materially. Television required 
changes to the spatial layout of rooms, where furniture was rearranged to enable 
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viewing. As TV has developed more sets have been incorporated into the family 
home, and where once it was a family event, it is now often an individual pass 
time as each member of the home moves to their own media consumption space. 
At the same time, however, homes are more than ever incorporating a specialized 
theatre or media room into their design. With this move, the television in 
‘common space’ is now often the domain of very young children. 
I then explored the phenomenology of screens more generally as a means to 
accessing the particularities of television as a screening technology. At the outset, 
I emphasized that screens and screen based media have become increasingly 
pervasive in infants’ and toddlers’ lifeworlds in the late twentieth and early 
twenty first century. A number of seemingly diverse technologies from toys to 
telephones now include screens. The proliferation of screens and their 
intertwining with our everyday lives affirms that we inhabit a world in which 
there are more screens than there are people. Increasingly, therefore, screens qua 
screens, have become not only a way of getting information about the world but 
also as an fundamental part of reality (Introna and Ilharco 2006, 57-58). The 
almost constant co-location of screens in infants’ and toddlers’ lifeworlds mediate 
the rhythms of everyday life in profound ways (Introna and Ilharco 2006, 68).  
Introna and Ilharco (2004) suggest that as we comport ourselves towards screens 
we set up a ‘grounding intentional orientation that conditions our engagement 
with certain surfaces’ (Introna and Ilharco 2006,58). Hence both adults and 
children’s inclination towards, or chiasmic intertwining with screens reveals itself 
through posture, orientation and gesture. As adults, with an expectation of 
relevance, screens concern us or touch us and we conduct ourselves towards 
them. As such screens are often the focus of our attention and thus enter into: 
our ongoing involvement in-the-world – as a screen – when we attend to it 
by turning it on. When we push the “on” button the screen captures our 
attention as it is the place, the location, the setting, the scene, in which what 
is supposedly relevant for us at that particular time is happening. (Introna 
and Ilharco 2006, 63) 
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Consequently in our engagement with screens we not only see what is on the 
screen but we are complicit in a particular way of being (Introna and Ilharco 
2006).   
While maintaining all the while that content is of secondary importance, it cannot 
be disregarded completely. It prompts certain orientational responses in even the 
youngest of children and with repetition, these orientational adjustments form a 
part of the child’s embodied being-in-the-world, which I suggest is the basis for 
an expectation of relevance. Furthermore, television content is significant in the 
lives of infants and toddlers precisely because it attracts and holds the attention of 
significant human others in very young children’s lifeworlds, which mediates the 
ways that attention is apportioned. On this point I referred to the distinction 
between co-presence and co-location to suggest that while parents or older 
siblings or others are co-located, when engaged with televisual content they may 
not necessarily be co-present, or available for interpersonal interaction. 
Moreover, adult attention to screens sets up a virtual space between others and 
the screen and a potential intersubjectivity between child and parent, as mutual 
orientation to the same screens (Senju and Csibra 2008).  
Yet, as I ultimately argued, while screens may have the potential to attract and 
hold attention, attention is not the same for adults as it is for very young children. 
Consequently I problematized the notion of attention, suggesting that while some 
studies gauge attention on the basis of whether a child watches TV, very young 
children’s modes of attention are not yet grounded in ocularcentrism, as adults 
are: they attend to television also in terms of mobility, audition, tactility and 
buccally. Moreover, very young children’s mode of being is distraction, and 
television is one of many distractors in a child’s life: at an early age, children are 
not able to attend for protracted periods of time. Television, for infants and 
toddlers, is one among an array of mediating technologies, which enter into their 
experiencing of the world but not in any straightforward or universal way. It 
enters into the rhythms of everyday life, shaping the environment in which 
children live and reconfiguring the dynamics of time and space, and hierarchies 
within the environment. Hence, while content is not insignificant, it only allows 
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us to access part of the picture, and cannot account for the ontological and 
perceptual significance of television in the lives of infants and toddlers. 
Infants, Toddlers and Interactive, Screen-based Digital Technologies brought us 
to a consideration of the ‘high’ technologies of mobile phones and tablets. In this 
chapter I briefly considered the notions of virtual space telepresence to illustrate 
the trajectory from television to newer screen based media. Initially I elaborated 
on the term tele-vision as also a way of seeing things at a distance to demonstrate 
that television is merely one among many devices which enable tele-vision. The 
prefix of the term implies operating at a distance and is not exclusive to televisual 
technologies, but also refers to telephony. Tele-technologies, facilitating a virtual 
being with distant others and occupy the space between, with the aid of the 
technology. By allowing us to simultaneously inhabit our geographically 
embedded embodied space and other spaces with other people, it confounds our 
sense of time and space, yet gives us the impression of being there, in the no-
space between us and others: telepresence. We cannot know whether very young 
children experience the virtuality of tele-presence in the same way as adults do, 
however, the ‘presencing’ effect that tele-technologies have on adults implicates 
carer-child co-presence. Elaborating and expanding on some of the previously 
used concepts the implications of other tele and interactive media were discussed 
to argue that the proliferation and holding power of new media have the potential 
to amplify and magnify the possibilities for oscillating attention and potential 
implications for co-presence and collocation.  
By way of further clarification, from here I discussed the notion of ‘new media’, 
initially problematizing its novelty in the rapidly changing world of technological 
advancement. I elaborated on the characteristics of ‘new media’ which separate it 
from its predecessors: digitization, interactivity, connectivity, manipulability and 
mobility. These characteristics allowed us to change from being solely consumers 
of media to also become producers of media content and in turn changing our 
relationship with media and the virtual world. While very young children may not 
yet be producers, new media offer a level of control to even very young children 
which distinguishes them from their predecessors, configuring ever younger 
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children as ‘users’. These aspects of new media were then discussed in relation 
specifically to touch screen technologies and the possibilities they offer infants 
and toddlers. As with the previous chapter, I then embarked on a chronology of 
telephone use and its changing phenomenological implications, culminating in an 
analysis of a very young child’s use of a mobile phone. Ultimately I referred to 
the prevalence of new media in the lives of infants and toddlers and offered an 
analysis of the ways in which they may function as facilitating 
microenvironments and transitional objects which mediate children’s being in the 
world. I did this by offering a lengthy scenario of a family car trip and the 
dynamics which emerged around the use of technologies. 
Using the specific examples of DVDs in cars, mobile phones and tablets, the 
chapter argued, as indeed this thesis has, that infants’ and toddlers’ experiences 
within the world are mediated by the technologies that enter into the gradually 
spreading space of écart in the process of maturation, informing how very young 
children may come to grips with the world, and ultimately understand their place 
within it. Acting as quasi facilitating microenvironments and transitional objects, 
the mediating technologies of ‘new media’ as they enter into human praxis, act in 
many of the same ways as toys, dummies and television, but each does so in 
particular ways which are specific to the physical properties of the medium in 
concert with children’s emerging corporeality.  
Where to From Here? 
Despite the scope of this dissertation, I have merely scratched the surface of the 
complexities of infant-toddler-media relations. In this thesis I have offered an 
approach to children and the media which does not rely on delineating ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ media content any more than it relies on notions of passive victims, or 
active and sophisticated readers. I have rather argued that while content is a 
contributing factor which impacts children’s lived experiences of the world in 
relation to mediating technologies, the relation is more primary and embodied 
than we generally concede. We are now in a position to consider our embodied 
and socio-cultural ways of being as dynamic, fluid and constantly evolving; each 
in relation to the other in concert with mediating technologies.   
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By redefining technology in the terms afforded by Ihde’s post-phenomenology, 
insisting on the primacy of infants’ and toddlers’ bodies in meaning making, and 
outlining the mediating potential of any material object this thesis also has 
implications for media studies more generally. In acknowledging that media is 
part of a spectrum of mediating technologies, we may now extend our 
investigation to the whole gamut of material objects rather than focusing on high 
technologies, communication or mass media. All mediating technologies 
necessarily communicate; their use value, societal and individual beliefs, values 
and attitudes towards media, children, and the intersection between them.  
Not only does this thesis offer an alternative approach to children and the media, 
and a potential to expand media studies, it also allows us to consider that our own 
engagement with mediating technologies may be more primary and embodied 
than we might think. The centrality of bodies in the epistemological process, 
offers us a way of understanding ourselves as primarily, embodied beings, who 
are always-already inextricably involved with-in the world. It is in the process of 
maturation and enculturation that palimpsests of language, cognition and habits of 
being-with overlay embodiment. Therefore rather than studying older children 
and extrapolating downward, as is the predominant mode of analysis in the field 
of children and the media, we need to look more closely at very early childhood, 
and extrapolate upwards. By returning to the pre-linguistic and pre-cognitive 
relation we all have with our socio-equipmental environment we are able to glean 
significant insights into our own sensori-motor-affective intervolvement with 
media as an aspect of our material culture. 
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